JUDGMENT T. U. Mehta, C. J.—This Letters Patet Appeal arises out of the judgment recorded by the Himachal Bench of the Delhi High Court in Regular Second Appeal No. 228 of 1967 on 13-11970. The point which is involved in this appeal is whether by virtue of the provisions contained in Section 3 of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1953, the grazing rights which the respondents held over the shamilat land of the village Dhagiar vest in the Panchayat or not. The Common Lands Act, 1953 referred to above, has been repealed and substituted by Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 and the corresponding section is Section 4 about vesting of rights in the Panchayat. The relevant portion of Section 3 of the Act of 1953 is equivalent to the relevant portion of the Section 4 of the 1961 Act. Since this matter has arisen when the Act of 1953 was in force, we shall refer only to the provisions of Section 3 of that Act which was in the following terms: "Vesting of rights in Panchayats and in non-proprietors —Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force, and notwithstanding any agreement, instrument, custom or usage or any decree or order of any court or other authority, all rights, title and interest whatever in the land— (a) which is included in the Shamlat Deh of any village, shall, on the appointed date vest in a Panchayat having jurisdiction over the village ; (b) which is situated in the Abadi Deh of a village and which is under the house owned by a non-proprietor, shall at the commencement of the Act vest in the said non-proprietor." It is apparent from the above quoted provisions of Section 3 of the Act that so far as the land which is included in Shamlat Deh of any village is concerned, all rights, title and interest therein shall vest in the Panchayat having jurisdiction over the village. 2. Now, the case of the respondents, who have filed this suit in their representative capacity, is that they have got customary grazing rights over the Shamlat Deh land of the village Dhagwar, and since these rights are in the nature of easement rights they do not vest in the Panchayat under Section 3 of the Act. 2. Now, the case of the respondents, who have filed this suit in their representative capacity, is that they have got customary grazing rights over the Shamlat Deh land of the village Dhagwar, and since these rights are in the nature of easement rights they do not vest in the Panchayat under Section 3 of the Act. The contention of the respondents is that Section 3 of the Act contemplates vesting of the rights "in" the land and not "over" the land. It is pointed out on behalf of the respondents that easement rights are the rights over the land and not in the land and therefore their easement rights to graze their cattle over the disputed land do not vest in the Panchayat. 3. The above contention of the respondents has found favour with the learned single Judge with the result that the appellant Panchayat has preferred this Letters Patent Appeal. 4. It is found from the record of the case that the grazing rights claimed by the respondents are the rights arising from the customary easement claimed by them. The respondents belong to a different village while the disputed land is situated within the limits of the village Dhagwar. The revenue record produced in the case shows that the respondents have got customary rights of easement to graze their cattle over the disputed land. 5. In view of these facts, the question which arises to be considered is whether such customary rights of easement of grazing can be said to have vested in the Panchayat by virtue of the above quoted provisions of Section 3 of the Act of 1953. The relevant clause of Section 3 speaks of the right, title and interest whatever "in" the land. There is a definite distinction between the rights which are found "in" a particular piece of land and the rights which are found "over" a particular piece of land. This distinction is pointed out by the Privy Council in Megh Raj v. Allah Rakhia, AIR 1947 PC 72, wherein their Lordships considered the implications of Item 21 of Second List of Schedule II of the Government of India Act, 1953. The distinction is pointed out by their Lordships in this case in the following words : "At to Item 21, land, the governing word is followed by the rest of the item, which goes on the say that is to say. The distinction is pointed out by their Lordships in this case in the following words : "At to Item 21, land, the governing word is followed by the rest of the item, which goes on the say that is to say. These words introduce the most general concept—rights in or over land. Rights in land must include general rights like full ownership or leasehold or all such rights. Rights over land would include easements or other collateral rights, whatever form they might take". These observations show that easement rights cannot be construed as rights "in" the lard so far as the servient tentement is concerned. Easement is defined by Section 4 of the Indian Easement Act as a right which the owner or occupier of certain land possesses, as such, for the beneficial enjoyment of that land, to do and continue to do something, or to prevent and continue to prevent something being done, in or upon, or in respect of certain other land not his own. This definition clearly conveys the idea that the easement right is a right owned by the owner of the dominant tenement over the servient heritage. The disputed land in this case is servient heritage and the easement right of grazing, which the respondents own, is the right over the disputed land. Under section 3 of the Punjab Village Common Lands Act, 1953 what vests in the Panchayat is right, title and interest "in" the land and not "over" the land and, therefore, the view taken by the learned single Judge is, in our opinion, correct. 6. Shri Nag appearing on behalf of the appellant referred to the decision given by a Full Bench of the Punjab High Court in Kangra Valley State Company Ltd. v. Kidar Nath, AIR 1961 Punj. 540. The facts of that case show that the Kangra Valley State Company Limited had lease hold rights over the land in question. Obviously, leasehold rights are the rights in the land and would, therefore, vest in the Panchayat under section 3 of the Act of 1953. The decision has, therefore, no relevance to the facts of the present case. It appears from the judgment recorded in this Full Bench case of the Punjab High Court that the Court did not go into the discussion of the question whether rights "over" the Shamlat land would vest in the Panchayat or not. The decision has, therefore, no relevance to the facts of the present case. It appears from the judgment recorded in this Full Bench case of the Punjab High Court that the Court did not go into the discussion of the question whether rights "over" the Shamlat land would vest in the Panchayat or not. At any rate, this decision having no relevance to the facts of the present case is not found to be of any use to us. 7. Under these circumstances, we find that this appeal should fail. The same is, therefore, dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.