JUDGMENT K. C. Agarwal, J. 1. THESE seven connected revisions filed under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure arise from a common judgment of the Second Additional District Judge, Meerut dated 14-1-1975 dismissing the revisions filed under Section 25 of the Small Causes Court Act. 2. THE relevant facts are that Mahabir Prasad, plaintiff-opposite party No. 1, was the owner of a building and few shops situated in Bazar Burababu, Laskarganj, Sardahaba, district Meerut. THE shops had been let out to various tenants, Budhumal was the tenant of shop No. 32, Baldeo Raj was the tenant of upper storey of the building bearing No. 27, Ramphal was the tenant of shop No. 28 where as Kallu Ram was the tenant of shop No. 30. These tenants were in arrears of rent. Mahavir Prasad sent combined notices of demand for determination of tenancy to these tenants. They did not pay the rent. Hence, Mahabir Prasad filed four suits for ejectment and for recovery of the arrears of rent against the four tenants. He impleaded Smt. Sulochana Devi, the wife of his deceased son Sukhmal Chand, and her two sons as defendant Nos. 2 to 4 in the suit. Mahabir Prasad did not seek any relief against the aforesaid defendant Nos. 2 to 4. He, however, alleged that the aforesaid defendants had no concern with the disputed premises. He further alleged that after the death of his son, Sukhmal Chand, the plaintiff opposite-party premitted Smt. Sulochna Devi, defendant No. 2, to realise rent from the plaintiff's property for her maintenance and her two children by the document dated 8-12-1966. THE disputed shops were also included in the said deed. But as Smt. Sulochana Devi, defendant No. 2, committed breach of the conditions of the agreement and instead of residing at Sardahana and maintain in her two minor sons, she began to live at Chap-rauli with her parents, therefore, the deed dated 8-12-1966 was cancelled on 2-11-1970. After the cancellation of the said deed, the defendant No. 2 was deprived of the benefits of the maintenance which she was granted. The suit was contested by the tenants as well as Smt. Sulochana Devi and her two minor sons. The tenants denied the relationship of landlord and tenants between the plaintiff and themselves. After the cancellation of the said deed, the defendant No. 2 was deprived of the benefits of the maintenance which she was granted. The suit was contested by the tenants as well as Smt. Sulochana Devi and her two minor sons. The tenants denied the relationship of landlord and tenants between the plaintiff and themselves. Smt. Sulochana Devi, defendant No. 2, however, claimed that the plaintiff was in possession of the property in suit as Karta of the family and that under the family settlement executed on 8-12-1966, she was realizing the rent from the tenants. She asserted that the tenants had paid rent to her and they were not liable to be evicted. She further claimed that the plaintiff opposite-party had no power to cancel the deed dated 8-12-1966. 3. ON the pleading of the parties, the Judge Small Causes Court, Meerut framed a number of issues. He held that the deed in question was not a family settlement. It was only a licence or permission granted by Mahabir Prasad to Smt. Sulochana Devi, defendant No. 2, to realise rent from the tenants for her maintenance. Mahabir Prasad had full rights to cancel the same. After the deed was cancelled in 1970, Smt. Sulochana Devi ceased to have any right to realise the rent. Consequently, she could not dispute the right of the plaintiff to bring the suits for ejectment and for the recovery of the arrears of rent. Other issues were also decided in favour of the plaintiff. The Judge Small Causes Court held that the plaintiff had proved that there was relationship of landlord and tenant between himself and the defendants he was entitled to the decree. 4. AGGRIEVED by the judgment of the Judge Small Causes Court, the tenants as well as Smt. Sulochana Devi preferred eight revisions before the learned District Judge. These revisions were transferred to the II Additional Civil Judge and were "dismissed by the impugned order dated 14-1-1975. Feeling aggrieved, all the tenants and Smt. Sulochana Devi filed eight revisions in this Court. One of the revisions was, however, dismissed for want of prosecution. We are now left with seven revisions. 5. SRI K. M. Dayal, counsel appearing for Smt. Sulochana Devi and her two minor sons, alleged that the courts below committed an error in holding that the document dated 8-12-1966 could be cancelled by Mahabir Prasad in 1970. One of the revisions was, however, dismissed for want of prosecution. We are now left with seven revisions. 5. SRI K. M. Dayal, counsel appearing for Smt. Sulochana Devi and her two minor sons, alleged that the courts below committed an error in holding that the document dated 8-12-1966 could be cancelled by Mahabir Prasad in 1970. He asserted that by the said document a charge was created in favour of Smt. Sulochana Devi and her two minor sons and that the said charge being absolute in its nature, could not be subsequently revoked by Mahabir Prasad. This argument of SRI Dayal was adopted by the learned counsel appearing for the tenants. 6. IT would be seen from the facts narrated above that in the written statement the defendant alleged the deed to be a gift and in the alternative a family settlement. During the course of arguments in the trial court as well as in the revision filed under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Court Act, the argument was confined to family settlement. The learned II Additional District Judge has held that it was not a family settlement. Although the case of family settlement was not pressed before me, it may be mentioned that on a perusal of the said document, it is not possible to hold it to be a family settlement. There is nothing in the document declaring the intention of the parties to hold the property as separate owners. The view of the II Additional District Judge holding that the deed was not a family settlement appears to be right. So far as the question of charge was concerned, there is nothing in the deed showing that any particular property was made a security for payment of money. A reading of this document indicates that it was on the compassionate ground that Mahabir Prasad permitted Smt. Sulochana Devi to realise rent from the tenants and to utilise the same for herself and her two minor children. Applying the rule of interpretation that the deed must be read as a whole in order to ascertain its true meaning, I am unable to discover that Mahabir Prasad intended to create any charge to secure the maintenance of Smt. Sulochana. No right or interest in the property had been created in her favour. Applying the rule of interpretation that the deed must be read as a whole in order to ascertain its true meaning, I am unable to discover that Mahabir Prasad intended to create any charge to secure the maintenance of Smt. Sulochana. No right or interest in the property had been created in her favour. As any decision on this question might prejudice Smt. Sulochana in a suit, when filed, I do not wish to pursue it further. 7. THE main objection raised on behalf of the respondents, however, was that the applicant having not claimed the document to be a charge in the courts below could not be permitted to advance an argument on that basis. It was also submitted on behalf of the plaintiff opposite party that even if it assumed that the courts below had committed an error in the construction of the said document, it would not give rise to a question of jurisdiction entitling this court to interference. It is true that though the construction of a document is a point of law, it has no relation to the jurisdiction of a court putting on the construction. THE submission made, however, by the learned counsel for the applicant was that the courts below misread the said document and reached at the wrong conclusion. It was also emphasised that no court has jurisdiction to misread a document and to arrive at a wrong finding. It is not necessary for me to decide whether misreading of a document could give rise to a question of jurisdiction, as in my view, no such mistake was committed by the courts below in the instant case. THE misreading means reading a document wrongly or falsely or incorrectly which results in conveying a wrong idea of its tenor and contents; whereas a rule of construction is one which governs the effect of an ascertained intention or points out what the court should do in the absence of an expressed or implied intention. It would, thus, be seen that there is a clear distinction between misreading and construction. In the instant case on being asked, the learned counsel for the applicant failed to show as to how was the document misread by the courts below. 8. It would, thus, be seen that there is a clear distinction between misreading and construction. In the instant case on being asked, the learned counsel for the applicant failed to show as to how was the document misread by the courts below. 8. IT was held by the Supreme Court in Pandurang Dhondi Chougula v. Maruti Hari Madhav, AIR 1966 SC 153 that the High Court has no jurisdiction to correct errors of fact, however gross they may be or even errors of law. The Supreme Court further held in this case that though construction of a decree, like the construction of a document of title is the point of law, it has no relation to the jurisdiction of the court putting on the construction. IT is, therefore, clear from the above pronouncement that this court has no jurisdiction to Interfere with the finding of learned District Judge although the interpretation placed on construction made by it on the document in question may be assumed to be erroneous. IT follows that if any errors of law are made in deciding matters which are left to a Tribunal for its decision such errors will be the errors within its jurisdiction. If High Court interferes in such a matter, it would be doing something what has been done within the jurisdiction by the court below. By doing so, it would transgress the limits within which its own jurisdiction or revision is confined. The next submission made by the learned counsel was that the suit involved the question of title between the plaintiff on the one side and Smt. Sulochana Devi and her two minor sons on the other. The proper course for the Judge Small Causes was to return the plaint for presentation on the regular side. Section 23 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act gives a discretion to a court trying a suit where the question of title is raised. It does not debar the court from deciding it. As held by this court in Ram Dayal Sonar v. Sukh Mangal Kalwar, AIR 1937 Alld. 676, Section 23 of the Provincial Small Causes Court has no jurisdiction to determine the question of title to immovable property but it gives that court an option to send the case to a court having jurisdiction to determine the title probably on the ground or convenience. 676, Section 23 of the Provincial Small Causes Court has no jurisdiction to determine the question of title to immovable property but it gives that court an option to send the case to a court having jurisdiction to determine the title probably on the ground or convenience. If, however, a Judge of the Small Causes Court does not do it, it is not possible to say that the error committed by the court below was one of jurisdiction. It was a matter of discretion with the said court. Moreover as the funding given on the question of little holding that Smt. Sulochana Devi had been acquired any right under the said deed is open to be challenged in a regular suit, she is not put to any hardship. 9. FOR these reasons, all the revisions fail and are dismissed. In the circumstances, I direct the parties to bear their own costs. The tenants are directed three months time to vacate the respective premises. Revision dismissed.