Judgment.- This appeal is directed against the order of disposal of property, namely, an autorickshaw (M.O. 1), passed by the Sessions Judge, Uttara Kannada, Karwar, in Sessions Case No. 27 of 1977. By the said order, the learned Sessions Judge has confiscated the autorickshaw (M.O. 1) by exercising his powers under sections 65 and 67 of the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’), on the reasoning that the appellant (P.W.10) had been non-co-operative and had showed unhelpful attitude and had put forward a false defence which suggested that the illegal transport of forest produce, namely, matti bark, in that autorickshaw must have been with his consent. 2. The few facts necessary may be narrated as follows: The prosecution case is that at about 10.25 p.m. on 11th April, 1977, the two accused in the Sessions Case and eight others had, at Shirwad on Karwar-Mallapur road, committed dacoity by attacking P.W.1, Chudiya, Section Forester, and his staff and put them in fear of death and bodily harm and threw away 20 bundles of matti bark which had been seized and held in the autorickshaw bearing registration No. MYD 7856 (M. O. 1) and had forcibly taken possession of the autorickshaw (M.O.1). The further case of the prosecution is that by or about the same time and place, the two accused had committed an offence punishable under section 24(f) of the Act by transporting the forest produce, namely, matti bark, in the said autorickshaw. 3. According to the prosecution, A-2 was driving the autorickshaw and it was carrying matti bark. P.W.1 and his staff were waiting and on the arrival of the autorickshaw they stopped it and they seized the autorickshaw with the matti bark loaded in it. On seeing this, the two accused ran away. They returned along with eight others and attacked P.W.1 and his staff, put them in fear of bodily injury and took away the autorickshaw. The autorickshaw was seized from the shed of P.W.10, Vishwanath, the owner, on 13th April, 1977. 4. The learned Sessions Judge acquitted the two accused holding that the material available before him was insufficient to prove the charges against the two accused. He did find that an offence under the Act had been committed in transporting matti bark in the said autorickshaw and that might have been committed by some others. 5. 4. The learned Sessions Judge acquitted the two accused holding that the material available before him was insufficient to prove the charges against the two accused. He did find that an offence under the Act had been committed in transporting matti bark in the said autorickshaw and that might have been committed by some others. 5. Section 65 of the Act, which has been relied upon by the learned Sessions Judge, Jays down that an order of forfeiture of all tools, boats, vehicles and cattle used in the commission of any forest offence can be made by a convicting Court. Sessions Case No. 27 of 1977 did not end in conviction. Therefore, section 65 of the Act has no application. The learned Sessions Judge has ignored this aspect of the matter while placing reliance on section 65. 6. Section 67 of the Act, which also has been relied upon by the learned Sessions Judge, reads as follows: “When the offender is not known or cannot be found, the Magistrate, may, if he finds that an offence has been committed, order the property in respect of which the offence has been committed to be forfeited to the State Government together with tools, boats, vehicles or cattle and other articles used in committing the offence and taken charge of by the Forest Officer, or to be made over to the person to whom the Magistrate, deems to be entitled to the same.” 7. The word ‘Magistrate’ is defined in sub-section (9) of section 2 of the Act as follows: “‘Magistrate’ means a Magistrate of the first or second class.” 8. In this very connection, it is to be noticed that section 64 vests a ‘Magistrate’ with certain powers, while section 65 vests a convicting Court with power of forfeiture in regard to tools, boats, vehicles and cattle used in committing a forest offence. Section 67 vests a Magistrate with power of passing an order of forfeiture when he finds that a forest offence has been committed, and the offender or offenders is or are not known, or cannot be found. In this view of the matter, it will have to be held that a Sessions Judge would not be vested with the power of forfeiture under section 67 of the Act. 9. In this view of the matter, it will have to be held that a Sessions Judge would not be vested with the power of forfeiture under section 67 of the Act. 9. Sri A.B. Patil, the learned Government Pleader, argued that when a Magistrate can exercise such power, a Sessions Judge being an officer superior to the Magistrate can certainly have such power. He, in this connection, pointed out that a Sessions Judge will have over-all jurisdiction over the entire Sessions Division. This argument of Sri A. B. Patil does not appeal to me. A Sessions Judge cannot be equated with a Magistrate, as the powers of a Magistrate are different from those of a Sessions Judge. For example, a Sessions Judge has no power to take cognizance of an offence or act under section 64 of the Act. It is obvious that there appears to be a lacuna in the Act, but it cannot be helped at this stage. It is is patent that the case came to be committed to he Court of Session, Uttara Kannada, Karwar, as the offence under section 395, Indian Penal Code is exclusively triable by a Court of Session. 10. The foregoing reasons show that the order of confiscation passed by the learned Sessions Judge is without jurisdiction. 11. Even on merits, it is seen that the learned Sessions Judge has proceeded on the basis of what appeared to be a v:ase suggested. He has passed the order of confiscation, not because it had been definitely established before him. that P.W.10 had connived in the commission of the offence by lending his autorickshaw, but because such a thing appeared to be suggested, according to the opinion of the learned Sessions Judge. He has based this suspicion on the alleged false defence put-forth by P.W.10 and the alleged unhelpful attitude of P.W.10, during the prosecution. A-2, according to prosecution, was the driver of the autorickshaw (M.O. 1) working under P.W.10. There is no material to show that P.W.10 had the necessary knowledge that the autorickshaw was going to be used in the commission of the offence. A-2, according to prosecution, was the driver of the autorickshaw (M.O. 1) working under P.W.10. There is no material to show that P.W.10 had the necessary knowledge that the autorickshaw was going to be used in the commission of the offence. When A-2 has been acquitted and when there is no material to show that P.W.10 had the necessary knowledge that his autorickshaw (M.O. 1) was going to be used in the commission of a forest offence, it is too very far fetched to conclude, as held by the Sessions Judge, and direct that the autorickshaw be confiscated. 12. In the result, this appeal is allowed and the order of disposal of property, namely, autorickshaw (M.O. 1), passed by the Sessions Judge, Uttara Kannada, Karwar, in Sessions Case No. 27 of 1977, is set aside. It is directed that the autorickshaw (M.O.1) be handed over to the possession of P.W.10 from whom it was seized on 13th April, 1977.