JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THE petitioner was a Tyre care taker employed in the m P. State Road Transport Corporation at its Morena Depot and held this post till 20-8-1975. On 5-4-1975, he was detected travelling without a ticket in bus No. 9295 belonging to the Corporation. On the same day, he was produced before the Mobile Court, Gwalior. The petitioner admitted his guilt and was convicted for having committed an offence punishable under section 6 of the M. P. Rajya Sadak Parivahan Seva (Bina Ticket Yatri Ki Rok) Adhiniyam, 1974 and sentanced to pay a fine of Rs. 10. 35, or in default, to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of ten days. ( 2. ) THE Corporation, by its order dated 20-8-1975, accordingly terminated the services of the petitioner under Regulation 109 of the M. P. State Road transport Corporation Employees Service Regulations, 1964, which reads thus: "109. Notwithstanding the provisions of Regulation 69, the services of an employee, if he has been convicted in a Criminal Court or has been declared insolvent by a competent Court, shall be liable to be terminated without notice. " ( 3. ) IN exercise of the powers conferred by section 45 of the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950, the M. P. State Road Transport Corporation, with the previous sanction of the State Government, framed the Madhya Pradesh state Road Transport Corporation Employees Conduct, Discipline and Appeal regulations, 1975, which came into force on 5-9-1975. Regulations 36 to 40 provided for the procedure for imposing major penalties. Then comes Regulation 41, the material portion of which runs thus : "41. Special procedure in certain cases.- Notwithstanding anything contained in Regulations 36 to 40- (i) Where the employee charged is a temporary employee or a probationer; (ii) Where the employee or a probationer; (iii) Where any penalty is sought to be imposed on an employee on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge; or. . . . . . . . " Regulation 43 (ii) confers a right of appeal to an employee against an order imposing any of the penalties specified in Regulation 32. Regulation 44 provides for constituting an appellate authority. Regulation 47 provides for the manner in which an appeal is to be dealt with and it reads: "47. . . . . . . . " Regulation 43 (ii) confers a right of appeal to an employee against an order imposing any of the penalties specified in Regulation 32. Regulation 44 provides for constituting an appellate authority. Regulation 47 provides for the manner in which an appeal is to be dealt with and it reads: "47. Consideration of appeal.- In the case of an appeal against an order imposing any of the penalties specified in Regulation 32 or enhancing any penalty imposed under the said Regulation, the appellate authority shall consider:- (A) Whether the procedure laid down in these regulations has been complied with, and, if not, whether such non-compliance has resulted in violation of any principle of natural justice, equity and good conscience or failure of justice; (B) Whether the findings of the competent authority are warranted by the evidence on record; and (C) Whether the penalty or the enhanced penalty imposed is adequate, inadequate, or severe; and pass orders,- (i) confirming, enhancing, reducing, or setting aside the penalty; or (ii) remitting the case to the authority which imposed the penalty or to any other authority with such direction as it may deem fit in the circumstances of the case: provided that :- (a) if the enhanced penalty which the appellate authority proposes to impose is one of the penalties specified in clauses (iv) to (ix) of regulation 32 and an inquiry under Regulation 36 has not already been held in the case, the appellate authority shall, subject to the provisions of Regulation 41, itself hold such enquiry or direct that such enquiry be held in accordance with the provisions of Regulation 36 and thereafter, on a consideration of the proceedings of such inquiry and after giving the appellant a reasonable opportunity, as far as may be, in accordance with the provisions of Regulation 37 of making a representation against the penalty proposed on the basis of the evidence adduced during such inquiry make such orders as it may deem fit; (b) If the enhanced penalty which the appellate authority proposes to impose is one of the penalties specified in clauses (iv) to (ix) of regulation 32 and an inquiry under Regulation 36 has already been held in the case, the appellate authority shall after giving the appellant a reasonable opportunity as far as may be in accordance with the provisions of Regulation 37 of making representation against the penalty proposed on the basis of the evidence adduced during the inquiry, make such orders as it may deem fit; and (c) no order imposing an enhanced penalty shall be made in any other case unless the appellant has been given a reasonable opportunity as far as may be in accordance with the provisions of Regulation 38 of making a representation against such enhanced penalty. " ( 4. ) THE petitioner preferred an appeal before the General Manager, M. P. State Road Transport Corporation on 6 9-1975, i. e. , after the Regulations had come into force. The appeal was, however, rejected by the General Manager by his order dated 8-1-1976. ( 5. ) SHRI Upadhyaya, learned counsel for the petitioner, in assailing the order of termination, has advanced a three-fold contention, namely, (i) under regulation 47, the General Manager should have considered the various matters provided therein, (ii) the services of the petitioner could not be terminated under Regulation 109 without holding an enquiry and without serving him with a notice and (iii) the termination of the services of the petitioner was in breach of Standing Order 12. We are afraid, none of the contentions can prevail. ( 6. ) THE first submission based upon a decision of their Lordships of the supreme Court in the Divisional Personnel officer, Southern Railway and another v. T. R. Chellappan ( AIR 1975 SC 2216 ) is that the failure on the part of the General Manager to deal with the appeal in the manner provided by Regulation 47 vitiates the decision of the General Manager. The contention cannot be accepted for the simple reason that though the language of the Regulation 47 was in terms similar to Rule 14 (1) of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules (1968) the decision of their Lordships in Divisional Personnel Officer, Southern railway and another v. T. R. Chellappan (supra) interpreting Rule 14 (1) is not applicable, because the Regulation 47 of the Madhya Pradesh State Road transport Corporation Employees Conduct Discipline and Appeal Regulations, 1975 does not apply to the case of the petitioner. The services of the petitioner were terminated on 20-8-1975, i. e. before the Madhya Pradesh State Road transport Corporation Employees Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Regulations, 1975 came into force. Regulation 51 provides that the repeal of Regulations 108 to 114 of the Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation employees Service Regulations, 1964 shall not affect the previous operation of the said Regulations. Under the Regulations so repealed, there was no right of appeal against the order of termination of the services of an employee, if he had been convicted in a Criminal Court. That being so, the appeal preferred by the petitioner under Regulation 43 was clearly not maintainable. Under the Regulations so repealed, there was no right of appeal against the order of termination of the services of an employee, if he had been convicted in a Criminal Court. That being so, the appeal preferred by the petitioner under Regulation 43 was clearly not maintainable. There was, therefore, no duty cast on the General Manager to determine any of the matters referred to in Regulation 47. ( 7. ) THE decision of their Lordships in Divisional Personnel Officer, southern Railway and another v. T. R. Chellappan (supra) is clearly distinguishable. The point involved in that case turned upon the construction of Rule 14 of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968, the relevant portion whereof reads: " the disciplinary authority may consider the circumstances of the case and make such orders thereon as it deems fit. " In that context, their Lordships observed: "the Rajasthan High Court has given a very wide connotation to the word consider as appearing in Rule 14 and has held that the word consider is wide enough to require the disciplinary authority to hold a detailed determination of the matter. We feel that we are not in a position to go to the extreme limit to which the Rajasthan High Court has gone. The word consider has been used in contradistinction to the word determine. The rule making authority deliberately used the word consider and not determine because the word determine has a much wider scope. The word consider merely connotes that there should be active application of the mind by the disciplinary authority after considering the entire circumstances of the case in order to decide the nature and extent of the penalty to be imposed on the delinquent employee on his conviction on a criminal charge. " Their Lordships then, interpreting Rule 14, observed: " This matter can be objectively determined only if the delinquent employee is heard and is given a chance to satisfy the authority regarding the final orders that may be passed by the said authority. In other words, the term consider postulates consideration of all aspects the pros and cons of the matter after hearing the aggrieved person. Such an inquiry would be a summary inquiry to be held by the disciplinary authority after hearing the delinquent employee. In other words, the term consider postulates consideration of all aspects the pros and cons of the matter after hearing the aggrieved person. Such an inquiry would be a summary inquiry to be held by the disciplinary authority after hearing the delinquent employee. It is not at all necessary for the disciplinary authority to order a fresh departmental inquiry which is dispensed with under Rule 14 of the Rules of 1968 which incorporates the principle contained in Article 311 (2) Proviso (a ). This provision confers power on the disciplinary authority to decide whether in the facts and circumstances of a particular case what penalty, if at all, should be imposed on the delinquent employee. It is obvious that in considering this matter the disciplinary authority will have to take into account the entire conduct of the delinquent employee, the gravity of the misconduct committed by him, the impact which his misconduct is likely to have on the administration and other extenuating circumstances or redeeming features if any present in the case and so on and so forth. " In the present case, the Divisional Manager, M. P. State Road Transport corporation had to pass the order of termination in terms of Regulation 109. ( 8. ) THE second submission is that Regulation 109 of the M. P. State road Transport Corporation Employees Service Regulations, 1964 must bear the same construction as was put upon Rule 14 of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1963 by the Supreme Court in Divisional Per-sonel Officer, Southern Railway and another v. T. R. Chellappan (supra ). It is urged that the words "shall be liable to be terminated" do not necessarily mean that an employee convicted on a criminal charge should necessarily be removed or dismissed from service without notice. In support of the contention, reliance is placed on the following observations in Kashibai Sachidanand v. Hindustan Pencils Pvt. Ltd (1975 (31) FLR 54 ). : "the word liable does not necessarily convey the sense of any inevitable or unavoidable consequence every time. " Reliance is also placed on The State v. Amru Tulsi Ram (A I R 1957 Punj. 55) where it was observed that the word liable carries with it an element of discretion which does not admit of being exercised arbitrarily. : "the word liable does not necessarily convey the sense of any inevitable or unavoidable consequence every time. " Reliance is also placed on The State v. Amru Tulsi Ram (A I R 1957 Punj. 55) where it was observed that the word liable carries with it an element of discretion which does not admit of being exercised arbitrarily. It is, therefore, urged that the services of the petitioner could be terminated under Regulation 109 only after holding a summary enquiry. There is no substance in the contention. ( 9. ) THE observations in Kashibai Sachidanand v. M/s. Hindustan Pencils pvt. Ltd. (supra) and The State v. Amru Tulsi Ram (supra) must be read in the context in which they were made. In Kashibai Sachidanand v. M/s Hindustan pencils Pvt. Ltd. (supra), the Bombay High Court was dealing with clause 13 (4) of the Model Standing Orders relating to termination of services of workman for remaining absent without leave. Besides, import of the word liable actually depends on the context and the entire setting in which it appears. The language of clause 13 (4) of the Model Standing Orders, according to their lordships of the Bombay High Court, far from creating any legal fiction of the workman having abondoned or left the services, militates against any automatic termination of services. The correctness of that decision is open to question as it runs counter the decision of the Supreme Court in National Engineering industries, Ltd. Jaipur v. Hanuman (4. AIR 1968 SC 33 . ). In State v. Amru Tulsi Ram (supra), a learned single Judge of the Punjab High Court held that the words "shall be liable to fine" in section 381 of the Indian Penal Code leave the discretion to the Magistrate to impose a sentence of fine or not, in addition to the sentence of imprisonment. As already stated, the meaning of a word depends on its context and setting. The words shall be liable to be terminated in Regulation 109 must, in our view, mean that the services of the employee convicted of a criminal charge shall be terminated. ( 10. ) THE contention based on the decision in Divisional Personnel Officer, southern Railway and another v. T. R. Challappan (supra), that before such termination, there should have been a summary enquiry cannot also be accept ed. In that case, their Lordships observed thus : ". . ( 10. ) THE contention based on the decision in Divisional Personnel Officer, southern Railway and another v. T. R. Challappan (supra), that before such termination, there should have been a summary enquiry cannot also be accept ed. In that case, their Lordships observed thus : ". . . In the Criminal Trial charges are framed to give clear notice regarding the allegations made against the accused, secondly the witnesses are examined, and cross-examined in his presence and by him; and thirdly, the accused is given full opportunity to produce his defence and it is only after hearing the arguments that the Court passed the final order of conviction or acquittal In these circumstances, therefore, if after conviction by the Court a fresh departmental inquiry is not dispensed with, it will lead to unnecessary waste of time and expense and a fruitless duplication of the same proceedings all over again " ( 11. ) THE third and the last submission is based on the decision in M. P. State Road Transport Corporation, Bhopal v. Ramchandra and others ( 1977 MPLJ 341 = 1977 JLJ 292 ) where a full Bench of this Court held that the Standard Standing Orders made applicable to the employees of the M. P. State Road Transport Corporation under the M. P. Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1961 w. e. f. 6-7-1963 and the M. P. State Road Transport Corporation Employees Service Regulations framed under section 45 of the Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950 which came into force on 2-6-1970, both co-existed in so far as they are not repugnant. It is, therefore, urged that the corporation was in duty-bound to hold an enquiry in the manner provided by Standing Order 12. Since no such enquiry was held, the termination order under Standing Order 11 was invalid. If that be so, i. e. the order of termination was bad, being in contravention of standing Order 12, the petitioner should have approached the Labour Court under section 31 (3) of the M. P. Industrial Relations Act, 1960. The petitioner cannot circumvent the normal remedy by straightaway approaching the high Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. In Mohd. Shaft v. State industrial Court and others (Misc. The petitioner cannot circumvent the normal remedy by straightaway approaching the high Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. In Mohd. Shaft v. State industrial Court and others (Misc. Petition No. 168 of 1976 decided on 18-2-1976), a similar contention was negatived by a Division Bench of this Court which observed : "the Supreme Court in Divisional Personal Officer v. T. R. Chellappan has held that if after conviction by the Court a fresh departmental enquiry is not dispensed with, it will lead to unecessary waste of time and expenses and a fruitless duplication of the same proceedings all over again. It was for this reason that the founders of the Constitution thought that where once a delinquent employee has been convicted of a criminal offence that should be treated as a sufficient proof of his misconduct and the disciplinary authority may be given the discreption to impose penalties referred to in Article 311 (2) namely, dismissal, removal or a reduction in rank. " There is no warrant for the submission in view of the decision in Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagatram ( AIR 1975 SC 1331 ) an employee of a statutory Corporation can straightaway file a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution against his order of dismissal. ( 12. ) THE result, therefore, is that the petition fails and is dismissed with costs. The M. P. State Road Transport Corporation shall be entitled to its fees. Hearing fee Rs. 200. Balance of the security amount be refunded to the petitioner. Petition dismissed.