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1978 DIGILAW 415 (ALL)

Babu Lal v. District Judge, Meerut

1978-04-13

K.C.AGARWAL

body1978
JUDGMENT K. C. Agrawal, J. :- By this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution the petitioners challenged the validity of the judgment of the District Judge, Meerut dated 26.7.1977. By the said order the District Judge allowed the appeal filed by respondent No. 3 under section 22 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 and granted the application filed under section 21 of the said Act. 2. The application under section 21 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 was filed by respondent No. 3 initially against Babu Lal Sharma petitioner No. 1 on the allegations that respondent No. 3 had a large family of ten members and the accommodation in his possession was insufficient for the residence of the family members. Respondent No. 3 also alleged that Babu Lal Sharma had purchased a house No. 217, Mohalla Janglat, Meerut city and had shifted to the same. 3. The application was resisted by Babu Lal Sharma. He claimed that Chander Bhan petitioner No. 2 was a co-tenant of the house in dispute along with him. He further denied that the need of respondent No. 3 was genuine. The application was rejected by the Prescribed Authority on 9.5.1974. Against the aforesaid order, respondent No. 3 went in appeal. The appeal was allowed on 7.4.1975 and the case was remanded to the Prescribed Authority with a direction to implead Chander Bhan as a party in the application under section 21 of the Act. The learned Judge while remanding the case did not record any finding as to whether Chander Bhan was a co-tenant of the premises along with Babu Lal Sharma. 4. After remand, Chander Bhan was impleaded by respondent No. 3. Chander Bhan also filed an objection and claimed that he was a cotenant along with Babu Lal Sharma. The Prescribed Authority rejected the application of respondent No. 3 on 31.8.1976. Against the said order respondent No. 3 went in appeal to the District Judge. The appeal was allowed by the impugned order dated 26.7.1977. Against this order the present writ petition has been filed by Babu Lal Sharma and Chander Bhan. 5. It may be noted that respondent No. 3 had filed the application under section 21(i)(a) of the Act. Under this section an application filed by the landlord can be allowed if he established that the premises is required for occupation as residence by himself. 5. It may be noted that respondent No. 3 had filed the application under section 21(i)(a) of the Act. Under this section an application filed by the landlord can be allowed if he established that the premises is required for occupation as residence by himself. In the application the respondent No. 3 alleged that he required the premises as the house in his possession at that time was insufficient and also contended that the house in dispute was in dilapidated condition and required reconstruction. 6. The first contention made by the learned counsel for the petitioners was that the District Judge committed an error in allowing the appeal and in granting the prayer for the release of the house to respondent No. 3 without recording a finding of the bona fide requirement of the premises by the said respondent. The submission made is well founded. It appears that as the learned District Judge found that Babu Lal Sharma Petitioner No. 1 who was a tenant of the premises, had shifted to another house, there was no need to consider the bona fide requirement of the premises by respondent No. 3. The view of the learned District Judge appears to be erroneous. An application under section 21 (i) (a) of U P. Act No. 13 of 1972 cannot be allowed without a finding that the premises is bona fide required by the landlord for occupation by himself. The fact that the tenant had shifted to another house was immaterial for the purpose of considering the question of bona fide requirement. One can imagine a case where a tenant may have shifted to another house even then the need of the landlord under section 21 of the Act may not be genuine. It was, therefore, incumbent on the learned District Judge to have given a clear finding about the bona fide requirement. Sri S. S. Bhatnagar, learned counsel for respondent No. 3 invited my attention to the judgment of the District Judge where he made an observation to the effect that the petitioners had not shown that the application filed by respondent No. 3 was mala fide. This, to my mind, is not a consideration of the need of respondent No. 3. Sri S. S. Bhatnagar, learned counsel for respondent No. 3 invited my attention to the judgment of the District Judge where he made an observation to the effect that the petitioners had not shown that the application filed by respondent No. 3 was mala fide. This, to my mind, is not a consideration of the need of respondent No. 3. At the same time it may be stated that in the earlier portion of the judgment the District Judge definitely remarked that in view of the fact that Babu Lal Sharma had shifted to another house the need of respondent No. 3 was not required to be considered. The two findings of the District Judge cannot be reconciled. I, therefore, uphold the argument of the learned counsel for the respondent. 7. In view of what I have said above, it is necessary to set aside the judgment of the learned District Judge and to send back the case for him to decide the application afresh. I, however, point out that the finding of the learned District Judge about petitioner No. 2 being a tenant of the premises is also not clear. Since I am sending back the case to the learned District Judge, he is required to give a finding afresh on this controversy as well. At this stage Sri S. S. Bhatnagar, counsel for respondent No. 3 pointed out that in case it was found that petitioner No. 2 was not a tenant and was living on behalf of petitioner no. 1, the need of the petitioner No. 2 to be compared with that of respondent No. 3 would not arise. As I am sending back the case to the learned District Judge, I am not required to express any opinion on it. 8. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The judgment of the learned District Judge is set aside and the case is sent back to him to decide the appeal afresh. He is directed to decide the same expeditiously.