Short Note : 1. The material facts are that the appellant was the manager of an orphanage (Bal Sadan) situated in the locality called Fafadih in Rajpur town. In that orphanage, the prosecutrix Kamini (P.W.12) and Meena (P.W.11) both aged about 13 years used to live. Parts of that building in which the orphanage is situated are occupied by Mohammad Ayub (P.W.8), his wife Husana Bi (PW 10), a Washer-man, Sukhnandan (P.W.9) and Niyamat Bi (P.W.4). During the night intervening between 2-5-74 and 3-5-74 at about 1 a.m., the appellant was seen sleeping with the girl Kamini (P.W.12). Husana Bi (P.W.10), who had happened to wake up, noticed this and first tried to awaken her husband Mohammad Ayub (P.W.8). When Mohammad Ayub did not pay much heed, she awakened Sukhnandan (P.W 9) and all of them saw the appellant sleeping with the girl Kamini. The next morning, when asked, Kamini (P.W.12) told the inmates of the house mostly females that the appellant had enraged in a sexual intercourse with her as he had been doing so for the past one year. 2. The learned Sessions Judge finding that the appellant during the right in question had had sexual intercourse with a minor girl found him guilty of the offence charged and sentenced him, as already pointed cut, to rigorous imprisonment for 7 years. Held : When we study the evidence of Mohammad Ayub (PW8), Sukh Nandan (PW 9), Husana Bi (PW 10), Meena (PW 11) and Kamini (PW 12) cumulatively, the only fact which stands conclusively proved is that during the night in question the appellant was found sleeping with Kamini, but nothing beyond it. In a sexual crime, although it is not the rule of strict law, it is a requirement of practice and prudence that the testimony of the prosecutrix be corroborated by independent evidence not only as to the identity of the accused, but also as to the fact of the accused having engaged in a sexual act. This requirement of corroboration becomes necessary in this case also on account of the age of the prosecutrix being about 13 years. 3. Applying these tests, it is noteworthy that Kamini (PW-12) had not immediately after the event in question narrated anything regarding the appellant. She had done so only in the morning 4. This requirement of corroboration becomes necessary in this case also on account of the age of the prosecutrix being about 13 years. 3. Applying these tests, it is noteworthy that Kamini (PW-12) had not immediately after the event in question narrated anything regarding the appellant. She had done so only in the morning 4. Sections 6, 7, 8, 9 and 14 of the Evidence Act, if considered together, embody the idea of res gestea. There may be many incidents that do not strictly constitute the fact in issue. Yet they may be regarded as forming part of it in the sense that they closely accompany and explain it. These constituents or accompanying incidents are admissible in evidence as forming part of res gestea. It is, however, a pre-requisite for their being admitted in evidence that they are stated either immediately before or during or immediately after the event in question. There must not be such an interval as to allow a fabrication or to reduce them to the mere narrative of a past event. They have of course to remain within bounds of explaining and relating the matter in issue. They, in any event, do not prove the facts stated which have to be proved independently. 5. We have seen while noting the findings of doctor (Miss) L.D’ Souza (PW 1) that there was no evidence of a recent intercourse (with Kamini). 6. She had found that Kamini had no injury anywhere on the body. She had found that Kamini's hymen was torn at 3.0' clock position and that the tear was an old one. Kamini's vulva was well developed and her vagina could admit only one finger. This last finding had led Dr. (Miss) L. D'Souza (PW 1) to conclude that even if the girl in this case was a consenting party, there would be bruises on her private parts after the sexual intercourse and there would be inflammation. This particular conclusion then, instead of connecting the appellant with the crime in question, takes him away from it. Dr. M.R. Pandey (PW13) again found nothing incriminating against the appellant. 7. In a trial of an accused for sexual offences, it has to be borne in mind that the evidence of the prosecutrix generally speaking to be corroborated by independent and unimpeachable evidence connecting the accused with the crime charged in material particulars. Dr. M.R. Pandey (PW13) again found nothing incriminating against the appellant. 7. In a trial of an accused for sexual offences, it has to be borne in mind that the evidence of the prosecutrix generally speaking to be corroborated by independent and unimpeachable evidence connecting the accused with the crime charged in material particulars. This requirement is all the more necessary when the prosecutrix happens to be a child witness, because we know that generally speaking children have good memory, but no conscience and easily relate facts which they have been tutored to relate as if those facts had occurred before them. A child witness cannot corroborate another child witness. 8. It is also clear that the main prosecution witnesses, namely Mohammad Ayub (PW 8), Sukhnandan (PW 9) and Husana Bi (PW 10) live in parts of the same premises. Their differences with the appellant, therefore, are possible and they on that account could possibly go to the extent of falsely implicating him. These possibilities have not been given due weight by the learned Additional Sessions Judge. It is most doubtful that the appellant during the night in question had known Kamini (PW12) sexually. The appellant has been wrongly found guilty of the offence punishable under section 376 of the Indian Penal Code and wrongly sentenced thereunder. Appeal allowed.