JUDGMENT H.S. Dubey, I.A.S. This petition in revision has been recommended by the learned Commissioner to this Court under the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953 (hereinafter called the Act). 2. I have heard the learned counsel for both the parties and have gone through the records of the case carefully. 3. The material facts leading to the present litigation are that the respondents/land-owners filed an application under section 14-A of the Act before the Assistant Collector, IInd Grade, Kulu stating therein that Shri Balku, tenant had not paid the rent in respect of the tenancy land held by him for the crops Rabi and Karif, 1965 and Rabi, 1966 amounting to Rs. 296-17, It was prayed that the tenant be served with the notice to pay the arrears within a month or else he may be ejected from the tenancy land. A notice in form ‘N was served upon Shri Balku, tenant on 17-7-1967 accompanied by another notice informing him about the fixing of the date of bearing on 18-7-1967. Consequently, the tenant Shri Balku appeared before the Assistant Collector, IInd Grade on 18-7-1967 on which date the latter passed an order that the counsel for the applicants and Shri Balku respondent were present and that the case be put up on 18-8-1967 after the expiry of the period of notice. On 18-8-1967, both the parties appeared before the trial court and as per statement of Shri Balku, he had brought the money and was prepared to pay it. The respondents counsel refused to receive the money saying that the period of notice had expired and that the tenant be ejected from the suit land. The Assistant Collector, IInd Grade accepted this plea and ordered the ejectment of Shri Balku on 18-8-67. An appeal was filed before the Collector, Kulu who dismissed the same and upheld the orders of the Assistant Collector, IInd Grade. Shri Balku filed the second appeal before the learned Commissioner who tretaed it as a revision petition and forwarded the same to this Court for orders. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner gave the history of the case and contended that the Assistant Collector IInd Grade did not comply with the provisions of section 10 (2) of the Act inasmuch as no opportunity was afforded to the petitioner to defend his case. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner gave the history of the case and contended that the Assistant Collector IInd Grade did not comply with the provisions of section 10 (2) of the Act inasmuch as no opportunity was afforded to the petitioner to defend his case. He further stated that under section 12 of the Act, rent in respect of tenancy land was required to be determined by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade which was not done and, hence, the orders of the Assistant Collector, IInd Grade and the Collector, Kulu were illegal and void. In support of his contentions, he cited AIR 1965 SC P. 1491. It was also argued by him that Shri Balku, tenant is an illiterate person and is hard of hearing, It was thus incumbent upon the Assistant Collector, IInd Grade to have explained to him on 18-7-1967 when he appeared in his Court that he (Shri Balku) was required to make payment of the rent before the next date of hearing viz. 18-8-67. He thus pleaded that the court had failed in its duty to bring home to him the contents of the notice requiring him to pay the rent within one month. It was also stated that the default in payment was for one day only and Shri Balku was prepared to deposit the money on 18-8 67 as per his statement on record, but the Assistant Collector, Und Grade did not accept his request which had caused great injustice to him. He also argued that the money sent to the landowners by the petitioner was not accepted by them. He also referred to the Khasra girdawari entries and stated that the orchard war planted by the tenant, Shri Balku and not by the landowners as reported by the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil), Kulu in his report dated 7-5-76. 5. In reply to the above arguments of the counsel for the petitioner, the learned counsel for the respondents argued that section 14-A (ii) provided a summary procedure for the ejectment of a tenant for non-payment of rent. He refuted the allegations of the counsel for the petitioner that the requirements of sections 10 (2) and 12 were not complied with by the Courts below. He stated that the rent was claimed on the basis of Naksha normal which was not disputed by the tenant. He refuted the allegations of the counsel for the petitioner that the requirements of sections 10 (2) and 12 were not complied with by the Courts below. He stated that the rent was claimed on the basis of Naksha normal which was not disputed by the tenant. He further stated that it was not the duty of the court to explain to the petitioner that he was required to make the payment of arrears of rent within one month from the date of receipt of notice in Form N’. He argued that this requirement was duly incorporated in the aforesaid notice and the failure of the petitioner to comply with the conditions of the notice could not be termed as an irregularity having been committed by the trial court. As for the alleged payment of rent by money order, it was contended that this plea was not taken in the appeal ; nor was there any thing on record to show that the amount was sent by money order. Regarding the extension of time in making the payment of arrears of rent after the period of notice, it was vehemently urged that the provisions of the Act did not provide for the same and as such no court had the powers to extend the time even though the default in payment may be for a single day. He went on to say that no illegality or irregularity was committed by the Courts below and as such no case is made out for interference in revision. In support of these arguments, he cited RLR 1970 p 376, AIR 1956 Travencore Cohin p. 171 and RCR 1977 (2) p. 62. He also cited LLT 1964 p. 7, LLT 1965 p. 18, LLT 1959 p. 49 and LLT 1961 p 1. 6. I have considered the case in the light of the above arguments of the parties and have considered the authorities cited by the counsels. I do not find any relevance of the case Kapur Chand v. B. S. Grewal, Financial Commissioner, Punjab and others, AIR 1^65 SC p. 1491, to the facts of the case before me. All that this case law seeks to do is to draw a distinction between clauses (i) and (ii) of section 14-A of the Act. I do not see how this helps or horms any bodys case. 7. All that this case law seeks to do is to draw a distinction between clauses (i) and (ii) of section 14-A of the Act. I do not see how this helps or horms any bodys case. 7. In the authorities cited by the learned counsel for the respondents, in case Dhaunkal v. Mankauri and another, RLR 1970 p. 376-378, it has been laid down that the Financial Commissioner can interfere with the proceedings or orders or decree of any Revenue Officer or Revenue Court subordinate to him only on three grounds mentioned in section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, In case «S. Richard Jaison v. Padam Nathan Nadar, AIR 1957 Travancore Cochin 171, it has been held :— "A law of limitation and prescription may appear to operate harshly or unjustly in particular cases, but where such a law has been adopted by the State, for reasons which justify the rule in the majority of cases, it must, if unambiguous, be applied with no stringency ; and no individual ca>e to which these reasons are inapplicable can be exempted from its operation. The general good of the community requires that even a hard case should not be allowed to disturb the law. The rule must be enforced even at the risk of hardship to a particular party. The judge cannot, on equitable ground enlarge the time allowed by the law, postpone its operation, or introduce exceptions not recognised by it". In case Sodhi Lal Singh v. Sham Singh, LLT 1964 p. 7, it has been held :— "that a tenant who receives a notice in Form ‘N’ prescribed under Rule 22 of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Rules, should have no doubt in his mind about the consequences of non-compliance with the notice. A tenant who fails to comply within the period stipulated in the notice, cannot be given any extension of time to deposit the rent, but should be ejected summarily". The -same point of view has been reiterated in the other authorities cited by the counsel for the respondents. 8. The scrutiny of the case file of the trial court reveals that the petitioner was served with a notice in Form ‘N’ and he did not dispute the payment of arrears of rent on any ground. Unfortunately’ he could not make the payment within the period of notice. 8. The scrutiny of the case file of the trial court reveals that the petitioner was served with a notice in Form ‘N’ and he did not dispute the payment of arrears of rent on any ground. Unfortunately’ he could not make the payment within the period of notice. It is probable that as an illiterate villager not well versed in the ways of the world, he did not know the consequences which were to follow from his failure to do so. It is equally likely that simultaneous service of the notice for payment within a month and the announcement in the Court on 17-7-1967 that the matter would come up for hearing on 18-8-1967, gave rise to a mistaken belief that he could make the payment any time upto 18-8-1967. But as the law stands, no consideration can be given to the mis-apprehension about the interpretation or understanding of the law for extending the period of payment. In view of this, the plea of the learned counsel for the petitioner that proper opportunity was not afforded to the petitioner and that the rent had not been determined cannot be accepted. As there is nothing on record to show that the amount was actually sent by money order, this plea also fails to stand scrutiny. The only point for consideration before me is whether the Assistant Collector, IInd Grade could accept the amount of arrears on 18-8-1967 when the petitioner appeared in his court and had stated that he had brought the money for being paid to the respondents/land-owners. I have carefully studied the provisions of the Act and the Authorities cited by the learned counsels. As I have said earlier, the case law cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner has no direct bearing on the problem before me. The authorities cited by the learned counsel for the respondents make it clear beyond any shadow of doubt that the date for payment of the arrears as given in the notice in Form N’ under rule 22 could not be extended whatever the mitigating circumstances. It is no doubt a very hard case. But in the circumstances of the case the recommendations of the learned Commissioner cannot be accepted and no relief can be provided to the petitioner. 9. It is no doubt a very hard case. But in the circumstances of the case the recommendations of the learned Commissioner cannot be accepted and no relief can be provided to the petitioner. 9. In view of the foregoing reasons, I dismiss the revision petition and uphold the orders of the Assistant Collector, IInd Grade, Kulu dated 18-8-1967. 10. Orders to be communicated. Revision dismissed.