JUDGMENT K.C. Agrawal, J.:- This is a defendant's revision filed against the judgment of the Judge Small Causes dated 2.1.1976 and that of the Additional District Judge, Allahabad, dated 17th November, 1976. 2. The plaintiffs-opposite parties filed suit no. 690 of 1973 for ejectment of the City Congress Committee, Allahabad on the ground of default. The plaintiffs-opposite parties claimed that they were the owners and the landlords of the building in question and the defendants-applicants had not paid rent them claimed through the notice of demand. Therefore, the defendants-applicants were liable to be evicted. The total amount of rent, damages for use an occupation and taxes claimed in the suit was Rs. 1512.08. On 8.11.1973 the defendants-applicants put in appearance and sought adjournment to enable them to file the written statement. On that very date the plaintiffs opposite parties also tiled an application (12 C) for refusing to entertain defence under Order 5 Rule 15 of the Civil Procedure Code. The case was adjourned to 10.12 1973. On 10. the defendants-applicants filed the written statement, disputing the claim of the plaintiffs-opposite parties. By the order passed on the aforesaid date, the defendants-applicants were allowed to check the accounts, and to deposit all the arrears of rent by 8.1.1974. On 8.1.1974 defendants-applicants deposited a sum of Rs. 2500/-. The plaintiffs-opposite parties thereafter filed an application (16-C) directing the defendants-applicants to file the original tender or affidavit in proof of deposit of Rs. 2500/- In compliance with the aforesaid order, the defendants-applicants filed the tender in original on 19.1.1974. Showing that a deposit of Rs. 2500/- had been made by them. The case was thereafter adjourned to 15.4.1974. On that date the defendants-applicants were directed to file all the rent receipts within ten days. It was thereafter that the plaintiffs opposite parties again filed an application dated 5.8.1974 (17-C) for striking out the defence. The defendants-applicants sought time from the court for depositing rent due upto 31st August, 1974 by 26th September, 1974, along with the costs of the suit. The Court granted the prayer on 12.8.1974. The case was, however, adjourned to the next date which was 26 6.1974 and was taken up thereafter on 12.10.1974. On that date the court having found that the defendants-applicants, had not appeared in the case directed the striking of the defence. The Court granted the prayer on 12.8.1974. The case was, however, adjourned to the next date which was 26 6.1974 and was taken up thereafter on 12.10.1974. On that date the court having found that the defendants-applicants, had not appeared in the case directed the striking of the defence. The defendants-applicants filed an application on 19.10.1974 for recalling the aforesaid order on the ground that the defendants-applicants had already deposited a sum of Rs. 2500/- and that according to its case no rent was due which was liable to be paid to the plaintiffs-opposite parties. The defendants also attempted to explain the reason as to why the counsel engaged by it did not appear on 12.10.1974. On the said application the Judge Small Causes held that delay may be condoned if the rent due upto 30.9.1974 was deposited by 30.10.1974. According to the defendants-applicants a sum of Rs. 665/- was again deposited on 30.10.1974. The case was after few adjournments taken on 7.3.1975. On that date the defendants were not present. The Court noted the absence of the defendants, took evidence of the plaintiffs and reserved the judgment. Although the judgment was reserved on 7.3.1975, but the learned Judge Small Causes could found it convenient to pronounce the judgment of the case only on 7.1.1976. Against the aforesaid order the defendants went in revision which was dismissed by the impugned order of the learned Additional District Judge on 17.10.1976; hence this revision. 3. The first submission made on behalf of the defendants-applicants was that as the entire rent had been deposited by the defendants applicants due to the plaintiffs-opposite parties, the defence could not be struck out on 12.10.1974. Sri R P. Tripathi counsel appearing for the plaintiffs-opposite parties urged that as the revision filed to the District Judge against the order striking off the defence was dismissed the defendants applicants could not raise the question of the validity of the said order 12.10.1974 now in the present revision. It appears that after the defence was struck of on 12 10.1974 the defendants- applicants filed revision No. 491 of 1974 before the learned District Judge. This revision was filed beyond time. It was accompanied by an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay. It appears that after the defence was struck of on 12 10.1974 the defendants- applicants filed revision No. 491 of 1974 before the learned District Judge. This revision was filed beyond time. It was accompanied by an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay. The learned District Judge was, however, not satisfied by the reason given for the condonation of delay and rejected the same on 26.7.1975. The question that arises for decision is that about the effect of the said order dismissing the revision. Admittedly this was not a decision given on merits. Had the learned District Judge decided the revision on merits, there could possibly be no dispute that the correctness of the order dated 12.10.1974 could not be subsequently challenged, but as it was only dismissed on the ground of limitation, it cannot be said to have been heard and decided on merits, and, therefore, cannot operate as res judicata. The learned Judge in revision was, therefore, wrong in not considering the aforesaid argument raised on behalf of the defendants- applicants and rejecting the same on the basis that since the revision preferred against it had been dismissed the said point was not open to the defendants- applicants. It may be noted that the order passed on 12.10.1974 was of an interlocutory character, the rejection of the revision preferred against it did not disentitle the defendants-applicants to challenge the correctness subsequently. 4. Now coming to the merits of the order dated 12.10.1974., it appears to me that the learned Judge Small Causes committed an error in striking of the defence without deciding as to whether the requisite, amount of rent had been deposited by the defendants-applicants. Under Order 5 Rule 15 of the C.P.C. the power to strike out the defence can be exercised in a case when the court is satisfied that the amount of monthly rent or compensation for use and occupation, due at the rate admitted by a defendant, had not been paid. The striking off the defence of a party for non-compliance with the provisions of Order 5 Rule 15 of the C.P.C. is a serious matter and a Court would not be justified in passing such an order without recording a finding that the defendant has committed a default as contemplated by the aforesaid rule and did not make the deposit of the amount mentioned therein. The order passed by the Judge Small Causes on 12.10.1974 is infact a non-speaking one as it does not give any idea of the basis of which he found that the defendants-applicants had not deposited the arrears. He did not record any finding about the amount due to the plaintiffs-opposite parties by the defendants-applicants. It was also pointed out by the learned counsel for the defendants-applicants. Smt. Ramo Devi Gupta, that the learned Judge Small Causes should have also passed order on the application (18C) filed on 19.10.1974 for recalling the order dated 12.10.1974. The submission made is not without substance. 5. There also appears to be some force in the submission made on behalf of the defendants-applicants that merely because that the written statements the defendants-applicants was struck-off that the Judge Small causes was absolved of its duty to find whether it was competent to pass a decree against the defendants-applicants. The question whether the defendants-applicant no. I, was a juristic person against which the suit could be decreed existed on the face of the plaintiff itself. The trial court should have examined the said question and obtained evidence, if, necessary, from the plaintiffs-opposite parties. 6. Sri R. P. Tripathi counsel for the plaintiffs-opposite parties contended that the revision preferred by the defendants-applicants before the District Judge was filed beyond time, the present revision was not maintainable. I have examined the record and I am unable to find anything from the same which could lead me to upheld his contention. The report made by the office of the District Judge on the memorandum of revision was that it was filed within time. It also appears that the said question was not raised by the plaintiffs. opposite parties in the Court of learned District Judge. I am, therefore, not inclined to accept this argument. The next argument advanced by the plaintiffs-opposite parties was that the defendants-applicants were defaulters and, therefore, even if the Court was of the view that the defence-could not be struck off, the decree passed in the suit could not be set aside. It is not possible to accept this submission. The question as to whether the defendants-applicants were defaulters and that it was liable to be evicted be could decided only after the parties has adduced evidence in support of their respective cases. In the absence of evidence etc., the said issue cannot be decided. 7. It is not possible to accept this submission. The question as to whether the defendants-applicants were defaulters and that it was liable to be evicted be could decided only after the parties has adduced evidence in support of their respective cases. In the absence of evidence etc., the said issue cannot be decided. 7. In the result, the revision succeeds and is allowed. The judgments of the learned Additional District Judge and that of the Judge Small Causes dated 2.1.1976 as well as the order dated 12.10.1974 striking off the defence are set aside and the case is sent back to the Judge Small Causes for deciding the suit expeditiously. No order as to costs.