JUDGMENT Monoj Kumar Mukherjee, J. 1. All these three appeals arising out of the judgment dated 24.5.69 rendered by the learned Judge, Special Court, Burdwan in Special Court Case No. 3 of 1963, have been heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment. 2. At all material times Netai Hari Roy, the appellant in Criminal Appeal No 350/69 was the contractor of Bejoy Chand Hospital, commonly known as B.C. Hospital, Burdwan for supplying dietary and other articles. Nilkanta Chatterjee, the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 351 of 1969 was one of his employees looking after the said contract job. Of the various articles that were to be supplied to the Hospital, some were tendered articles and some were non-tendered. For payment of the price of non-tendered articles to the contractor Netai Hari, the Hospital authorities used to obtain the prevailing market rates of those articles from the Sub-divisional Agricultural Marketing Officer, Burdwan (hereinafter referred to as the Marketing Officer) through correspondences. On receiving communication about the market rates from the Marketing Officer, the Hospital authorities used to pass the bills of the contractor in accordance with the rates furnished by the Marketing Officer. 3. The prosecution case is that during the period from March, 1959 to February, 1960 the accused Netai Hari and his employee Nilkanta entered into a criminal conspiracy with Satya Mullick, an employee of the Burdwan Collectorate and the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 314 of 1969, one Haraprosad Chatterjee, another employee of the said Collectorate and Makhan Chowdhury, head clerk of the Office of the District Medical Officer, Burdwan and collected letters and correspondences addressed to the Marketing Officer by the B.C. Hospital and replied to those letters themselves under the signature of either Satya or Haraprasad designating themselves as the Marketing Officer and through those letters inflated rates in respect of ice were supplied to the B.C. Hospital on the basis of which inflated bills were prepared and passed for payments and subsequently encashed by the contractor. Sri Dwijendra Chandra Chakraborty (P.W. 30), an Inspector of Police attached to the District Enforcement Branch, Burdwan got an information and in pursuance of that information he searched the house of the accused Netai Hari at Ranigunge Bazar, Burdwan on 17.7.60 after obtaining the requisite search warrant from the Magistrate. Sri Dwijendra Chandra Chakraborty (P.W. 30), an Inspector of Police attached to the District Enforcement Branch, Burdwan got an information and in pursuance of that information he searched the house of the accused Netai Hari at Ranigunge Bazar, Burdwan on 17.7.60 after obtaining the requisite search warrant from the Magistrate. A number of documents including a draft of a letter in the hand writing of the accused Netai Hari purportedly addressed by the Marketing Officer to the Resident Medical Officer, B.C. Hospital, a typed letter dated 5.3.60 regarding quotation of ice-addressed to the Resident Medical Officer, B. C. Hospital by the Marketing Officer and a type writer machine were seized therefrom. On the selfsame day Sub-Inspector S.N. Chatterjee searched the house of one Satya Prasad Burman and seized some documents. After the above two searches and seizures Sri Chakraborty lodged a complaint with the Burdwan Police Station and on the basis thereof, Burdwan Police Station Case No. 39 dated 17.7.60 was started against Netai Hari, Nilkanta, Satya Prasad and others under Ss. 420/409/468/471/120B of the Indian Penal Code Sri Chakraborty took up investigation of the case and seized various documents from the Office of the Marketing Officer and the B.C. Hospital. He also searched the house of Satya Mullick on 28.7.60 and seized various documents including typed letters bearing the signatures of Satya Mullick or Haraprosad Chatterjee describing themselves as the Marketing Officer and addressed to the Resident Medical Officer, B.C. Hospital. In course of investigation he arrested some other persons including Biswanath Roy, Dharani Dhar Malakar and Haraprosad Chatterjee. He took the specimen writing of Makhan and Dharani Dhar before the Magistrate. He could not, however, take the specimen hand writing of Netai, Nilkanta or Satya as they refused to give the same. The Investigating Officer, then seized some petitions for casual leave made by Satya and Haraprosad together with other documents bearing their signatures from the Burdwan Collectorate on 20.8.60. He sent some of the documents seized during investigation including the typed letters bearing the signatures of Satya Mullick and Haraprosad and the issue together maintained at the B.C. Hospital to the hand writing expert. After examination of witnesses and obtaining necessary sanction for prosecution against some of the persons arrested in connection with the case, the Investigating Officer submitted chargesheet against eight accused persons including the three appellants. After examination of witnesses and obtaining necessary sanction for prosecution against some of the persons arrested in connection with the case, the Investigating Officer submitted chargesheet against eight accused persons including the three appellants. He thereafter, made a prayer for allotment of the case and, on receipt of the order of allotment, the learned Judge, Special Court, Burdwan took cognizance of the case and issued process against the eight accused persons. After thirtyfour witnesses were examined by the prosecution and a number of documents were exhibited at its instance, the learned Judge by an order dated November 10, 1965 framed charges against five of the accused persons while discharging the three others, namely, Biswanath Roy, Satya Barman and Dharani Dhar Malakar as there was no prima facie case against them. A common charge under S. 120B/420 of the Indian Penal Code was framed against all the five accused persons, namely. Netai Hari Roy, Nilkanta Chatterjee, Makhanlal Chowdhury, Haraprosad Chatterjee and Satya Kinkar Mullick. Charges under Ss. 474 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code were framed against accused Netai Hari Roy. A common charge under S.471 of the Indian Penal Code was framed against Netai Hari Roy and Nilkanta. Separate charges under Ss. 419, 476 and 468 of the Indian Penal Code and under S.5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 were framed against accused Satya Kinkar Mullick. Separate charges under S.476 of the Indian Penal Code and under S.5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 were framed against Haraprosad Chatterjee. A charge under the above section of Prevention of Corruption Act was also framed against accused Makhan. During the pendency of the trial accused Haraprasad Chatterjee died and as such the case proceeded against the three appellants and Makhan. 4. The defence of the accused persons as it appears from the trend of the cross-examination and statements made during their examination under S. 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, was that they were innocent and were not parties to any conspiracy. The accused Satya Mullick, further, stated that the documents allegedly seized from his house were planted for which he was obliged to file an application before the learned Magistrate. 5. The learned Judge, on a consideration of the materials on record, found the accused Makhan Chowdhury not guilty of all the charges levelled against him and accordingly acquitted him. The accused Satya Mullick, further, stated that the documents allegedly seized from his house were planted for which he was obliged to file an application before the learned Magistrate. 5. The learned Judge, on a consideration of the materials on record, found the accused Makhan Chowdhury not guilty of all the charges levelled against him and accordingly acquitted him. The learned Judge, however, found all the three appellants guilty of the charge under S. 123B/420 of the Indian Penal Code and convicted and sentenced each-, of them to suffer rigorous imprisonment for three months and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/- in default to suffer rigorous imprisonment for three months more. He found the accused Netai Hari and Nilkanta also guilty of the charge under S.471 of Indian Penal Code and sentenced both of them to suffer rigorous imprisonment for three months each and to pay a fine of Rs. 300/- each. The accused Netai Hari was also found guilty of the charge under S.420 of the Indian Penal Code but no separate sentence was passed. Accused Satya Kinkar was found guilty of the charge under S.419 of the Indian Penal Code and was sentenced to suffer three months' rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs. 200/- in default to suffer rigorous imprisonment for three months more. Accused Satya was also convicted under S.468 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to suffer three months' rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs. 300/- in default three months' rigorous imprisonment more. He, further, directed that the substantive sentences passed against each of the three accused should run concurrently. Netai Hari was however, acquitted of the offence under S. 474 of the Indian Penal Code and Satya Hari of the offences under S.476 of the Indian Penal Code and under S.5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. 6. We have heard Mr. Sankar Das Banerjee the learned Advocate appearing with Mr. Balai Chandra Roy and Mr. Sovan Lal Hazra on behalf of the appellants Netai Hari Roy and Nilkanta Chatterjee and Mr. N.C. Banerjee appearing with Mr. Arun Kumar Mukherjee on behalf of the appellant Satyakinkar Mullick. We have also heard Mr. Surathi Mohan Sanyal, the learned Advocate appearing for the respondent State of West Bengal in all the three appeals. Balai Chandra Roy and Mr. Sovan Lal Hazra on behalf of the appellants Netai Hari Roy and Nilkanta Chatterjee and Mr. N.C. Banerjee appearing with Mr. Arun Kumar Mukherjee on behalf of the appellant Satyakinkar Mullick. We have also heard Mr. Surathi Mohan Sanyal, the learned Advocate appearing for the respondent State of West Bengal in all the three appeals. We have also gone through the oral and documentary evidence adduced in the case and the judgment under challenge. 7. Before we proceed to consider the merits of the appeals we propose to dispose of a point of law raised at the outset on behalf of the appellants regarding admissibility of certain documents. It has been contended on behalf of the appellants that the charges framed in this case against all the accused persons relate to the period from March 1959 to February 1960 and as such the learned Trial Judge erred in law in entertaining and relying on evidence relating to period beyond that mentioned in the charge. On a perusal of the record we find that the learned Judge has, in fact, referred to and relied upon some oral and documentary evidence relating to period beyond that mentioned in the charges. The question, therefore, that falls for determination is whether, evidence, adduced in respect of a period ocher than that mentioned in the charge could have been admitted or relied upon for the purpose of ascertaining whether the charges framed have been proved or not. It is true, as a general proposition, that the evidence of commissions or omissions constituting the offence is to be confined to the period mentioned in the charge, but for the purpose of the charge of conspiracy, however, there cannot be such a blanket ban as there are certain provisions of the Evidence Act other than S.10 with the aid of which evidence outside the period mentioned in the charge can be admitted and relied upon. In the instant case the charge of conspiracy against the accused persons, that is between the period from March 1959 to February 1960 at Burdwan the accused persons agreed with one another to do or caused to be done illegal acts, namely, to cheat the B.C. Hospital, Burdwan and some of its officers by dishonestly inducing them to recommend payments to pass and deliver an excess amount of money against inflated bills drawn by Netaihari Roy as also by causing to commit and/or by committing forging of market rates submitted with those bills, which were done in pursuance of the said agreement. To prove the above charge all evidence, which go to show that the bills submitted for that period were inflated and that the market rates submitted therewith were forged is certainly admissible, notwithstanding that such evidence may necessarily refer to and narrate acts of the conspirators beyond the period of conspiracy but should be within a reasonable limit and not to remote. Then again in a charge of conspiracy the conduct in general of each individual co conspirator including his acts, writings and statements is evidence against himself. Such conduct, irrespective of the time to which it relates can be relied on by the prosecution to show the criminality of the intention of the individual accused with reference to his proved participation in the alleged conspiracy. Such evidence would come u/s.8 and 14 of the Evidence Act and would be admissible This view was expressed by the Supreme Court in the case of Sardul Singh Caveeshar v. The State of Bombay reported in AIR 1957 Supreme Court 747 and we propose to consider the evidence keeping in view the above principle. (In paragraphs 8 and 9 his lordship discussed facts.) 10. From the above discussion of evidence, We are fully satisfied that the appellant Netaihari Roy was a diet contractor of B.C. Hospital and he used to supply different commodities including ice which was a non-tendered commodity. The rate, according to which the contractor was to be paid for such supply of ice was the rate furnished by the Marketing Officer. Burdwan and for that purpose the hospital authorities used to write letters to the. Marketing Officer who in his turn used to furnish the rates through written replies. The rate, according to which the contractor was to be paid for such supply of ice was the rate furnished by the Marketing Officer. Burdwan and for that purpose the hospital authorities used to write letters to the. Marketing Officer who in his turn used to furnish the rates through written replies. The bills of the contractor were to he accompanied by the market rate, sheets supplied by the Marketing Officer at the time of presentation before the Resident Medical Officer for being passed for payment. 11. Mr. Balai Chandra Roy, the learned advocate appearing for the contractor submitted that there is no evidence on record that the contractor had to submit market rates along with his bills nor there is any evidence to show that bills were to be passed and payments were to be made, only according to the market rates to be furnished by the Marketing Officer. We are, however, unable to accept the contention of Mr. Roy. The evidence of P.W. 33 Dr. U.N. Saha, who was the Chief Medical Officer is, that along with the bills submitted by Netaihari Roy 'there were market rates attached by him where necessary. The necessity of such submission of market rates were in respect of non-tendered articles supplied by the contractor. The evidence of P.W. 1 Monindra Nath Bhattacharya, a clerk attached to the hospital is that the quotations were to be produced along with the bills. The evidence of P.W. 10 that he noted irregularities, such as, there was no invitation of tender issued by any committee and the rates of the articles, particularly of ice were not certified by the Agricultural Marketing Officer, clearly indicate that without such market rates no bills were allowed to be submitted by the contractor for supply of non-tendered articles. The evidence of P.W. 12 Shibapada Mondal and P.W. 13 Nirode Baran Singha, who were attached to the Office of the Chief Medical Officer clearly indicate that for encashment of bill, copies of market rate used to be sent along with the contractor's bills and in cases where no open tender was issued for purchase of articles, quotations were obtained from Agricultural Marketing Officer or Circle Officer. The positive evidence of Amulya Prosad Roy (P.W. 14) is that along with the bills of ice etc., supplied there is a market-sheet attached and after this is submitted by a contractor the office prepares the proforma and then it comes to his office and he places the same before the District Medical Officer. After he signs the bills they are sent to Chief Medical Officer for counter signature. The accused Netaihari also in his examination u/s. 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure slated that at times slip of bazar rates were enclosed with the bills. All these evidence and material on records clearly prove that the bills for non-tendered articles were to be accompanied by market rates supplied by the Marketing Officer and the contractor was fully aware of the same. There is also no dispute that at the material time ice was a non-tendered article. (In paragraphs 12 and 13 his lordship discussed facts) 14. As we have already indicated, the documents (Y series) have been formally proved only to the extent of the signatures appearing thereon, which, according to the prosecution witnesses, are either of S.P. Mullick or H.P. Chatterjee. According to the prosecution case the contents of all these documents indicate the market rates supplied by the accused persons with inflated price of ice shown and in fact, the entire prosecution case rests upon the contents of these documents. In other words, if the contents of these documents can not be looked into for not having been formally exhibited, as contended by Mr. Banerjee, the entire prosecution case must fail. Let us, therefore, now consider whether the contents of the documents can be said to have been proved enabling us to look into the same. 15. Section 67 of the Evidence Act does not lay down any specific mode of proof and it only provides that if a document is alleged to he signed or to have been written wholly or in part by any person the signature or the handwriting of so much of the document as is alleged to be in that person's handwriting must be proved to be in his handwriting. or in other words. S. 67 only enjoins that before a document can be looked into it has to be proved but does not provide for the mode of proof. or in other words. S. 67 only enjoins that before a document can be looked into it has to be proved but does not provide for the mode of proof. Section 47 of the Evidence Act which comes under the part relating to relevancy of facts provide that opinions of persons who are acquainted with the handwriting of a particular person are relevant facts and the person who can be said to be acquainted with the handwriting is described therein. Similarly, opinion of a handwriting expert for identifying a handwriting is also a relevant fact. It would thus appear that the Evidence Act has not laid down any specific manner of proving a handwriting but has only laid down that evidence of certain persons is relevant in proof of a document. 16. Wigmore in his treatise on Evidence (Third Edition, Vol. 7, page no. 606) while discussing different mode of authentication of documents observed : "Accordingly, it seems generally conceded that the more contents of a written communication, purporting to be a particular person's, are of themselves not sufficient evidence of genuineness. Only in special circumstances, where the contents reveal a knowledge or other trait peculiarly referable to a single person,' could the contents alone suffice, However, where the necessity above-mentioned does in fact exist, namely the impossibility of obtaining handwriting testimony, it would seem to follow that resort must be had to the evidence from contents, at any rate, in some circumstances or upon the facts of a particular case." 17. Proof of documents, by their contents have also been acknowledged by our Courts as a proof by circumstantial evidence. In the case of Barindra Kumar Ghosh v. Emperor. reported in the ILR XXXVII Calcutta, page 467 (at page 524), Justice Carduff while considering the question whether certain letters could be attributed to one of the accused said-: "The stereotyped methods of proof thus went by the wall. But I am unable to concede, and I can find no authority for the proposition, that a particular individual's authorship of a document cannot be established by the force of circumstantial evidence." and further said: “And one can readily imagine cases in which circumstantial evidence might be immeasurably superior to must if not all of the stereotyped media of proof. But I am unable to concede, and I can find no authority for the proposition, that a particular individual's authorship of a document cannot be established by the force of circumstantial evidence." and further said: “And one can readily imagine cases in which circumstantial evidence might be immeasurably superior to must if not all of the stereotyped media of proof. For example, A, whose credit is unimpeachable, is able to swear that B was the sole occupant of a room, and that, as soon as B left it, he (A) entered and found a letter, with the ink still 'wet, lying on the table. There could be no more convincing 'and conclusive evidence that B wrote that letter, however feigned the handwriting might be, however unlike B's ordinary penmanship, however strong B's denial. I cannot believe that the law would reject such evidence; I can find nothing in the Evidence Act to exclude it; but, on the contrary, it seems to me that it would be admissible under S. 6, or S. 7, or S. 9, or S.11, and I consider that those provisions may be appealed to here." 18. In the case of Karali Prasad Dutta & Ors. v. East India Railway Co. reported in AIR 1928 Calcutta page 498, a Division Bench of our Court quoted with approval an earlier decision of a, Single Judge that S.60 and 67 (Evidence Act) were somewhat ambiguous but that it was never intended by S.67 that direct evidence of handwriting was always necessary, but the section merely stated, with' reference to deeds, what was the universal rule in all cases that person who makes an allegation must prove it and lays down no new rule as to the kind of proof to be given; and that it was never intended by S.60 to exclude circumstantial evidence of a thing which could be seen, heard and felt though at first' sight the section might appear to have that, meaning. 19. The Supreme 'Court, in the case' of Mobarik Ali Ahamed v. State of Bombay reported in AIR 1957 Supreme, Court page 857 while repelling a similar contention as raised in the cases, by the learned advocates for the appellants, observed :-. “The proof of the genuineness of a document is proof of the authorship of the document and is proof of a fact 'like that of any other fact. “The proof of the genuineness of a document is proof of the authorship of the document and is proof of a fact 'like that of any other fact. The evidence relating thereto may be direct 'or circumstantial. It may consist of direct evidence of a person who saw the document being written or the signature being affixed. It may be proof of the handwriting of the contents, or of the signature, by one of the modes provided in Ss. 45 and 47 of the Indian Evidence Act. It may also be proved by internal evidence afforded by the contents of the document. This last mode or proof by the contents may be of considerable value where the disputed document purports to be a link in u chain 'of correspondence, some links in which are proved to the satisfaction of the court in such a situation the person who is the recipient of the document, be it either a letter or a telegram, would be in a reasonably good position both with reference to his prior knowledge of the writing or the signature of the alleged sender, limited though it may be, as also his knowledge at the subject matter of the chain of correspondence, to speak to its authorship. In an appropriate case the court may also be in a position to judge whether the document constitutes a genuine link in the chain of correspondence and' thus to determine its authorship. We are unable, therefore, to say that the approach adopted by the courts below in arriving at the conclusion that the letters are genuine is open to any serious legal objection. The question, if any, can only be as to the adequacy of the material on which the conclusion as to the genuineness of the letters is arrived at. That however is a matter which we cannot permit to be canvassed before us. A few of the letters said to have been received from the appellants as stated above, do not bear his signatures. These were held to have been proved by the circumstantial evidence as pointed out and we see no objection thereto." 20. That however is a matter which we cannot permit to be canvassed before us. A few of the letters said to have been received from the appellants as stated above, do not bear his signatures. These were held to have been proved by the circumstantial evidence as pointed out and we see no objection thereto." 20. From the foregoing discussions, therefore" the following propositions emerge, Though the ordinary methods of proving a document are by calling as a witness the person, who executed the document or saw it executed or signed or is qualified to express an opinion as to the handwriting there can be other modes of proof of such documents. Some of the other modes are by comparison of the handwriting as' envisaged u/s 73 of the Evidence Act, by evidence of a handwriting expert u/s.45 of the Evidence Act, by admission of the person against whom the document is tendered and by circumstantial evidence. But in arriving at the conclusion, about the proof by circumstantial evidence, the principle which inevitably has to be followed for reception and acceptance of such evidence has to be borne in mind and that is the circumstantial evidence must be of sufficient strength to carry, conviction. In other words, circumstantial evidence as a mode of proof of authorship or execution of documents is a legitimate method of proving a document and such evidence may consist of the internal evidence of the contents of the document and other surrounding circumstances. (From paragraphs 21 to 24 evidence and fact have been discussed) 25. From the evidence discussed above, therefore we find that the content's of the documents marked (Y series) go to show that by these documents certain market rates were being furnished to the hospital authority by the office of the marketing officer under the signature of accused Satya Mullick or Haro Prasad Chatterjee, The contents further show that some time forwarding letters were being issued with the market rates "furnished and certain memo numbers were given" therein. The evidence on, record prove that the memo numbers of the issuing office appearing in the said documents also appear in a note book written by the accused Satya Mullick and found from his house. The evidence on, record prove that the memo numbers of the issuing office appearing in the said documents also appear in a note book written by the accused Satya Mullick and found from his house. The evidence on record also prove that the stamp and seal appearing thereon are neither those of the Sub-divisional Agricultural Marketing Officer nor were those memos issued by the said office. It has also been proved that accused Satya Mullic and Haro Prasad Chatterjee, the signatories in these typed letters, were not the Sub-divisional Agricultural Marketing' Officer as indicated therein. These circumstances lead to the only conclusion that the signatories were the authorities of these documents and they signed the documents knowing the content thereof. In view of the above conclusion we are fully satisfied that the contents of the documents have been proved by circumstantial evidence and the contents of the said documents can be treated as legal evidence in the instant case. 26. Before we conclude our general discussions about the case presented before us we would like to advert to another submission made by Mr. Balai Roy appearing on behalf of the contractor Netai Hari and his employee Nilkantha. Mr. Roy contended that the ice being a non-tendered article, the contractor was entitled to offer any rate for supply of the same and it was for the hospital to accept or refuse supply at such rate. According to Mr. Roy even if the market rate was less than Rs.10/- per maund of ice, as contended by the prosecution, the contractor was within its right to charge Rs.10/- being the rate offered by him and even it such rate was not acceptable to the hospital authority, there cannot be any question of inducement or cheating because it was the prerogative of the contractor to fix his own rate. Mr. Roy contended that even if the contractor submitted forged market rates showing ice at Rs.10/- per maund, such user of forged documents cannot be said to be for the purpose of cheating and therefore all the charges framed against the accused must fail. We are, however, unable to accept this contention of Mr. Roy. 27. Mr. Roy contended that even if the contractor submitted forged market rates showing ice at Rs.10/- per maund, such user of forged documents cannot be said to be for the purpose of cheating and therefore all the charges framed against the accused must fail. We are, however, unable to accept this contention of Mr. Roy. 27. As already discussed, the material on records clearly prove that the contractor was to be paid according to the rates prevailing in the market, which were to be supplied by the Marketing Officer and if the accused submitted such forged market rates showing inflated price of ice it was to induce the hospital authority to pay at such inflated rates. As we have already indicated the rates shown in the bills submitted by the contractor in his bills were Rs.10/- and the market rate of Ice, as it appears from the evidence of P.W. 4 Marketing Officer, was at the material time Rs. 2.50 n.p. per maund to Rs. 3/- per maund. while during the summer the rate fluctuated between Rs. 2.50 n.p. per maund and Rs. 6.50 n.p. per slab of three maund 30 seers. In answer to a question put by the Court this witness Stated that ice was never sold at Burdwan at Rs. 10/- per maund. By memo, being number 1719/BCH dated November 5,1959 addressed to the Sub-divisional Marketing Officer, Sadar Burdwan (exhibit 10/3) which was duly received by office of P.W. 5, the hospital authority wanted to know the market rates for the month of October, 1959 of certain commodities including ice and the office copy of the reply given by the Marketing Officer through his memo number 1740/V-23, dated November 16, 1959 (Ext. 10/2) show that the rate of ice was given as Rs. 2.50 per maund. The evidence of Bhola Nath Khanna, P.W. 8 who dealt in ice also proves that in 1959-60 the wholesale rate of ice was Rs. 3.75 per maund and the retail rate of sale on credit was Rs. 5/- per maund. The evidence of P.W. 4 and P.W. 8 and the contemporaneous document (Ext. 10/2) clearly show that at the time the rate of ice was much less than Rs. 10/-. 3.75 per maund and the retail rate of sale on credit was Rs. 5/- per maund. The evidence of P.W. 4 and P.W. 8 and the contemporaneous document (Ext. 10/2) clearly show that at the time the rate of ice was much less than Rs. 10/-. On behalf of the contractor, however, a number of documents have been exhibited to indicate that the hospital authority accepted the tender rate of Rs.10/- per maund for ice to be supplied by the contractor Netaihari for the period from 1.4.57 to 31.3.58. Relying on these documents it has been contended that price of ice as deposed to by the Marketing Officer is wholly unacceptable. In the instant case we are not concerned with rate of ice prevailing before or after the period now under consideration by us, and it is immaterial whether the rate offered by Netaihari at Rs.10/- per maund of ice were accepted by the Hospital authority for other periods. Here we are only concerned with market rates during the period March, 1959 to February, 1960 and whether the contractor while submitting his bills furnished inflated market rates. The evidence clearly prove that market rate at the material time as certified by the marketing officer was much less than the market rate prevailing and that rate at which the bills were submitted were inflated rates. The evidence clearly prove that the contractor was to submit market rates along with the bills and the documents showing the market rates (Y series) prove that the rates indicated therein were shown at Rs.10/- per maund of ice. (In paragraphs 28 to 32 lordship considered individual items of evidence). 33. Though the contents of the documents (marked Y for identification) and the handwriting appearing in the memo No. 157 dated 4th February 1960 (Exhibit 10/5) have not been proved by any of the witnesses, the circumstantial evidence on record clearly prove that the accused appellant Satya Kinkar Mullick was the author thereof. The circumstances proved are (i) the signatures appearing thereon are those of Satya Mullick, (ii) Exhibit. The circumstances proved are (i) the signatures appearing thereon are those of Satya Mullick, (ii) Exhibit. 10/5, was recovered from the possession of Satya, (iii) handwritten endorsement appearing thereon contains a reference of a memo being number 9 M.O. dated 13.2.60, (iv) the same memo number appears in the document containing the signature of Satya Mullick (marked Y for identification), (v) the memo number appearing thereon finds place together with the contents of the document (marked Y) in the Exercise Book (Ext. 24) proved to be in the 'handwriting of accused Satya Mullick and (vi) Ext. 24 was recovered from his house. (In paragraphs 34, to 38 his lordship discussed facts). 39. Since the transaction for the month of December 1959, January 1960 and February 1960 clearly show that there was a conspiracy amongst the accused persons namely, Netaihari' Roy, Satya Mullick and Haro Prasad Chatterjee (since deceased) and some hospital employees to cheat the hospital authority by forging market rate sheets and submitting inflated bills, we need not go into further discussion in respect of transactions of other months mentioned in the charge.' 40. So far as accused Nilkanta is concerned the only evidence that has been adduced in the case is that he sometime took delivery of some letters from the hospital addressed to the Sub-divisional Marketing Officer asking for market rates and in support of the same, signatures of Nilkanta appearing in the issue register of the hospital in token of receipt of some such letters have been proved (Exts.4/3 dated 4.3.59, 4/4 dated 4.5.59, 4/5 dated 6.6.59 and 4/6 dated 6.7.59). But then receipt of such letters by itself do not conclusively prove that Nilkantawas' a party to the conspiracy as he might have accepted those letters on behalf of his master namely, Netaihari Roy and handed over the same to him without knowing that the same were to be utilized for submission of inflated bills. Mere receipt of letters by Nilkanta on behalf of his master do not conclusively prove that he was aware of or was a party to the conspiracy hatched by the other accused persons. 41. Mere receipt of letters by Nilkanta on behalf of his master do not conclusively prove that he was aware of or was a party to the conspiracy hatched by the other accused persons. 41. On a consideration of the materials on record, we are satisfied that the prosecution has been able to prove beyond all reasonable doubt that the charge of conspiracy against Satyakinkar Mullick and Netai Hari Roy, two of the appellants before us, but the charge of conspiracy has not been proved conclusively so far as Nilkanta is concerned. 42. As regards the specific charge of cheating framed against the appellant Netai Hari it has been proved in this case that Netai Hari submitted inflated bills by showing the price of ice at Rs.10/- pre maund even though the price was much less and for the purpose of receiving payments on touch inflated rate he induced the hospital authority to recommend payments by, enclosing forged market rates with the same. There is no dispute that Netai Hari obtained payments at the inflated rates shown in his bills and therefore the charge u/s. 420 of Indian Penal Code has also been conclusively proved against Netaihari. So far as the charge u/s. 471 of Indian Penal Code is concerned we have already discussed and found that Market rates submitted with the bills were forged as the same were not sent by the Marketing Officer from whom they were asked for and the rate sheets submitted with the bills was prepared either by the accused., Haro Prasad Chatterjee or Satya Mullick and the recovery of copy of such market rates from the house of accused, Netai Hari unmistakably prove, that he was fully aware that the sane were forged. The charge u/s 471 of the Indian Penal Code against Netaihari has therefore also been conclusively proved. In absence of any evidence on record that Nilkanta submitted the forged, market rate sheets or that he was aware of the same the charge u/s 471 of Indian Penal Code against Nilkanta Chatterjee, however, fails. As regards, the charge under S.468 of the Indian Penal Code against Satya Mullick, we have already found that some of the documents (marked Y series) were signed by Satya Kinkar Mullick posing himself as the Sub-divisional Marketing Officer, Sadar, Burdwan though he never worked in such capacity. As regards, the charge under S.468 of the Indian Penal Code against Satya Mullick, we have already found that some of the documents (marked Y series) were signed by Satya Kinkar Mullick posing himself as the Sub-divisional Marketing Officer, Sadar, Burdwan though he never worked in such capacity. There is thus no manner of doubt that Satya forged these documents and he used it for the purpose of cheating the Bejoy Chand Hospital and its officers to dishonestly induce them to recommend, pass and make payment an excess amount of money against inflated bills of the contractor Netaihari. The charge u/s. 468 of the Indian Penal Code therefore has been brought home against, accused Satyakinkar Mullick. As regards the charge u/s. 419 of the Indian Penal Code there is no evidence on record that Satya impersonated as Sub-divisional Marketing Officer and hence this charge must fail. 43. On the conclusions as above the convictions of Netai Hari Roy, in respect of all the charges framed against him are upheld. The convictions of Satya Kinkar Mullick for the charges under Ss.120B/420 of the Indian Penal Code and under S. 68 of the Indian Penal Code are upheld but the conviction under S.419 of the Indian Penal Code is set aside. The convictions and sentences passed against Nilkanta Chatterjee for both the charges framed against him are hereby set aside. 44. Coming now to the question of the sentence we find that the case against the appellant was instituted as far back as 17.7.60 and the sentences were imposed on them in May 1969 and during all these period the accused persons must have suffered great mental agony and anguish. We also find from the record that both the appellants Netai Hari Roy and Satya Kinkar Mullick have undergone detention for some period during the investigation of the case. Besides Satya Mullick has also undergone imprisonment after his conviction till his release pursuant to the order of this Court after admission of his appeal. We are, not unmindful of the fact that the offences for which the above two appellants have been found guilty are compulsorily punishable with substantive imprisonment, but then. Besides Satya Mullick has also undergone imprisonment after his conviction till his release pursuant to the order of this Court after admission of his appeal. We are, not unmindful of the fact that the offences for which the above two appellants have been found guilty are compulsorily punishable with substantive imprisonment, but then. These two appellants will be entitled to set off in accordance with the provisions of S.428 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 in case any substantive imprisonment is imposed upon them, Considering all these facts and circumstances, we are oat inclined to send these two appellants behind the bar again after such a long lapse of time. Accordingly, we reduce the sentence of the appellants to the period undergone while maintaining the sentences of fine imposed upon them for the convictions which are being upheld by us. 45. In the result, the Criminal Appeal No. 351 of 1969 is allowed and the convictions and sentences passed against Nilkanta Chatterjee under S. 120B/420 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code are hereby set aside and he is acquitted of the said charges. He is discharged from his bail bond. Criminal Appeal No. 314 of 1969 preferred by the appellant Satya Kinkar Mullick is allowed in part. The order of conviction and sentence passed against him under S.419 of the Indian Penal Code is hereby set aside and he is acquitted of the said charge. His conviction under S. 120B/420 and 468 of the Indian Penal Code are upheld but the sentences passed against him for the above convictions are reduced to the period already undergone but the sentence of fine imposed for the above two convictions are maintained. Criminal Appeal No. 350 of 1969 preferred by Netai Hari Roy is dismissed subject to the modification regarding substantive sentence of imprisonment which is reduced to the period already undergone during investigation with the sentence of fine maintained. R. Bhattacharya, J. : I agree. Appeal No. 351/69, allowed. Appeal No. 314, allowed in part. Sentence reduced.