A. K. JANAH, R. K. SHARMA, JJ. ( 1 ) THIS appeal is by the defendant and it arises out of a suit instituted by the plaintiff respondent against the appellant for realization of a sum of Rs. 27,133. 69p as mortgage dues. The plaintiff's case is as follows: ( 2 ) THE defendant is the owner of the properties described in schedule A to the plaint. On December 29, 1954, Rajasthan Insurance Co. Ltd. advanced a loan of Rs. 21,000/- to the defendant at her request and the defendant agreed to pay the loan with interest at the rate of 9 per cent per annum. On the same day the defendant executed a promissory note for the said sum of Rs. 21,000/- in favour of the Rajasthan Insurance Co. Ltd. Subsequently on the same day the defendant deposited her Title Deed regarding the properties described in schedule A with the Rajasthan Insurance Co. Ltd. at its office at 23/a, Netaji Subhas Road, Calcutta. On December 29, 1955 the defendant paid a sum of Rs. 1890/- to the Rajasthan Insurance Co. Ltd. towards the principal amount. Thereafter all the assets and liabilities of the Rajasthan Insurance Co. Ltd. vested in the Life Insurance Corporation of India by the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956 (Act 31 of 1956 ). The defendant has not made any other payment towards the said loan or towards the interest inspite of demands. The plaintiff, therefore, filed the suit for recovery of the amount of the loan together with interest calculated upto 3rd May, 1960. ( 3 ) THE defendant contested the suit by filing a written statement. The defendant denied her liability for the amount claimed by the plaintiff. The defendant claimed to be an illiterate pardanashin lady. She asserted that she did not know how to read and write any language whatsoever. She denied to have taken the loan alleged by the plaintiff from the Rajasthan Insurance Co. Ltd. on executing a promissory note. She also denied that she deposited her title deed with the Rajasthan Insurance Co. Ltd. for the purpose of creating a security for the loan as alleged by the plaintiff. The defendant also denied the story of any payment towards the principal and interest. The defendant's positive case is that the promissory note and the memorandum are all forged documents. She also denied that she deposited her title deed with the Rajasthan Insurance Co. Ltd. for the purpose of creating a security for the loan as alleged by the plaintiff. The defendant also denied the story of any payment towards the principal and interest. The defendant's positive case is that the promissory note and the memorandum are all forged documents. It was alleged that the defendant kept her title deed and many other valuable papers with one of her trusted friends, Sm. Giribala Debi of Tantipara, Baranagar, who used to look after her properties, as the defendant used to reside at Benares and other places of pilgrimage for the major part of the year. The said Giribala died sometime ago without making over the deed and other papers to the defendant. The defendant tried to get back her title deed and other papers from family members of Giribala and they assured the defendant that those papers would be returned to her after those were found out on search. It was alleged that some designing person or persons somehow secured her valuable title deed and a false, fraudulent and fictitious claim has been made against her on the basis of a false fabricated and forged promissory note and a memorandum of document. ( 4 ) THE trial court found that the defendant was not a pardanashin illiterate lady. The trial court further found that the defendant took the loan on executing the promissory note and subsequently deposited the title deed and executed the memorandum for such deposit. Before the trial court it was argued on behalf of the defendant that the memorandum itself created the mortgage and therefore it required registration. This plea was also negatived by the trial court. On these findings the trial court passed a preliminary mortgage decree. Against the said decision of the trial court the defendant has come up in appeal. ( 5 ) MR. Dutt, learned Advocate for the appellant has in the first place argued that the defendant being an illiterate and pardanashin lady the onus was upon the plaintiff to establish by positive evidence that the contents of the aforesaid two documents namely, the promissory note, Exhibit 2, as well as the memorandum. Exhibit 3, were explained to the defendant and she fully understood the transaction. Mr. Dutt contended that the evidence on record is not sufficient to come to such a conclusion. Exhibit 3, were explained to the defendant and she fully understood the transaction. Mr. Dutt contended that the evidence on record is not sufficient to come to such a conclusion. It was argued by Mr. Dutt that the only witness examined on behalf of the plaintiff is P. W. 1, Taraprosad Banerjee, who is an employee of Zonal Mortgage Department, Life Insurance Corporation of India. According to Mr. Dutt, the evidence of this witness cannot be relied upon for the purpose of coming to the finding that the contents of the above-mentioned two documents were explained to the defendant. Mr. Dutt contended that according to the evidence of this witness, Benode Babu, Manager, explained both the documents to the defendant but Benode Babu was not examined. It was also contended that Sushil Mukherjee who according to this witness wrote the ledger, Exhibit 1, has also not been examined. Similarly, Bidyut Majumdar who typed the promissory note and the memorandum has also not been examined. It was also contended that according to the evidence of PW 1, all the officers were present but none of them had been examined. It is true that all those persons had not been examined but it is not necessary for the plaintiff to examine all the persons who might have been present during a particular transaction in order to prove his case. In our view PW 1 is certainly a competent witness to speak on the subject on which he has deposed. It appears from his evidence that he used to look after law matters, namely, assignment, mortgage and other suits of the Rajasthan Insurance Co. Ltd. He has stated that the promissory note, Exhibit 2, was signed by the defendant in his presence and the memorandum Ex. 3, was also signed by the defendant in his presence. He has stated that Benode Babu, Manager, explained both the documents to the defendant. Nothing has been elicited in cross examination of this witness which shakes his credibility. The trial Court accepted this witness as reliable and we find no reason to differ from the view taken by the trial court. The defendant made an attempt to show that PW 1 was not in service of Rajasthan Insurance Co. Ltd. and for that purpose she examined one Subedar Singh as DW 2. The evidence of DW 2 is that he was a policy-holder of Rajasthan Insurance Co. The defendant made an attempt to show that PW 1 was not in service of Rajasthan Insurance Co. Ltd. and for that purpose she examined one Subedar Singh as DW 2. The evidence of DW 2 is that he was a policy-holder of Rajasthan Insurance Co. Ltd. and he occasionally used to go the office of the Rajasthan Insurance Co. Ltd. to enquire about Bonus etc. and in that connection he used to meet the Managing Director. He said that he did not see PW 1 at the office of the company. Apart from the fact that it is quite unlikely that a policy-holder of an Insurance Company would come to see the Managing Director regarding Bonus etc. it is not expected for him to remember who were the employees working in that office. We have no hesitation in discarding the evidence of this witness through whom an attempt was made to prove that PW 1 was not an employee of Rajasthan Insurance Co. Ltd. at the relevant time. ( 6 ) LET us know turn to the evidence of the defendant to see whether the story set up by her in the written statement can be believed or not and how far she has succeeded in establishing that she is a pardanashin and illiterate lady. The plaintiff's case in the plaint is that the payment of Rs. 21,000/- was made first, then the defendant executed the promissory note and thereafter on the same date after sometime she executed the memorandum and deposited her title deed. This case of the plaintiff has been completely denied by the defendant who asserts that she never executed the promissory note or the memorandum and those documents are forged. Her explanation about the production of the original title deed by the plaintiff is, as we have seen earlier, that the same was made over to her friend Giribala and while it was lying with the said Giribala, some designing persons somehow secured the documents and fabricated the promissory note and the memorandum on the strength of the said document. In answer to question 17, the defendant stated that she did not even see the deed with her own eyes and that she did not deposit the same for creating a mortgage. If the defendant did not see her title deed, how is it that she deposited the same with her friend Giribala? In answer to question 17, the defendant stated that she did not even see the deed with her own eyes and that she did not deposit the same for creating a mortgage. If the defendant did not see her title deed, how is it that she deposited the same with her friend Giribala? In order to establish her case that she was a pardanashin and illiterate lady who was completely ignorant about the worldly affairs, the defendant gave certain answers to question put to her in her examination on Commission which clearly shows that the defendant deliberately suppressed the truth in order to create an impression that she was totally unaware of all worldly affairs and was completely ignorant about matters which one is expected to know. This would be evident from the answers given to a number of question such as QQ. 4, 9, 10, 17, 39, 45, 48, 53, 60, 62, 65-67, 69-76, 81-83, 87-88, 98, 116, 119, 124, 125, 128 and 131. It is the defendant's case that her friend Giribala with whom she deposited her title deed and other papers used to look after her properties and render accounts to her. She stated that Giribala was also illiterate and the accounts which she used to render was verbal. According to the defendant, this Giribala was a very intimate friend of the defendant. But the defendant does not even know the surname of Giribala's husband. The defendant's case is that after the death of Giribala she caused inquiry to be made through her nephew Shewnath about her title deed and other papers from Giribala's relations. But she could not give the address of her nephew. She could not even tell the name of the father of that nephew. Then again, the evidence of the defendant is that she herself and her mother knew about the fact that the document and other valuable papers were kept with Giribala. After her mother's death the defendant told about the same to her husband. But her husband did not pay any heed to it. It is her evidence that when she did not get her documents she told about it to her third son. After her mother's death the defendant told about the same to her husband. But her husband did not pay any heed to it. It is her evidence that when she did not get her documents she told about it to her third son. According to her evidence, when her husband did not pay any heed to her, she did not do anything for about one and half years after which she told her third son about the documents being kept with Giribala. According to her evidence, her nephew Shewnath realizes rent of her house at Baranagar and an old tenant pays taxes and gives money at an interval of one and two months. The name of the tenant is Ratan. Neither Shewnath nor Ratan was examined by the defendant. The defendant even went to the length of saying that she did not at all know that her second son Anil Kumar Singh was the managing Director of Rajasthan Insurance Co. Ltd. at the time when the loan was alleged to have been given to her although she admitted that her son Anil Kumar Singh lives in the same house with her. There are certain inherent improbabilities in the story set up by the defendant which she tried to support in her evidence for which we find it impossible to believe the evidence of the defendant. No independent witness was examined by the defendant in support of her case that she was an illiterate and pardanashin lady. It must, therefore, be held that the defendant has failed to prove that she is an illiterate and pardanashin lady. That being so, she has failed to discharge the initial onus which lay upon her. Unless this initial onus was discharged by the defendant there could not be any question of the documents being explained to the defendant. Moreover, we have already held that the two documents Exhibits 2 and 3, were explained to the defendant and she executed the same understanding perfectly well the implication of her execution of those two documents. ( 7 ) A large number of authorities were cited before us by Mr. Dutt in support of his contention that a pardanashin lady is entitled to certain protection in the matter of execution of documents. Such protection given to a pardanashin woman has been extended to the case of illiterate persons as well. ( 7 ) A large number of authorities were cited before us by Mr. Dutt in support of his contention that a pardanashin lady is entitled to certain protection in the matter of execution of documents. Such protection given to a pardanashin woman has been extended to the case of illiterate persons as well. The decisions cited are (1) Annoda Mohini Roy Chowdhury v. Bhuban Mohini Debi, 28 IA 71; (2) Shambati Keori and Ors. v. Jago Bibi, 29 IA 127; (3) Mirza Sajjad Husain and Anr v Nawab Wazir Ali Khan and Ors , 39 IA 156; (4) Mussamat Sarid-un-nisa v. Munshi Mukhtar Ahmed, 52 IA 342; (5) Tara Kumar v. Chandra Mandshwan Prasad Singh, 58 IA 450; (6) Inche Noriah binti Mohammed Tahir v. Shaikh Altebin Omerbin Abdullah Bahashuan, AIR 1929 PC 3; (7) Mr. Kharbuja Koer v. Jangbahadur Rai and Ors. , AIR 1963 SC 1203 ; and (8) Narayantara Datta v. Caledonian Insurance Co. , 72 Calwn 733. There is no dispute about the proposition of law laid down in these decisions. But in view, of our findings that the defendant is not an illiterate and pardanashin lady these decisions are of no assistance to Mr. Dutt. ( 8 ) THE next contention urged in support of this appeal is that the memorandum dated 29th December, 1954 executed by the defendant required registration and as the same is not registered the present suit is not maintainable. The contention is that the said memorandum in effect is the bargain between the parties. In support of this contention Mr. Dutt relied upon the decision in (9) Subramoniam and another v. Lutchman and others, 50 IA 77. In that case it was held that where titles are handed over with nothing said except that they are to be security, the law supposes that the scope of the security is the scope of the title where however titles are handed over accompanied by a bargain, that bargain must rule. Lastly, when the bargain is a written bargain, it, and it alone, must determine what is the scope and extent of security. The facts of that case were however quite different from the facts in the present case as would appear from the letter which passed between the parties as quoted in the said judgment. Lastly, when the bargain is a written bargain, it, and it alone, must determine what is the scope and extent of security. The facts of that case were however quite different from the facts in the present case as would appear from the letter which passed between the parties as quoted in the said judgment. The next case cited in support of this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant is (10) Indian Bank Ltd. , Hyderabad v. M/s. Anomula Seshagiri Rao and Sons Co. and others, AIR 1971 AP 287 . In that case also, the facts were quite different. While considering this question Their Lordships quoted the observations of the Supreme Court in (11) Rachpal v. Bhagwandas AIR 1950 SC 272 . The said observations are as follows:the crucial question is: Did the parties intend to reduce their bargain regarding the deposit of the title deeds to the form of a document? If so, the document requires registration. If, on the other hand, its proper construction and the surrounding circumstances lead to the conclusion that the parties did not intend to do so, then, there being no express bargain the contract to create the mortgage arises by implication of the law from the deposit itself with the requisite intention and the document, being merely evidential does not require registration. The decision in Rachpal's case was followed by the Supreme Court subsequently in the case of (12) United Bank of India v. Lekharam and Co. AIR 1965 SC 1591 . The question to be considered, therefore, is what the parties intended to do. This has to be gathered upon the proper construction of the document and the surrounding circumstances. Mr. Dutt also relied on the decision in (13) Bhairab Chandra Bose v. Anath Nath De, 24 Calwn 599. In that case the defendant having already mortgaged the house to the plaintiff to secure two previous loans and had delivered to the plaintiff the title deeds and executed a promissory note for Rs. 1500/- in respect of fresh advance and on the same date wrote a letter to the plaintiff in these terms:-FOR payment of the sum of Rs. 1500/- with interest I have borrowed from you on a promissory note of date, I hereby put on record that the title deeds are my premises already deposited with you shall be held as a collateral security. 1500/- with interest I have borrowed from you on a promissory note of date, I hereby put on record that the title deeds are my premises already deposited with you shall be held as a collateral security. The amount was paid to the defendant after the execution of the promissory note and passing of the letter. In these circumstances it was held that there was no compelled contract of mortgage before the letter passed, which in the circumstances of the case constituted the mortgage contract and was inadmissible for want of registration. Applying the above principles of law to the facts and circumstances of the present case as appearing in evidence we are of the view that the letter or the memorandum, Exhibit 3, did not constitute the bargain between the parties and as such it did not require registration. ( 9 ) THE only other thing which remains for us to consider is the application for reception of additional evidence which has been filed on behalf of the appellant. In this application the appellant has stated that being advised by her Advocate, Sri Purnendu Narayan Sarkar, since deceased, she caused search to be made in the office of the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies and obtain certified copies of certain documents which have been annexed to the application as Annexure ?x?. According to the appellant these documents will show that the case made out by the respondent that the disputed promissory note, Exhibit 2, and the memorandum, Exhibit 3, were explained to the appellant cannot be true. In view of the discussions made hereinbefore this aspect of the case has very little importance and it cannot affect the conclusions arrive at by us. Moreover, we do not require these documents to pronounce judgment in this case. The application is accordingly dismissed. ( 10 ) FOR the reasons mentioned above, this appeal fails and it is accordingly dismissed with costs. ( 11 ) MR. Subhas Chandra Banerjee, learned Advocate for the appellant, prayed for stay of operation of this order. In the circumstances of the present case, we find no reason to pass an order for stay as prayed for. The prayer made by Mr. Banerjee is accordingly refused. ( 12 ) SHARMA, J. ; I agree with what has fallen from my Lord but I would like to add a few lines on my own. In the circumstances of the present case, we find no reason to pass an order for stay as prayed for. The prayer made by Mr. Banerjee is accordingly refused. ( 12 ) SHARMA, J. ; I agree with what has fallen from my Lord but I would like to add a few lines on my own. Whether or not the Memorandum, handed over along with the title deed, constituted the bargain in this case, can be determined by the contents of the Memorandum. If from the contents taken along with circumstances surrounding it, one finds no difficulty in spelling out the entire terms of the transaction, the document constitutes a bargain, but on the other hand if one has to go beyond the document to something else (here in this case the promissory note), to comprehend the terms of the transaction, the document can not be described as the bargain. A document which fails to give the picture of the bargain and stops short of giving such a picture or affords only a partial view into the bargain remains a Memorandum but not a bargain. In the instant case, the contents of Ex. 3 fall short of giving a complete picture of the bargain inasmuch as Ex. 3 does not speak out the stipulated rate of interest upon which the loan was taken and the time stipulated for repayment. There can be no doubt that the rate of interest is an essential feature and an integral part of the bargain and when Ex. 3 does not spell it out and for the complete understanding of the bargain refers to another earlier document, namely, the promissory note, Ex 3 remains a Memorandum and by itself does not constitute the bargain. In taking this view, I rely upon (14) Sunil Kr. Singh v. Life Insurance Corporation of India reported in AIR 1976 Cal 224 , a decision in which I was myself a party. In the premises I have no hesitation in agreeing with my Lord in holding that Ex. 3 required no registration at all. Appeal disposed of.