Ismail, J.-This is an appeal against the order of Ramanujam, J. dated 15th October, 1976. The matter lies in a very narrow compass. 2. The respondent herein was the third defendant in O.S. No. 733 of 1972, on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Coimbatore. After a preliminary decree was passed therein, the final decree proceedings had taken place. Notice was served on the respondent herein, and he was represented by counsel. His counsel was taking time for filing counter affidavit on behalf of the respondent, and at a particular stage, the counsel reported no instructions. Thereafter, an ex parte final decree was passed on 26th November, 1974. Subsequently, on 24th January, 1975, the respondent herein filed LA. No. 63 of 1975 under Order 9, rule 13, Civil Procedure Code, to set aside the ex parte final decree on the ground that his non-apperance before Court on the day of the hearing of the final decree proceedings was due to the fact that the plaintiff represented to him that he would not proceed against the mortgaged properties, that he would exonerate the respondent and that he would have recourse only to the subsequent purchaser of the Mills. The learned Judge did not accept the explanation offered by the respondent herein and held that the respondent should be taken to be aware of the ex parte final decree even on 26th November, 1974, and therefore, the application filed on 24th January, 1975 should be rejected as being out of time. It is against that order A.A.O. No. 591 of 1975 was referred to this Court which was disposed of by Ramanujam, J. by the impugned order. 3. The learned Judge took the view that the application for setting aside the ex parte decree had to be considered on merits and should not have been dismissed on the ground of limitation. The learned Judge pointed out that it was true that the ex parte decree came to be passed on 26th November, 1974, after respondent’s counsel reported no instructions, but unless it was shown that the counsel informed about the passing of the final decree to the respondent, knowledge could not be attributed to the respondent, with the result, the learned Judge allowed the appeal and directed the lower Court to dispose of I. A. No. 63 of 1975 on merits. It is against the order of Ramanujam, J., that the present appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent has been filed. 4. As we pointed out already, the matter lies in a very narrow compass. Article 123 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act of 1963, reads as follows:- Thus, the starting points of limitation are two. One is the date of the decree and the other is the date of the knowledge of the decree. With reference to the second, the condition to be satisfied is that no summons or notice should have been duly served. Thus, it is clear that a person applying for setting aside an ex parte decree can claim the period of limitation to commence from his knowledge of the decree only in a case where the summons or notice was not duly served. In other cases, limitation commences from the date of decree itself. In this particular case, as we pointed out already, in the final decree proceedings, the respondent therein was represented by counsel who took time for filing counter more than once and finally reported ‘no instructions. ‘Therefore, the present is a case which falls under the first alternative in the third column to Article, 123 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, and not under the second alternative where alone the date of knowledge of the decree is irrelevant. In view of this crucial feature, we allow the appeal, and set aside the order of Ramanujam, J., and restore that of the lower Court dismissing I.A. No. 63 of 1975. No order as to costs.