JUDGMENT 1. THIS Rule, which arises out of an application under Article 227 of the Constitution, is at the instance of a thika tenant and it is directed against,the order dated February 27, 1975 of the Subordinate Judge, First court, Howrah, in Misc. Appeal No. 25 of 1975. By the said order, the learned subordinate Judge set aside the order of the Thika Controller dismissing the application of the landlord opposite party for the assessment of compensation. The learned Subordinate Judge sent back the case on remand to the Thika controller directing him to dispose of the said application for assessment of compensation on merits. 2. IT appears that on July 7, 1953, the opposite party filed an application under section 5 of the Calcutta Thika tenancy Act, 1949, hereinafter referred to as the Act, praying for eviction of the petitioner, who is a thika tenant, on the ground that the opposite party required the land for the purpose of building on the same and for developing the same by discontinuing letting to thika tenants. The said application was registered as misc. Case No. 61 of 1959. On December 23, 1959, an order for eviction of the petitioner was made by the Thika Controller subject to the payment of compensation by the opposite party to the petitioner. The petitioner preferred an appeal against the said order, but the same was dismissed on May 19, 1960. The petitioner also moved this Court in revision, but in vain. Thereafter, the opposite party made an application for assessment of compensation. During the pendency of the said application, the calcutta Thika Tenancy (Second amendment) Act, 1969 came into force on October 10, 1969. By the said amendment Act, section 3 of the act which contained the grounds for ejectment of a thika tenant was amended by the substitution of a new section 3. The eviction of a thika tenant for the purpose of building on a land or a land or otherwise developing the land by discontinuing letting to thika tenants as a ground for ejectment as contained in clause (iv) of the unamended section 3 is no longer a ground for ejectment under the substituted section 3. Further, the amendment has introduced into the act a new section, namely, section 7a. Sub-section (1) of Section 7a provides as follows : "(1). Further, the amendment has introduced into the act a new section, namely, section 7a. Sub-section (1) of Section 7a provides as follows : "(1). Where an order for ejectment of a thika tenant from his holding has been made by the Controller under section 5 before the date of commencement of the Calcutta thika Tenancy (Second Amendment) Act, 1969, but the possession of the land comprised in the holding has not been recovered by the landlord from the thika tenant, the thika tenant may, within sixty days from such date, apply to the Controller for setting aside the order." On January 9, 1969, the petitioner made an application under section 7a and prayed for the setting aside of the order of eviction. The said application having been filed beyond sixty days from the date of commencement of the amendment Act, it was dismissed. An appeal preferred by the petitioner from the order of dismissal of his application under section 7a was also dismissed. Thereafter, on February 2, 1973 the opposite party filed an application in misc. Case No. 61 of 1959, praying for an order for the assessment of compensation. The Thika Controller look the view that as the ground upon which the eviction order was made against the petitioner not being available by the opposite party under the amended provision of section 3, the opposite party was not entitled to evict the petitioner on that ground. In that view of the matter, the Thika Controller dismissed the application of the opposite party for the assessment of compensation. On appeal by the opposite party against the said order of the Thika Controller, the learned Subordinate Judge took a different view. He was of the opinion that the opposite party could not be deprived of his right which had lawfully accrued to him. Accordingly, he set aside the order of the Thika Controller and sent the case back to him on remand, directing him to dispose of the application for assessment of compensation on merits. Hence this Rule. 3. MUCH argument has been made in this Rule on behalf of both parties on the interpretation of the words "an order for ejectment of a thika tenant" occurring in section 7a. It is contended by Mr. Hence this Rule. 3. MUCH argument has been made in this Rule on behalf of both parties on the interpretation of the words "an order for ejectment of a thika tenant" occurring in section 7a. It is contended by Mr. Saktinath Mukherjee, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the opposite party, that when the Thika Controller makes an order for eviction under section 5 subject to the payment of compensation to him by the landlord, it is "an order for ejectment of a thika tenant" within the meaning of section 7a. He submits that the said order having been passed by the thika Controller on December 23, 1959, that is, long before the commencement of the amendment Act, the petitioner had no scope for making an application under section 7a. In other words, he submits that if the amendment Act had. come into force at the stage the Thika controller passed the said order on December. 23, 1959, the petitioner could avail herself of the provision of section 7a as inserted in the Act by the amendment Act. Further, he submits that after that stage was over, the petitioner had no remedy for getting the order set aside under the amended prevision of the Act. On the other hand, it is submitted by Mr. Biswajit Ghose, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner, that section 7a contemplates the passing of the final order under section 5, which can only be made after the landlord either pays or deposits the compensation money. As that stage had not reached on the commencement of the Act, the remedy provided by section 7a is still available to the petitioner. 4. THE point came up for consideration before S. K. Chakrabarti J, in two cases, namely, Lalua Shaw vs. Anil Bh. Ganguly, A. I. R. 1971 Cal. 330 and jatindra Nath Paramanick vs. Debiprasad Mitra. A. I. R. 1971 Cal. 539. In both these cases, the learned Judge held that section 7a would apply only where a final order for ejectment had been passed under section 5 of the Act after the payment of compensation to the thika tenant. A Division Bench in Pannalal Shaw vs. Mani Bhutan Paul, 81 C. W. N. 335, has, however, taken a contrary view which supports the contention of mr. Mukherjee. A Division Bench in Pannalal Shaw vs. Mani Bhutan Paul, 81 C. W. N. 335, has, however, taken a contrary view which supports the contention of mr. Mukherjee. In our view, we do not think that we are called upon to decide the scope of section 7a read with section 5 of the Act for the reasons given hereafter. Section 13 of the amendment act provides as follows : "the amendments made to the said Act by this Act shall have effect in respect of all applications for ejectment of thika tenants, and all appeals from orders made on such applications, under the provisions of the said Act which are pending at the commencement of this Act. " It is clear from section 13 of the amendment act hat the amendments made to the Act will apply to all pending applications and appeals under the Act. There cannot be any doubt that the application under section 5 giving rise to the said Misc. Cast no. 61 of 1959 was not finally disposed of by the Thika Controller inasmuch as the proceeding for assessment of compensation was pending on the date of commencement of the amendment Act. When the ground for eviction is the requirement of the landlord, the application under section 5 cannot be finally disposed of by the Thika Controller so long as the compensation is not paid to the thika tenant. In the instant case, therefore, the proceeding for eviction of the petitioner was pending on the date of communication of the amendment act. In view of section 13 of the amendment Act, all the amendments made to the Act are retrospective in operation. The ground on which the petitioner prayed for the eviction of the opposite party is not a ground for eviction under the amended provision of section 3. In the facts and circumstances of this case, the effect of section 13 is that an order for eviction of the petitioner cannot be made by the Thika Controller on the ground which is no longer available to the opposite party. This view finds support from a recent decision of the Supreme Court in Subhendu Prosad Roy Choudhury and others vs. Kamala Bala Roy Choudhury and others, A. I. R. 1978 S. C. 835. In that case, the ground for eviction was as provided in the unamended section 3 (iv) of the Act. This view finds support from a recent decision of the Supreme Court in Subhendu Prosad Roy Choudhury and others vs. Kamala Bala Roy Choudhury and others, A. I. R. 1978 S. C. 835. In that case, the ground for eviction was as provided in the unamended section 3 (iv) of the Act. The proceeding for eviction under section 5 of the Act instituted by the appellant before the supreme Court was dismissed on the ground of invalidity of the notice to quit. The Supreme Court came to the finding that the notice to quit was good and valid. In spite of the said finding, the Supreme Court sent the case back on remand to the appellate authority for a fresh decision of the appeal in accordance with section 13 of the amendment Act and the amended section 3 of the Act. In view of the said decision of the Supreme Court and in the view which we have taken the case has to be sent back to the learned Thika Controller for a fresh decision in the light of amended section 3 read with section 13 of the amendment act. 5. BEFORE we part with this case, we may dispose of another point. It has been stated already that the petitioner's application under section 7a. was dismissed by the Thika Controller and the order of dismissal was upheld by the learned Subordinate Judge. Even then, in our opinion, the order of dismissal cannot deprive the petitioner of the benefit of the amendment of the grounds for eviction under section 3 of the Act read with section 13 of the amendment act. Section 7a provides for an additional remedy and even though a thika tenant fails to avail himself of such additional remedy, yet he cannot be prevented from invoking to his aid any other remedy under the provisions of the Act as amended. Very recently, in balai Chandra Hazra vs. Shewdhari jadav, A. I. R. 1978 S. C. 1062, the Supreme Court has expressed a similar view in connection with section 17e inserted in the West Bengal Premises tenancy Act, 1956 by the West Bengal premises (Second Amendment) Act. 1369. Very recently, in balai Chandra Hazra vs. Shewdhari jadav, A. I. R. 1978 S. C. 1062, the Supreme Court has expressed a similar view in connection with section 17e inserted in the West Bengal Premises tenancy Act, 1956 by the West Bengal premises (Second Amendment) Act. 1369. In that case, the Supreme Court observed as follows : "therefore, it could not be said that once a specific remedy under S. 17-E is provided for the benefit of tenants under a decree for eviction on the ground mentioned in S. 13 (l) (f), that is the only way and no other in which he could get relief. If so, his appeal would become incompetent. Remedy under S. 17-E is an additional remedy. More particularly it appears for the benefit of those tenants against whom decree for eviction was made under S. 13 (1) (f) and appeal by whom was not pending so that they could protect themselves against eviction by landlords whose suits had become incompetent in view of the provisions contained in sub-s. (3-A) of s. 13. " SO it is immaterial that the application of the petitioner under section 7a of the Act was dismissed. 6. FOR the reason aforesaid, we set aside the order of the learned Subordinate Judge and send the case back to the learned Thika Controller for the purpose of disposal of the same in accordance with the amended provision of section 3 of the Act read with section 13 of the amendment Act. The Rule is made absolute, but there will be no order for costs. Rule made absolute.