ORDER B.N. Sapru, J. - The petitioner was a tenure-holder. He was served with a notice under Section 10 (2) of the U. P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act. The petitioner filed objections. In the objections, it was stated that the petitioner had executed a sale-deed of agricultural land on 2-12-1971 in respect of 18.71 acres of land situate in village Chandpai and that the petitioner had also executed two sale-deeds dated 8th March, 1971 in respect of .44 acre and 4.9 acres of land respectively. The petitioners submission was that the land comprised in the sale-deed should be excluded from his holdings while determining the ceiling area applicable to the petitioner. There were various other objections raised by the petitioner with which we are not concerned in the present proceedings. The Prescribed Authority as well as the appellate authority have, in view of the provisions of Section 5 (6) of the U. P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act while determining the ceiling area applicable to the petitioner, ignored the aforesaid sale-deeds as they had been executed after the relevant date, that is, 24th Jan., 1971. Aggrieved by the orders of the Prescribed Authority and of the appellate authority, the petitioner has filed the instant writ petition. 2. The only question on which the argument has been addressed to the court is as to the correctness or otherwise of the decision of the aforesaid two authorities in not excluding the lands comprised in the sale-deeds from the petitioners holdings while determining the ceiling area applicable to the petitioner. The provisions of Section 5 (6) provide that : - "In determining the ceiling area applicable to a tenure-holder, any transfer of land made after the twenty fourth day of Jan., 1971, which but for the transfer would have been declared surplus land under this Act, shall be ignored and not taken into account." Proviso (b) to sub-s, (6) of Section 5 of the Act says that : - "A transfer proved to the satisfaction of the Prescribed Authority to be in good faith and for adequate consideration and under an irrevocable instrument or not being benami transaction or for the immediate or deferred benefit of the tenure-holders or other members of his family." 3. In the present case, it has been stated that the transfers were effected in favour of a person who was not member of the family of the petitioner but a stranger. It has also come in evidence that the transferees under the sale-deeds are in possession. 4. The appellants had urged before the appellate authority that the sale-deeds were bona fide and, as such, they were entitled to the benefit of Section 5 (6) (b) of the Act. The appellate authority did not accept this submission of the appellants and held that before the tenure-holder can get the benefit of Section 5 (6) (b), he should establish that the transfers were bona fide transfers. The reason given by the appellate authority for not treating the transfers as bona fide was that the sale-deeds did not mention, the need for transfer or to execute a deed for transfer of the land. The evidence of the petitioner shows that the circumstances which impelled him to transfer the land were that he required the money for a marriage. It has been found by the appellate authority from the evidence that the petitioners daughter was aged about 10 years and was studying in class V. He, therefore, held that the reason given for the execution of the sale-deed by the petitioner was not reliable. 5. Neither the Prescribed Authority nor the appellate authority has recorded any finding that the sale-deeds were executed in order to take out the lands from the purview of the U. P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act. Both these authorities have also not found the transactions to be for inadequate consideration or to members of the family of the petitioner nor have the transactions been found to be benami or for the benefit of the petitioner or members of his family. The law does not require a seller of the property to state in the sale-deed the reasons which impel him to enter into a transaction of sale. The Legislature has also, while drafting the proviso (b) to Section 5 (6) of the Act not provided therein that a sale-deed in which there is no recital as to the circumstances which led to the sale-deed being executed shall not qualify for the benefit of that proviso. The Legislature has also, while drafting the proviso (b) to Section 5 (6) of the Act not provided therein that a sale-deed in which there is no recital as to the circumstances which led to the sale-deed being executed shall not qualify for the benefit of that proviso. The authorities below mis-directed themselves in law in treating the absence of a recital as to the need of a seller in executing the sale-deed as one of the important factors to determine whether the transfer was bona fide or not. Such test has not been laid down by the Legislature. 6. The fact that the petitioner had, inter alia, given wrong information in his statement before the Prescribed Authority as to the need to enter into a transaction of sale, cannot make the previous transaction of sale suffer from the lack of bona fide. Only this can be shown that there was an attempt to escape the provisions of the U. P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act. The needs of the seller are irrelevant while determining the question as to the applicability of Section 5 (6) (b) of the aforesaid Act. 7. The learned Standing Counsel has drawn my attention to the provisions of Explanation II to Section 5 (6) of the Act. It provides that : - "The burden of proving that a case falls within Cl. (b) of the proviso shall rest with the party claiming its benefit." 8. The burden in the instant case has been discharged by the petitioner when he showed that the sale-deeds were executed for adequate consideration and were irrevocable and that possession had been handed over to the transferees under the sale-deeds. Once these primary facts had been established, the burden of proof has been fully discharged. 9. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned orders of the Prescribed Authority and the appellate authority are quashed. The petitioner is entitled to his costs.