JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THREE workmen, namely, Baburam, Jainath and Ramsubhag, who were employed in the Katkona Colliery of Western Coalfields, Ltd. , were charge sheeted by the management on 30 April 1975, for going on hunger strike and for preaching and inciting other workers to go on strike. After a domestic enquiry, the services of these workmen were terminated by the management with effect from 22 September 1975. The madhya Pradesh Koyla Mazdoor Panchayat, which is a registered trade union and of which the three workmen are members, took up the dispute and approached the Assistant Labour commissioner for conciliation. The management showed no response to the conciliation on which the Central Government was approached. By order, dated 5 April 1976, passed under S. 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes act, 1947, the Central Government referred to the Industrial Tribunal presided over by sri S. P. Bhargava the following dispute: "whether the action of the management of Katkona Colliery of Western Coalfields, ltd. , Post Office Katkona, District Surguja (Madhya Pradesh), in dismissing Sarvasri baburam son of Kanayaram, Jainath son of bodhan and Ramsubhag son of Bhagirath with effect from 22 September 1975, is justified? If not, to what relief are the said workmen entitled ? " ( 2. ) SUBSEQUENTLY, the reference was transferred to the Central Government Industrial tribunal -cum -Labour Court, Jabalpur. When the matter came up before the Industrial tribunal -cum -Labour Court, the management took a preliminary objection that there was no industrial dispute which could be referred to the Tribunal. The preliminary objection was overruled by the Industrial Tribunal cum-Labour Court by its order, dated 19 October 1977. The management then filed this petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution for quashing of the order of the Industrial Tribunal -cum -Labour Court and the proceedings pending before it. The management also applied for adjournment of the proceedings before the Tribunal which was refused. During the pendency of this petition, the industrial Tribunal -cum -Labour Court by its award, dated 23 December 1977, adjudicated upon the dispute. The Tribunal held that the dismissal of the workmen was wholly unjustified and they were ordered to be reinstated with full back-wages. The petitioner thereafter amended the petition incorporating therein the grounds for challenging the award. ( 3. The Tribunal held that the dismissal of the workmen was wholly unjustified and they were ordered to be reinstated with full back-wages. The petitioner thereafter amended the petition incorporating therein the grounds for challenging the award. ( 3. ) THE first contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the workmen did not make any demand on the management before the reference of the industrial dispute was made by the Central government and in the absence of any demand made on the management, there could be no industrial dispute which could be referred by the Government. In the same context, it was argued that the Madhya pradesh Koyla Mazdoor Panchayat, which took up the dispute on behalf of the workmen had very few members in the petitioners colliery and, therefore, it cannot be said that the dispute was sponsored by sufficient number of workmen to make it an industrial dispute. In our opinion, there is no merit in this contention. Before introduction of s. 2a by amending Act 35 of 1965, the law was that when the dispute related to a single workman it could not be an industrial dispute until it was espoused by a sufficient number of workman making it a common cause with the aggrieved individual workman. It was in that context necessary that before an individual dispute could be treated an industrial dispute it should be espoused by a sufficient number of workmen who should make a demand on the management to con-very that they have taken up the dispute of the individual workman and by that act have made it an industrial dispute. A workman whose dispute was not so espoused by a substantial number of workmen had no remedy. It was to obviate this difficulty that S. 2a was inserted. This section says that "where any employer discbarges, dismisses, retrenches or otherwise terminates the services of an individual workman, any dispute or difference between that workman and his employer connected with, or arising out of such discharge, dismissal, retrenchment, or termination shall be deemed to be an industrial dispute notwithstanding that no other workman nor any union of workmen is a party to the dispute. " the effect of S. 2a is that an individual workman who was discharged, dismissed or retrenched or whose services were otherwise terminated can be given relief without its being necessary for the relationship between the employer and the whole body of employees being attracted to that dispute and the dispute becoming a generalized one bet-ween labour on the one hand and the employer on the other: See Chemicals and Fibres of india, Ltd. v. D. G. Bhoir and others [1975ii l. L. N. 1 ] and Rustom and Hornsby (India), ltd. v. T. B. Kadam [197511 L. L. N. 318]. An individual dispute relating to discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination of a workman arises immediately the workman is discharged, dismissed, retrenched or terminated without his consent or in face of his opposition. This individual dispute because of the legislative fiat contained in S. 2a becomes an industrial dispute. It is not necessary in such cases to make a demand on the management for making the dispute an industrial dispute. Nor it is now necessary that such a dispute should be sponsored by the trade union or a substantial number of workmen. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the case of Sindhu Resettlement corporation, Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal, gujarat [a. I. R. 1968 S. C. 529], for the proposition that as no demand was made on the management, no industrial dispute could be referred by the Government. The case relied upon is a case under S. 2 (k) of the Act and not under S. 2a. It was held in this case that a mere request to the Government without a dispute being raised by the workmen with their employer, cannot become an industrial dispute. The case has no application here because the dispute in that case had arisen before the enactment of S. 2a. Learned counsel also relied upon the case of Jaipur udyog, Ltd. v. Cement Works Karmachari sangh [a. I. R. 1972 S. C. 1352]. In this case, the services of a workman in a quarry were terminated on the ground that he had attained the age of superannuation which was fifty-five years. The workmans dispute was that his age was not fifty-five but only fifty years. The workman had not questioned that the management had no right to fix the age of superannuation. In this case, the services of a workman in a quarry were terminated on the ground that he had attained the age of superannuation which was fifty-five years. The workmans dispute was that his age was not fifty-five but only fifty years. The workman had not questioned that the management had no right to fix the age of superannuation. There was a reference made under S. 10 of the Act to the tribunal for deciding the dispute whether the termination of the workman concerned on the ground of superannuation was legal and justified. The Tribunal held that the management could not fix fifty-five years as the age of superannuation and, therefore, the termination was not justified. The Supreme court in this context held that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to enlarge the dispute and say that the management could not fix fifty-five years as the age of superannuation. In this connexion it was pointed out that no question had been raised relating to the age of superannuation by the workman before the dispute was referred by the Government. The case no doubt makes a reference to the previous case of Sindhu Resettlement Corporation (vide supra), but it does not decide that before a reference of a dispute covered by S. 2a of the Act can be made by the Government, it is necessary that the workman should have made a demand on the management. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further relied upon the case of feeders Lloyd Corporation (Private), Ltd. v. Union of India [a. I. R. 1970 Del. 60]. This case does support the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. But,in our opinion, and we say it with great respect, the learned Judges failed to consider the change in law brought about by S. 2a of the Act and by relying upon the case of Sindhu Resettlement corporation (vide supra), they held that a demand by the workman concerned on the management was necessary before a reference of an industrial dispute could be made by the government. For the reasons already indicated, we respectfully differ from the view taken by the Delhi High Court. In the instant case, the workmen were dismissed in face of their opposition in the domestic enquiry. That itself showed that there was a dispute between them and the management in respect of their dismissal. For the reasons already indicated, we respectfully differ from the view taken by the Delhi High Court. In the instant case, the workmen were dismissed in face of their opposition in the domestic enquiry. That itself showed that there was a dispute between them and the management in respect of their dismissal. Further, the union on their behalf approached the Assistant Labour Commissioner for reconciliation. The Labour Commissioner issued a notice to the management, but no reply was sent to the notice. Intimation by the Labour Commissioner that a dispute as to the dismissal of the workmen has been placed before him by the union for conciliation was itself sufficient demand, if any demand was necessary, to make the dispute an industrial dispute. All that is necessary is that there should be an industrial dispute at the time when the reference is made. It is clear that in view of the above facts there was an industrial dispute in existence within the meaning of S. 2a when the reference was made by the central Government to the Tribunal. It may here be pointed out that the dismissed workmen are members of the union which took up their dispute. The said union may not be having other members in the petitioners colliery, but that is an irrelevant circumstance. The dispute did not become an industrial dispute because it was taken up by the trade union; the dispute was an industrial dispute because of S. 2a. The union only acted for the workmen as required by S. 36 of the Act. ( 4. ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner next contended that the Tribunal did not hold proper enquiry and the management was not given sufficient opportunity to had evidence for the witnesses were enquired to be produced only for cross-examination by the trade union on behalf of the workmen. The management was given full opportunity to produce evidence. It was only in respect of those witnesses who were not cross-examined during the domestic enquiry by the union that they were asked to be produced for purposes of cross-examination. Their statement taken in the domestic enquiry were supplemented by the statements made by them in cross examination in the enquiry before the tribunal, the management was given full opportunity to produce other evidence. In our opinion, therefore, the enquiry before the tribunal was not vitiated. ( 5. Their statement taken in the domestic enquiry were supplemented by the statements made by them in cross examination in the enquiry before the tribunal, the management was given full opportunity to produce other evidence. In our opinion, therefore, the enquiry before the tribunal was not vitiated. ( 5. ) LEARNED counsel then submitted that the finding of the Tribunal that the workmen did not take part in any illegal strike was not justified. The Tribunals findings are that the workmen went on hungry strike and that they were entirely peaceful. The Tribunal has first said that hunger strike is not a strike within the meaning of S. 2 (q) of the Act as it is resorted to for self-purifications. We do not accept this view as correct. "strike" is defined to mean " a cessation of work by a body of persons employed in any industry acting in combination, or a concerted refusal, or a refusal under a common understanding, of any number of persons who are or hive been so employed to continue to work or to accept employment. " if hunger strike is not simply refraining from taking food but is also accompanied by cessation of work by a body of persons employed in any industry, the same would obviously come within the definition of strike. The tribunal has, further, held that even assuming that hunger strike amounts to strike the strike in the instant case was not an illegal strike within S. 22 of the Act. The Tribunal said that the management tailed to produce evidence to show that the strike was in breach of contract as requited by S. 22. Section 2 (I) (a) on which the case of the management was based, provides that no person employed in a public unity service shall go on strike in breach of contract without giving to the employer notice of strike within six weeks before striking. But this provision does not require that there should be some special contract or a specific standing order that the workmen would not go on strike. But this provision does not require that there should be some special contract or a specific standing order that the workmen would not go on strike. A strike by the workmen win constitute a breach of contract under S. 22 if the workmen are obliged by their contact of employment or service to work when they go on strike : State of Bihar v. Dtodhur Jha [a. I. R. 1958 Pat 51] In the instant case it is not disputed that the workmen struck work during the night shift when they were required to work under their contract of service, it is also not disputed that the industry of coal is a public utility service and the workmen did not give any notice as required by S. 22 (1) (a ). It was, therefore, plain that the strike by the; workmen was illegal. The Tribunals finding on this question proceeds upon a misconstruction S. 22 (1) (a)and is apparently erroneous. The Tribunal has further found that the strike was entirely peaceful and there was no violence or threat of violence and no obstruction to other workmen. Participation in an illegal strike does not in all cases justify a punishment of dismissal When the strike is of a short duration and entirely peaceful, as is the position in the instant case, dismss. il of workmen will be too harsh a punishment more so when one of the striking workmen was not awarded any punishment at all. 0n this point the Tribunal is entirely right However, as the strike was plainly illegal, there was no justification for awarding back-wages. To that extent the petition has to be allowed. ( 6. ) THE petition is partly allowed. The tribunals award in so far as it relates to back-wages is quashed. There will be no order as to costs. The security deposit be refunded to the petitioner.