JUDGMENT 1. - The petitioners claim to be sub-tenants of Kalyan Bux, who is now represented in the present writ petition by his sons Brij Mohan, and Ram Gopal and widow Suit. Ghisi (respondents 4 to 6) in respect of a piece of land situated in village Pachar. District Sikar. The land holder Kalyan Bux, who claimed to be a khatedar tenant of the said land, filed a suit for ejectment of the petitioners under Section 180 (I) (b) of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act in the Court of Sub-divisional Officer, Sikar. The suit was dismissed by the said Court, but on appeal the Revenue Appellate Authority decreed the plaintiff's claim for ejectment of the petitioners from the land in dispute and also imposed a penalty upon the petitioners of twice the land revenue. The petitioners preferred a second appeal before the Board of Revenue, which was dismissed and the Board upheld the order passed by the Revenue Appellate Authority. While upholding the decree for ejectment of the petitioners, the Board held that the petitioners, who were in possession of the land in dispute after the expiry of the period of their sub-lease, at the end of Samvat year 2017, became trespassers and were liable to ejectment under section 183 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. Thus, the view of the Board was that the suit filed by Kalyan Bux (deceased), though not maintainable under section 180 (1) (b) of the Act, yet the same was maintainable under section 183 and the decree for ejectment was, therefore, maintained with the aforesaid modification. 2. The petitioners have come to this Court challenging the order passed by the Board of Revenue on July 4,1977. It was contended by Mr. Bhandari, appearing for the petitioners that the petitioners could not be held to be trespassers, but they were merely tenants at sufferance, as they were continuing in possession of the land in dispute after the expiry of the term of their tenancy, without the assent of the tenant and without payment or acceptance of rent, and as such the decree for ejectment passed against the petitioners was erroneous. The Board of Revenue while dismissing the petitioner's appeal, placed reliance upon a Full Bench decision of the Board in Bhalla v. Mst. Gulab Kanwar (1977 RRD 1). The Board of Revenue while dismissing the petitioner's appeal, placed reliance upon a Full Bench decision of the Board in Bhalla v. Mst. Gulab Kanwar (1977 RRD 1). wherein a majority of the members of the Board took the view that a person continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy, becomes a trespasser and is liable to be ejected under Section 183 of the Act. Mr. Bhandari relied upon the minority decision of one of the Members of the Board of Revenue-Shri K.S. Ujjwal-who held that a person who has been lawfully let in, can become a trespasser only after his tenancy has been terminated in accordance with law and in the absence of such termination of his tenancy, his position will be juridical and he will be in a position of a tenant holding over and not a trespasser. In taking this view, the learned Member, Shri Ujjwal relied upon a judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Nandgir v. Board of Revenue ( 1963 RRD 250 ). 3. In the present case, we do not desire to express any concluded opinion upon the question as to whether the petitioners, who continued to remain in possession of the land in dispute after the expiry of the term of their sub-lease, did so as trespassers or as sub-tenants holding over, because it is not necessary for the purposes of this case to do so. In our view, for the decision of the present case, it would be sufficient to observe that in either case the decree for ejectment has to be upheld. If the view taken by the majority of the Members of the Board of Revenue in Bhalla's case is not accepted and even if it may be assumed for the purposes of this case that the petitioners continued in possession as tenants holding over from year to year, after the expiry of the period of their sublease, then a suit under Section 180 (I) (b) of the Act could be properly maintained and the decree for ejectment could be passed therein against the petitioners, treating them as tenants holding over. 4. In Nandgir's case, it was held by this Court that on account of the provisions of Section 63 of the Raj. 4. In Nandgir's case, it was held by this Court that on account of the provisions of Section 63 of the Raj. Tenancy Act, an agricultural tenancy is not extinguished by efflux of time and on account of the provisions of clause (5) of Section 63, tenancies which have been created for a fixed term are extinguished only when the tenant is ejected from the agricultural land in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The Bench of this Court made the following observations in the aforesaid case:- "The tenancy, in such a case, comes to an end only when the tenant is ejected from his holding and till then he shall be taken as tenant-holding over and his possession in the eye of the law will be `juridical' possession and will be protected from the unauthorised ejectment." 5. Thus, according to the aforesaid decision the position of a tenant or sub-tenant of an agricultural holding for a fixed term of years, is that of a tenant-holding over, alter the term of his lease comes to an end, and he does not vacate the land. In Ramdeo v. Board of Revenue (1968 RRD 11) , this Court approved the decision of a Full Bench of the Board of Revenue in the case of Ummediram v. Ramdeo (1961 RRD 100) and observed that Section 180 (1) (b) of the Act provides that a tenant or a sub-tenant holding over from year to year is liable to ejectment on an application made under the aforesaid provision, and section 181 lays down the procedure for filing such an application for ejectment. Thus, on the facts stated above, the relief of ejectment could unquestionably be granted against the petitioners under the provisions of Section 180 (1) (b) of the Act in case they claim to be sub-tenants holding over from year to year. Thus, on the facts stated above, the relief of ejectment could unquestionably be granted against the petitioners under the provisions of Section 180 (1) (b) of the Act in case they claim to be sub-tenants holding over from year to year. The Board of Revenue held in Ummediram's case that a person holding under a lease for a fixed term and retaining possession after the expiry of the said term, has to be evicted under the due process of law and cannot be held to be a trespasser and that there being no provision in Section 63 of the Act for extinguishment of tenancy by efflux of time or on the expiry of the period for which it was created, a person admitted as a tenant for a fixed term, does not become a trespasser on its expiry nor he is liable to be ejected form the said land as a trespasser,but he can be ejected only under section 180 (l)(b) of the Act. The suit in the present case was also filed under Section 180(1) (b) of the Act and even if it may be assumed for the purpose of the present case, as has been argued by the learned counsel for the petitioners, that the petitioners were not trespassers and as such were not liable to be ejected under Section 183 of the Act, then they were certainly liable to be proceeded with for ejectment under section 180 (1) (b) of the Act, as sub-tenants-holding over from year to year. 6. On the other hand if the petitioners were trespassers, as held by the Board of Revenue in this case, then a decree for ejectment was rightly passed against them under Section 183 of the Act. The learned counsel argued that the status of the petitioners was neither that of trespassers nor that of tenants holding over from year to year, but that they were merely tenants at sufferance and drew our attention to the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Badrilal v. Municipal Corporation of Indore ( AIR 1973 S.C. 508 ) in this connection. In that case, it was held by their Lordships that a person who was lawfully placed in occupation does not become a trespasser and if he does not become a tenant holding over, within the meaning of Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act, then his position will be that of a tenant by sufferance as he has no lawful title to the land, but holds it only through the laches of the landlord. The aforesaid case does not relate to agricultural tenancies and is concerned with a case governed by the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. According to the provisions of Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act, if the lessee after the termination of the lease continues to remain in possession either with the assent of the landlord or if the landlord accepts rent from such person, then only he becomes a tenant holding over from month to month or from year to year, according to the nature of his tenancy. But on account of the provisions of Section 63 (1) of the Act, a lease or sub-lease in respect of agricultural holding is not extinguished merely on account of efflux of time or the expiry of the term of the lease, but under sub-clause (v) thereof, the tenancy of such a person shall be extinguished only when he is ejected from the land under due process of law. If even after the expiry of the term of his lease, the person who was initially admitted as a tenant for a fixed term of years, continues to occupy the land, he shall be termed as a tenant holding over, because his tenancy has not been determined in accordance with the provisions of Section 63 of the Act. This is the view which was also taken by this Court in Nandgir's case and we have no reason to take a different view in the present case as well. 7. This is the view which was also taken by this Court in Nandgir's case and we have no reason to take a different view in the present case as well. 7. Thus, even if we may not agree with the Board of Revenue that the petitioners became trespassers after the expiry of the term of their sub-lease and they were liable to be ejected under section 183 of the Act, yet if the possession of the petitioners be considered to be as sub-tenants holding over from year to year, then a suit for ejectment under Section 180 (I) (b) could be filed against them and a decree for ejectment passed by the Revenue Courts cannot be interfered with by this Court. 8. Lastly, it was argued by Mr. Bhandari that the plaintiff could have filed a suit under Section 180 (1) (c) of the Act. But it is neither the case of the petitioners nor the case of the legal representatives of the plaintiff that the suit was filed under the provisions of Section 180 (1) (c). It was not the case of the plaintiff in the suit that the land was required for his personal cultivation and as such the case did not fall within the preview of Section 180 (1) (c). The argument advanced in this respect was also repelled by the Board of Revenue and it was held that the question of applicability of Section 180 (1) (c) of the Act did not arise in the present case. 9. We wish to make it clear that we are not expressing any final opinion about the correctness of the order of the Board of Revenue as to whether the status of such persons, who continue to remain in possession of agricultural land even after the expiry of the fixed term of their tenancy, would be that of trespassers or not, because as we have pointed out above in the present case the decree for ejectment would have to be upheld, whether the petitioners are held to be trespassers or they are held to be sub-tenants holding over from year to year, as the suit was filed under section 180 (1) (b) of the Act. 10. It was pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the Revenue Appellate Authority has passed an order imposing a penalty of twice the land revenue upon the petitioners. 10. It was pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the Revenue Appellate Authority has passed an order imposing a penalty of twice the land revenue upon the petitioners. It is not necessary in this case to decide the question as to whether such a penalty could be levied in accordance with law or not, because the learned counsel appearing for the respondents Nos. 4 and 5 have stated before us that they are willing to fore go the decree in respect of penalty and that, they would only be entitled to the land revenue. In view of the concession made by the learned counsel for the respondents, we are not called upon to decide the question of penalty in this case. 11. In the result, the writ petition is dismissed subject to the observations made above. *******