Nandlal v. State of Rajasthan — 1978 DIGILAW 46 (RAJ)

SHRIMAL J.—These two special appeals Nos, 47 and 49 of 1977, preferred by Nand Lal and Ganesh Lal, under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949, are directed against the order, delivered in Civil Writ Petitions Nos. 1507 of 1976 and 1508 of 1976 on October 26, 1977, rejecting the writ peti-tions challenging the validity of the order of the Revenue Appellate Authority, dated August 27, 1976, holding that the transfers of the surplus land, transfer of which was. made after December 31, 1969, had no right of hearing and consequantly the appeals filed by then were not maintainable. 2. The facts giving rise to these special appeals are that the Sub Divisional Officer, Kota, (vide his order, dated July 12, 1976) refused to recognise the transfer of land made in favour of the appellants as the sale-deeds were executed after December 31, 1969 and the Sub-Divisional Officer further held that Bakhtawar Singh was liable to surrender 339.76 standard acres of land, being surplus land. He was given an option to select for himself and his sons land within the ceiling limit which he wanted to retain. It was urged that the Khatedar-tenant while exercising the option given to him included in the list of the fields to be surrendered, Khasra No. 39, measuring 29 Bighas and 1 Biswa, situate in village Chatinda, as also Khasra No. 38, measuring 13 Bighas and 1 Biswa of land, situate in village Bhojpura, alleged to have been transferred to petitioners Nandlal and Ganeshlal respectively. The petitioners raised an objection before the Sub-Divisional Officer, but without any success. The appeal filed before the Revenue Appellate Authority also resulted in fiasco. 3. Aggrieved of the impugned orders, the petitioners instead of filing revision petitions before the Board of Revenue, straightway approached this Court, seeking redress under Article 226 of the Constitution. But both the writ petitions Nos. 1507 and 1508 of 1976 were dismissed by the learned Single Judge. 4. As both these appeals emerge out of the same order and as common questions of law and facts are involved, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. 5. But both the writ petitions Nos. 1507 and 1508 of 1976 were dismissed by the learned Single Judge. 4. As both these appeals emerge out of the same order and as common questions of law and facts are involved, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. 5. The contention of learned counsel, appearing on behalf of the petitioners, is that the statutory authority, namely, the Revenue Appellate Authority, has acted in contravention of law in not interfering with or in not reversing the order of the Sub-divisional Officer, accepting the encumbered land. Learned counsel further urged that the requirement of the second proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 30-E of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955, is that where the person, surrendering excess lands, holds lands of which some are encumbered and some are not encumbered, the unencumbered lands shall so far as may be, be surrendered in preference to encumbered lands. It has also been submitted that at no stage of the proceedings any notice had been issued to the petitioners. Non-giving of the notices to the transferee-petitioners violates the principles of natural justice. Placing reliance on Harnek Singh vs. State of Punjab (1) learned counsel argued that the petitioners were entitled to adequate opportunity to safeguard their interest under the proceedings, which culminated in adversely effect ting their right to property. 6. The arguments advanced before the learned Single Judge were reiterated before us. All these points, raised before us, have been exhaustively dealt with by the learned Single Judge. The learned Single Judge. The learned Single Judge has rightly observed that the decision in, Harnek Singhs case (1) (supra) dealt with the interpretation of Section 32-FF of the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Land Act, 1954, and that there is no corresponding provision contained in Chapter III B of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955. It is a decision passed on the special facts of that case and is of no avail to the appellants. A perusal of Section 30-DD of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955, reveels that the transfers made upto December 31, 1969, in favour of agriculturists, domiciled in Rajasthan of in favour of Khatedars sons or brothers, intending to take the profession of agriculturists and capable of cultivating lands personally and who had attained the age of majority on or before the said date, could be recognised. The Sub divisional Officer has rightly refused to recognised the transfers made in favour of the petitioners vide his order, dated July 12, 1976. The appellants have no grievance against the above order. Their grievance relates to the manner of exercise of option by the Khatedar tenant and its acceptance by the Sub-divisional Officer and non-interference in the said order by the Revenue Appellants Authority. 7. Now the questions, which need to be determined, are (1) what is the effect of not availing of the alternative remedy available to the petitioners; and (ii) whether the petitioners had any right of notice against accepting the option exercised by the Khatedar-tenant, Major Bakhtawar Singh. 8. In Smt. Dal Kanwar Bai vs. Ram Singh and State of Rajasthan (2) a Single Bench of the Board of Revenue had set aside a similar order of the Sub-divisional Officer, accepting the surrender of land which was encuabered and as such the petitioners cannot be said to be correct in their submission that no useful purpose would have been served by filling a revision petition. The Rajasthan Tenancy Act is a self contained Code. It provides for a complete machinery and recourse must be had to that machinery for redress and not to a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is not the object of Article 226 of the Constitution to convert this Court into an appellate or a revisional Court. Whenever a litigant feels that revisional Court will not give him appropriate relief, there should be something more in a case to warrant the entertainment of a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, something going to the root of the jurisdiction of the Revenue Authorities, something to show that it would be a case of palpable injustice to ask the transferee to adopt a remedy provided by the Act. The effect of 42nd amendment of the Constitution is that the High Court previously had the freedom to issue a high prerogative writ notwithstanding the existence of an alternative remedy, but it is now precluded from doing so because Article 226 (3) of the Constitution provides that "no petition for redress of any injury referred in sub-clause (b) or sub-clause (c) of clause (1) shall be entertained if any other remedy for such redress is provided for by or under any other law tor the time being in force." Reference in this connection may be made to Jai Hanuman Trading Co., Pvt., Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Income-tax (3). 9. As regards petitioners right to be heard, suffice it to say, that the transfers of the lands made by a Khatedar-tenant after December 31, 1969, cannot be recognised and they are rendered ineffective against the State Government. For the purpose of determining surplus land of the Khatedars, such transfers are required to be ignored. Chapter III-B of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955, and the Rajasthan Tenancy (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) (Government) Rules, 1963, made thereunder do not provide for the issuance of a notice to the transferees. Under section 30 E (2) of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955, a duty has been cast on the person holding land in excess of the ceiling area to make a report of such possession and surrender such excess land to the State Government and place it at the disposal of the Tehsildar within the local limits of whose jurisdiction such land is situate. Under sub section (4) of section 30-E of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955, the person (i.e. the Khatedar) retaining the possession of the land after April 1, 1966, in excess of the ceiling area applicable to him, is deemed to be a trespasser liable to ejectment from such excess land and to pay penalty in accordance with clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 183 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955. The petitioners are purchasers pending pro-ceedinge. They were bound by the result of the pending celling proceedings, between Khatedar Bakhtawar Singh and State Government, at the time of the alleged sale by the Khatedar in favour of the purchasers. Where a transfer is not recognised, the land covered by such transfer has to be treated as land of the Khatedar, whose land is being acquired. They were bound by the result of the pending celling proceedings, between Khatedar Bakhtawar Singh and State Government, at the time of the alleged sale by the Khatedar in favour of the purchasers. Where a transfer is not recognised, the land covered by such transfer has to be treated as land of the Khatedar, whose land is being acquired. Thus, it is manifest that the legislature by necessary implication excludes the right of transferee-purchasers to be heard. The transferees are entitled to be reimbursed and the transferor is bound to restore to them the advantage obtained by him. They can also claim reimbursement under rule 22 of the Rules of 1963, out of the compensation amount paid by the State Government to the transferor in respect of such land under Section 30.G of the Act. Thus, under the scheme of Chapter III-B of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955, the Legislature, by necessary implication, excludes the application of the principles of natural justice regarding Audi Alteram Partem in favour of the transferees. In sum, they have no right of being heard. 10, In the Union of India vs. J.N. Sinha (4), the question regarding the principles of natural justice came up for consideration while dealing with the fundamental rule No. 56 J. Their Lordships, repelling similar contention, raised by the respondent in that case, observed as under:— "....It is true that if a statutory provision can be read consistently with the principles of natural justice, the Courts should do so because it must be presumed that the legislatures and the statutory authorities intend to act in accordance with the principles of natural justice. But, if on the other hand, a statutory provision either specifically or by necessary implication or by necessary implication excluded the application of any or all the rules of principles of natural justice then the Court cannot ignore the mandate of the legislature or the statutory authorityand read into the concerned provision the principles of natural justice. Whether the exercise of a power conferred should be made in accordance with any of the principles of natural justice or not depends upon the express words of the provision conferring the power, the nature of the power conferred, the purpose for which it is conferred and the effect of the exercise of that power." 11. Whether the exercise of a power conferred should be made in accordance with any of the principles of natural justice or not depends upon the express words of the provision conferring the power, the nature of the power conferred, the purpose for which it is conferred and the effect of the exercise of that power." 11. A series of legislation has been gradually adopted and provided for land reforms and for acquisition of right, title and interest in land from the land holders and intermediaries. The motive behind the present Act is to ensure equitable distribut on of agricultural land for securing the odject that the ownership and control of material resources of the community are so distributed, as best to subserve the comman good, as enshrined in Article 39 of the Constitution of India. State acquires land under this Act under the ceiling provisions not for making profit but for fair distribution of land amongst landless agriculturists and other deserving persons with a view to remove the disparity in the holdings of agricultural land and to increase agricultural products. That is why the legilature, in order to acquire expenditiously the surplus land, did not make any provision under Chapter III-B of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act or the Rules made thereunder regarding giving an opportunity of being beared to the transferees, of the land whose transfers have not been recognised under the law of the Sand for ceiling purposes. The principle of natural justice cannot be stretched to defeat the very purpose and object of the Act itself. 12. We find no infirmity in the orders of the learned Single Judge. 13. The two special appeals, being bereft of merits, are hereby dismissed in limine.