JUDGMENT Bhattacharya, J.: This is a second appeal by the plaintiff, who brought a suit for recovery of possession of the disputed property on a declaration of his title therein and also for mesne profits. In the trial court the plaintiff succeeded but on appeal by the defendants in the first appellate court below, the decree in favour of the plaintiff was set aside and the suit was dismissed. 2. The relevant facts for the purpose of determination of this appeal may be stated in brief One Sarala Bala Dasi took lease of the disputed land from the predecessor-in-interest of the defendant-landlords. The original lease was executed in favour of two persons, namely, Sarala and one Srikanta her paramour. Srikanta was a name-lender. It is admitted by both the parties that in fact Sarala was the tenant. There is no dispute also that the tenancy was for non-agricultural purpose and that the tenancy was governed by the West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act. From the khatians it also appears that the defendant landlords are also recorded as non-agricultural tenants. There is no doubt, therefore, that the defendants-landlords were the non-agricultural tenants and Sarala was the non-agricultural under-tenant as classified in section 3 of the West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act. Admittedly again, the lease was for a period till the death of Sarala i.e. to say, for the life-time of Sarala. Sarala died and one Kishore Sardar, the brother of Sarala was the sale heir and, as such he claimed the suit property. Almost immediately after the death of Sarala, the property was sold to the present plaintiff Binapani Roy. The allegation of the plaintiff is that she got possession but the defendant-landlords by force ousted her and took khas possession of the property in suit. She, therefore, brought a suit for recovery of khas possession, fur declaration of her title in the suit properly and for mesne profits. The plaintiff claimed non agricultural tenancy right in the suit property under the defendant-landlords. 3. Before the trial court the plaintiff relied upon Sub-section (3) of Section 7 of the West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act for her right against eviction. The plaintiff claimed non agricultural tenancy right in the suit property under the defendant-landlords. 3. Before the trial court the plaintiff relied upon Sub-section (3) of Section 7 of the West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act for her right against eviction. Under sub section (3) of Section 7 of the Act, if any non-agricultural land has been held for a term of not less than 12 years under a lease in writing but no term is specified in such lease then the tenant shall get certain rights against eviction. At this stage, however, we are not concerned to see the nature of right. In the present case, admittedly, there is one lease in writing and according to the term of the lease Sarala was to enjoy the lease during the period of her life-time. There is no doubt also that for more than 12 years she was a tenant. Now the question that fell for determination before the courts below was whether in that lease there was any term specified. That is important because if no term is specified, then Sarala or his Successor may have some right against eviction. According to the trial court, there was no "term" in which was specified in the lease. According to him the 'term" to be specified must be in terms of year, months, days, etc. In the lease as it was stated that it was for the life-time of Sarala. According to the trial court there was no knowing as to how many years she would live or for how many months/and, therefore, there was no "term" specified. In this view of the matter, the trial court held that with the death of Sarala the lease did not expire and consequently the plaintiff having purchased the land from the heir of Sarala was entitled to get back the suit lands on the declaration that the plaintiff was a tenant. The learned Additional District Judge who disposed of the appeal, however, was of different view on the meaning of "term" appearing in the last portion of Sub-section (3) of Section 7. The learned Additional District Judge who disposed of the appeal, however, was of different view on the meaning of "term" appearing in the last portion of Sub-section (3) of Section 7. According to the learned Judge, the word "term" appearing for the second time in sub-section (3) of Section 7 does not necessarily mean a specified period expressed in days, months or years, but it means a period during which the lease is to subsist, that is to say, a definite period which can be understood by the parties. In the present case when it was stated in the lease that it was granted for the life time of Sarala, there was tile 'term' specified meaning that the lease would be subsisting during the life-time of Sarala, which was not indefinite. In this view, it was held by the Appellate Court below that Sarala’s heir or successor or the plaintiff would not have any right in the tenancy as alleged due to the provision of Section 7(3) of the West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act. 4. Mr. S.C. Miller appearing on behalf of the appellant contended that mere statement that the lease is for the life time of the lessee is no "term" specified as mentioned in sub-section (3) of section 7. He has contended that in the first portion of sub-section (3) there is a reference to a "term of not less than 12 years" and therefore the word "term" appearing for the second time in the same sub-section would naturally mean "a term" with reference to years as mentioned in the first part of the sub-section. Mr. P.N. Mitter, appearing on behalf of the respondents has, however, opposed this contention as put forward from the side of the appellant. His contention is that the word "term" used for the second time in sub-section (3) must be definite which means specified and when it is stated that the lease is for the life time of Sarala it was quite explicit and the parties knew that the lease would be subsisting so long as the lessee would be alive and as such the "term" was not indefinite because it was clearly specified and known to both the parties. In support of his contention, Mr. P. N. Mitter has referred to a case (1) Indian Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. v. Biswanath Sonar). reported in AIR 1967 SC page 77. In support of his contention, Mr. P. N. Mitter has referred to a case (1) Indian Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. v. Biswanath Sonar). reported in AIR 1967 SC page 77. This case went upto the Supreme Court from this High Court and it relates to the provisions of the West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act. During the argument, the construction of the words "no term is specified as appearing in sub-section (3) of section 7 came up for consideration. The construction made by the Supreme Court goes in favour of the respondents before us. We quote below the relevant portion of the judgment: "A bare perusal of these enactments is sufficient to show that the word "term" used for the first time in (3) indicates that the period of occupation must not be less than 12 years. It cannot mean an agreed period because the latter part says that this applies where "no term" is specified in the lease and in this part the word "term" must obviously mean an agreed period" We, therefore, find that the question raised by Mr. S C. Mitter on behalf of the appellant has already been answered by the Supreme Court as quoted above. The "term" used for the second time in sub-section (3) of Section 7, therefore, means an agreed period of time known to the parties concerned. In the present case the lease was for the life time of the lea see Sarala and both the lessor and the lessee accepted the term. It was an agreed term no doubt and specified and, therefore, in view of the interpretation given by the Supreme Court the plaintiff can have no right as claimed by her in the tenancy created in favour of Sarala, now deceased. We find no merit in this appeal. 5. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed but without costs in the facts and circumstances of this case. Mukherjee, J. : I agree.