Order.-Criminal Petition No. 43 of 1978 has been filed under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, challenging the preliminary order dated 4th January, 1978 passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Bangalore Division, Banglore, in MAG. SR. No. 75/77-78 under section 145(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It has been by now well settled that as against such orders, revisional jurisdiction of the High Court is to be exercised and bar under section 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure would not come in the way. In view of this position, Sri Masilamani, learned Counsel for the petitioners, is permitted to argue this petition as a revision petition. 2. A preliminary objection was raised before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate that he had no jurisdiction to proceed with the enquiry in the aforesaid matter and the Sub-Divisional Magistrate by his order dated 17th January, 1978 overruled the preliminary objection. Criminal Petition No. 56 of 1978 has been filed against this order under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 3. As the result in Criminal Petition No. 56 of 1978 would depend on the decision in Criminal Petition No. 43 of 1978, I have proceeded to dispose of both the matters by this common order. 4. The few facts that may be necessary are narrated as follows: On 29th December, 1977, the Sub-Inspector of Police, Krishnarajapuram Police Station, Bangalore, submitted a First Information Report to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Bangalore Division, Bangalore, requesting him to initiate action under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in regard to the lands Sy. Nos. 19|2, 94 and 65 situated in Vijnapura alias Kothur Village, Krishnarajapuram, Hubli, Bangalore South Taluk, Bangalore. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate has stated that the sworn statement of the Sub-Inspector also accompanied the First Information Report. Whatever it may be, on receipt of the said report, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate has passed the order impugned in Criminal Petition No. 43 of 1978. 5. The report of the Sub-Inspector of Police is reproduced verbatim in the earlier portion of the impugned order. It ends at the portion where the title ‘Preliminary Order’ appears in the impugned order. This shows that the Sub-Divisional Magistrate has taken into consideration every aspect that has been reported by the Sub-Inspector. 6. 5. The report of the Sub-Inspector of Police is reproduced verbatim in the earlier portion of the impugned order. It ends at the portion where the title ‘Preliminary Order’ appears in the impugned order. This shows that the Sub-Divisional Magistrate has taken into consideration every aspect that has been reported by the Sub-Inspector. 6. In the portion styled as ‘preliminary order’ the Sub-Divisional Magistrate has unambiguously said that he had perused the First Information Report, the sworn statement and other documents and on the basis of that was satisfied about the existence of the dispute between the petitioner and respondent-2 and also about the likelihood of breach of the peace and public tranquillity and therefore decided to call upon the petitioner and respondent No. 2 to appear before him on 10th January, 1978 at 2-30 p.m. and show cause why they should not be restrained from entering the lands in question, an official receiver should not be appointed to look after the standing crop and to hold possession of the land until further orders and also asking the parties to produce all the documents and evidence in support of their claims in regard to the lands in question. 7. Sri Masilamani, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner, urged that the Sub-Divisional Magistrate has acted in a mechanical manner in re-producing the report of the Sub-Inspector of Police word by word and narrating in the course of a ‘preliminary order’ the ingredients of section 145(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and, hence, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate has not applied his mind to the facts and circumstances to the case. Nextly it is urged that the report of the Sub-Inspector itself shows that respondent No. 2 had filed O.S. No. 936 of 1974 in the Court of the I Additional II Munsiff, Bangalore and attempted to obtain an order of injunction but had failed to secure it and that fact ought to have put the Sub-Divisional Magistrate on guard not to start a parallel proceeding. He placed reliance on the decision of this Court in Hutchegowda and others v. M.R. Venkatesh Iyengar and another1. He placed reliance on the decision of this Court in Hutchegowda and others v. M.R. Venkatesh Iyengar and another1. The First Information Report of the Sub-Inspector narrates the various proceedings that have taken place between the petitioner and respondent-2 in O.S. No. 936 of 1974, before the Land Tribunal under the Land Reforms Act, in this High Court in writ petitions and the fact that the decision of this High Court (Full Bench) is in question before the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court has issued an order for the maintenance of status quo in regard to the possession of these lands. 8. While dealing with the revisional powers of this Court in regard to the orders passed under section 145(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, the Supreme Court has in R.H. Bhutani v. Miss. Mani J. Desai and others2, laid down that the High Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction would not go into the question of sufficiency of material which has satisfied the Magistrate. In other words, it is laid down that the satisfaction of the Magistrate contemplated under section 145(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure in about the existence of the dispute in regard to the possession of the immovable property and such dispute being likely to cause breach of peace and public tranquillity is subjective satisfaction of the Magistrate. 9. As already pointed out, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate has expressed that he was satisfied about all these aspects on taking into consideration the facts and circumstances reported by the Sub-Inspector. Therefore, it is not for this Court in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction to go into the question whether the material is sufficient or not for such satisfaction. 10. In Hutchegawda’s case1, it has been held that where the respondent Venkatesh Iyengar had filed a suit for permanent injunction restraining Hutche Gowda and others from interfering with their possession and had failed to get an order of temporary injunction and later complained to the police of obstruction to his possession whereupon the police reported that action may be taken under section 145, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate ought not to have started parallel proceeding in respect of the subject-matter in regard to which civil litigation is pending. 11. 11. I am unable to see how the decision in Hutche Gowd’s case1, comes in the way of the continuation of the proceeding before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate in a case where the preliminary order under section 145(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is according to law. It has been already seen that it is in accordance with law when the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in Bhutani’s case2, is applied. 12. It is no doubt true that so far as the actual possession of the subject-matter in dispute is concerned, the enquiry which is still to go on before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate might amount to a parallel proceeding when the litigation in the civil Court is taken into consideration. But if it is in law found necessary that the question of possession is likely to give rise to breach of public peace and tranquillity the Sub-Divisional Magistrate has got to act for preventing the same. Therefore, he has power to proceed with the enquiry so as to take steps for prevention of breach of peace and public tranquillity. He may, at proper stage, pass a proper order as contemplated by section 146 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 13. In view of the foregoing reasons I see no substance in Criminal Petition No. 43 of 1978. 14. As Criminal Petition No. 43 of 1978 fails, Criminal Petition No. 55 of 1978 also has to fail. 15. Hence, both petitions are dismissed.