JUDGMENT M.P. Saxena, J.:- This is a Petition under Article 226 of the constitution of India arising out of proceedings under section 21 of the U. P, Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, hereinafter called the Act. 2. Dr. Sitaram Gandhi, the petitioner is owner of House No. 505 situate Begmabagh in the city of Meerut. It consists of two flours. viz ground floor and the first floor. In the Municipal records their number in 5050/11 and 500/12 respectively. The ground floor which consists of four rooms, court yard latrine, bath room, varandah kitchen and small compound is in possession of the landlord. The first floor was in possession of one Mr. N.P. Daga as a tenant. According to the petitioner, this building was constructed in 1965 and till 1975 the provisions of the Act were not applicable to it. He was posted outside Meerut but his father, wife and children used to live on the ground floor of this house. In 1973 he was transferred to Meerut and had to convert one of the rooms into consulting room. As there was paucity of accommodation he asked Mr. Daga to vacate the first floor. On his reluctance suit for his ejectment ,was filed in the small cause court. It was dismissed in 1975 because by that time the building had become 10 years old and had come under the operation of the Act. The landlord filed a revision against it. However, on 19-4-1976 Mr. Daga sent a letter to the Kent Control and Eviction Officer informing him that he was going to vacate the disputed building by the next month. A copy of this letter was also sent to the landlord. On 22-4-1976 the landlord moved an application under section 16 (1) (b) of the Act for its release on the ground that it was bona fide required by him for his own need. This application is Annexure II to the supplementary rejoinder affidavit. On 24-4-1976 the opposite party no. 3 applied for allotment of this building as he was living as a guest in a room and was experiencing great inconvenience. His application for allotment is Annexure III to the writ petition. One Sri Ram Sahai also appears to have applied for its allotment on 5-5-1976. On 24-4-1976 the opposite party no. 3 applied for allotment of this building as he was living as a guest in a room and was experiencing great inconvenience. His application for allotment is Annexure III to the writ petition. One Sri Ram Sahai also appears to have applied for its allotment on 5-5-1976. On 11-5-1976 the Rent Control and Eviction Officer rejected the release application on the ground that the landlord had no bona fide need for this building. On the same day he took up both the allotted this portion to Dr. A. K. Srivastava who is opposite party no. 3 possession is also said to have been delivered to the allottee on the same day. 3. The landlord filed two appeals viz. Rent Appeal No. 296 and Rent Appeal No. 302 of 1976 against both the orders. It may be stated here that till then section 18 of the Act provided appeal against an order passed under section 16. By the time the appeals came up for hearing the U. P. (Amendment) Act XXVIII of 1976 came into force and all appeals under section 18 were treated as revisions and were to be disposed of as such. The scope of a revision provided by the Act was the same as contained in section 115 of the C.P.C. The learned District Judge Meerut, agreed with the findings of the Delegated Authority and dismissed both the appeals on 8-9-1976. Hence this writ petition challenging the validity of the orders passed on the release and allotment applications. The learned counsel for the petitioner has urged the following three points before me : (i) The bona fide need of the landlord was not considered in correct perspective. (ii) Rule 9 (3) was not complied with and its effect was not considered. (iii) The release and allotment applications could not be simultaneously disposed of. The learned counsel for the petitioner has urged the following three points before me : (i) The bona fide need of the landlord was not considered in correct perspective. (ii) Rule 9 (3) was not complied with and its effect was not considered. (iii) The release and allotment applications could not be simultaneously disposed of. So far as the first point in concerned, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that section 15(2) of the Act which is a analogous to rule 6 framed under the U. P. Act III of 1967 lays down that no release order under clause (b) of sub-section (I) shall be made unless the District Magistrate is satisfied that the building or any part thereof or any land appurtenant thereto is bona fide required ..................by the landlord for occupation by himself or member of his family either for residential purposes or for purposes of any profession. trade or calling. According to him, the word 'bona fide' is used in contradiction to mala fide and as long as the application is not mala fide in the sense that the landlord in fact does not want to occupy the house himself but wants to let out on higher rent, the Prescribed Authority is bound to permit the landlord to occupy it and has no option in the matter. In this connection reference is made to the full Bench decision of this court in Ram Surat Singh v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, 1946 A.L.J. 412 in which it was held that the word 'need implies a necessity but the degree of necessity is not material except in so far as it may throw light that the landlord's application is made in good faith. Reliance has also been placed on the case of Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Allahabad v Dr. M.N. Laloraya and another, 1973 R.C.J. 389 in which the Rent Control and Eviction Officer had held that he landlord had no bona fide need because the accommodation in his possession was sufficient for his requirements. This approach was held to he not according to law laid down by the Full Bench as it was held that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer had no jurisdiction to enter into the sufficiency of the needs of the landlord. This approach was held to he not according to law laid down by the Full Bench as it was held that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer had no jurisdiction to enter into the sufficiency of the needs of the landlord. The scope of the word bona fide needed or required has again been considered by a Full Bench of this Court in Chandra Kumar Sah v. District Judge Varanasi, 1976 A.L.R.95. They have been construed to mean genuinely or in good faith, and convey an idea of absence of any intent to deceive. It will not be bona fide requirement of the landlord if release is sought for ulterior purpose or fanciful whim. The question whether the building is bona fide required by the landlord will differ on the facts and circumstances of each case. As it is the distinction of the District Magistrate, the High Court cannot consider whether the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer is correct or incorrect, reasonable of unreasonable but it can consider whether the satisfaction of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer is based on relevant or irrelevant consideration. In the latter case it can held that the satisfaction is fictitious and is no satisfaction in law. This is borne out from the case of Muni Devi v. Radhey Shyam, 1967 A.L.J. 698. In the instant case the ground floor consists of four rooms, court yard, latrine, bath room, varandha, kitchen and small compound on the ground floor. The petitioner has seven numbers in his family. It may be true that at the time it was let out to. Mr. Daga only five member living home but the petitioner has also been transferred to Meerut and the number has increased. They are all living in the said accommodation. As regards need, the landlord set out that after his transfer to Meerut he has opened a clinic in one room while his son who has qualified as M. B B. S. and who wants to start private practice, also requires one room for this purpose. Out of four rooms already in their possession one big room has been converted into the rooms by a wooden partition as reported by the Rent Control Inspector. There is no reason why the father and the son cannot carry on-their private practice in one of these rooms. Out of four rooms already in their possession one big room has been converted into the rooms by a wooden partition as reported by the Rent Control Inspector. There is no reason why the father and the son cannot carry on-their private practice in one of these rooms. Three big rooms and one small room will still be available to the members of the family. I am reluctant to believe that his son who, till recently was completing his internship in the P. L. Sharma Hospital has such a heavy rush of patients that it is difficult to carry on practice in that small room. Therefore, the requirement for this purpose was more fanciful than real. 4. Another need of the petitioner was that his eldest son is of marriageable age. He is receiving proposals for his marriage but it is held up due to paucity of accommodation. Both the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and the District Judge held it to be future need. Even if it is held to be a need in presenti, it will not advance the petitioner's case much further. The accommodation already in their possession can conveniently accommodate the married couple. The first floor has only three rooms in which the opposite party no. 3 has been accommodated. In this view of the matter the Rent Control and Eviction Officer of the District Judge cannot be said to have committed any manifest error of law apparent on the face of the record in recording their satisfaction that the landlord does not bona fide require the first flour. As held in the case of Muni Lal and others v. Prescribed Authority and others, AIR 1978 Supreme Court 29 finding on bona fide need or comparative hardship is a finding of fact and High Court cannot interfere or disturb the name in writ proceedings. High Court cannot reappraise evidence and come to its own conclusion different from that of the District Judge and the Delegated Authority. Therefore, the first point carries no force. 5. So far as the first and the third points are concerned, they are to be rejected primarily for the reason that they have neither been raised in the entire writ petition nor in the affidavit filed in support of it or in the rejoinder affidavit filed in point not raised in the writ petition cannot be considered. 5. So far as the first and the third points are concerned, they are to be rejected primarily for the reason that they have neither been raised in the entire writ petition nor in the affidavit filed in support of it or in the rejoinder affidavit filed in point not raised in the writ petition cannot be considered. Even on merit it carries no force because the learned District Judge has specifically mentioned in his judgment that notice has specifically mentioned in his judgment that notice under rule 9(3) of the Act was given and is on the record. He has referred to that paper. Besides it, the copy of the order sheet filed by the petitioner shows that the release and allotment applications were both listed for 4-5-1976 and both the parties had notice of the same. Arguments on the release application were over on 10-5-1976, which was rejected on 11-5-1976 and there- after the building was allotted to opposite party no. 3. The petitioner had full knowledge of the application for allotment and could very well have filed objections to it so that in the event of his application for release being rejected they could be considered. His contention that he got no chance to be heard in the matter of allotment is without substance because in the case of Trilok Singh and Co. v. District Magistrate Lucknow, 1976 (U.P.) R.C.C. 138 the Supreme Court has held that no hearing is contemplated at the stage when the District Magistrate passes an order of allotment or release. Therefore, the notice under rule 9 (3) appears to have been given nor the petitioner has been able to show that prejudice, if any, was caused to him. Similarly the contention that the release and allotment applications could not simultaneously be considered had no force. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer no doubt listed both the applications for disposal on the same date but the order sheet shown that he had taken up the release application first and after it was dismissed the allotment applications were considered. Therefore, it was not simultaneous disposal of release and allotment applications. 6. For all these reasons the writ petition has no force. It is accordingly dismissed with costs on parties.