JUDGMENT M. M. Gupta, J. 1. THIS reference has been made by brother K. C. Agarwal, J. before a larger bench. The question referred is as below : "Whether the property which has been attached under sub-Sec. (1) of Sec. 146 CrPC can be released only after the rights of the parties have been determined by a competent court and that the Magistrate has no power to proceed further u/Sec. 145 CrPC excepting that he may withdraw the attachment at any time if he is satisfied that there is no longer any likelihood of the breach of the peace in regard to subject of the dispute". 2. IN the instant case a preliminary order was passed by the Magistrate u/Sec. 145 CrPC on 5th June, 1975, as he was satisfied that there was a dispute with regard to plot no. 31/1 and that there was an apprehension of the breach of the peace. By the same order the Magistrate was satisfied that it was a case of emergency and directed the attachment of the plot. The parties were also required to put in their written statements and adduce evidence in respect of their respective claims. On 18th July, 1975 the Sub Divisional Magistrate after perusing the papers relating to the attachment of the property passed the order that the property has been attached u/Sec. 146 (1) and the parties were directed to get their rights decided through a competent court. The property was to remain under attachment till then. A revision was filed before the Sessions Judge. The Sessions Judge, however, set aside the order and sent back the case to the Magistrate to proceed in accordance with Sec. 145 and to decide the case of possession on merits. The point for decision that arose was whether after the attachment u/Sec. 146 (1) was made the Magistrate becomes functus officio to proceed further u/Sec. 145 CrPC till the parties get their rights adjudicated by a competent court and thereafter to decide the proceedings initiated u/Sec. 146 CrPC in accordance with the decision given by the competent court. 3. BROTHER K. C. Agarwal, J. disagreed with the view taken by brother Kapoor, J. in Chandi Prasad v. Om Prakash Kanodia, 1975 AWC 558. 3. BROTHER K. C. Agarwal, J. disagreed with the view taken by brother Kapoor, J. in Chandi Prasad v. Om Prakash Kanodia, 1975 AWC 558. Kapoor, J. was of the view that the Magistrate had to stay the proceedings after attachment and to wait for a decision of the competent court for making a final order u/Sec. 146. It may also be mentiond here that Honourable G. D. Srivastava, J. had taken the view in Ram Adhin v. Shyam Devi, 1977 AWC 33 which is in consonance with the view now taken by K. C. Agarwal J. while making the reference to the larger Bench. 4. HOWEVER, a Division Bench of our High Court in Sohan Lal Burman v. State of U. P., 1977 AWC 210 took the view that the case decided by G. D Srivastava, J. reported in 1977 AWC 33 (supra) did not lay down the correct law. Perhaps, if the view taken in 1977 AWC 210 was brought to the notice of K. C. Agarwal, J. the necessity for reference would not have arisen. In view of the conflicting views over the same question, we have to decide the reference. Since the matter is now again before this bench, we do not think that the view taken by the Division Bench in 1977 AWC 210 is binding on us sitting in a Division Bench. We, therefore, proceed to express our view on the question referred to this Bench. Section 146 (1) runs as follows : "If the Magistrate at any time after making the order under sub-Sec. (1) of Sec. 145 considers the case to be one of emergency, or if he decides that none of the parties was then in such possession as is referred to in Sec. 145, or if he is unable to satisfy himself as to which of them was then in such possession of the subject of dispute, he may attach the subject of dispute until a competent court has determined the rights of the parties thereto with regard to the person entitled to the possession thereof : Provided that such Magistrate may withdraw the attachment at any time if he is satisfied that there is no longer any likelihood of breach of the peace with regard to the subject of dispute". 5. 5. THUS, if one reads the above sub-clause (1) of Sec. 146 in cold print and without any reference to the context, one would reach the only conclusion that wherever and at whatever stage after perusing preliminary order u/Sec. 145 (1) the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that the case is one of emergency or if he decides that none of the parties are in possession of, if he is unable to satisfy himself, as to which of them was in such possession, he is left with no other option but to attach the property and leave the parties to get their rights decided by a competent court and till then the property would remain under attachment and the contending parties shall remain out of possession. So far as this reference is concerned, we are only concerned with the case where the Magistrate considers the case as one of emergency and not with the other two contingencies. lis. Before considering the matter in controversy we would like to notice certain principles involving interpretation of Statutes. 6. IN Union of India v. Sankal- Chand Himatlal Sheth, AIR 1977 SC 2328 the Supreme Court speaking through Chandrachud, J. observed : ' 'But if the words of an instrument are ambiguous in the sense that they can reasonably bear more than one meaning, that is to say, if the words are somentically ambiguous, or if a provision, if read literally, is patently incompatible with the other provisions of that instrument the court would be justified in construing the words in a manner which will make the particular provision purposeful. That, in essence is the rule of harmonious construction". He also quoted with approval, the observations made in M. Pentiah v. Veeramallappa, AIR 1961 SC 1107 at 1115: "Where the language of a statute, in its ordinary meaning and grammatical construction leads to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment, or to some inconvenience or absurdity, hardship or injustice presumably not intended, a construction may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words, and even the structure of the sentence......." IN the same case the Supreme Court speaking through Bhagwati, J. observed that ''The words used in a statute cannot be read in isolation; their colour and content are derived from their context and, therefore, every word in a statute must be examined in its context. And when I use the word 'context' I mean it in its widest sense as including not only other enacting provisions of the same statute, but its preamble, the existing state of the law, other statutes in pari materia and the mischief which-the statute was intended to remedy." The context is of the greatest importance in the interpretation of the words used in a statute". His Lordship cited Heydon's case, (1854) 76 ER 637 which requires four things to be "discerned and considered" in arriving at the real meaning : (1) what was the law before the Act was passed; (2) what was the mischief otr defect for which the law had not provided; (3) what remedy Parliament has appointed; and (4) the reason of the remedy. It was further observed : "There is also another rule of interpretation which is equally well settled and which seems to follow as a necessary corrollary, namely, where the words;, according to their literal meaning ''produce an inconsistency, or an absurdity or inconvenience so great as to convince the Court that the intention could not have been to use them in their ordinary signification". The Court would be justified in "putting on them some other signification, which, though less proper, is one which the Court thinks the words will bear". 7. KEEPING these rules of interpretation in mind we now proceed to examine the question under consideration. Possession is the prima facie evidence of title. It is good against the whole world excepting the true owner Law has, therefore, always tried to protect the person in rightful possession of the property. KEEPING this principle in mind. Secs. 145 and 146 have been enacted. These two sections are to be found in Chapter X dealing with 'the Maintenance of Public Order and Tranquillity'. Part D of Chapter X deals with disputes as to immovable property. KEEPING this principle in mind. Secs. 145 and 146 have been enacted. These two sections are to be found in Chapter X dealing with 'the Maintenance of Public Order and Tranquillity'. Part D of Chapter X deals with disputes as to immovable property. Sec. 145 (1) requires that when an Executive Magistrate is satisfied from a report of a police officer or upon other information that a dispute likely to cause a breach of peace exists concerning any land or water or the boundaries thereof, within his local jurisdiction, he shall make an order in writing stating grounds of his being satisfied and require the parties concerned in such dispute to attend his court in person or by pleader, on a specified date and time, and to put in written statements of their respective claims as respects the fact of actual possession of the subject of dispute. This means that if the Magistrate is satisfied that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists concerning any land or water, he will pass a preliminary order u/Sec. 145(1) and call upon the parties to put in written statements in respect of the claims regarding the fact of actual possession of the particular immovable property. After passing that preliminary order the Executive Magistrate shall proceed in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 145 sub-clause (4) which requires that the Magistrate shall, without reference to the merits of the claims of any of the parties to a right to possess the subject matter of dispute, decide whether any of the parties was on the date of the order made by him under sub-Sec. (1) in possession of the subject of dispute. There is a provision added to sub-clause (4) which requires that if the Magistrate finds that a person has been forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed within two months next before the date on which the report of a police officer or the information received, he may treat the party so dispossessed as that party has been in possession on the date of the order under sub-Sec. (1). The clear intention of the Legislature as expressed in the aforesaid provisions of sub-Sees. (1) and (4) of Sec. 145 is to preserve the possession of the party who was in possession on the date of the preliminary order passed u/Sec. 145 (1). The clear intention of the Legislature as expressed in the aforesaid provisions of sub-Sees. (1) and (4) of Sec. 145 is to preserve the possession of the party who was in possession on the date of the preliminary order passed u/Sec. 145 (1). Sec. 146 recognises three exceptions subsequent to the passing of the preliminary order u/Sec. 145 (1). They are when the Magistrate considers the case to be one of emergency or if he decides that none of the parties was in such possession or if he is unable to decide as to satisfy himself as to which of them was in such possession of the subject of dispute, the Magistrate may attach the property of the subject of dispute until a competent court has determined the rights of the parties. Under the proviso, however, such attachment could be withdrawn if the Magistrate is satisfied that there is no longer any likelihood of the breach of the peace. Here, we have to consider the case where the Magistrate considers it to be one of emergency. 8. AFTER passing the preliminary order under Sec. 145 (1) it is the duty of the parties to put in their respective claims supported by the evidence they want to adduce, but the emergency contemplated in Sec. 146 can also arise where the parties have not been heard and have not been able to file their respective claims and evidence in support of them. Such contingencies can arise on the report of the police about the continued existence of the breach of the peace or upon one of the parties complaining about such continuance of the apprehension of the breach of the peace. In such an event if the Magistrate acts u/Sec. 146 and attaches the property the parties would be left with no other option but to get their rights decided by a competent court. The result would be that till the decision of the competent: court comes, as is usual under the present conditions may come after years and years of waiting the party which was in possession on the date of the order, would be deprived of his possession and would have to remain out of possession till the competent court decides and the Magistrate releases the property from attachment. This could not be the intention of the Legislature, as is evident from the provisions of Sec. 145 (4). This could not be the intention of the Legislature, as is evident from the provisions of Sec. 145 (4). G. D. Srivastava, J. in Ram Adhin v. Shyama Devi, 1977 AWC 33 made the following observations : "A literal interpretation will, therefore, lead to the result that as soon as the Magistrate attaches the property on account of emergency, he will have no jurisdiction to decide the question of possession. This will clearly be inconsistent with sub-Sec. (4) of Sec. 145 which says that, if possible, the Magistrate shall decide which of the parties was, at the date of the order passed under sub- Sec. (1) of Sec. 145, in possession of the subject of dispute. Sub-Sec. (4) thus makes it clear that normally and primarily it is the duty of the Magistrate to decide the question of possession. Only in those cases, where he is unable to decide the question of possession or in cases where he decides that none of the parties was in possession, he has to wait for the decision of a competent court. Under the old Code of Criminal Procedure, the Magistrate could refer the matter to Civil Court for decision. In the new Code of Criminal Procedure, this provision has been dropped but this much is clear that except in cases where the Magistrate is unable to decide or if he decides that none of the parties was in possession, it is the Magistrate who will decide the question of possession. If this is the real intention of the law, Sec. 146 (1) should not be interpreted to mean that if the Magistrate attaches the property on account of emergency, his jurisdiction comes to an end". G. D. Srivastava, J. has further observed : "It is, therefore, evident that a literal interpretation sought to be put on Section 146 (1) will not only lead to an anamolous situation but will also be inconsistent with the main provisions incorporated in Sec. 145". G. D. Srivastava, J. has further observed : "It is, therefore, evident that a literal interpretation sought to be put on Section 146 (1) will not only lead to an anamolous situation but will also be inconsistent with the main provisions incorporated in Sec. 145". There can be no doubt about the fact that if the provisions of Sec, 146 relating to attachment in cases of emergency are to be read in isolation and after excluding the provision of Sec. 145 it would lead to a very anamolous situation and would lead not towards the advancing of the purpose and object of the Legislature in preserving the right of the person in possession, but it would lead to defeating of that very purpose. The construction, therefore, will have to be put on these sections so as to advance the purpose and object of the Legislature. The object is unambiguously clear from the provisions of Sec. 145. Thus, even if a Magistrate comes to the conclusion that there is an emergency he should decide as to who was the person in possession of the property on the date of the order. If, however, he comes to the conclusion and finds that he is unable to decide as to which party was in possession or that none of the parties was in possession then, of course, he may ask the parties after attaching the property to get their right decided by the competent court, but if after merely coming to the conclusion of emergency he attaches the property and requires the parties to get the matter decided by the competent court, he would put them in a situation which is not intended by Sec. 145 or by the Legislature. In our opinion, brother K. C. Agarwal, J. is on a stronger footing while making the reference that if the interpretation placed by the learned counsel is accepted the irresistible result would be that the elementary doctrine of fair procedure will have to be sacrificed inasmuch as the property would continue under attachment so long as the question of right relating to it has not been adjudicated upon by a competent court. In this view of the matter we respectfully dissent from the view taken by the Division Bench of our High Court in Sohan Lal Burman v. State of U. P., 1977 AWC 210 which held that the view taken by G. D. Srivastava, J. in Ram Adhin v. Shyama Devi (Supra) is not correct. 9. A Division Bench of the Bombay High Court has taken a similar view in Gajitan A. D'Souza v. The State of Maharashtra, 1977 CrLJ 2032. It observed at page 2037 as below : "In our view, the intention of the Legislature in making the said provisions of Sec. 146 is to vest the Magistrate with necessary powers to preserve the subject of dispute till the determination of the proceedings u/Sec. 145 by attaching the subject of dispute in case an emergency arises. It seems to us that the provisions of Sec. 146 are ancillary to those of Sec. 145. The rule of harmonious construction must prevail over the rule of construing a provision literally where the result of a literal construction would have the effect of rendering some other provisions otiose or nugatory. On a harmonious construction of the two provisions, it appears to us that Sec. 146 cannot be construed as an independent section, but must be construed as a part of Sec. 145 and cannot override the provisions of Sec. 145. The consequences of construing the section literally will have to be borne in mind, for, if such a construction is adopted, merely because of a situation of emergency having arisen, the proceedings u/Sec. 145 must be abruptly terminated. On such a construction, the whole scheme of the proceeding u/Sec. 145 would be rendered nugatory and infructuous. We do not think that such an intention can be attributed to the Legislature. Hence, we are of the view that the Magistrate does not become functus officio merely because of his passing an order of attachment during the pendency of the proceedings before him, because he considers the case to be one of emergency". 10. We do not think that such an intention can be attributed to the Legislature. Hence, we are of the view that the Magistrate does not become functus officio merely because of his passing an order of attachment during the pendency of the proceedings before him, because he considers the case to be one of emergency". 10. IN normal course we would have referred the case to a Full Bench in view of our dissent from the view taken by another Division Bench, but we do not consider it necessary now as the Supreme Court in Shri Chandu Naik v. Shri Sitaram B. Naik, Cr.A. No. 308 of 1977 D/- December 6, 1977 indicated as to how the Magistrate is to proceed for disposing of the proceedings. It observed : "The Magistrate, in the first instance, will try to conclude the proceeding in accordance with the various provisions of Sec. 145 of the Code. If he is able to declare the possession of either party on consideration of the evidence adduced or to be adduced before him he would do so. IN that event the other party will be forbidden from creating any disturbance of the possession (including the deemed possession, in case the application of the proviso to sub-Sec. (4) is found necessary) of the party declared in possession. The Magistrate, then, will have to withdraw the attachment in accordance with the proviso to sub-Sec. (1) of Sec. 146, because, as per his order declaring a party in possession, there would be no longer any likelihood of the breach of the peace with regard to the subject of dispute. The party not found in possession by the Magistrate will have to seek the redress of his grievance, if any, elsewhere. If, however, the Magistrate decides that none of the parties was in possession of the disputed property on the date of the order made under sub-Sec. (1) of Sec. 145 or if he is unable to satisfy himself as to which of them was then in possession of the subject matter of dispute, he need not lift the attachment until a competent court had determined the rights of the parties as provided for in Sec. 146 (1). IN such a situation recourse, if necessary, may be taken to sub-Sec. (2) of Sec. 146 of the Code either by the Magistrate or a Civil Court, as the case may be". IN such a situation recourse, if necessary, may be taken to sub-Sec. (2) of Sec. 146 of the Code either by the Magistrate or a Civil Court, as the case may be". The view, therefore, taken in Chandi Prasad v. Om Prakash, 1975 AWC 558 and taken by the Division Bench in Sohan Lal Burman v. State of U. P., 1977 AWC 210 (Supra) should be treated as impliedly overruled. 11. THE reference is, therefore, answered according to the observations made by the Supreme Court quoted above. Reference answered.