Order.- This petition is filed under section 482, Criminal Procedure Code, wife a request that the proceedings in C.C. No. 107 of 1978 on the file of the IV. Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad, should be quashed. 2. The petitioners are A-1 and A-2 in C.C. No. 107 of 1978, on the file of the IV. Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad, A-3 is their son and he is now residing in the United States of America working in a hospital there. The complainant (1st respondent herein) filed a private complaint on 17th February, 1978. Her sworn statement was recorded. On the basis of her sworn statement and the allegations made in the complaint, the learned Magistrate took cognizance of the offence punishable under section 417, Indian Penal Code, and registered a case as C.C. No. 107 of 1978. 3. The learned Magistrate issued process. As against the order of the learned Magistrate taking cognizance of the case for an offence punishable under section 417, Indian Penal Code, A-1 and A-2 filed Cr.M.P. No. 592 of 1978, in this Court for quashing the proceedings on the ground of limitation and also on the ground that no offence is made out even if the allegations made in the sworn statement and the complainant are accepted. 4. Our learned brother Muktadar, J., after hearing arguments addressed by the Counsel on both sides, passed the following order: — “......I am of the opinion that an opportunity should be given to the petitioners accused herein, to raise this plea before the lower Court. The lower Court after hearing the arguments of the parties will dispose of the plea as to whether the complaint is within time or not. The questions involved in this petition, as it would appear are questions of fact as to when exactly the complainant had knowledge of the offence. Therefore, it would not be proper for this Court to quash the proceedings where questions of fact are involved. Hence, the trial Court will hear the parties on this point and decide the matter. With this observation the petition is dismissed”. 5. As against this order, the petitioners approached the Supreme Court with a special leave petition. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court dismissed the special leave petition with the following observations. “It will be open to the petitioner to take up all defences including that of limitation before the learned Magistrate as a preliminary issues”. 5. As against this order, the petitioners approached the Supreme Court with a special leave petition. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court dismissed the special leave petition with the following observations. “It will be open to the petitioner to take up all defences including that of limitation before the learned Magistrate as a preliminary issues”. Then the petitioners filed Cr.M.P. No. 1067 of 1978, in the Court of the IV. Metropolitan Magistrate, submitting that in view of the observations of the Supreme Court of India, in SLP. (Cr.) No. 720 of 1978, dated 5th May, 1978, the petitioners are allowed to raise the objection of limitation etc., as a preliminary issue and in accordance with the directions made by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in the Judgment reported in Bharat Hybid Seeds and Agro Enterprises v. State1, the petitioners have to be given an opportunity to contest the issue of limitation before the trial is commenced. The petitioners further submit that it is far just and proper that the Court may be pleased to call the complainant to be cross-examined by the petitioners on the preliminary issue of limitation. That petition was opposed by the complainant with the contention that the complaint is within limitation from the date of the knowledge of the offence as provided in sections 468 and 469(b), Criminal Procedure Code, that in January, 1978 the complainant learnt that A-3 had no intention to marry the complainant with freewill and that he married Mrs. Bridget with his freewill, that A-3 declared all these facts on his return from the United States of America, that then the complainant came to know that all the three accused cheated her, that till then she was not aware that they committed the offence of cheating and she, therefore, contended that the complaint is within the period of limitation and the objections raised by the accused are unsustainable. She also contended that the prayer for cross-examining the complainant is untenable and that there is no provisions in the Criminal Procedure Code, to ask for the directions to cross-examine the complainant who has not been examined in chief and if the accused want to contest the case on the point of limitation, the accused can produce oral and documentary (evidence) to establish their contention, that the delay as contemplated under section 473, Criminal Procedure Code, does not arise and in the complaint she explained clearly as to the circumstances under which she came to know of the offence committed by the three accused and as she came to know in January, 1978, of that fact she immediately filed the complaint within one year from the date of her knowledge as contemplated by section 469(b), Criminal Procedure Code. She also contends that it is the accused who have to establish knowledge of the complainant regarding the accused of the cheating on the part of the accused sufficiently earlier than one year, and hence the direction sought for is liable to be rejected by this Court. 6. The learned Magistrate, after hearing the arguments on both sides, passed the following order on 14th July, 1978. ‘I am of the opinion, that the petitioners are at liberty to have the limitation issue as one of the defence pleas and as the limitation point is a question of fact I feel that at the time of the trial alone this fact can be established". The learned Magistrate further observed: "The Supreme Court of India also clearly stated that it is open to the petitioner, to take up all defences including that of limitation before this Court as a preliminary issues. I am of the opinion, that this factor can be questioned only at the time of trial and this Court had already taken cognizance of the case considering the aspect of limitation under section 469(b). For the foregoing reasons the prayer of the petitioner herein to call upon the respondent-complainant to be cross-examined by the petitioner on the preliminary issue of limitation without her being examined in chief does not arise. I have already stated that the parents had been to Madras as per the complainant and they are also to be examined. For the foregoing reasons the prayer of the petitioner herein to call upon the respondent-complainant to be cross-examined by the petitioner on the preliminary issue of limitation without her being examined in chief does not arise. I have already stated that the parents had been to Madras as per the complainant and they are also to be examined. In case the petitioner herein, wants to establish the fact of limitation they are at liberty to produce oral and documentary evidence. For the foregoing reason, I cannot entertain this petition at this stage and this application is dismissed." The petitioners are aggrieved with this order. The petitioners also felt that the previous petition which they filed for quashing the proceedings in C.C. No. 107 of 1978 on the ground that there was no material to proceed against him even if the accusation of the complainant is accepted and that fact was not decided by the High Court in Cr.M.P. No. 593 of 1978. The petitioners, therefore, filed this petition. 7. Sri Padmanabha Reddy, the learned Counsel for the petitioners, contends that the Supreme Court gave a direction specifically that the question of limitation should be raised as a preliminary issue before the learned Magistrate along with other defences and hence the learned Magistrate is not justified in not deciding the question as preliminary issue and in observing that this question will be considered during the course of the trial along with the other defences. He also contends that the accusations made against the petitioners even if accepted do not make out any offence punishable under section 417, Indian Penal Code. He therefore contends that the proceedings in C.C. No. 107 of 1978, should be quashed. 8. As against these contentions, Sri Sarathy, the learned Counsel for the respondent-complainant, contends that the Supreme Court in fact dismissed the special leave petition with the observations mentioned above and when the Supreme Court dismissed the leave application, it means that it confirmed the order passed by the High Court in Cr.M. P. No. 593 of 1978. If that be so, the order of this Court in Cr.M.P. No. 593 of 1978, remains unaffected and hence the learned Magistrate is justified in observing in his order that the issue on the question of limitation can be decided in the course of the trial. If that be so, the order of this Court in Cr.M.P. No. 593 of 1978, remains unaffected and hence the learned Magistrate is justified in observing in his order that the issue on the question of limitation can be decided in the course of the trial. He also contends that when once the High Court has disposed of the petition filed for quashing the proceedings in C.C. No. 107 of 1978, this petition which is the second petition for the same relief is not maintainable. He further contends that it is not correct to say that the accusations even if accepted do not make out any offence for which the learned Magistrate, has taken cognizance of C.C. No. 107 of 1978. He also contends that there is ample documentary evidence in the possession of the complainant which will be produced before the Court during the course of the trial and if that evidence along with the allegations made in the complaint and also the sworn statement, is taken into consideration, the offence under section 417, Indian Penal Code, will be undoubtedly made out. He also contends that as questions of fact are involved and the question whether the offence is made out or not, is to be decided on the basis of the documentary as well as oral evidence before the Court this Court cannot quash the proceedings in C.C. No. 107 of 1978, under section 482, Criminal Procedure Code. 9. From the contentions raised before me, the following points arise for consideration. (1) Whether the question of limitation can be raised as a preliminary issue as per the directions of the Supreme Court? (2) Whether the present petition is not maintainable ? (3) Whether the accusations made in the complaint as well as sworn statement, even if accepted, do not make out a case under section, 417, Indian Penal Code. 10.Point No. 1.-The Supreme Court while dismissing the special leave petition observed as follows: “It will be open to the petitioner to take up all defences including that of limitation before the learned Magistrate as a preliminary issue.” If the Supreme Court merely observes that it will be open to the petitioner to take up all defences including that of limitation before the learned Magistrate and stops with it, it could be easily said that the question need not be decided as a preliminary issue. As the Supreme Court added the words “as a preliminary issue” to its order, I am of the view that the Supreme Court felt that this question should be decided as a preliminary issue, otherwise, the words “as a preliminary issue” could not have been added to the other direction which is in general terms and which is also consistent with the order passed by Muktadar, J. It is true that there is no provision in the Criminal Procedure Code for a preliminary issue to be decided corresponding to a provision in Civil Procedure Code. But a provision with regard to limitation is incorporated in the new Criminal Procedure Code, the question relating to limitation should naturally be decided as a preliminary issue if such a question is raised, as it goes to the root of the matter and could save parties from proceeding further if ultimately the Court is satisfied on the material that the proceedings are barred by limitation . 11. Since I felt that the Supreme Court wants the question of limitation to be decided as a preliminary issue, I hold that this question should be decided as a preliminary issue and the learned Magistrate, cannot postpone his decision on this question till other questions are decided on merits. As the petitioners herein contend that the complaint is barred by limitation and as the respondent-complainant contends that the complaint is within time, the learned Magistrate should permit the parties to adduce evidence on this question and give a decision. Since evidence is necessary on this question, the learned Magistrate, should direct the complainant on whom the initial burden rests that the complaint is not barred by limitation to give evidence and after her evidence, he should direct the respondents who are the petitioners herein to adduce their rebuttal evidence, if they feel it necessary. If the respondents do not choose to adduce evidence, the learned Magistrate can give his finding on this question on the basis of the evidence adduced by the complainant. After the evidence is closed on this aspect, the Magistrate should give a decision on the question of limitation and without giving a decision on the question of limitation he cannot proceed to take evidence on other aspects. I find this point in favour of the petitioners herein. After the evidence is closed on this aspect, the Magistrate should give a decision on the question of limitation and without giving a decision on the question of limitation he cannot proceed to take evidence on other aspects. I find this point in favour of the petitioners herein. 12.Point No. 2.-As stated above, the counsel for the respondent contends that since the previous petition filed before Muktadar, J., was dismissed, this petition is not maintainable. As against this contention Sri Padmanabha Reddy, contends that the second petition is maintainable as the first petition was not disposed of on merits and Muktadar, J., considered only the question of limitation and remanded the matter to the Magistrate to give a decision on that question after the parties are given opportunity to adduce evidence, it cannot, therefore, be contended that the learned Judge, considered the other questions raised in the petition. The order of Muktadar, J., reads as follows: “I am of opinion, that an opportunity should be given to the petitioners accused herein to raise this plea before the lower Court. The lower Court after hearing the arguments of the parties will dispose of the plea as to whether the complaint is within time or not. The questions involved in this petition, as it would appear, are questions of fact as to when exactly the complainant had knowledge of the offence. Therefore, it would not be proper for this Court to quash the proceedings where questions of fact are involved. Hence, the trial Court will hear the parties on this point and decide the matter. With this observation the petition, is dismissed.” 13. From this order it is clear that Muktadar, J., considered only the question of limitation and he felt that it cannot be disposed of, as evidence has to be taken on this question and without such evidence no finding can be given. He, therefore, observed, that it is a question of fact as to when exactly the complainant has knowledge of the offence and in that context my learned brother observed that it would not be proper for this Court to quash the proceedings where questions of fact are involved. It cannot be said that Muktadar, J., adverted to the other questions raised in the petition, and hence I cannot hold that Muktadar, J., gave findings on the other questions involved in the petition . It cannot be said that Muktadar, J., adverted to the other questions raised in the petition, and hence I cannot hold that Muktadar, J., gave findings on the other questions involved in the petition . Since other questions were not decided, it is open for the petitioners herein to file this petition and thus I find no force in the contention of Sri Sarathy that this is a second petition and it is not maintainable. 14. It is now well-settled that where questions of fact are involved, the High Court cannot quash the proceedings in exercise of inherent powers under section 482, Criminal Procedure Code. It is also well-settled on the basis of expediency in the interests of justice that where a competent Court has given a rinding on a particular question of fact, a second petition for canvassing the same point cannot be entertained. But it is again well-settled that where the Court has not considered and given its decision on a question, though raised, it is open to the parties to invite a decision on that question by filing a second petition. The Supreme Court in Superintendent and Remembrancer, W.B. v. Mohan Singh1, went still further to hold that even if the High Court rejected an application for quashing proceedings on the ground that the questions involved are purely questions of fact, a second application is no bar to the quashing of the same proceedings, if no progress was made even for 1½ years after the disposal of the first application. Their Lordships held as follows: “The fact that a similar application for quashing the proceedings on a former occasion was rejected by the High Court on the ground that questions involved were purely questions of fact which were for the Court of fact to decide, is no bar to the quashing of the proceedings at the later stage. Such quashing will not amount to revision or review of the High Court’s earlier order.” Their Lordship of the Supreme Court gave this decision on the question whether the High Court has jurisdiction, to make the order dated 7th April, 1970 quashing the proceedings against respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 3 when on an earlier application made by the 1st respondent, the High Court had by its order dated 12th December, 1968, refused to quash the proceeding. Before their Lordships Mr. 1, 2 and 3 when on an earlier application made by the 1st respondent, the High Court had by its order dated 12th December, 1968, refused to quash the proceeding. Before their Lordships Mr. Chatterjee, on behalf of the state strenuously, contended that the High Court was not competent to entertain the subsequent application of respondents 1 and 2 and made the order dated 7th April, 1970, quashing the proceeding because that was tantamount to a review of its earlier order by the High Court, which was outside the jurisdiction of the High Court to do. Their Lordships did not agree with the contention raised by the learned Counsel. Their Lordships observed that the earlier application which was rejected by the High Court was an application under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure to quash the proceeding and the High Court rejected it on the ground that the evidence was yet to be led and it was not desirable to interfere with the proceeding at that stage. But, thereafter, the criminal case dragged on for a period of about one and half years without any progress at all and it was in these circumstances that respondents 1 and 2 were constrained to make a fresh application to the High Court under section 561-A to quash the proceedings. Their Lordships further observed that it was difficult to see how in those circumstances it could ever be contended that what the High Court was being asked to do by making the subsequent application was to review or revise the order made by it on the earlier application. The facts and circumstances obtaining at the time of the subsequent application of respondents 1’ and 2 were clearly different from what they were at the time of the earlier application of the 1st respondent because despite the rejection of the earlier application of the 1st respondent, the prosecution had failed to make any progress in the criminal case even though it was filed as far back as 1965, and the criminal case rested where it was for a period of one and half years. It was for that reasons the High Court proceeded to consider the subsequent application of respondents 1 and 2 for the purpose of deciding whether it should exercise its inherent jurisdiction under section 561-A. It was held that the High Court was perfectly to do so. 15. It was for that reasons the High Court proceeded to consider the subsequent application of respondents 1 and 2 for the purpose of deciding whether it should exercise its inherent jurisdiction under section 561-A. It was held that the High Court was perfectly to do so. 15. Muktadar, J., did not advert to the contentions raised by the petitioners herein in their previous petition Cr.M.P. No. 593 of 1978 except giving decision on the question as to limitation. He remanded the matter with a direction that the question of limitation should be decided after permitting the parties to adduce evidence on that question. Since the learned Judge did not give any finding on the other questions raised before him in the petition, it is open to the petitioners to canvass the other questions in this petition along with the question of limitation which is necessary to be considered in view of the directions given by the Supreme Court. Hence I find no force in the contention of Sri Sarathy. 16. Sri Sarathy cited several decisions in support of his contention. I need not discuss as to the effect of those decisions, as they do not deal with this question. I find this point in favour of the petitioners herein. 17.Point No. 3: Now I have to consider the question whether the proceedings in C.C. No. 107 of 1978, should be quashed as the accusations made by the complainant either in the sworn statement or in the complainant even if accepted do not make out any offence. 18. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab1. The Supreme Court considered the category of cases where inherent jurisdiction to quash the proceedings can and should be exercised. According to their Lordships, the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be exercised in the following cases: — "(i) Where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the criminal proceeding in respect of the offence alleged; absence of the requisite sanction may, for instance, furnish cases under this category. According to their Lordships, the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be exercised in the following cases: — "(i) Where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the criminal proceeding in respect of the offence alleged; absence of the requisite sanction may, for instance, furnish cases under this category. (ii) Where the allegations in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged; in such cases no question of appreciating evidence arises; it is a matter merely of looking at the complaint or the first information report to decide whether the offence alleged is disclosed or not; (iii) Where the allegations made against the accused person do constitute an offence alleged but there is either no legal evidence adduced in support of the case or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. In dealing with this class of cases it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is evidence which is manifestly and clearly inconsistent with the accusation made and cases where there is legal evidence which on its appreciation may or may not support the accusation in question. In exercising its jurisdiction under section 561-A the High Court would not embark upon an enquiry as to whether the evidence in question is reliable or not. That is the function of the trial Magistrate, and ordinarily it would not be open to any party to invoke the High Court inherent jurisdiction and contend that on a reasonable appreciation of the evidence the accusation made against the accused would not be sustained. Broadly stated that is the nature and scope of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under section 561-A in the matter of quashing criminal proceedings". 19. Now I have to examine whether the complainant has succeeded in making out a case prima facie for an offence punishable under section 417, Indian Penal Code, either from the accusations made in her sworn statement or from the allegations made in her complaint. 19. Now I have to examine whether the complainant has succeeded in making out a case prima facie for an offence punishable under section 417, Indian Penal Code, either from the accusations made in her sworn statement or from the allegations made in her complaint. To make out a case for an offence punishable under section 417, Indian Penal Code, the prosecution has to establish the following ingredients: (1) deception of any person: (2) (a) Fraudulently or dishonestly inducing that person- (i) to deliver any property to any person; or (ii) to consent with any person to retain any property; or (b) intentionally inducing that person to do which he would not do or omit to do, and that act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind reputation or property. A dishonest concealment of facts is a deception within the meaning of this section. 20. Section 415, Indian Penal Code, visualises two separate classes of acts which the person may be induced to do. In the first place, he may be induced to deliver any property to any person or to consent that any person shall retain any property. The second class of acts set forth in the section is the doing or omitting to do anything which the person deceived would not do or omit to do if he were not so deceived. In order to constitute the offence of cheating with regard to this class of Acts, the person who induces another to do them must intentionally induce him to do them. In the first class of cases the inducing must be fraudulent or dishonest. In the second class of acts, the inducing must be intentional. 21. The complainant’s case, if accepted would come within the second class of cases. By this clause, the intentional deceptions are made punishable (cheats) if they cause or likely to cause damage or harm to that person. It is sufficient to constitute cheating within the meaning of this clause, if intention to cause damage or harm is proved. The deception, must be intended not only to induce the person deceived to do or likely to do but also to cause damage to other person. It is sufficient to constitute cheating within the meaning of this clause, if intention to cause damage or harm is proved. The deception, must be intended not only to induce the person deceived to do or likely to do but also to cause damage to other person. It is sufficient if he intentionally induces the person deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit to do if he were not deceived and the act or omission causes damage or harm to that person in body mind, reputation or property. 22. In State of Kerala v. A.P. Pillai1, the Supreme Court held: "To hold a, person guilty of the offence of cheating it has to be shown that his intention was dishonest at the time of making the promise. Such a dishonest intention cannot be inferred from the mere fact that he could not subsequently fulfil the promise". 23. Sri Sarathy contends that the material incorporated in paragraphs 14 and 15 of the complainant’s petition would clearly establish the offence under section 417, Indian Penal Code. It reads as follows: “14. By oral, written express and implied deliberate and false representations, A-1 and A-2 and A-3 convinced the complainant and her parents that the married life of A-3 with Bobby was unhappy and that A-3 voluntarily took steps to divorce her and that A-3 was very much interested in the complainant and was eager to marry her. This representation has been fraudulent and dishonest from the very inception, solely motivated with the purpose of compulsorily getting rid of the Christian daughter-in-law and to save the prestige of the family by having a daughter-in-law of the same sect. Their intention is manifest in some of the letters traced and filed by the complainant. By such dishonest concealment of facts and positive misrepresentation, A-1 and A-2 painted a rosy picture of the affluence and luxury and the fame that the complainant will get by marriage with A-3. Their intention is manifest in some of the letters traced and filed by the complainant. By such dishonest concealment of facts and positive misrepresentation, A-1 and A-2 painted a rosy picture of the affluence and luxury and the fame that the complainant will get by marriage with A-3. Finally, A-1 and A-3 with premediated plan and common object and intention to cheat the complainant played fraud and made intentionally false representation knowing fully well that these representations are blatantly false that A-3 was willingly marrying the complainant and that he will lead happy marital life with the complainant by showing the true copy of the decree of divorce assuring the complainant that she will have no legal difficulty. A-1 and A-3 thus created artificial circumstances, under which the complainant and her parents could not exercise their discretion and had no other choice than to cancel her engagement with Sri Prabhakar and agree for the marriage with A-3. A-3’s motive to make the false representation is that he will be deprived of the property by his all dominating mother A-1, if he does not play according to the instructions of A-1 in the drama of cheating. Subsequent events after the marriage of complainant clearly establish that A-3 had no intention to marry the complainant to lead normal married life with her but to make her suffer without happiness of married life and allow her to be woman of service to his parents. The marriage of A-3 with the elder sister of his divorced wife and bringing forth a child through her clearly establishes that at the time of representation in Hyderabad he had already planned to marry the elder sister of his divorced wife and he intended to cheat the complainant and ruin her life for the sake of not losing the property from his mother. At the time of representation in Hyderabad, A-1 was quite aware of the lose character of her son A-3 and in particular his conduct with Bridget the elder sister of Bobby and that A-3 is incorrigible and cannot be persuaded to have marital life with a girl of her own sect, played fraud upon the complainant and her parents to agree for marriage with A-3. It is now learnt that with monetary settlement divorce was obtained against the will of Bobby and A-3 they had no real differences at all. It is now learnt that with monetary settlement divorce was obtained against the will of Bobby and A-3 they had no real differences at all. Thus it is clear that the representations of A-1 from time to time made in her letters and in person that A-3 and Bobby decided to divorce due to unhappy martial life is false to her knowledge. 15. Thus, A-1 to A-3 with fraudulent and dishonest intention induced the complainant to marry A-3 which she would not have done if she were not so deceived. The complainant’s parents too would not have agreed for the marriage but for deception. The fraudulent deception played by A-1 to A-3, have caused irreparable damage and harm to the complainant in mind and reputation. She was silently suffering from mental agony from the date of marriage with the hope that A-3 will give marital happiness to her, after some time. But the arrival of A-3 in India with his another wife Bridget and a baby and A-3’s clear statement made that he married her only for the sake of his parents and that she can go out of the house and decide her future and his return to U.S.A., within a week have caused irreparable, damage to the mind and reputation of the complainant. She was unable to believe that A-1 to A-3 could have resorted to deceive her for their selfish ends but now she is finally reconciled to the effect that all the three accused constitute a gang of cheats, without slight regard for the future of the complainant and without qualms of conscience......” 24. In order to appreciate whether the contentions of the complainant are sustainable or not, it is necessary for me to mention a few facts that led to the marriage of the complainant with A-3 and the part played by A-1, A-2 and A-3 in the Commission of the offence punishable under section 417, Indian Penal Code. 25. The complainant was staying in Padmavathi Women’s College Hostel at Tirupathi as she was studying B.Sc., (Home-Science) in the Padmavathi Women’s College, Tirupathi. In December, 1970, the complainant paid a courtesy call to A-1 and A-2, in Madras when she came to Madras for sightseeing along with her father. A-1 introduced the complainant to her son, A-3. 25. The complainant was staying in Padmavathi Women’s College Hostel at Tirupathi as she was studying B.Sc., (Home-Science) in the Padmavathi Women’s College, Tirupathi. In December, 1970, the complainant paid a courtesy call to A-1 and A-2, in Madras when she came to Madras for sightseeing along with her father. A-1 introduced the complainant to her son, A-3. The complainant came to know that A-3 was already married and he married a Christian girl by name Janet alias Bobby. From the conversation with A-1, the complainant could understand that A-1 was not happy with the marriage of A-3 with the Christian Girl, Bobby though A-3 married her as she was his class-mate when they were studying medicine and as he fell in love with her. A-1 kept friendly relations with the complainant by writing several letters. In some letters written to the complainant, A-1 expressed that she was feeling very sorry for the circumstances in which she (A-1) was placed on account of the marriage of A-3 with Janet alias Bobby. In similar letters she wrote that she was not able to perform ‘puja’ with the Christian girl in her house. She also wrote that A-3 and Bobby were always quarrelling and that Bobby was living separately and that there is no chance of her coming back and leading marital life with A-3. A-1 had an eye upon the complainant and expressed her desire to take her as her daughter-in-law in the event of separation between A-3 and Bobby. Even after so many letters from A-1, neither the complainant nor her parents developed any fancy or many letters from A-1, neither the complainant and A-3. In fact the complainant’s father arranged a marriage between the complainant and Seshagiri Rao son of Sri T. Ramachandra Rao, who is a close relative of the complainant’s mother. After coming to know of this engagement, A-1 wrote a letter dated 7th January, 1972, stating that A-2 wants a daughter-in-law like complainant, that Bobby left her house two months back and if there is early separation between A-3 and Bobby, A-1 and A-2 wanted a girl of Golconda Vyapari sect for the marriage of A-3 and that A-3 also accepted this idea. A-1 asked the complainant to send her horoscope of her prospective husband and that her astrologer Sri Pakala will give prediction. A-1 asked the complainant to send her horoscope of her prospective husband and that her astrologer Sri Pakala will give prediction. A-1 wrote letters to:he complainant expressing her feeling that she lost something valuable due to the complainant having been proposed to be marked to the other boy. But the complainant was not tempted, but she invited A-1 to attend her marriage at Tirupathi. The complainant’s marriage muhurtham fixed on 22nd May, 1972, in Tirupathi was called off due to the intimation given by Sri T. Ramachandra Rao, about his son’s love affair with a girl of some other caste. Even after the failure of the marriage of complainant with Seshagiri Rao, the complainant and her father did not entertain the desirability of the complainant’s marriage with A-3. The complainant’s parents arranged alliance for the complainant with Sri Prabhakar and the betrothal function was settled at Chikkadpalli in November, 1973, and the marriage muhurtham was fixed on 9th December, 1973. Having come to know the said engagement of the complainant, the accused Nos. 1 to 3, came to Hyderabad, and stayed at Blue Moon Hotel. They contacted the complainant and her father along with her elder sister. A-1 informed the complainant her father and her elder sister that divorce was granted in the month of February, 1973, against Bobby and after February, 1973, there is no impediment for the marriage of the accused No. 3 with the complainant. They had also shown the copy of the decree passed by the District Court, Chingalput granting divorce. On 11th November, 1973, the complainant, her father and her elder sister went to the hotel and had talks with A-1 and A-3 and questioned A-3 about the correctness of the statement made by A-1 and also about his willingness to marry the complainant. Thereupon A-3 specifically told them that he divorced Bobby on account of the differences between him and Bobby and he was willing to marry the complainant. A-1 and A-3 also showed the copy of the decree. In those circumstances, the complainant’s father on 11th November, 1973 gave a wire to Sri K.K. Sharma dropping the proposal of his alliance with his son Sri Prabhakar. A-1 and A-3 also showed the copy of the decree. In those circumstances, the complainant’s father on 11th November, 1973 gave a wire to Sri K.K. Sharma dropping the proposal of his alliance with his son Sri Prabhakar. Believing the representations made by A-1 and A-3 about the divorce and also the copy of the decree of divorce passed by the Court shown to the complainant and her ‘father, they agreed for the marriage between A-3 and the complainant. Hence the complainant’s father gave wire on 11th November, 1973, to Prabhakar’s father dropping the proposal of the marriage alliance between complainant and Prabhakar. After the cancellation of the said proposal the marriage of A-3 with the complainant was celebrated on 11th March, 1974, at Bharani Gardens, Madras. After the marriage, the complainant lived in the house of the accused. Sometime after the marriage A-3 evaded the marital relations with the complainant stating that he did not want to have children unless he became self-reliant. In the year 1976, A-3 left for U.S.A., for taking his job having promised the complainant that he would take her to States if he settled there and got a job. A-3 got a job and was working in the hospital in Brooklyn and later in New Jersey. The complainant had been writing letters to A-3. But she did not receive any reply from him. While the complainant was eagerly expecting the return of A-3 and her being taken by him to States, A-3 returned to Madras in January, 1978, with a lady by name Bridget and a baby. Bridget is no other than the elder sister of Jannet. On seeing A-3 with Bridget and the baby, the complainant became shocked. When she questioned A-3 as to who that lady was, he told that he married her and she is his wife and the baby is their daughter. Then she questioned as to why he married her. He told her that he never wanted to marry her and in order to satisfy the whims and fancies of his parents that they should have a daughter-in-law of same sect of Golconda Vyapari, he tied ‘mangalasutram’ around her neck but in reality Bridget is his wife and the baby is their child and he is not prepared to live with the complainant and she can go out of her house and marry someone else. Even A-1 and A-2 failed to dissuade A-3 from her. A-3 made all these announcements and proclaimed his decision in the presence of A-1 and A-2. They failed to dissuade A-3 from his decision. Thus the complainant became victim of dishonest and fraudulent game played by A-1 to A-3. The situation created by them forced her to leave the house apprehending danger to her life. She contacted her parents and they visited her on 22nd January, 1978, with her relatives in Madras. The complainant’s father questioned A-1 to A-3 about the matter. A-3, in the presence of A-1 and A-2 and other relatives, told the father of the complainant that he was not prepared to live with the complainant and lead marital life with her and that he had chalked out his life with Bridget. A-2 did not speak anything and went to have a drink. A-1 had taken things easily as if there was no surprise in the conduct of A-3. Realising that they had been cheated by A-1 to A-3, the complainant and her father returned to Hyderabad and filed this complaint in the Court at Hyderabad, as the offence had taken place in Hyderabad. 26. According to the complainant, A-1 to A-3 dishonestly concealed the facts relating to the divorce of A-3 from his first wife Bobby and fraudulently and dishonestly made representations that A-3 divorced his wife Bobby and showed a document purported to be the decree of divorce of A-3 from his first wife Bobby inducing the complainant and her parents to believe that the Court granted the decree of divorce and the complainant and her father as well as her mother believed the document shown to them as a genuine document and relying upon that document, they believed that A-3 divorced his first wife Bobby only for the purpose of marrying the complainant and acting upon the said representations and inducement the complainant and her father cancelled the proposal of the marriage alliance between the complainant and Prabhakar. 27. 27. Sri Sarathy contends that the document shown to the complainant and her parents in Hyderabad, was not the copy of the decree granted by competent Court, but it was ‘fabricated to make the complainant and her parents to believe that it was a copy of the decree granted by the Court of Chengalput, and that the complainant is having a document to show that after the marriage i.e., on 11th March, 1974, the Madras High Court granted a divorce decree in favour of Janet for divorcing her from A-3 and also another document to show that Bridget divorced her husband subsequently and obtained divorce decree from the Madras High Court and hence A-3 and Bridget were married. He relying upon these documents, contends that A-1 and A-3 suppressed all these facts dishonestly and misrepresented fraudulently to the complainant and her parents in Blue Moon Hotel at Hyderabad, that A-3 obtained a decree of divorce from his first wife though in fact there was no such decree for divorce and the copy shown to the complainant and her parents is not a genuine document and it was fabricated and shown to the complainant and her parents in order to induce them to believe that A-3 divorced his first wife and agreed to complainant’s marriage with A-3 and hence they cancelled the proposal of marriage of Prabhakar with the complainant and the marriage of A-3 with the complainant, therefore, took place. But for this fraudulent and dishonest misrepresentations and presentation of the fabricated documents shown to the complainant and her parents, they would not have agreed for the marriage between A-3 and the complainant and marriage would not have taken place and hence the complainant has made out a case for an offence punishable under section 517, Indian Penal Code. 28. Sri Padmanabha Reddy, the learned Counsel for the accused as against these contentions, contends that according to sworn statement of the complainant, the document alleged to have been shown to complainant was a decree of Chengalput Court and there is allegation in the complaint or in her-sworn statement that the said document was fabricated for purpose of inducing them to believe it and agree for complainant’s marriage with A-3. With regard to the other document about which a reference was made during the course of arguments by Sri Sarathy, Padmanabha Reddy contends that there is no mention about them either in the complaint or in the sworn statement and in the absence of such allegation made in the complaint or sworn statement the alleged document should not be looked into and they should be excluded. If they are excluded, there is no material even if the accusation made in the sworn statement or complaint to make out a case. 29. From the facts mentioned above, it is clear that A-1 and A-3 showed a document to the complainant and her parents representing that it was a decree of divorce granted by the Court of Chengalput and the complainant and her parents believed the document as if it was divorce decree according to which A-3 divorced Janet and believed their representation that there is no legal impediment. It is on account of that document and also the representations made by A-1 and A-3 to the complainant and her parents, that divorce between A-3 and his first wife Janet was granted by Court, that the complainant and her parents were induced to agree for the marriage between A-3 and the complainant and consequently they cancelled the proposal of complainant’s marriage with Prabhakar. From these facts it is again clear that but for the presentation of the document purported to be the decree of divorce of A-3 from Janet and misrepresentation of A-1 and A-3 in this regard, the complainant would not have agreed to marry A-3 and complainant and her father would not have cancelled the proposal of complainant’s marriage with Prabhakar. 30. Thus there are allegations as to dishonest concealment of actual facts with regard to divorce and presentation of the document purported to be the divorce decree and also the fraudulent misrepresentation about the divorce decree. On account of the dishonest suppression of facts and fraudulent representations made by A-1 and A-3, that A-3 obtained decree of divorce from the Court, the complainant and her parents, acting upon the spurious document which was shown to them that it was the divorce decree granted by Court, believed the representation made by A-1 and A-3 as true and genuine, and consequently, they cancelled the proposal of Prabhakar Rao’s marriage with the complainant and thus the complainant’s marriage with A-3 took place. These facts, if believed are sufficient, to make out prima facie case that A-1 and A-3 committed an offence punishable under section 417, Indian Penal Code. 31. Regarding A-2, I have to hold that there is no sufficient material to show that he has taken any part in any of the acts committed by A-1 and A-3. From my above discussion, I find it difficult to say at this juncture that there is no material at all for proceeding against A-1 and A-3 for an offence punishable under section 417, Indian Penal Code, though it cannot be proceeded against A-2. Under those circumstances I find myself unable to agree with the contentions of Sri Padmanabha Reddy, as against A-1 and A-3. But I agree with him as against A-2. Hence, I hold the proceedings in C.C. No. 107 of 1978 on the file of IV Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad, cannot be quashed as against A-1 and A-3, but the proceedings in C.C. No. 107 of 1978, as against A-2 are quashed. This point is answered accordingly. 32. In view of my findings on the three points, I have to hold that the lower Court should decide the question of limitation as a preliminary issue and the lower Court should, therefore, direct the complainant and her witnesses to give evidence first and after their evidence, the Court should direct the respondents i.e., A-1 and A-3 to adduce evidence if they feel it necessary. The petition is ordered accordingly.