JUDGMENT - G.N. VAIDYA, J.:---The above three second appeals arise out of proceedings in execution of the awards, certified to be executed as decrees of the Civil Court, under section 98 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960, and raised an interesting point as to whether the surety could not be proceeded against, inasmuch as some directions in his favour contained in the reasons for the awards were not followed by the Award-holding Society in executing the awards. 2. As the facts are common to all the three awards from which the surety has filed the above three appeals, they may be briefly stated as follows :--- The Islampur Urban Co-operative Bank Ltd., Islampur, obtained five different awards against the principal debtor Gajanan Pawar, for various amounts in respect of loans, taken on different dates for which, there were different sureties. The sureties concerned were made parties to the Awards which were ultimately passed in proceedings under section 91 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960, for recovering loans with interest and costs against the original debtors as with interest and costs against the original debtors as well as the sureties. 3. The Awards were in the forms prescribed by the Co-operative Manual, prevailing in the Maharashtra State, and referred to reasons separately recorded in a separate judgment. Thus, in ABN No. 68(4)/1963-64, in which the common appellant in the above appeals was the surety, joined as defendant No. 2 and the claim was Rs. 5,707.08 P., the award read as follows, after setting out the title of the dispute :--- "An application for an arbitration proceeding was made by the Disputant Society against the opponents, and it came up for hearing before me following a decision under section 91(1) of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act of 1960. After having carefully considered the matter and for reasons separately recorded, I pass the following Order : ORDER Defendants Nos. 1-A to 1-F and defendants Nos. 2 and 3 do pay to plaintiff-Bank Rs. 5,707.01 together with future interest on the principal amount of Rs. 5,000/- at the rate of 9 p.c. from the date of filing this arbitration case till its recovery by the end of October 1968. 1-A to 1-F and defendants Nos. 2 and 3 do pay to plaintiff-Bank Rs. 5,707.01 together with future interest on the principal amount of Rs. 5,000/- at the rate of 9 p.c. from the date of filing this arbitration case till its recovery by the end of October 1968. The plaintiff-Bank to deposit in Court the amount of costs as sanctioned by the District Deputy Registrar in the first instance and to recover the same from defendants 1-A to 1-F. All the moveable and immoveable properties of the deceased Gajanan Sakharam Powar in the hands of his heirs defendants Nos. 1-A to 1-F and belonging to defendants Nos. 2 and 3 including the properties bearing C.T.S. No. 2844 and Municipal No. 1829/2 purchased by defendant No. 2 Shri M.D. Powar and described in the sale-deed Exh. 90 are liable to be attached and sold for the dues of the plaintiff-Bank. The Order of attachment passed by the Assistant Registrar is made absolute in respect of the properties bearing C.T.S. No. 2844 and Municipal No. 1829/2 and is vacated in respect of two other properties bearing C.T.S., Nos. 2755 and 2709. Defendants Nos. 2, 3 and 4 are not personally liable to pay the amount due to the plaintiff-Bank. The properties purchased by defendants Nos. 3 and 4 are not liable for the dues of the plaintiff-Bank. Defendants Nos. 2, 3 and 4 to bear their own costs. Sangli. Sd/- M.A. Shaikh. 7-8-68. Officer on Special Duty, SANGLI." 4. It is common ground that similar Awards were passed in all the three cases with which we are concerned in these second appeals; and the above Award was the Award under execution, certified like the others to be executed as a decree of Civil Court under section 98 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960, which is the subject matter of Second Appeal No. 493 of 1975. 5. It is common ground that all the contentions of the principal debtor and the appellant surety were dealt with in a common judgment or reasons for the award, recorded in Arbitration Case No. 39 of 1962-63. It is also undisputed that, in that judgment, the Officer on Special Duty, Sangli, observed under Issue No. 7, as follows : "Before I pass a final order in this case I have to consider the liability of Shri R.T. Khurd, namely defendant No. 2 in this case. It is also undisputed that, in that judgment, the Officer on Special Duty, Sangli, observed under Issue No. 7, as follows : "Before I pass a final order in this case I have to consider the liability of Shri R.T. Khurd, namely defendant No. 2 in this case. He has signed the two cash credit bonds Exhibits 148 and 150 as a surety. The other surety on the above said bonds is Baban Gajanan Powar, the son of the deceased defendant No. 1. He is made defendant No. 1-B in this case. The contention raised by Shri R.T. Khurd is that defendant No. 1 has sold away all his properties bogusly and has put his position as a jeopardy. It is therefore contended by Shri R.T. Khurd, defendant No. 2 that all the properties of defendant No. 1 should be sold first for recovering the debt of the plaintiff-Bank and therefore, he should be held liable in case any amount of debt under the cash credit bonds remains unsatisfied. In my discussion below Issue No. 7 I have already held that only two properties of defendant No. 1 bearing C.T.S. No. 2844, and Municipal No. 1829/2 are liable to be sold for the dues of the plaintiff-Bank. After these properties are sold the surety Shri R.T. Khurd will be liable to pay the remaining amount. Before I pass the final Order I find it necessary to state that in view of the said decision given by the Co-operative Tribunal in the Surat District Co-operative Milk Producers Union Limited v. Ramjibhai Madhavbhai Patel, Bombay Co-operative Tribunal Decisions XI and XII (Parts I and II) page 71, provisions of section 61 of the Indian Contract Act will apply in this case. Therefore, the amount realised by the plaintiff-Bank by sale of the properties available should be applied in discharge of debts in Order of time in this case as well as the other companion cases." 6. Therefore, the amount realised by the plaintiff-Bank by sale of the properties available should be applied in discharge of debts in Order of time in this case as well as the other companion cases." 6. Then follows the operative part of the order, on the basis of which the awards were drawn up and which has been incorporated in the formal awards, certified for execution in this case under section 98; and it is rather unfortunate that the operative part of the order does not refer specifically to the above directions in the judgment in favour of surety, and what was certified by the Registrar under section 98 was not the judgment, but only the formal award which was sent for execution by the Society. 7. In the course of the execution of the Awards after the certificates were granted by the Registrar under section 98, the appellant-surety contended that the Darkhasts against him were liable to be dismissed, inasmuch as the Society had not followed the directions given in the judgment. This contention was upheld by the learned Civil Judge, Junior Division, Islampur, on April 26, 1974; and all the Darkhasts filed against the surety were dismissed, as it was conceded before the learned Civil Judge by the Advocate for the Islampur Urban Co-operative Bank Ltd., Islampur, that if the judgment was looked into, it must be held that the plaintiff/Bank had appropriated the sale-proceeds out of the property mentioned by the Officer on Special Duty, and on those premises the present surety stood discharged. 8. But it was also contended on behalf of the Bank that the debt from A.B.N. No. 68(1), in which one P.M. Watharkar was the surety was dated 14-11-1962 and the debt of Rs. 6,000/- from A.B.N. No. 39/62-63 taken by Gajanan was dated 12-11-1962. But the learned Civil Judge overruled this contention, observing :--- "Prima facie this contention appears to be plausible but the officer on special duty has passed one and indivisible award for 5 debts taken by Gajanan which was the subject matter of A.B.N. No. 39/62-63 and it is not possible to say as to how much part of the sale proceeds realised in Special Darkhast No. 41/72 have gone in satisfaction of the debt of Rs. 6,000/- dated 12-11-1962. 6,000/- dated 12-11-1962. Under these circumstances, I cannot but hold that due to action of plaintiff-Bank all the sureties in these five darkhasts are discharged from their liabilities." 9. Feeling aggrieved by the said decision, the Islampur Urban Co-operative Bank Ltd., carried appeals before the District Judge, Sangli, who set aside the orders passed by the learned Civil Judge, on the ground that as the directions recorded in the judgment were not incorporated in the awards, certified for execution, the learned Civil Judge was not justified in taking into consideration the observations in the judgment and reasoning, particularly because the certified awards did not restrict the right of the Bank to recover from the sureties the balance of debts unrecovered from the properties of the principal debtor. The decisions of the learned District Judge, dated April 22, 1975, are challenged in the above Second Appeals by the surety. 10. Mr. Rane, the learned Counsel appearing for the surety, submitted that the scheme for the settlement of disputes, in a Co-operative society, by arbitration, under Chapter XI of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960, does not contemplate a separate award to be certified under section 98. He submitted that the distinction between the judgment and decree made in the Civil Procedure Code is not to be found between a judgment and an award under Chapter IX of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960; and hence, the award itself refers to the reasons separately, recorded whatever reasons are recorded in the judgment should be considered as part and parcel of the award itself by incorporation. In other words, Mr. Rane submitted that in executing the awards, the directions given by the Officer on Special Duty were deemed to be incorporated in the awards which were certified for execution; and the award holder could not execute the awards in contravention of those directions. 11. The contention must be rejected, firstly because an award and a judgment of the Officer on Special Duty is not ipso facto executable by a decree in any Civil Court. It is only an Order which is certified under section 98 to be executed as decree of the Civil Court that can be executed. Section 98 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960, lays down how the award is to be passed. 12. It is only an Order which is certified under section 98 to be executed as decree of the Civil Court that can be executed. Section 98 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960, lays down how the award is to be passed. 12. Rules have been framed and complied by the Government in the form of a Co-operative Manual, where the form of the award is prescribed in the Rules relating to arbitration. Even, Mr. Rane fairly conceded that it has been the uniform practice of Registrars and Officers on Special Duty to follow the Manual and record separately their judgments and awards in accordance with the orders proposed in the judgments. 13. Thus, though the mere absence of the provision in Co-operative Societies Act making a distinction between the judgment and decree made in the Civil Procedure Code is not enough to ignore the well settled distinction between award and reasons for the award or judgment, there can be no doubt that the Co-operative Manual makes a distinction between the reasons for the awards and the award. 14. Secondly, even assuming that the reasons should be treated as part of the award, only the award is certified by the Registrar and not the award along with the reasons, under section 98. Hence, no part of the directions contained in the judgment or reasons for the award can be enforcible as the decree of the Civil Court. If at all the surety wanted to rely on the directions in his favour assuming that they were in his favour, he ought to have obtained a certificate under section 98 in respect of those directions. 15. In the absence of such a certificate, I do not think that it is open to the surety to enforce the directions contained in the reasons for the award, in the Civil Court. Further, I find that there is no merit even in the contention that there was any breach of the directions in the judgment, which are quoted above, was committed by the Society in executing its various awards against the principal debtor and sureties. Mr. Rane submitted that in selling away the properties to itself in execution of one of the awards, the Bank had committed a breach in not appropriating the amount realised in discharge of the debts in order of time, in accordance with section 61 of the Indian Contract Act. 16. Mr. Rane submitted that in selling away the properties to itself in execution of one of the awards, the Bank had committed a breach in not appropriating the amount realised in discharge of the debts in order of time, in accordance with section 61 of the Indian Contract Act. 16. According to Mr. Rane, the Bank purchased the property in execution of an award in respect of the debt later in time than the debts for which the appellant was the surety. But the directions would come into operation only if any amount was "realised by sale of the properties". But it is common ground that the properties could not be sold in public auction; and the Bank has purchased them by itself; and therefore, no amount was realized by the sale of the properties as such and the amount was merely adjusted. It is idle to contend that there was any breach of the directions. Moreover, the directions in the judgment must be understood as directory one and not mandatory ones, in all the facts and circumstances of the case, as the operatics part of the order did not incorporate this direction. 17. Lastly it was contended by Mr. Rane that the Bank in any event, was not entitled to recover interest in excess of the principal amount having regard to the provisions of section 44-A of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960, which was inserted in the Act long after the passing of the awards in these cases and the filing of the present darkhasts, by Maharashtra Act No. III of 1974. Section 44-A runs as follows :--- "44-A. Notwithstanding anything contained in any agreement or any law for the time being in force, a society (other than a land development bank) shall not, for any loan given by it to any member for a period not exceeding 15 years whether the loan was given before or is given after the commencement of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies (Third Amendment) Act, 1973, charge, on account of interest, a sum greater than the principal of the loan." Mr. Rane submitted that this section was retrospective and it will apply even to the awards in respect of the earlier loans given by the society in the present case. 18. Rane submitted that this section was retrospective and it will apply even to the awards in respect of the earlier loans given by the society in the present case. 18. The contention must be held to be untenable, as it is well settled that vested rights under awards or decrees cannot be defeated by subsequent legislation unless there are express words in such legislation affecting such vested rights confer in the awards as in the present cases. The appellant cannot rely on section 44-A and contend that the award holder Society cannot recover what is ordered to be recovered under the awards passed against him. 19. Similarly, the contention of Mr. Rane that the Society could not claim any interest after October, 1968, having regard to the first clause of the operative order in the award, which refers to October, 1968, is frivolous and false, as, it appears that the period was mentioned only to enable the principal debtor and sureties to satisfy the debt before that period, so that the Bank should wait from the date of the award (August 7, 1968 till end of October 1963), for recovery of the amount through execution. 20. The executing Court had also rightly over-ruled this contention on the ground that the interpretation made by the surety was not correct, and further on the ground that the contention was barred by res judicata, inasmuch as, it was rejected when the appellant had raised such a contention earlier in another Darkhast where he had appeared. Mr. Rane submitted that he was not a party to that Darkhast, and merely because he raised the contention, it cannot be said to be barred by res judicata. 21. Although it may not be strictly res judicata, it must be held to be barred by the general principle of res judicata, inasmuch as, any question relating to the execution and discharge of satisfaction of the decree could be raised by any of the parties interested; and the appellant was a party interested when he raised the point, and he would be barred from raising the same point again. 22. In the result, I find no substance in the above three Second Appeals, which are, therefore, dismissed with costs. -----