( 1 ) IN this revision petition, the petitioner has challenged the order, dt. 17-2-78 of the I Addl. Civil Judge, Kolar, in P. Misc. Case No. 55 of 1977, allowing the application made by the respondent under Order XXXIII Rule 1 of C. P,c. to sue as an indigent person. In P. Misc. Case No. 55 of 1977 as also in the suit, the petitioner public limited company has been sued twice in the same capacity, firstly being represented by the Managing Director and secondly being represented by its chairman which was wholly unnecessary. In this view, the Company represented by its Managing Director has sought to revise the order of the court below as the sole petitioner which is in order. ( 2 ) ON or about 18-6-1977 the respondent instituted a suit in the court of the first Addl. Civil Judge, Kolar, against the petitioner claiming, a sum of Rs- 4,00,000 being the damages and refund of amounts paid or deposited by him. On the plaint filed by him the respondent had to pay a court fee of Rs. 30,000 which he did not pay, but made an application along with the plaint on the same day under Order XXXIII Rule 1 C. P. C. to sue as an indigent person. In his application the respondent averred that he had invested all his monies in the filature mills of the petitioner and had incurred heavy loss and he had no other moveables other than those mentioned in the schedule to his application, In the schedule the respondent stated that he was in possession of 6 (old) round cane chairs, 4 (old) wooden chairs, 4 (old) cane sofas and 1 wooden table valued about Rs. 200, and utensils and household articles valued at Rs. 500. He therefore asserted that he was unable to pay heavy court fee on the claim made by him which was legally and justly due by the petitioner. The application filed by the respondent was resisted by the petitioner and the Government through its Government Pleader. The petitioner denied the allegation of the respondent that he was an indigent person. The petitioner asserted that the respondent had a major share in Aman silk Mills of Sidlaghatta and possessed moveable and immoveable properties in andhra State. It also contended that the suit filed by the respondent was a speculative suit. The petitioner denied the allegation of the respondent that he was an indigent person. The petitioner asserted that the respondent had a major share in Aman silk Mills of Sidlaghatta and possessed moveable and immoveable properties in andhra State. It also contended that the suit filed by the respondent was a speculative suit. Apart from these, the petitioner also raised certain technical contentions that are not very necessary to set out in detail. The Government through the Goverement Pleader also denied the claim of the respondent that he was an indigent person and urged that he had sufficient means to pay the requisite court fee on the plaint. In support of his case, the respondent examined himself and another witness, while the petitioner examined its Managing Director K. Jayarao. On a consideration of the evidence placed by the parties, the learned Civil Judge concluded that the respondent was an indigent person and therefore allowed his application, the correctness of which is challenged by the petitioner in this revision petition. ( 3 ) SRI M. R. Achar, learned counsel for the petitioner, assailed the order of the learned Civil Judge on various grounds that will be noticed by me and dealt separately. Sri S. K. Venkataranga. Iyengar, learned counsel for the respondent, at the threshold urged that when leave has been granted by the trial court to sue as an indigent person, a private party like the petitioner has no locus standi to challenge the order under S. 115 C. P. C. and therefore the revision petition should be dismissed in limine without examining the merits of the contention urged by the petitioner. In support of his contention Sri S. K. Venkataranga lyengar strongly relied on the ruling of the Muktadar, J. , in K. Laxamma v. N. Yadagiri Rao (AIR. 1972 AP. 240 ). Sri Achar refuted the contention of Sri Venkataranga lyengar and urged that the petitiouer who is the defendant in the suit and who is the respondent to the application made by the respondent, has a right to maintain the revision petition and challenge the validity of the order. In support of his contention sri Achar strongly relied on the ruling of the Supreme Court in m. L. Sethi v. R. P. Kapur (AIR. 1972 SC. 23~79 ). In support of his contention sri Achar strongly relied on the ruling of the Supreme Court in m. L. Sethi v. R. P. Kapur (AIR. 1972 SC. 23~79 ). As the objection raised by Sri Venkataranga lyengar goes to the very root of the matter, I propose to examine this contention. ( 4 ) ADMITTEDLY in the suit filed by the respondent, the petitioner is the sole defendant though it has been sued twice. In the application presented by the respondent under Order 33 Rule 1, the petitioner is also the sole respondent though it has been sued twice. The application made by the responednt was opposed by the petitioner and the court below has passed an adverse order against the petitioner. Sri Venkataranga lyengar does not dispute that the order passed by the court below is a 'case decided', and in these circumstances, it is undoubtedly open to the petitioner to maintain his revision petition under S, 115 c. P. C. As to whether there are grounds to interfere under S. 115 or not has to be examined separately, but that is not decisive in deciding whether the petitioner can invoke the jurisdiction of this court under S. 115 C. P. C. But what he contends is that when leave is granted by the court below the matter is one essentially relating to payment of court fee in respect of which one and the only party that is interested is the State and not any other private party. Sri Venkataranga lyengar also maintained that the order essentially decided the Court fee payable by the respondent to the State and the petitioner is in no way concerned with the same and cannot maintain its revision petition. In deciding whether a person should be permitted to sue as an indigent person, what the court decides is whether the person seeking for leave has the capacity to pay the requisite court fee or not and whether the circumstances warrant that person should be permitted to sue as an indigent person, The normal rule is that a litigant is required to ply the court fee prescribed by the Court-fees Act to have his cause decided. Order XXXIII is an exception and empowers the court to permit a litigant to sue as an indigent person if it is satisfied that he is an indigent person, in deciding whether a person is an indigent person or not, the court is not really deciding on the court fee payable by such person. On principle itself I find it difficult to uphold the contention of Sri Venkataranga lyengar. In Laxmama's case (1), petitioners who were the respondents in the application filed by the respondents to sue in forma pauperis, that being the term that was in vogue then, challenged the order of the District Judge, Warangal, allowing the} application of the respondents. In upholding the objection of the respondents whose application had been allowed Muktadar, J. , observed thus:-" Moreover, it is to be noted that in a case of this kind, it is the State that is primarily interested in questioning the legality or the correctness of the order of the lower Court and it is not for the petitioners to agitate the same in revision. I am supported in my view by a ruling of the Madras high Court in chinnamani Nadar v. Devagirubai Rajan (1958) 2 Mad. LJ. 93, wherein it was held that it is the State that is primarily interested in questioning the legality or correctness of the order of the trial Judge granting leave to sue in forma pauperis. Thus there is no occasion for interfering with the operative portion of the order of the lower Court. "with respect this view propounded by Muktadar, J. , which is also not correct on principle, is also opposed to the enunciations made by the Supreme Court in Sethi's case (2 ). In Sethi's case, the Supreme Court had to consider the correctness of the remand order of the Allahabad High Court rejecting the application of the respondent to sue in forma pauperis under Order XXXIII Rule, 1 C. P C. As in Laxmammarra's (1) case, the High Court of Allahabad appears to have held that in an enquiry under Order XXXIII, Rule 1 the matter was exclusively between the applicant and the State Government and a private party like Sethi who contested the application had no locus standi. In reversing the order of the allahabad High Court, Mathew, J. , speaking for the Bench, observed thus :" We venture to think that the High Court was labouring under a mistake when it said that the enquiry into the question whether the respondent was a pauper was exclusively a matter between him and the State government and that the appellant was not interested in establishing that the respondent was not a pauper. Order 33, Rule 6 provides that if the ccurt does not reject the application under R. 5, the Court shall fix a day of which at least 10 days' notice shall be given to the opposite party and the Government pleader for receiving such evidence as the applicant may adduce in proof of pauperism and for hearing any evidence in disproof thereof. Under O. 33, Rule 9, it is open to the Court on the application of the defendant to dispauper the plaintiff on the grounds specified therein, one of them being that his means are such that he ought not to continue to sue as a pauper. An immunity from a litigation unless the requisite Court fee is paid by the plaintiff is a valuable right for the defendant. And does it not follow as a corollary that the proceedings to establish that the applicant plaintiff is a pauper, which will take away that immunity, is a proceeding in which the defendant is vitally interested ? To what purpose does Order 33, Rule 6 confer the right on the opposite party to participate in the enquiry into the pauperism and adduce evidence to establish that the applicant is not a pauper unless the opposite party is interested in the question and entitled to avail himself of all the normal procedure to establish it? We can think of no reason why if the procedure for discovery is applicable to proceeding under Order 33, the appellant should not be entitled to avail himself of it. "in my opinion Sri Achar is right in his submission that the principal enunciated by Muktadar, J. is opposed to the enunciation made by the Supreme Court in Sethi's case (2 ). I therefore hold that there is no merit in the preliminary objection raised by Sri Venkataranga lyengar and reject the same. "in my opinion Sri Achar is right in his submission that the principal enunciated by Muktadar, J. is opposed to the enunciation made by the Supreme Court in Sethi's case (2 ). I therefore hold that there is no merit in the preliminary objection raised by Sri Venkataranga lyengar and reject the same. ( 5 ) SRI Achar contended that the respondent in his application had not furnished the particulars of the moveable and immoveable properties owned by or belonging to him as required by Rule 2 of Order XXXIII C. P. C. , and therefore the court below was not justified in allowing this application. ( 6 ) IN the cause title of the application and also in the plaint the respondent described himself as the managing partner of Aman Silk Mills, Sidlaghatta, kolar District. In his plaint, the respondent has averred that he was running a business in the name of Aman Silk Mills in Sidlaghatta town, Kolar District and he was its managing partner (vide para 3 of the plaint ). From the above, the one and only inference that can be drawn is Aman Silk Mills is a partnership firm which is still in existence and that the respondent continues to be a managing partner of that partnership firm. In the, schedule to the application, the respondent does not furnish the details as to the nature of his interest in that firm and t he value of the business interest and all other details that are required to be furnished. An interest in the partnership firm is undoubtedly a business asset. A partnership firm may even possess moveable and immoveable properties, and every partner of the firm has an interest in it and the interest possessed by him is also capable of valuation. As observed by Sambasiva Rao, J. , as he then was, in Mavudu Nuka Raju v. Rajani China Appanna (AIR 1977 AP. 15) an applicant under Order xxxiii has to make a full disclosure of all his assets. In this case, the failure of the respondent to disclose his interest in the partnership firm does not appear to be deliberate as he has specifically described himself as the managing partner of that firm and has also averred to it in his plaint. In this view, Sri Achar also did not rightly urge for the total rejection of the application made by the respondent. In this view, Sri Achar also did not rightly urge for the total rejection of the application made by the respondent. But he rightly contended that the respondent should be given a chance to set out his business interest in his application and the matter should be investigated by the trial court after giving necessary opportunity to the petitioner. In deciding whether the respondent is an indigent person or not, the learned Civil judge has not addressed himself to the business interest of the respondent. Apart from this, the petitioner has also filed an application before this court producing certain other documents to show that he has immoveable properties in the State of Andhra Pradesh. In the very nature of things, I cannot examine these matters and the case has necessarily to be remitted to the trial court to give a further opportunity to the respondent to set out all his assets and hold a fresh enquiry as to whether or not the respondent is entitled to sue as an indigent person. ( 7 ) SRI A char next contended that the learned Civil Judge has allowed the application of the respondent without properly examining whether the plaint filed by him discloses a cause of action. Sri Venkataranga lyengar refuted this contention and urged that the learned Civil Judge has found that the plaint discloses a cause of action. ( 8 ) IN his order the learned i ivil Judge has not examined the nature of the claim made by the respondent in his plaint and has not found that it discloses a cause of action. But in one short and sketchy sentence which reads as under he holds so: " It also cannot be said that the allegations made by the petitioner do not show a cause of action against the respondent. " it is manifest that the learned Civil Judge has not even examined the nature of the claim and whether the plaint discloses a cause of action, which is a well known legal expression. The object of Or. XXXIII, R. 5 (d) is that a court should reject an application to sue as an indigent person if the plaint does not disclose a cause of action which requires to be tried in due course. An applicant under or. The object of Or. XXXIII, R. 5 (d) is that a court should reject an application to sue as an indigent person if the plaint does not disclose a cause of action which requires to be tried in due course. An applicant under or. XXXIII R. 1 is not entitled to sue as an indigent person if his claim is frivolous and does not even prima facie require to be investigated by a court. It appears to me, the learned Civil Judge has not borne in mind the above salutary principles and has allowed the application without really applying his mind to the nature of the claim made by the respondent in his plaint and has committed manifest illegality and irregularity in the exercise of his jurisdiction, which has resulted in failure of justice and has also caused injury to the petitioner. For these reasons, the order of the learned Civil Judge is liable to be set aside and the case has to be remitted to the Civil Judge for fresh disposal. At the time the application was filed and the suit was -instituted the Civil Judge, Kolar had jurisdiction over Sidlaghatta taluk. But now with the establishment of a Civil judge's Court in Chikkaballapur, that court has now jurisdiction over Sidlaghatta taluk. Learned counsel for the parties also submitted that on the establishment of the Civil Judge's Court in Chikkaballapur the proceeding instituted by the respondent has been transferred and is pending before that court. In these circumstances, it is necessary to remit the case to the court of the Civil judge, Chikkaballapur. ( 9 ) IN the result, I set aside the order of the I Additional Civil Judge, Kolar, in P. Mis. Case No. 55 of 1977 and remit the application made by the respondent to the learned Civil Judge, Chikkaballapur for fresh disposal with a direction to give necessary opportunity to him to state all the particulars of the properties owned and possessed by him and thereafter an opportunity to the petitioner to file his additional objections if it so desires, and permit the parties to place such additional evidence as they desire to place in support of their respective cases and dispose of the said application in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made in this order. ( 10 ) REVISION petition allowed Case remanded. ( 10 ) REVISION petition allowed Case remanded. ( 11 ) IN the circumstances of the case. I direct the parties to bear their own costs. --- *** --- .