Short Note : 1. The finding of the Registrar that it was not established that the Union had a membership of not less than twenty-five per cent during the relevant period was set aside. The Industrial Court came to the conclusion that on the material on record the requirement was satisfied. Other objections which had remained undecided by the Registrar were also decided. Heavy Electricals Mazdoor Trade Union was granted recognition as a representative union. Thereafter these petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution were filed. In Misc. Petition No.1122 of 1974 apart from Mohammad Wahid Siddique, the other petitioner is a trade union by the name Bharat Heavy Electricals Employees Trade Union. The other petition, i.e. Misc. petition No. 213 of 1974 has been filed by Heavy Electricals Mazdoor Union. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioners in Misc. petition No. 1122 of 1974 contends that Mohammad Wahid Siddique, petitioner No.1 in this petition, ought to have been heard by the Industrial Court before the appeal was decided for the reason that he was one of the objectors before the Registrar. It is contended that as Siddique was not heard by the Industrial Court, the order allowing the appeal is invalid and must be quashed. Held: New coming to the question whether Mohammad Wahid Siddique, petitioner No.1, should have been joined before the Industrial Court, we find that an employee has no right to be heard before the Industrial Court. Section 27 of the Act provides that a Representative Union, any union of which the employee of the industry concerned is a member or a Labour Officer can alone be heard as the representative employees. Section 28 says that a conciliator, an arbitrator, a Labour Court, the Industrial Court or a Board may, if he or it considers it expedient for the ends of justice, permit an individual, whether an employee or not to appear in any proceeding before him or it. Reading sections 27 and 28, it is clear that no employee can be heard as a matter of right by the Industrial Court. Ordinarily, an employee can be heard only through a Representative Union or a Trade Union or the Labour Officer. In the circumstances, in our opinion, the non-joinder of the petitioner Mohammad Wahid Siddique was not such a defect that the order of the Industrial Court could be said to be invalid. Ordinarily, an employee can be heard only through a Representative Union or a Trade Union or the Labour Officer. In the circumstances, in our opinion, the non-joinder of the petitioner Mohammad Wahid Siddique was not such a defect that the order of the Industrial Court could be said to be invalid. A reading of sections 13, 14 and 18 of the Act will show that where there are two or more unions in an industry. The question whether a particular union should be recognised as Representative Union is a dispute essentially between the rival trade unions. In the instant case, the Heavy Electrials Mazdoor Union, which is a rival trade union and which had also objected before the Registrar, was made a party and was heard before the Industrial Court. Some of the objections raised by Mohammad Wahid Siddique were the same as raised by the Heavy Electrical Mazdoor Union. In the circumstances, we do not think that non-joinder of Mohammad Wahid Siddique was a defect fatal to the maintenance of the appeal. We are also of opinion that omission to hear him was also not such a defect which makes the appellate order invalid. 3. It was also contended that the Industrial Court had no jurisdiction to set aside the order of the Registrar on facts. In our opinion, there is no merit in these contentions The power of the Industrial Court is defined by section 22 of the Act Sub-section (2) of section 22 says that the Industrial Court may admit an appeal, if on a perusal of the memorandum of the appeal and the decision appealed against it finds that the decision is contrary to law or otherwise erroneous. Sub-section (3) of section 22 empowers the Industrial Court to confirm, modify or rescind any order passed by the Registrar. The words "otherwise erroneous" as they occur in sub-section (2) of section 22 make it clear that the jurisdiction of the Industrial Court in hearing the appeal is not limited to the questions of law only. These words are wide enough to empower the Industrial Court to set aside a finding of fact. In our opinion, full jurisdiction, both on questions of law and on questions of fact, has been conferred by section 22 on the Industrial Court. Petition dismissed.