B. B. Bhat v. State of Karnataka, represented by the Labour Enforcement Officer and another
1978-07-06
M.S.NESARGI
body1978
DigiLaw.ai
Order: All these petitions are directed against the common judgment of convictions and sentences passed by the Judicial Magistrate, First Glass, at Yellapur, in Criminal Cases Nos. 19, 20, 21, 22, 23 and 24 of 1977 respectively. The petitioner is the same. He has been found guilty of various offences under the provisions of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’). He has been sentenced to pay a fine, of Rs. 10 and in default simple imprisonment for two days, Rs. 30 (Rs.10 on each count) and in default simple imprisonment for two days, Rs. 20 (Rs. 10 on each count) and in default simple imprisonment for two days, Rs. 20 (Rs. 10 on each count) and in default simple imprisonment for two days, Rs. 30 (Rs. 10 on each count), and in default simple imprisonment for two cays and Rs. 10 and in default simple imprisonment for two days, in the respective cases. 2. The Labour Enforcement Officer (Central) Railway, Hubli, filed complaints in the above said cases alleging that the petitioner had committed various offences, which according to him fell under section 12(1), rules 81 (I) (1), 71 and 79; rules 78 (2) (a) and 78 (2) and 78(2)(b); rules 78(2)(e), 78(2)(D) and 78(D), rules 75, 76 and 78(2)(b) and rule 81(2), respectively. 3. The complaint of the Inspector was that the petitioner was a ‘contractor’ within the meaning of the Act and had committed the aforementioned offences. In one or two of the complaints he has even alleged that the petitioner constituted an ‘establishment’ within the meaning of the Act. 4. The petitioner pleaded not guilty to the substance of the accusation levelled against him in each of the said cases. 5. The learned Magistrate has concluded that the petitioner was a ‘contractor’ within the meaning of the Act and was also an ‘establishment’ within the meaning of the Act. 6. Perusal of the substance of the accusation in each case clearly shows that the averment against the petitioner has been that the petitioner was a contractor and was carrying out contract work of transporting Manganese Ore from Bisgod, Tarakibail . and Dandeli to Belekeri Port, as per contract entered into between the petitioner and Mysore Minerals Ltd. Nowhere in the substance of the accusation, is he accused of being an ‘establishment’ within the meaning of the Act.
and Dandeli to Belekeri Port, as per contract entered into between the petitioner and Mysore Minerals Ltd. Nowhere in the substance of the accusation, is he accused of being an ‘establishment’ within the meaning of the Act. In view of the foregoing, the learned Magistrate ought to have seen that the petitioner had not been called upon to answer the accusation that he was an ‘establishment’ within the meaning of the Act. In that view of the matter, the learned Magistrate ought not to have gone into that question and held against the petitioner. 7. Now, it is to be seen that whether the petitioner is a ‘contractor’ within the meaning of the Act. 8. ‘Contractor’ is defined in section 2 (1)(c) of the Act, as follows: "Contractor", in relation to an establishment, means a person who undertakes to produce a given result for the establishment, other than a mere supply of goods or articles of manufacture to such establishment, through contract labour or who supplies contract labour for any work of the establishment and includes a subcontractor;" Italics is mine. 9. The learned Magistrate has, in paragraphs 35 to 38 of his common judgment while dealing with this aspect, reasoned that as per Exhibit P-5 i.e., the agreement entered into between the petitioner and the Mysore Minerals Ltd., the petitioner has undertaken the work of transporting Manganese Ore from the aforementioned places as contractor and he was required to transport Manganese Ore and therefore he was undoubtedly ‘contractor’ within the meaning of the definition 6f the said word in the Act. It is evident that the learned Magistrate has overlooked the words "other than a mere supply of goods or articles of manufacture to such establishment", which have been italicised by me in the definition of ‘contractor’. Exhibit P-5 discloses that the petitioner had undertaken to transport 32,500 tonnes of Manganese Ore from Bisgod, Tarakabail and Dandeli to Belekeri Port by 30th April, 1977. Manganese Ore can be only the goods or articles of manufacture.
Exhibit P-5 discloses that the petitioner had undertaken to transport 32,500 tonnes of Manganese Ore from Bisgod, Tarakabail and Dandeli to Belekeri Port by 30th April, 1977. Manganese Ore can be only the goods or articles of manufacture. But for the words "other than a mere supply of goods or articles of manufacture to such establishment" appearing in the definition of the word "contractor" in section 2(1)(c) of the Act, it could have been argued with force that the petitioner has undertaken to produce a given result, namely, seeing to it that 32,500 tonnes of Manganees Ore reached Belekeri Port on or before 30th April, 1977. Such an argument is not available in view of the aforementioned words appearing in the defining clause. 10. Sri K.H.N. Kuranga, learned High Court Government Pleader appearing on behalf of the State argued that the petitioner has been described as ‘contractor’ in Exhibit P-5 and therefore, he is also a ‘contractor’ within the meaning of the Act. This argument does not appeal to in view of the foregoing reasons. 11. In the result these petitions are allowed and convictions and sentences passed against the petitioner by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Yellapur, in G.C. Nos. 19 to 24 of 1977, are set aside. The petitioner is acquitted.