Short Note : 1. The plaintiff-applicant repaired a vehicle of the non-applicant Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. The amount of Rs, 722 plus interest and notice charges, in ail Rs, 838,87 p. was claimed in respect of motor parts supplied and repair-work undertaken by the plaintiff at various occasions. The defendant Municipal Corporation, Gwalior, inter alia denied the receipt of the goods alleged to have been supplied vide Ex, P-2, namely, assembly carburetor worth Rs. 285. 2. The trial Court has decreed the suit in respect of Rs. 437 and interest Rs. 194,85 p. with proportionate costs. The suit in respect of the price of goods supplied as contained in bill Ex. P-2 was dismissed. Held : The factum of supply of goods in respect of Bill Ex, P-2 for Rs. 285 has been proved by the plaintiff Roshan Lal. The factum of carburetter major repair kit having been supplied to the Corporation by fixing it in the Corporation vehicle has been admitted in Ex. P-7. But what is said is that the aforesaid goods were supplied by IPCO Piston House and that it was incomplete. It is also stated that the price has been paid to the IPCO Piston House. In all fairness Mr. Shah admitted that IPCO Piston House belonged to the plaintiff. In this view of the matter it was for the Corporation either to have proved that Carburetter major repair kit was incomplete or that its price was paid to the aforesaid IPCO Piston House. There is no proof in respect of any of these points. Therefore, in view of the provisions contained in section 102 of the Indian Evidence Act, the suit could not be dismissed but it ought to have been decreed on failure of the defendant - non-applicant to lead evidence on these points. The suit could not be dismissed in the manner it has been dismissed by the learned Small Cause Judge. The approach of the learned Small Cause Judge is vitiated by placing of burden of proof contrary to the provisions of section 102 of the Evidence Act which governs the situation, in view of the admissions contained in Ex. P. 7 and P. 8. No doubt in the written statement, there is denial but with proof of admissions contained in Ex. P. 7 and P. 8. No doubt in the written statement, there is denial but with proof of admissions contained in Ex. P-7 and P-8, the onus of proof shifted to the Corporation to prove either that the payment was made or that the condition of the kit was defective. The shifting of onus of proof is a continuous process in evaluating of the evidence as held by their Lordships of the Supreme Courts in A. Raghamma and another v. A. Chanchamma and another, AIR 1964 SC 136 , relied on. Revision allowed.