JUDGMENT T. U. Mehta, C. J.—The petitioner in this case has filed this writ petition on 15-3-1970 with the prayer to quash the order Annexure I which is dated 24-10-1969, by virtue of which the withdrawn resignation of the petitioner has been accepted with effect from a retrospective date. 2. Short facts of the case are that in the month of December 1963, the petitioner was appointed as Assistant Store Keeper Ay I he Government of Punjab in Punjab State Electricity Board, Patharikot. Thereafter he joined the service of Superintending Engineer, Bassi Power House, Joginder Nagar on 6-3-19o6. On reorganisation of Punjab and consequent dissolution of the Punjab Suite Electricity Board, the petitioner became the employee of the Government in the year 1967 as per the plea raised by the respondents in paragraph 2 of their reply. 3. It is found that the petitioner was granted 27 days earned leave with effect from 4th December, 1967 to 30th December, 1967 with permission to prefix and suffix holidays. The petitioner, however, submitted his departure report for leave with effect from 11-12 1967. He was, therefore, due to resume his duties on 7-1-1968 (F.N.). He thereafter applied for extension of leave telegraphically on 10-1-1968. The same was disallowed telegraphically by the S.D.6., Central Store, Jogindernager on 11-1-1968. 4. On 23rd August, 1968 the petitioner sent his resignation from service as per Annexure ‘A’. No official decision on the letter of resignation of the petitioner was taken till 24th October 1969. In the meanwhile on 28th February 1969 the petitioner withdrew his resignation as per Annexure B’. Thereafter he sent several reminders with regard to the withdrawal of this resignation. Ultimately on 24th October 1969 the resignation was accented with retrospective effect from 7-1-1968 as per the impugned order Annexure I. This order is in the following terms:— "OFFICE ORDER No. 210 Dated 24-J0-69. The resignation tendered by Shri Taran Singh Offg. Asstt. Store Keeper attached to Resident Engineer, Bassi Power House Const. Division, Jogindernager is hereby accepted w.e.f. 7-1-1968 P.N. the date and time be absented himself from duty without proper sanction of leave. Sd/- Superintending Engineer, Uhl Hydel Circle, Paiampur." This order was subsequently modified on 2-7-1970 as per Annexure RG, in the following terms:— "OFFICE ORDER No. 100 Dated 2-7-1970. Store Keeper attached to Resident Engineer, Bassi Power House Const. Division, Jogindernager is hereby accepted w.e.f. 7-1-1968 P.N. the date and time be absented himself from duty without proper sanction of leave. Sd/- Superintending Engineer, Uhl Hydel Circle, Paiampur." This order was subsequently modified on 2-7-1970 as per Annexure RG, in the following terms:— "OFFICE ORDER No. 100 Dated 2-7-1970. In supersession of this office order No. 210, dated 24-10-1969, the resignation tendered by Shri Taran Tej Singh, Assistant Store Keeper attached to the Resident Engineer, Bassi Power House Construction Division, Jogindernager is hereby accepted w.e.f. 23-8-1968 F.N. in terms of clause (2) of his offer of appointment. Sd/- (L. N. Nangia). Superintending Engineer, Uhl Hydel Circle, Palampur." 5. Now, the contention of the petitioner is that his resignation was accepted on -24-10-1969 after he withdrew the same on 28-2-1969 as per Annexure ‘B’ and, therefore, the acceptance of his resignation is illegal and he should be considered as continuing in service. In support of this contention the petitioner has relied upon the Patna High Court decision in case of N. K. Jagnani v. Bihar State Electricity Board reported in 1975 (1) S. L. R. 598. August 17, 1978. 6. Before taking up the Patna decision above cited for consideration, it would be necessary to state certain facts which throw light on the question whether the resignation submitted by the petitioner was required to be accepted by the Department or not. At Annexure RF is the. letter of appointment addressed to the petitioner by the Superintending Engineer Yamuna "Dam Investigation Circle, Chandigarh. At Annexure RF is the. letter of appointment addressed to the petitioner by the Superintending Engineer Yamuna "Dam Investigation Circle, Chandigarh. This letter of appointment is dated 13-12-1963 and the relevant portion thereof is as under:— "It should be clearly understood that this appointment itemporary and that your services will be terminable by one month notice by the board on one side and you on the other or by depositing with the Board one months pay plus allowances in lieu thereof, except in case of misconduct of any description or unsatisfactory work then your service will be terminable without notice." Relying upon this clause relating to the termination of the service of the petitioner, it is contended on behalf of the respondents that it was open to petitioner to resign unilaterally and thus to bring about the termination of his service at the end of one months period of the notice without waiting for the acceptance of his resignation by the authorities concerned. In other words, it is contended by the respondents that the formalities of the acceptance of the resignation tendered by the petitioner being superfluous, it should be held that when the petitioner withdrew his resignation on 28-2-1969, his service had already come to an end. 7. In this connection it should be necessary to note that the extract above quoted taken from the appointment letter addressed to the petitioner does not say anything about the necessity of the acceptance of the resignation, and the said portion does not also provide for the condition on the hap-pending of which the services can be said to have been eventually terminated after the service of the petitioner. On the question whether the resignation once put by the petitioner was required to be accepted or not, we have, therefore, to refer to the pleadings of the parties. 8. In paragraph 10 of his petition the petitioner has alleged that the respondent No. 2, the Superintending Engineer passed the order accepting the resignation in utter disregard of the fact that the resignation letter sent by the petitioner stood abrogated and cancelled by the subsequent letter communicating the intimation that the resignation had been withdrawn. 8. In paragraph 10 of his petition the petitioner has alleged that the respondent No. 2, the Superintending Engineer passed the order accepting the resignation in utter disregard of the fact that the resignation letter sent by the petitioner stood abrogated and cancelled by the subsequent letter communicating the intimation that the resignation had been withdrawn. In reply to this paragraph the respondents have stated, inter alia as under:— "It may be submitted that the resignation tendered by the petitioner had to cross several channels before it could be accepted by the appointing authority after observing usual formalities................ It may also be submitted that the respondent No. 2 was the appointing authority as also he was empowered to accept the resignation tendered by the petitioner as such the said acceptance of the resignation was legal and in pursuance of the rules applicable to the petitioner." In paragraph 7 of the reply the respondents have made a clear admission of the fact that in order to be effective the resignation put by the petitioner was required to be accepted. This admission is made by the respondents in the following-words:— "It may, however, be submitted that resignation in order to become effective, must be accepted to, but there is no provision that the resignation become effective only after the incumbent has been relieved of his duties. It may be further submitted that it is purely discretionary with the authority competent to permit to withdrawal of the resignation and as the resignation has become effective, the petitioner neither remain in Government service and the acceptance of his request for withdrawal of the resignation would have amounted to his re-employment in service after condoning the period of break." These averments are obviously self-contradictory; however, they make it abundantly clear that even in the opinion of the respondents the resignation tendered by the petitioner would not have become effective unless it was accepted by the competent authority. 9. The question whether a particular resignation requires acceptance or not, and whether it becomes effective only after its acceptance by a competent authority, is essentially a question of fact which has to be determined in view of factual pleas raised by the parties in their pleadings. It is not open to the Court to go beyond the pleadings, and confine its attention only to the terms of the contracts. It is not open to the Court to go beyond the pleadings, and confine its attention only to the terms of the contracts. Speaking of this case, the terms of the contract show nothing about the requirement of acceptance of the resignation put by the petitioner. In that view of the matter, the above pleadings assume a great deal of importance because they show that even according to the respondents the resignation put by the petitioner could not have become effective till it was accepted by a competent authority. 10. Shri Ahuja, who appears on behalf of the respondents, has contended that the pleadings contained in paragraphs 7 and 10 of the reply are not happily worded and that the real intention of the respondents in making these averments in paragraphs 7 and 10 was to show that the resignation operated automatically at the end of the one months period. In supprt of this he lias put reliance upon the following lines appearing in paragraph 10 of the reply:— "The petitioner was temporary hand and the period of notice in the resignation having been already expired prior to the request of the petitioner for its withdrawal amounted to the acceptance of the resignation by the replying respondents automatically." I find myself unable to accept this plea, because if once it is believed that the acceptance of the resignation was a necessary requirement for terminating the services of the petitioner, there would be no automatic acceptance of the said resignation. If there was any such automatic acceptance, the pertinent question which arises to be considered is, why the resignation was accepted at all any why a formal order as regards this acceptance was subsequently issued by the authority concerned. In my view, if the pleadings contained in paragraphs 7 and 10 of the return filed by the respondents, are properly construed, there is no doubt left that the resignation sent by the petitioner on 23-8-1968 was required to be accepted by a competent authority, and the acceptance thereof was delayed because, as stated by the respondents, themselves in their reply in paragraph 10, the said resignation "had to cross several channels before it could be accepted by the competent authority after observing usual formalities." 11. Under these circumstances it must follow that the service of the petitioner came to be terminated on 24-10-1969 when his resignation was accepted by the order found at Annexure T. in this view of the matter, the question which arises to be considered first is what will be the effect of the withdrawal of the resignation on 28-2-1969 before its acceptance on 24-10-1969. On the above referred question we have got sufficient guidance from the reported cases. In a similar Allahabad case of jwala Prasad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, reported in AIR 1954 All 638, the Allahabad High Court held that no question of withdrawal of the resignation could arise as the resignation of the servant concerned in that case was already accepted before its withdrawal. However, the High Court further observed that even if his withdrawal of resignation application had been received before the resignation was accepted, he could not claim an absolute right to withdraw the resignation because the resignation was unconditional, and that being so, the question whether he would be permitted to withdraw that resignation was a matter within the discretion of the appointing authority. These observations have been dissented from subsequently by a Full Bench of that High Court in Bohari Lal v District Magistrate, reported in AIR 1956 All 511 wherein it is held that the law allows a person to withdraw his resignation before it has become effective by acceptance in cases where acceptance is required. After considering the case law on the subject Agarwala J. has in this connection observed as under :— "Similarly there is no reason why the resignation which may be unconditional but is yet ineffective before its acceptance, may not be withdrawn. After considering the case law on the subject Agarwala J. has in this connection observed as under :— "Similarly there is no reason why the resignation which may be unconditional but is yet ineffective before its acceptance, may not be withdrawn. A resignation which depends for its effectiveness upon the acceptance by the proper authority is like an offer which may be withdrawn before it is accepted." In Jai Ram v. Union of India, reported in AIR 1954 SC 584 the Supreme Court has observed in this connection as under :— "It may be conceded that it is open to a servant, who has expressed a desire to retire from service and applied to his superior officer to give him the requisite permission, to change his mind subsequently and ask for cancellation of the permission thus obtained; but he can be allowed to do so as long as he continues in service and not after it has terminated." The above observations of the Supreme Court in Jai Rams case clearly Suggest that before the services of a particular servant are legally terminated, it will be open to him to withdraw his resignation because on the date of the termination of the services there would not be any resignation in existence on account of its withdrawal. It is, of course, true that if the resignation is found to have been accepted by the competent authority, then the same cannot be withdrawn subsequent to that acceptance, even if the acceptance is not conveyed to the servant concerned, as has been held by the Supreme Court in Raj Kumar v. Union of India, reported in AIR 1969 SC 180. 12. Facts of this case show that when the petitioner tendered his resignation on 23-8-1968, he did hot prefer to give any notice as contemplated by the above referred extract as regards the conditions of his service. His letter of resignation as found at Annexure A states as under:— "I hereby tender my resignation w.e.f. with 24 hours notice as per terms and condition of my offer appointment. His letter of resignation as found at Annexure A states as under:— "I hereby tender my resignation w.e.f. with 24 hours notice as per terms and condition of my offer appointment. It is further added that one month pay including D. A. & D.P. may please be deducted from my Leave Salary and the balance amount be remitted to me at my permanent home address." It is thus evident from this letter of resignation that the petitioner did not give one months notice, nor did he deposit the monthly salary etc., but requested the department to deduct this amount from his monthly pay. The department has, however, not done this, and kept the whole thing under consideration. It was open to the department to raise objection as regards the validity of this notice; but till the department, accepted this type of resignation, the exact stand of the department could not be known. While the department was still considering the above quoted resignation of the petitioner, the petitioner wrote another letter found at Annexure 4B on 28-2-1969 informing the Department that in view of the changed circumstances he had changed his mind, and, therefore, the resignation sent by him should not be accepted, and should be considered as cancelled and the period during which he has remained absent should be treated as leave of the kind due as admissible under the rules. To this letter also the department did not give any reply with the result that on 23-6-1969, 18-8-1969, 30-8-1969, 9-94969 30-9-1969 and finally on 27-10-1969 the petitioner sent reminders to the department as regards the intimation to withdraw his resignation. The department took the final action in the matter only a few days before the last reminder of the petitioner dated 27-10 1969. But by that time the resignation of the petitioner was already withdrawn. According to the department it took so much time because certain formalities were required to be undergone. The department may have justification for taking this time, but Men it follows that before these formalities could be undergone the resignation could not be accepted and the services of the petitioner could not be terminated. These facts of the case are covered by the decision given by the Patna High Court in N. K. Jagani v. Bihar State Electricity Board (supra), in that case the servant concerned tendered his resignation under his letter dated 29-11-1972. These facts of the case are covered by the decision given by the Patna High Court in N. K. Jagani v. Bihar State Electricity Board (supra), in that case the servant concerned tendered his resignation under his letter dated 29-11-1972. In that letter he requested the department that his resignation should be accepted on or before 31-12-1972. According to the terms of his service his appointment was temporary and terminable on one months notice on either side, as is the case of the present petitioner. The petitioner of the Patna case did not receive any reply as regards the acceptance of his resignation till 9-5-1974, but before that date the petitioner withdrew his resignation by his letter dated 2-8-1973. The question which arose before the High Court was whether, in view of the fact that the petitioners services were terminable by one months notice, it was open to the petitioner to withdraw his resignation on 2-8-1973. The High Court on review of the case Jaw on the subject held that in view of certain formalities which were required to be undergone before accepting the resignation of the petitioner, the services of the petitioner could be terminated only after these formalities were undergone and his resignation was accepted, but before the said acceptance the petitioner had withdrawn his resignation. The High Court further observed that the word "terminable" contained in the terms of service of the petitioner was of great significance inasmuch as it indicated that the termination in question was not automatic and some formalities had to be undergone before the acceptance of the resignation letter of the petitioner. I find that the question whether the expression "terminable" by itself signifies the performance of any formalities or not is a doubtful one, but so far as the case which is under my consideration is concerned, there is no scope of any such doubt in view of the fact that the respondents themselves have admitted in paragraph 10 of the reply that formalities were required to bs undergone before the petitioners resignation could be accepted. 13. Under these circumstances, my conclusions are as under:— (a) Considering the facts of the case it was necessary that the petitioners resignation should have been accepted. (b) This resignation could not be accepted earlier because certain formalities were required to be undergone by the department in processing the petitioners resignation. 13. Under these circumstances, my conclusions are as under:— (a) Considering the facts of the case it was necessary that the petitioners resignation should have been accepted. (b) This resignation could not be accepted earlier because certain formalities were required to be undergone by the department in processing the petitioners resignation. (c) In view of this the petitioners services could be terminated only on its acceptance. (d) But before this acceptance was made, the petitioner withdrew his resignation and, therefore, on the date of his acceptance, there was, in fact, no resignation which could be accepted. 14. The learned Advocate General has orally submitted that the Himachal Pradesh Government Department of Multipurpose Project and Power is now no more in existence and there is at present the Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board. According to the learned Advocate General the petitioner should have made the Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board as a party to this petition and unless that was done effective relief could not be given. I find that there is no such plea in the reply nor there is any material to substantiate this oral submission of .the learned Advocate General. Therefore, I do not propose to take any notice of this prayer. 15. In view of the above conclusions I find that this writ petition should succeed and the impugned order found at Annexure ‘I’ as amended by Annexure RG dated 2-7-1970 is quashed. The petitioner should, therefore, be deemed to be continuing in the service of the respondents. The rule is accordingly made absolute with costs. The learned Advocate General contended that the Department should be at liberty to take suitable action against the petitioner for remaining on leave without permission. So far as this writ petition is concerned, I am not concerned with this question as the Department can take any legal action which is permissible under the law. Petition allowed.