JUDGMENT K.N. Seth, J. - The petitioner claiming to be a confirmed Development Officer of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (hereinafter referred to as the Corporation) filed the present petition challenging the validity of the order of the Divisional Manager dated 5-1-1976 terminating his services. The petition came up for final hearing before a Division Bench. Hon'ble K. N. Singh, J. accepted the stand taken by the petitioner that he was confirmed as Development Officer by an order dated 19-9-1975 and his services could not be terminated in the manner it was sought to be done. Hon'ble Farooqi, J. took the view that the decision as expressed in the order dated 19-9-1975 was not a legal decision; in law it was an offer to the petitioner to continue in service of the Corporation permanently and like any other offer under the law of contract it could not be an effective offer unless it was received by the petitioner. Since the order was not sent out to the petitioner and received by him it could not bind the Corporation merely because the order was communicated to other relevant authorities or because the petitioner has got constructive knowledge of the order. 2. According to the petitioner he was appointed as development officer of the Corporation by Divisional manager by his order dated 10-1-1974. The appointment was on probation on the terms and conditions contained in the letter of appointment. Clause 2 of the letter of appointment provided that the petitioners initial appointment was on probation for a period of twelve months from the date of his joining duties. The probationary period was liable to be extended and the total period beyond which the probationary period could not be extended was 24 months. During the period of probation the petitioner was liable to be discharged from service at any time without previous notice. Clause 12 provided that on satisfactorily completing the period of probation and subject to securing the minimum business as set out and in the manner specified in para. 10 and further subject to observing and complying with all other conditions set out in the letter of appointment the petitioner will be confirmed in the service of the Corporation in Class II. The confirmation will depend inter alia upon the fulfilment of the minimum business set out in para. 10 and further subject to observing and complying with all other conditions set out in the letter of appointment the petitioner will be confirmed in the service of the Corporation in Class II. The confirmation will depend inter alia upon the fulfilment of the minimum business set out in para. 10 and upon the record of post-sales service to the Corporations policy holders and other functions performed by him in the area allotted to him. 3. The petitioner joined the service on 12-1-1974 at Another Block in district Fatehpur. The period of probation was extended from time to time and it was finally extended up to 11-7-1975. According to the petitioner the probationary period was not extended any further and the Divisional Manager by his order dated 19-9-1975 confirmed the petitioner in service as a Development Officer with effect from 1-8-1975. Copies of the order were sent to the Zonal Officer, Kanpur, the Branch Manager, Fatehpur, and the Accounts Department of the Divisional Office, Kanpur, for information and necessary action. 4. In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents it has been asserted that the petitioners period of probation was extended by a further period of six months after 11-7-1975. It has further been averred that on the basis of the office note submitted to the Divisional Manager a tentative order was passed by the Divisional Manager on 19-9-1975 and the office prepared a letter to be sent to the petitioner. The order was, however, not communicated to the petitioner and on 27-9-1975 the petitioners probationary period was extended up to 10-1-1976. In view of the fact that the business performance of the petitioner was not found to be satisfactory his services were terminated by an order dated 5-1-1976. As the petitioner continued to be on probation on that date, he was liable to be discharged from service under Cl. 2 of the letter of appointment. 5. At the time of hearing of the petition the relevant records of the Corporation were produced before the Court. They indicated that the question of the petitioners confirmation was considered in March 1975. His work was not found satisfactory and his period of probation was extended for four months. The office of the Divisional Manager, Kanpur, obtained details about the business secured by the petitioner and other necessary information. They indicated that the question of the petitioners confirmation was considered in March 1975. His work was not found satisfactory and his period of probation was extended for four months. The office of the Divisional Manager, Kanpur, obtained details about the business secured by the petitioner and other necessary information. According to the Data-Sheet the petitioner satisfied the requirements for confirmation as contained in the letter of appointment. On a note put up by the office it was decided to confirm the petitioner and the Divisional Manager appended his signature to the formal letter of confirmation. Copies of the letter of confirmation were sent out to the Zonal Office, Kanpur, and the Accounts Department of the Divisional Office, Kanpur. A controversy has been sought to be raised whether a copy of the letter of confirmation was also sent out to the Branch Manager, Fatehpur, but I do not consider it necessary to enter into this controversy as it has no bearing on the fate of the case. Admittedly the original letter of confirmation was not despatched to the petitioner. The records further indicated that the Divisional Manager visited Khajua on 27-9-1975 in the course of his tour. On return to Kanpur he recorded the following note on the petitioners file: "I have been to Fatehpur and Kha-jau, met Mr. Khare at his hqrs., his business performance does not indicate a healthy trend. We may, therefore, withhold this and review the confirmation after 31st Dec., 1975 taking his cost etc., as on that date." It appears that in pursuance of the above order the formal letter of confirmation addressed to the petitioner was not sent out to him and an order was passed extending the period of probation to 10-1-1976. However, no letter was issued to the petitioner informing him about the extension of period of his probation. This position has not been disputed during the course of hearing. 6. The only question for consideration is whether the order dated 19-9-1975 confirming the petitioners service on completing the period of probation was an effective order of confirmation and the service of the petitioner could not be terminated in the manner it was sought to be done by the order dated 5-1-1976 or whether it remained a tentative order as it was not formally communicated or served on the petitioner and the Corporation could validly terminate the petitioners service under Cl. 2 of the letter of appointment. It is no longer in dispute that a formal letter of confirmation was drawn up and signed by the Divisional Manager, Kanpur, who was the competent authority to pass the order of confirmation in the case of the petitioner. Copies of the letter of confirmation addressed to the petitioner were in fact dispatched to the Zonal Office, Kanpur, and the Accounts Department of the Divisional Office, Kanpur, for information and necessary action but a copy of the letter was not sent out to the petitioner. The petitioner, however, claimed to have received information of his confirmation in service. The contention raised by the Corporation is that since the letter of confirmation was not communicated to the petitioner, the decision remained only a tentative one and did not become effective so as to confer on the petitioner the status of a confirmed Development Officer. 7. The question as to when an order becomes effective has been considered by the Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Amar Singh Harika ( AIR 1966 SC 1313 ). The matter for consideration before the Supreme Court was whether an order of dismissal can be said to be effective only from the date when it is made known or communicated to the concerned public servant. The Court held, rejecting the contention that the order became effective as soon as it was issued, that the mere passing of the order of dismissal would not make it effective unless it was published and communicated to the concerned officer. The Court held, rejecting the contention that the order became effective as soon as it was issued, that the mere passing of the order of dismissal would not make it effective unless it was published and communicated to the concerned officer. Gajen-dragadkar, C. J. speaking for the Court laid down the law thus (at p. 1316):- "We are, therefore, reluctant to hold that an order of dismissal passed by an appropriate authority and kept on its file without communicating it to the officer concerned or otherwise publishing it will take effect as from the date on which the order is actually written out by the said authority; such an order can only be effective after it is communicated to the officer concerned or is otherwise published." In State of Punjab v. Khemi Ram ( AIR 1970 SC 214 ) : (1970 Lab IC 271) after analysing the rule laid down in earlier decisions relating to orders of suspension and dismissal, the Court observed that it was the communication of the impugned order which was held to be essential and in not its actual receipt by the officer concerned and such communication was held to be necessary because till the order is issued and actually sent out to the person concerned the authority making such order would be in a position to change its mind and modify it if it thought fit. But once such an order is sent out, it goes out of the control of such an authority, and therefore, there would be no chance whatsoever of its changing the mind or modifying it. The Supreme Court summarised the law thus (at p. 276 of Lab IC):- "In our view, once an order is issued and it is sent out to the concerned Government servant, it must be held to have been communicated to him, no matter when he actually received it." The Court rejected the contention that it is only from the date of the actual receipt that the order becomes effective. Dealing with the order of dismissal the Court observed that actually knowledge by the officer of an order which is one of dismissal may, perhaps, become necessary because of the consequence which the decision in Amar Singh Harikas case (supra) contemplates. But such consequences would not occur in the case of an officer who has proceeded on leave. 8. Dealing with the order of dismissal the Court observed that actually knowledge by the officer of an order which is one of dismissal may, perhaps, become necessary because of the consequence which the decision in Amar Singh Harikas case (supra) contemplates. But such consequences would not occur in the case of an officer who has proceeded on leave. 8. The rule laid down by the Supreme Court may safely be taken to be that mere passing of an order is not enough and unless it is communicated to the person concerned it is not effective. In case of dismissal, however, the order can be effective after it is communicated to the officer concerned or is otherwise published. The basic question involved in the present case is whether these principles should be rigidly applied to an order of confirmation. In case of an order of suspension or dismissal the communication or receipt of the order is vitally important and, as observed by the Supreme Court, various complications may arise if it is held that mere passing of the order has the effect of suspending the officer concerned or terminating his services. If before receiving the order the officer has exercised his power and jurisdiction to take decision or do acts within his authority and powers would these acts and decisions be rendered invalid after the order passed against him is known? It is on these grounds that the Supreme Court took the view that communication of the order is essential and in case of dismissal the order must either be served on the officer concerned or it is otherwise published which may impute knowledge of the order to him. To my mind these considerations do not strictly apply to a case involving confirmation or other orders of a similar nature, like granting increment or permitting an officer to cross the efficiency bar, where the officer concerned is not required to do anything in consequence of the order passed. The mere passing of an order may not be effective if it is left at there but if it is followed up by actions which may indicate that it was meant to be given effect to, the failure to formally communicate the order to the person concerned would not destroy the effectiveness of the decision taken. The mere passing of an order may not be effective if it is left at there but if it is followed up by actions which may indicate that it was meant to be given effect to, the failure to formally communicate the order to the person concerned would not destroy the effectiveness of the decision taken. In the present ease it is clear that the decision to confirm the petitioner was arrived at after fully considering his business performance as indicated by the Data-Sheet relating to him. The order was actually signed by the officer concerned and copies were sent out to relevant departments for information and necessary action. If the decision was not final, there could be no sense in communicating the decision to other departments which were concerned with the confirmation of the petitioner on the post that he held. There appears to be no reason to doubt the assertion of the petitioner that he did come to know of the order of confirmation and that the order dated 27-9-1975 extending the period of probation was not communicated to him. 9. The contention of the Corporation that the order dated 19-9-1975 was in the nature of an offer under the law of contract and since it was open to the petitioner to accept or reject it, it could not be an effective offer until it was received by the petitioner is wholly untenable. The Corporation is a statutory body. The service conditions of the employees of Corporation are regulated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960 which are statutory and have the force of law. In the case of a Government servant the origin of service is certainly contractual. There is an offer and acceptance in every case but once appointed to his post or office the rights and obligations of the employee are no longer determined by consent of both parties but by the statutory Regulations. The relationship between the Corporation and its servant is not like an ordinary contract of service between a master and a servant. It is much more than a purely contractual relationship voluntarily entered into between the parties. The rights and obligations of both the parties are fixed by Regulations. In the present case the decision to confirm the petitioner on the post he held was taken keeping in view Cl. It is much more than a purely contractual relationship voluntarily entered into between the parties. The rights and obligations of both the parties are fixed by Regulations. In the present case the decision to confirm the petitioner on the post he held was taken keeping in view Cl. 12 of the letter of appointment and in conformity with the Regulations. The order of the Divisional Manager confirming the petitioner cannot be read as a mere offer requiring the petitioner to accept or reject it. 10. In my opinion the stand taken by the petitioner that by virtue of the order of the Divisional Manager dated 19-9-1975 he acquired the status of a confirmed Development Officer and his service could not be terminated without complying with the provisions of the statutory Regulations relating to termination of service of a confirmed employee of the Corporation and the order D/- 5-1-1976 terminating the services of the petitioner on the basis that he continued to be on probation deserves to be quashed must be upheld. 11. The papers may be laid before the Bench concerned for orders.