CHITTATOSH MUKHERJEE, B. C. RAY, JJ. ( 1 ) THE State of West Bengal and others have preferred this appeal under Clause 14 of the Letter Patent against the judgment of Amiya Kumar Mookerji J. making the Rule obtained by the respondent absolute and quashing the order of his dismissal passed by his disciplinary authority as well as the order of the appellant authority dismissing the appeal preferred by the respondent. The learned Judge remanded the matter back to the disciplinary authority for re-considering the matter afresh. ( 2 ) THE respondent, Ram Nagina Dubey, was a Traffic Constable in the Calcutta Police Force. The Magistrate, 1st Class Gazipore had convicted the respondent and several others under S. 147 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced them to R I for three months. The learned Magistrate had also convicted the respondent and others under S. 323. 149 Indian Penal Code and also under S. 325/149 Indian Penal Code and had sentenced them to R. I. for three months and six months respectively. The respondent, Ram Nagina Dubey and others had preferred an appeal against their said conviction and sentence to the Sessions Judge, Gazipore. The learned Sessions Judge, Gazipaore by his order dated 31st October, 1969 had confirmed their convictions and sentence under S. 147 and 323/149 Indian Penal Code but had set aside their conviction and sentence under S 323/149 of the Indian Penal Code. On 7th April, 1970 the Assistant Commissioner, Traffic Department, Calcutta Police had issued a charge sheet against the respondent. Firstly, the respondent was charged with moral turpitude on the ground that he had been convicted and sentenced under S. 147 and under S. 323/149 Indian Penal Code. Secondly, the respondent was charged with gross undisciplined conduct unbecoming of a member of the Calcutta Police Force because he had left his barrack without any permission from the proper authorities and had absented himself without permission from 7th April, 1970. The respondent had showed cause. The Assistant Commissioner (II), Traffic Department acting as the Enquiry Officer conducted a proceeding against the respondent. The said Equity Officer found that both the charges against him had been proved and recommended his dismissal from the force and service. The respondent had showed cause. The Assistant Commissioner (II), Traffic Department acting as the Enquiry Officer conducted a proceeding against the respondent. The said Equity Officer found that both the charges against him had been proved and recommended his dismissal from the force and service. The Deputy Commissioner of Police, Traffic Department by his provisional order dated 25th April, 1970 had accepted the said enquiry report and formed the opinion that both the charges against the delinquent had been proved. The Deputy Commissioner directed the respondent to show-cause as to why he shall not be dismissed from service. The respondent in his reply stated that he would place himself at the mercy of the Deputy Commissioner, Traffic Department and prayed for re-consideration of the mater. In his reply the respondent mentioned about cases of two other police personnel's whose convictions were not considered as an offences involving moral turpitude. The Deputy Commissioner of Police, Traffic Department by his order dated 5th September, 1970 dismissed the respondent from service. ( 3 ) THE respondent being aggrieved by the said order had presented an appeal to the Commissioner of Police. While the appeal was pending, the respondent moved this court under Article 226 of the Constitution and had obtained Civil Rule No. 5622 (W) of 1971. On 16th July, 1974, Anil Kumar Sen J. made the said Rule absolute in part by directing the appellate authority to hear out the appeal of the present respondent. Ram Nagina Dubey, at an early date and to dispose of the specific issue raised by him that the conduct which led to his conviction did not amount to an act of moral turpitude. The learned Judge did not express any opinion on the merits of the case. ( 4 ) THEREAFTER, the Joint Commissioner of Police, Calcutta by his order dated 26th July, 1976 rejected the appeal of the respondent and maintained the order of his dismissal passed by the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Traffic Department. The Joint Commissioner of Police held that the conduct of Ram Nagina Dubey which led to his conviction also amounted to an act involving moral turpitude. The Joint Commissioner in his appellate order further held that the present respondent was also guilty of the second charge and the said charge related to a conduct which was utterly unbecoming of a member of the Calcutta Police Force. The Joint Commissioner in his appellate order further held that the present respondent was also guilty of the second charge and the said charge related to a conduct which was utterly unbecoming of a member of the Calcutta Police Force. ( 5 ) RAM Nagina Dubey, the present respondent had again moved this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and obtained Civil Rule No. 9846 (W) of 1976. As already stated that on the July, 1977 Amiya Kumar Mookerji J. made the said Rule absolute and quashed the order of the appellate as well as disciplinary authority and remitted the matter back to the disciplinary authority for re-considering the matter afresh. ( 6 ) TWO points arise for consideration in this appeal. In the first place, whether or not the respondent was sentenced for any offence implying moral turpitude. Secondly, whether his disciplinary authority by his final order had dismissed him only on the ground that he had been sentenced for an offence implying moral turpitude also on the charge that he was guilty of misbehavior for having absented himself without leave for the period mentioned in the second head of charge framed against him. ( 7 ) WE may now proceed to consider the meaning of the expression ?moral turpitude? in Rule 5, Chapter XIX of the Police Regulations, Calcutta, 1968, Vol. I. The said Rule 5 deals with retention in service of police officers sentenced by criminal courts. Firstly, in case a police officer is sentenced by a court for an 'offence implying moral turpitude', unless the Commissioner of Police otherwise directs, he shall be dismissed from service. Secondly, in case of his sentence for an offence not implying moral turpitude, the police officer shall be ordinarily dismissed. Thirdly, in case he is sentenced for a trivial criminal offence, the police offer may be awarded some more lenient form of punishment or he may not be punished at all. Thus, when a police officer is sentenced by a court for any offence, the consequence of the same would depend upon the nature of his offence and also upon the fact whether the said offence implies moral turpitude. Further, the Rule 5, Chapter XIX of the Police Regulations, Calcutta, 1968, Vol. Thus, when a police officer is sentenced by a court for any offence, the consequence of the same would depend upon the nature of his offence and also upon the fact whether the said offence implies moral turpitude. Further, the Rule 5, Chapter XIX of the Police Regulations, Calcutta, 1968, Vol. I recognizes that whether a sentence is passed by a criminal court against a police officer for an offence, the same would not necessarily imply that he is guilty of moral turpitude or that he should be automatically dismissed from service. Commission of some offence would imply moral turpitude while other offences would not do so. Before deciding whether a police officer who has been sentenced for committing an offence should be dismissed or not, the disciplinary authority must determine whether the sentence in question implies moral turpitude. In other words, in accordance with the principles of fair play, it should be decided whether the first paragraph or the second paragraph of Rule 5, Chapter XIX of the Police Regulations, Calcutta, 1968 Vol. I would be attracted to a particular case. Therefore, although Article 311 (2) proviso (a) dispenses with the requirements of clause (2) of the said Article, still the disciplinary authority before dismissing a police officer under Rule 5 must decide whether the offence committed by him implied moral turpitude on the part of the said officer. ( 8 ) THE reported decisions mentioned in the judgment of Amiya Kumar Mookerji J. had considered the meaning of the expression ?moral turpitude? in the context of the facts of each particular case and in the light of the statute applicable. Therefore, we do not propose to discuss these reported decisions. Primarily it is for the disciplinary authority to determine whether the conviction and he sentence of a police officer by a criminal court imply his moral turpitude. Whether or not an offence commuted by a police officer implies moral turpitude ought to be considered according to the standard of conduct expected of a member of the Calcutta police force in relation to his official and private acts. This Court exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot substitute its own views about the standard of morality expected of a member of the police force who are under the discipline and control of the respondent. This Court exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot substitute its own views about the standard of morality expected of a member of the police force who are under the discipline and control of the respondent. The decision of the Supreme Court In the matter of P, an advocate, reported in 1963 SC 1313, is distinguishable. The Supreme Court was exercising its disciplinary jurisdiction in respect of an advocate on record. Further, tests applicable for deciding whether gross negligence of an advocate involved moral turpitude or delinquency would not be of much assistance in considering what criminal acts of a member of the police force imply moral turpitude. ( 9 ) ALTHOUGH this court exercising its writ jurisdiction cannot be the arbiter of morals for the police personnel, but at the same time this court under Article 226 can certainly correct errors of jurisdiction committed by the disciplinary authority in the exercise of its powers under Rule 5 Chapter XIX of the Police Regulations, Calcutta, 1968, Vol. I. The authority concerned under Rule 5 cannot arbitrarily decide whether a sentence imposed by the court upon a police officer implies moral turpitude. The authority concerned is enjoined to consider the facts and circumstances of the case which led to the conviction of the police officer concerned. In that connection, we may mentioned about the tests indicated by Srivastava J in Mangali v. Chakki Lal U Ors. AIR 1963 All. 527 at page 528, paragraph 5. The expression 'moral turpitude' has not been defined in the Calcutta Police Regulations. The expression 'moral turpitude' in ordinary parlance means 'base or shameful character, vileness, depravity, wickedness, etc. ' Thus, the expression ?moral turpitude? in Rule 5 implies an act contrary to accepted morals. Therefore, the disciplinary authority before dismissing a police officer on the ground that he had been sentenced for an offence by a criminal court must come to a decision that the acts or omissions of which the police officer were found guilty were immoral, vile, depraved or base etc, because every conviction or sentence imposed by a criminal court does not necessarily imply that the convicted person is guilty of moral turpitude. It is true that many of the crimes punishable by law perse imply moral turpitude of the convicted person e. g. theft, giving false evidence breach of trust, murder, decoity, cheating, rape, unnatural offences counter-feiting of currency, bigamy. We may add that this enumeration is in no sense exhaustive but only illustrative. When a court sentence a person for any of these offences, the same may ipso facto imply moral turpitude of the person who perpetrated the crime. But, there are many other acts and omissions which are although punishable under the law does not involve any element of moral turpitude. In case of most of the offences, only the examination of the facts and circumstances leading to the conviction in a particular case would indicate whether the sentence imposed for the said offence implied moral turpitude. ( 10 ) IN the instant case, the learned Sessions Judge, Gazipore had modified the conviction and sentence passed by the learned Magistrate and the respondent stood convicted and sentenced under S. 147 I. P. C. and S. 323/149 I. P. C. We are unable to say that the said conviction and sentence would per se imply moral turpitude of the respondent. The said question can be decided only by examining the facts and circumstances of the particular criminal case and the appellate decision. In fact, Anil Kumar Sen J. while disposing of Civil Rule No. 5622 (W) of 1971 had observed. ?in my opinion, the answer to the point raised by Mr. Banerjee would be dependent on the findings of fact to the nature and character of the conduct of the petitioner which led to the conviction. ? The learned Judge had directed the appellate authority to determine the said specific issue while disposing of the appeal of the respondent which was then pending. In terms of the said order of Anil Kumar Sen J the appellate authority was bound to review the facts and to make an assessment of the evidence in order to decide for himself how far the disciplinary authority was correct in his conclusion that the conduct which led to the petitioner's conviction implied moral turpitude. ( 11 ) WE have perused the order of the Joint Commissioner of Police, Calcutta dismissing the appeal of the respondent. ( 11 ) WE have perused the order of the Joint Commissioner of Police, Calcutta dismissing the appeal of the respondent. The said appellate authority in his order dismissing the appeal of the respondent did not discuss the facts and circumstances of the criminal case against the respondent and the Joint Commissioner of Police had mentioned about two reported decisions but did not discuss how far these decisions were relevant. Further the said appellate authority only made some general statements about the duty of the policemen but did not at all apply his mind to the facts and circumstances leading to the conviction of the respondent. The Joint Commissioner of Police thereby had failed to carry out the directions contained in the order of Anil Kumar Sen J. passed in Civil Rule No. 5622 (W) of 1971. Therefore, the appellate decision cannot be sustained. The appellate authority should again dispose of the said appeal. It should consider whether the sentence imposed upon the respondent implied moral turpitude by discussing the facts and also the nature and character of the acts of the respondent which led to his conviction in the said criminal case and also the findings made by the learned Sessions Judge, Gazipore in his appellate decision. ( 12 ) WE, however, are not inclined to also quash the dismissal order passed by the disciplinary authority as done by Amiya Kumar Mookerji J. The appeal of the resonant is yet to be disposed of according to law. Therefore, the proper order would be to direct the appellate authority to again dispose of the appeal of the respondent, Ram Nagina Dubey, because the appellate authority had failed to discharge his duties. ( 13 ) THE disciplinary authority had framed another charge against the respondent for his unauthorized absence from duty. But, the respondent could not be punished for his alleged absence without drawing up of a regular proceeding. Therefore, the appellant at least in respect of the second charge was bound to draw up a proceeding in terms of Rule 9 of Chapter XIX against the respondent, Ram Nagina Dubey. In fact a proceeding was drawn up against the respondent. But, the respondent could not be punished for his alleged absence without drawing up of a regular proceeding. Therefore, the appellant at least in respect of the second charge was bound to draw up a proceeding in terms of Rule 9 of Chapter XIX against the respondent, Ram Nagina Dubey. In fact a proceeding was drawn up against the respondent. The disciplinary authority, who, held that the respondent should be dismissed because he had been sentenced for offence implying moral turpitude did not pass any separate order of punishment in respect of the second charge framed against Ram Nagina Dubey for his absence without leave. In this connection, Mr. De, learned advocate for the respondent has drawn our attention to Rule 9 (6) (b), Chapter XIX which inter alia provides that even if the person charged is found guilty, punishment shall be awarded only after his previous character is considered. In the instant case, the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority did not at all consider the previous character of the respondent. In the above view, the entire appeal of the respondent should be heard. ( 14 ) WE, accordingly, allow this appeal in part and modify the order of the learned Single Judge. The impugned order of the appellate authority dismissing the appeal of the respondent, Ram Nagina Dubey, is quashed. The matter is remitted back to the appellate authority for a fresh disposal of the said appeal in accordance with law and in the light of the observations and directions contained in our judgment and in the judgment of Anil Kumar Sen J. in Civil Rule No. 5622 (W) of 1971. The appellate authority would dispose of the said appeal which is pending for a long time within four months. There will be no order as to costs. B. C. Ray, J. : i agree. . .