Judgment M. P. Singh, J. 1. This Second Appeal by the landlord appellant is against the concurrent findings of the two courts below dismissing his suit for eviction of the tenant. The plaintiff landlord is an Advocate at Muzaffarpur. The defendant tenant is Homeopath at the same place. The tenant respondent took on lease a portion of the house at a monthly rental of Rs.95 in the ground floor from the appellant in Mohalla Motijheel in the town of Muzaffarpur. His tenancy commenced about 15 years prior to the filing of the present suit which was filed in 1966. At that time the landlord appellant was occupying the upper floor. He filed the present suit for eviction of the respondent from the portion of the premises in occupation of the respondent on a plea of personal necessity giving five grounds in support of his plea. That he required the lower portion (i) for his blind father and sickly mother who were residing with their at Mohalla Naya Tola for want of sufficient accommodation (ii) for the marriage of his daughter and also on account of increase in the number of the members of the family (iii) for carrying on his profession properly (iv) for remodeling the lower portion of the house in order to bring the same for proper use ; and (v)because the tenant defendant had committed a breach of the terms of the tenancy by damaging the water pipeline. The claim of the plaintiff appellant was opposed by the respondent. All the allegations were denied The respondent contended, inter alia, that the landlords case of personal necessity was false because the portion of the premises in his occupation contained 11 rooms and the same was sufficient for his purpose. 2. The learned Munsif Ist. Muzaffarpur found on the evidence on record that the plaintiffs claim was not correct and that the plaintiff wanted the premises of the defendant only with a view to let out the same to some other person on a higher rent. He, accordingly, dismissed the suit. In appeal the learned additional Subordinate Judge confirmed his findings and he also held that the plaintiff did not require the portion of the premises in occupation of the defendant for his personal use or accommodation or for his office purposes. He, accordingly, dismissed the suit. In appeal the learned additional Subordinate Judge confirmed his findings and he also held that the plaintiff did not require the portion of the premises in occupation of the defendant for his personal use or accommodation or for his office purposes. He concurred with the Munsif in holding that the main motive of the plaintiff was to re-let the premises in question on a higher rent and that the suit had been filed with mala fide motive. He, therefore, dismissed the appeal. It is quite clear that the two courts below did not accept the evidence of personal necessity. The finding is apparently a finding of fact binding upon this Court in second appeal as held in Ram Lakhan Chou hary V/s. Raj Narain Sah, 1976 BBCJ 626 . 3. Mr. S. C. Ghose appearing for the appellant, however, submits that the question relating to the plaintiffs bona fide requirement of the terms is a mixed question of law and fact, as held in Madan Lal Puri V/s. Sain Das Berry. AIR 1973 Supreme Court 585 and he, therefore, can challenge the correctness of such finding. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent argued that the finding of the lower appellate court on this point is a finding of fact and this court has no jurisdiction to examine the correctness of the finding in Second appeal. He relied upon the decision in Mattu Lal V/s. Radhey Lal, (AIR 1974 supreme Court 1596) which relying upon an earlier decision of the Supreme Court in Sar Vate T. B. V/s. Nemi Chanel, 1966 MPLJ 26 (SC) held that such a finding on a mixed question of law and fact. My attention was also drawn to another decision of the Supreme Court in Damadi Lal V/s. Parashram, AIR 1976 Supreme court 2229 in which an apparent conflict between the two decisions aforesaid was noticed but it was not considered necessary to express any opinion for the purpose of that case. I am of opinion that in the present case also it is not necessary to embark upon an enquiry as to whether the question relating to the bona fide requirement of the landlord is a mixed question of law or fact or purely one of fact. I am of opinion that in the present case also it is not necessary to embark upon an enquiry as to whether the question relating to the bona fide requirement of the landlord is a mixed question of law or fact or purely one of fact. Both, the courts below have fully considered separately each of the grounds given by the landlord appellant in support of the plea of personal necessity and they have rejected the same. There are 11 rooms in the first floor out of which two rooms have been given to others and nine rooms are still in possession of the plaintiff appellant In the ground floor there is a number of shops arid tenants. The appellant is practising as a lawyer for 22 years. From the evidence on record the courts below came to the conclusion that he was a pleader Commissioner and had practically no practice and that he was keeping his office in upper floor for the last 22 years or so and there was nothing on the record to show that the circumstance had changed. This ground was considered by the trial court in paragraph 26 and by the lower appellate court in paragraph 10. In this regard the courts below considered the evidence of P. W.2 in paragraph 10 and D. W.1 in paragraph 4. Mr. Ghose vehemently contended that the courts below cannot say that the plaintiff was a briefless lawyer. He argues that the plaintiff needed a room in the lower portion for his office. I have already pointed out that the courts below considered the evidence of P. W.2 and d. W.1 for giving a finding that the plaintiff had practically no practice. The courts below have not said any thing beyond record. The trial court also took into consideration the fact that the plaintiff used to hold his office on the ground floor which he subsequently let out to a tenant named Sukhdeo who had his tea stall there. The trial court opined that the very fact that the tea stall was opened there, goes to prove that in fact the plaintiff did not require any office. 4. With regard to the need of the premises for the parents of the plaintiff, it is enough to say that both the father and mother died after the decision of the trial court, and, therefore, the need ceased to exist. 4. With regard to the need of the premises for the parents of the plaintiff, it is enough to say that both the father and mother died after the decision of the trial court, and, therefore, the need ceased to exist. Mr. Ghose for the appellant, however, contended that the Court can look to the subsequent events for the purpose of giving relief to the plaintiff and not to dismiss the suit. The contention is unfounded. If this contention be sound, then the rights of a litigant cannot be taken away by subsequent retrospective legislation. Mr. Ghose relied upon the case of Rameshwar V/s. Jot Ram, AIR 1976 Supreme Court 49. In that case it was held that the right to relief must be judged to exist as on the date a suitor institutes the legal proceedings, that is to say, the right of a party is determined by the fact as they exist on the date of the action and later developments cannot defeat his right. But in that very case it was observed at page 52 in paragraph 9 : ". . . . . . . . . Where the nature of the relief, as originally sought, has become absolute or unserviceable or a new form of relief will be more efficacious on account of developments subsequent to the suit or even during the appellate stage, it is but fair that the relief is moulded, carried or reshaped light of up dated facts. . . . . . . . " It is quite clear from that very case that the Courts can take note of subsequent events and grant relief accordingly in exceptional circumstances. It will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case as to when a Court of appeal should take note of subsequent events. In the present case it must be held that the parents of the plaintiff being dead, his necessity for them ceased to exist and I do not find any error in the view taken by the courts below. This aspect of the case was considered by the courts below on merits also. It appears that the parents of the plaintiff had gone to reside with their daughter at Naya Tola because they could render their services to their daughter in looking after their house at Naya Tola. This aspect of the case was considered by the courts below on merits also. It appears that the parents of the plaintiff had gone to reside with their daughter at Naya Tola because they could render their services to their daughter in looking after their house at Naya Tola. The daughter was a lady doctor and her husband was also a doctor and both of them were Government servants and their job was transferable. Obviously, therefore, they could not be stationed at Muzaffarpur and they could not be in a position to look after their house at Naya Tola which contained about 10-11 rooms on the upper floor and 10-11 rooms in the ground floor. There was a number of tenants both in the upper floor and ground floor in the house of the sister of the plaintiff at Naya Tola and the father of the plaintiff used to realise the rent from the tenants. They occupted two rooms in the house of their daughter. This matter has been fully cansidered in paragraphs 20 to 25 of the trial court and paragraphs 7 and 8 of the lower appellate court judgment. The trial court considered the fact and during the tenure of the defendant in the house of the plaintiff for about 15 to 17 years a number of tenants were inducted and evicted and if at all there was any necessity for accommodation of the parents in the house of the plaintiff, the plaintiff should not have inducted a number of tenants during the span of 15 to 17 years. It is obvious that this ground also given by the plaintiff in support of his plea that he required lower portion of the house in the ground floor in occupation of the defendant for the use of his parents, is baseless. 5 Mr. Ghose next contended that the court of appeal below has observed that the daughter of the appellant had already been married during the pendency of the suit and hence this ground was not available to the appellant. He submitted that the plaintiff had stiil two daughters to marry. In my opinion, this ground given by the plaintiff cannot be considered to be genuine. The marriage of the remaining daughter, if any, can be done in the same manner as done before. He submitted that the plaintiff had stiil two daughters to marry. In my opinion, this ground given by the plaintiff cannot be considered to be genuine. The marriage of the remaining daughter, if any, can be done in the same manner as done before. It appears that there was no contention on behalf of the plaintiff before any of the two courts below that he had two more daughters to marry. The trial court adjudged this point in paragraph 39. The lower appellate Court dealt with this point in paragraph 9. Moreover, bona fide need for the house must have existed on the date of the suit. As regards the remaining two grounds also, the court below found no substance in them and no argument has been advanced before me with respect to the same. 6. It may further be mentioned that the trial court took into consideration another significant important fact to show that the case of the plaintiff regarding the requirement of the lower portion of the house was not bona fide. It appears that previously a portion of the ground floor was occupied by the family members of the tenant Sri H. D. Ghose and Sri S. K. Mukherjee. The plaintiff filed eviction suit against them and got a decree. He got delivery of possession of that portion of the house occupied by Sri Ghose and Mukherjee on the 25th November, 1966. The curious thing to be noted is that he inducted the tenants in that portion of the house vacated by Sri H. D. Ghose and Sri S. K. Mukherjee in the month of january-May, 1967, that is to say during the pendency of the present suit. He let out the portion on the ground floor to Jetha Nand, Ram Naadan Singh and agra Cycle House in the month of January-February, 1967 and April-May, 1967 respectively. The trial Court rightly concluded from the conduct of the plaintiff that he got evicted Sri H. D. Ghose and S. K. Mukherjee only for the purpose of securing high rent from other newly inducted tenants. Now, the legal position is that the facts found by the courts below cannot be questioned in second Appeal. Only the soundness of conclusion from them can be questioned, if erroneous. Now, the legal position is that the facts found by the courts below cannot be questioned in second Appeal. Only the soundness of conclusion from them can be questioned, if erroneous. In the present case the only sound conclusion from the aforesaid facts found by the courts below is that the landlord appellant did not require the premises in question reasonably and in good faith. The concurrent conclusion of the courts below is, therefore, unquestionable. 7. Another contention of the Appellant is that the court below committed an error of law because it has not given any finding in terms of the proviso to section 11 (i) (c) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act. It is pointed out that a duty has been cast upon the Court to give such a finding. Relying upon the case of Krishna Das Nandy V/s. Bidhan Chandra Roy, (AIR 1959 calcutta 181), it was urged that partial eviction could be allowed under the said proviso by the court below. In my opinion, the contention has no substance. The Calcutta case was a case of first appeal. In that case the suit had been decreed in favour of the landlord for total eviction of the defendant from the entire premises. In that situation it was observed that it was open to the tenant-defendant of that case to contend under the proviso that the plaintiffs reasonable requirement for occupation could be satisfied by evicting him from a part only of the premises and by allowing him to continue in occupation of the rest. That case, therefore, is of no assistance to the appellant. 8. Under the said proviso it is only when the court is satisfied (not the plaintiff) that the landlords necessity would be fulfilled by the tenant vacating a portion only it shall order, accordingly. That situation does not arise in the present case. Here both the courts below after a full investigation of all the grounds on which eviction was sought, held that the landlords claim was not bona fide and that his intention was mala fide. According to the courts below, the motive of the landlord was only to let out the premises of the defendant to some other person on a higher rent and the grounds were given by him simply as a ruse for eviction. According to the courts below, the motive of the landlord was only to let out the premises of the defendant to some other person on a higher rent and the grounds were given by him simply as a ruse for eviction. It is clear from the findings arrived at by the courts below that the plaintiff totally failed to make out any case of reasonable requirement even in respect of a portion of the premises of the defendant. The plaintiff was already in possession of nine rooms and he did not need any further. Under these circumstances, the question of partial eviction did not at all arise and it was not necessary for any of the two courts below to give any finding in terms of the proviso to section 11 (1) (c) of the said Act. The point thus, has no force. 9. I, accordingly, agree with the courts below that the portion of the premises in question was not required reasonably and in good faith by the landlord. His plea of personal necessity for evicting the defendant was incorrect. The appeal, therefore, must be dismissed. 10. In the result the appeal fails and it is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, I will make no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.