Order Section 2(b) of the West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act), defines "Apex Society", as a cooperative society, whose area of operation extends to the whole of the State and the primary objective of which, is the promotion of object and the provision for facilities for the operation of other co-operative societies which are its members. The West Bengal State Co-operative Marketing Federation Limited (hereinafter referred to as the said Society), is such an Apex Society. The petitioner Ali Ahmed is the Chairman of the said society and was elected as such to the Board of Directors of the same, as a representative of the Murari Thana Large Seeds Agricultural Co-operative Marketing Society Limited. at the Annual General Meeting of the Federation held on December 22, 1976 2. The said society is also a co operative society within the meaning of the said Act. It has been stared that the said Society was organised in the month of January, 1958 and was duly registered with the Registrar of Cooperative Societies, having its registration No: as 8/Cal of 1958. In view of the recommendations of the Dantwalla Committee, the membership of the said Society was re-organized by eliminating individuals and other types of societies and the same was converted to a purely federal organization of marketing and processing co-operative and was re-named as West Bengal State Co-operative Marketing Federation Limited (hereinafter referred to as the said Federation). The membership of the said Society, on such re-organization are of the following categories:- (1) A-class holders and primary agricultural marketing society. (2) B-class share holders............agricultural processing societies. (3) C-class share holders....................State Government. (4) D-class share holders............................open to individual and other types of agricultural co-operative societies which have business connection with the said society. But such members do not have any right to vote in the affairs of the said society and participate in the management for meeting of the said society or to share its profits. The said society at present has more or less 248 members and from the 15 different districts of West Bengal, there are 15 representatives to the Board of Management of the said Society and the petitioner Ali Ahmed is stated to be one of such representatives from the district of Birbhum. 3. The said society at present has more or less 248 members and from the 15 different districts of West Bengal, there are 15 representatives to the Board of Management of the said Society and the petitioner Ali Ahmed is stated to be one of such representatives from the district of Birbhum. 3. From the statements in the petition it appears that the said society has a Managing Committee consisting of 21 members, out of whom, 18 primary members were elected and 3 were nominated by the State Government. Of these 18 elected members, 15 were again elected by the elected primary agricultural marketing societies i.e. one from each of the 15 members, who were elected by the agricultural processing societies. It further appears that the day to day administrative and financial matters of the said society at all material times were and still are looked after by one Pravash Nath Mukherjee, who is the principal executive of the same and is designated as the Managing Director being appointed under the provisions of Rule 51 of the West Bengal Co-operative Societies Rules, 1974 (hereinafter referred to as the said Rules) as also under the provisions contained in the bye-laws of the said Society (hereinafter referred to as the said bye-laws). 4. It bas been slated by the petitioner that the Managing Committee of the said Society consisting of the persons as aforesaid, is only responsible for laying down the policies of administration which is implemented and the day to day administration is carried out by the said Managing Director, who again is a Government Officer and is a Joint Registrar of the Cooperative Societies. 5. It has been stated further that the said Society made considerable efforts in the Co-operative movement in general arid also made considerable improvement on its past activities by sincere and devoted administration under its Board of Directors. Pursuant to a scheme sponsored by the National Co-operative Development Corporation in the year 1964-65, the said Society is stated to have set up a technical and promotional sale for guiding and supporting its affiliated primary societies in matters relating to organisational, financial and technical problems for installation of processing units and marketing and processing of agricultural produces. Pursuant to a scheme sponsored by the National Co-operative Development Corporation in the year 1964-65, the said Society is stated to have set up a technical and promotional sale for guiding and supporting its affiliated primary societies in matters relating to organisational, financial and technical problems for installation of processing units and marketing and processing of agricultural produces. For such activities, the said Society is again stated to have requisitioned the services of the Project Engineer, Fertilizer Experts, Executive Engineer, Refrigeration Engineer, Rice Mill Engineer, Jute Development Officer, Development Officer (Seeds). Marketing Development Officer and Financial Controller for the purpose of supplying the know-how to its affiliated units. The petitioner has stated that the State Government in its turn has also helped the said Society by subsidising the cost of the staff employed in the concerned sale, for a period of 5 years. It has been stated further that for the last few years, it made tremendous progress in various field of activities and as a result whereof, the same is now recognised as one of the biggest distributors of fertilizers in West Bengal. That apart, it bas been stated that in the year 1974-75, the said Society handled fertilizers worth about 1003 lakhs as against 195-69 lakhs for the year 1971-72. The petitioner has stated that in the year 1971-72, the said Society started in a very humble way its business in pesticide, seeds and other agricultural implements and financial involvement of the said Society was also Rs. 24.6 lakhs and by the year 1975-76, such amount has grown to Rs. 6148 lakhs. It has also been mentioned in the petition that the jute business of the said Society was started in 1972-73 by purchasing jute worth 1.08 lakhs mounds and in the year 1975-76, such purchase has gone upto 567 lakhs and produced jute about 810 lakhs mounds. In this way the petitioner has sought to establish that the business of the said Society has flourished and is flourishing. 6. The petitioner has also mentioned that the financial position of the said Society at all material times registered and is still registering steady improvement every year. For the purpose of establishing such financial position, the table as quoted hereunder, was relied upon by the petitioner. 7. 6. The petitioner has also mentioned that the financial position of the said Society at all material times registered and is still registering steady improvement every year. For the purpose of establishing such financial position, the table as quoted hereunder, was relied upon by the petitioner. 7. The petitioner has stated that the profits in the year 1974-75 has gone down because of the fact that the price of fertilizes have been considerably reduced for about 4 times during the said financial year. The petitioner has stated further that the accounts of the said Society is being regularly audited by the appropriate authorities under S.79 of the said Act, which lays down that the Registrar should be responsible for the audit and he will have power to have the accounts written up. In fact, the said section requires the Registrar to have the accounts of every Co-operative Society checked and audited at least once in each year and by such auditor as may be prescribed. Such auditing may also be done and completed by an Audit Officer, authorised by the Registrar in that behalf, by general or special order in writing. The section also requires that in respect of every audit of its accounts of a Co-operative Society shall pay such audit fee, and in such manner, as may be prescribed. The section also makes provision that if at the time of auditing, the accounts of a Co-operative Society are not completed, the Registrar or, with its approval the Audit Officer, may cause the accounts to be written up at the expenses of the society, and also make provisions and defines the purpose and jurisdiction of such audit in subsection (4). Section 80 of the said Act which is to the following effect:- (Lordship quoted S. 80 of the Act) * * * * lays down that after such audit as in S. 79 takes place, the audit officer will have to give a report under S. 80 as aforesaid for rectification of defects, if any mentioned in the audit report. 8. It has been stated that in the instant case, such audit under S. 17 as aforesaid was undertaken by the appropriate authorities and a report under S. 80 was also published and the said Society took necessary remedial steps for rectification of the 'defects as mentioned or pointed out in the audit report. 9. 8. It has been stated that in the instant case, such audit under S. 17 as aforesaid was undertaken by the appropriate authorities and a report under S. 80 was also published and the said Society took necessary remedial steps for rectification of the 'defects as mentioned or pointed out in the audit report. 9. Section 82(1)(a) of the said Act lays down that every Co-operative Society shall be liable at any time to inspection by the Registrar or any person authorised by the State Government or by the Registrar in this behalf by general or special order. It is stated that in terms of such provision, an inspection was undertaken with the affairs of the said Society. The relevant notice is in Annexure 'A" to the petition and is dated August 6, 1977 and one Sri C.R. Bhattacharjee, Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies, West Bengal, was appointed to complete such inspection. The time for completing the inspection appears to have been extended upto 13.9.77 the relevant order is in Annexure "C" to the petition and is dated 6th September. 10. The legality, validity or otherwise of the orders as aforesaid, were challenged by one' of the Directors of the said Society in Civil Rule No. 5001(W) of 1977. The said Rule was issued on September 12,1977 and while issuing the same an order of injunction was granted by this Court to the effect that the inspection of the said Society should be stayed and no action should be taken for submission of the concerned report of inspection. The injunction as aforesaid was issued initially for a temporary period upto October 10. 1977 and thereafter, the same, has stated to have been extended till the disposal of the Rule and that too in the presence of the respondents concerned. The said petitioner has stated further that the said Rule is still pending. 11. The injunction as aforesaid was issued initially for a temporary period upto October 10. 1977 and thereafter, the same, has stated to have been extended till the disposal of the Rule and that too in the presence of the respondents concerned. The said petitioner has stated further that the said Rule is still pending. 11. The resolutions of the Managing Committee and appointment of Administrator of its Society is mentioned in S. 26 of the said Act, which is to the following effect :- (Lordship quoted S. 26 of the Act) * * * * and it has been stated that in exercise of the powers under the proviso to sub-so 1 of S. 26 as aforesaid the Managing Committee of the said Society, in terms of the notices in Annexures "D" and "E" to the petition, has been dissolved and one Shri Arun Chowdhury, Headmaster, Nagari High School Nagari, Birbhum, has been appointed as Administrator for managing the affairs of the said Society. The notice in question, which is in Annexure "D" is dated October 28,1977 and is to the following effect;- Registered No. WB/SC-132 No. 580(1) THE CALCUTTA GAZETTE Extraordinary Published by Authority Kartika 6. Friday. October 28.1977 Saka 1899 Part-I. Orders and notifications by the Governor of West, Bengal, the High Court. Government Treasury etc GOVERNMENT OF WEST BENGAL Co-operation Department NOTIFICATION No. 5986-Co-Op/DS/2382/77-18th Oct. 1977. Whereas it transpires that the Managing Committee of the West Bengal State Co-operative Marketing Federation Limited, 6 Ganesh Chandra Avenue, Calcuita-700013 (Hereinafter referred to as the said Society)- (i) has persistently made defaults and has been grossly negligent in the performance of the duties imposed on it by the West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 1973 (West Bengal XXXVIII of 1973) and the rules and bye-laws made thereunder and (ii) has committed acts which are prejudicial to the interest of the said Society and the co-operative movement in general: And whereas the State Government has very large financial stake in the said society. And whereas the entire policy of marketing in the co-operative sector depends to a very large extent on the proper working and clean administration of the said Society; And whereas the Governor is of opinion that in view of the aforesaid circumstances immediate dissolution of the Managing Committee of the said Society is essential in the interest of the said Society and the co-operative movement in general; Now, therefore in exercise of the power conferred by the proviso to sub-so (1) of S. 26 of the West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 1973 (West Bengal Act XXXVIII of 1973) the Governor is pleased hereby- (a) to dissolve the managing committee of the said Society, the members of which shall forthwith vacate their office, and (b) to appoint, for a period of two years with effect from the date of this notification, Sri Arun Choudhury, Headmaster, Nagari High School, Nagari, Birbhum as the administrator to manage the affairs of the said society. By order of the Governor A. K. Dutta I have quoted the notice in extenso because arguments were advanced on the validity of the same and in the manner in which the same was issued. 12. The petitioner has alleged that on a perusal of the S. 26 of the said Act as aforesaid, it would be clear that the power of the authorities concerned, to dissolve a Managing Committee could be exercised only in certain conditions as specified in tire section itself and such power can only be exercised after giving the Managing Committee, which is proposed to be dissolved, an opportunity of being heard. It has also been contended that mere recital of the section in the notice itself is no compliance with the statutory requirements. It has further been stated that the necessity for giving notice and/or giving the Committee, proposed to be dissolved, an opportunity of being heard, can be dispensed with only if that State Government is satisfied on the basis of a report given by the Registrar concerned that immediate dissolution of the Managing Committee of a Society is necessary in the interest of the Co-operative Society and in the interest of the co-operative movement in general. It has been stated that from a reference to the records in the instant case and on a perusal of the impugned order, it would appear that such mandatory obligation under S. 26 of the said Act, on the authorities concerned, to give the said Society an opportunity of being heard, has been dispensed with in a manner which is foreign to the said S. 26. As such it has been contend ed that the impugned order of dissolution of the Managing Committee of the said Society was void ab initio and was a nullity apart from the fact that such order was passed not only without jurisdiction and competence but also on total non-application of mind. 13. It has been alleged that the notices in question were served on the petitioner on October 29, 1977 at about 3-30 p. m., which was a Saturday and on which date the office of the said Society closes at at 2 p.m. By mentioning the hours as aforesaid, the petitioner has also contended mala fides against the authorities concerned and he has alleged that the entire action was a pre-planned and pre-arranged one with the other officers, employees and servants of the said Society, who is also stated to have been informed behind the back of the petitioner about the orders impeached. The petitioner has also mentioned that the Managing Director in the instant case has taken unusual interest in staying in the office even after the normal working hours on Saturday. He has, however, mentioned that the assumption of charge by the Administrator so appointed, after 2 p. m. on the given date which was a Saturday, was improper and by such act, the said Administrator has not in effect or in fact taken charge of the said Society. He has, however, mentioned that the assumption of charge by the Administrator so appointed, after 2 p. m. on the given date which was a Saturday, was improper and by such act, the said Administrator has not in effect or in fact taken charge of the said Society. That apart, it has been contended by the petitioner that the notification in the instant case was gazetted on October 28, 1977 and the Administrator concerned fixed his visit to the office on October 29, 1977 at about 4-30 p.m. and this fact clearly shows and establishes the pre-arranged move on the part of the respondents in the matter of taking possession of the said Society, The petitioner has also alleged that the Managing Director of the said Society, with a view to prove that the Administrator concerned has already taken charge of the office or the Administrator on October 29, 1977, took unusual interest in installing the said Administrator. The petitioner has alleged that the Managing Director and the Administrator so appointed, were in league in taking possession or assuming charges of the said Society at a point of time when its offices were closed and thereby to create an atmosphere to mislead all concerned including this Cont. 14. Apart from all these, the petitioner has contended that there was no cause or any occasion for formation of opinion, not to speak of requisite opinion, regarding the immediate dissolution of the Managing Committee of the said society and as such, the dispensation with the opportunity of being heard, which has been made in the instant case and in a manner which is not provided for in the statute. Thus, it bas been contended that the impugned order was unauthorized, void, illegal and improper and the same as such, cannot be termed or treated as an order under S. 26(1) as aforesaid. It bas also been stated that since no reason has been assigned for passing of the impugned order under S.26 as aforesaid, the same is also void. These apart, the petitioner has also contended that the order, not being a speaking one, cannot be given effect to or acted upon. It bas also been stated that since no reason has been assigned for passing of the impugned order under S.26 as aforesaid, the same is also void. These apart, the petitioner has also contended that the order, not being a speaking one, cannot be given effect to or acted upon. In fact, he has submitted that the notification in question merely repeats the provisons of the statute, but does not indicate any reason and/or any opportunities in support of the concerned recitals and as such, the same cannot be a proper order in the eye of law. The petitioner has stated that the Society has not committed any act which is prejudicial to the interest either of the said Society or the co-operative movement in general and in fact there was no contrary view expressed in the impugned order, which was a prerequisite for a valid and bona fide order. The petitioner has made a reference to a printed hand out under the heading "Co-operative movement of West Bengal 1977" which he has stated was issued during the balding of a conference of the Ministers-in-charge of the Co-operative of the Eastern States, which was carried by the present Chief Minister of West Bengal and where the achievements of various co-operative societies in West Bengal have been mentioned under the heading marketing of co-operatives. He has further stated that from the particulars as appearing in the said hand out, the achievements of the said Society would be amply proved, established and justified and it would thus be incorrect to sayar contend even that the said Society bas committed acts, which are either prejudicial to the interest of the said Society or co-operative movement in general. 15. The petitioner has further, on a reference to S. 26(1) of the said Act, has mentioned that the power under the same to disolve the co-operative society without giving any opportunity of being heard would be very wide, arbitrary, naked and discriminatory. In fact, he has stated that no criterion has been fixed in the exercise of such power and more particularly when the interest of co-operative movement has not been defined anywhere in the said Act. In fact, he has stated that no criterion has been fixed in the exercise of such power and more particularly when the interest of co-operative movement has not been defined anywhere in the said Act. Thus, he has contended that those terms would be very vague and of wide import and amplitude and as such the decision of the State Government to dissolve the Managing Committee of a co-operative society on the basis of a report of the Registrar of Co-operative Societies which would also equally apply in case of dissolution of a society, would also be improper. The petitioner has contended the power under S.26(1) to be arbitrary void and ultra vires of Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution of India. The petitioner has further referred to recitals contained in the impugned order and or placing them, and more particularly the portion which lays down that the said Society has committed certain acts, argued that the same would be enough to establish non-application of mind and since there is no evidence of any formation of opinion for initiating steps under S. 26(1) of the said Act, the action as taken hereunder should not be allowed to continue. On a reference to Civil Rule No. 5001(W) of 1977 which was obtained by Shri Panchanan Ghose, Vice Chairman of the said Society with the injunction that the Registrar concerned should not call for the report it was submitted by the petitioner that because of the pendency of such injunction, there was wilful laches or any negligent conduct on their part in not filing the report in time or as asked for by the authorities concerned. In fact, it has been submitted by the petitioner that because of such injunction, which restrained the respondents in the said Rule, from publishing the report of the inspection, purported to be conducted under S 82(1)(a) of the said Act, the respondents herein, in order to circumvent the said order, which was extended in their presence and in order to make the said order of injunction infructuous, have passed the impuglJed order in this case, without the order of the Registrar and as such action urged and considered along with the admitted facts that no opportunity has been given to the said Society before dissolution, would be improper, void and bad. Apart from all these, the petitioner has also alleged political motivation in the matter of taking the action in the instant case and as such has also contended that the order has been passed, issued and obtained, not on appropriate material or satisfaction, but for collateral purposes. The petitioner, for the purpose of explaining away the gradual downward trend of the business and in fact of the said Society mentioned that much happened due to the reduction of price of fertilizers by the Government. 16. There were 3 affidavits-in-opposition filed by the answering respondents. In the first opposition which is by respondent Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 and has been filed by the Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies, the maintainability of the application, in view of the provisions of Article 226(3) or the Constitution of India has been raised. It has been stated that the order under challenge being appealable one under S. 134 of the said Act before the West Bengal Co-operative Tribunal, the present petition would not be maintainable. It has been contended that the petitioner, if he is at all aggrieved by the impugned order under S.26 of the said Act, should have preferred the appeal as aforesaid, which is a statutory one. The said deponent has further mentioned that the Managing Director in the instant case, was appointed under Rule 51 of tile said Rule and he is only responsible for implementation of the policy as taken. The said Managing Director is also subject to control of the Chairman of the said Society. It has been alleged that the inspection reports of the Reserve Bank of India and that too of the Deputy Registrar of the Co-operative Societies, do not conform to or establish the statements as made by the 'petitioner and such inspection reports show that the affairs of the Society have been' thoroughly mismanaged during the last few years under the Managing Committee of which the petitioner is the Chairman. In the said affidavit it has been mentioned that in 1973-74 the said Society earned a net profit of Rs.15.15 lakhs which• in 1974-75 came down to Rs.6.59 lakhs and in 1975-76 to Rs. 1.54 lakhs only. In the said affidavit it has been mentioned that in 1973-74 the said Society earned a net profit of Rs.15.15 lakhs which• in 1974-75 came down to Rs.6.59 lakhs and in 1975-76 to Rs. 1.54 lakhs only. Such statements were made or put forward for the purpose of establishing the dangerous downward trend in the profit of the said Society, which in fact has also been put forward for the purpose of the super-session of the same. It has been categorically asserted that the loss for such downward trend in profit, as alleged by the petitioner, would be untrue because any loan due to the fall of price of fertilizer have been appropriately compensated by the Government. These apart, it has been alleged that in respect of its audit the Federation is always in arrears and in fact till date, audit for the year 1974-75 has been completed, although audit for the succeeding 2 years should have been completed by this time. As such, the deponent has alleged that the very purpose of S. 80 of the said Act has been frustrated, 17. It has further been contended by the deponent concerned that the inspection report under S. 82 of the said Act was duly submitted by the inspecting officer on 12th September, 1977 before the Registrar of Co-operative Societies, West Bengal and that too before the communication of the injunction order as issued in Civil Rule No. 5001(W) of 1977. Such order is stated to have been received by the Inspecting Officer on 13th September, 1977, when it has been alleged that the report was already submitted before the Registrar concerned. The fact that the Managing Committee of the said Society has been dissolved under proviso to S. 21(1)(?)of the said Act and Shri Arun Chowdhury, Head Master, Nagari High School, Birbhum, Respondent No.6, has been appointed as Administrator has not been disputed. It has of course been stated that proviso to sub-s. (1) of S. 26 of the said Act no opportunity of hearing is required to be given and the State Government has passed the impugned order duly and in accordance with law. It has of course been stated that proviso to sub-s. (1) of S. 26 of the said Act no opportunity of hearing is required to be given and the State Government has passed the impugned order duly and in accordance with law. That apart, it has been contended that in passing the impugned order the authorities concerned have acted with jurisdiction, power and competence and in fact there is no illegality or any irregularity in the matter of dissolving the Managing Committee of the said Society and appointing the Respondent No.6 as the Administrator. The deponent has further stated that as usual. the Managing Director and Chairman of the said Society on the day as mentioned, which incidentally was a Saturday, was in their office after 2 pm. and as such the taking over of possession by the said Respondent No.6 after 2 p.m. was possible. The allegations that the Managing Director took unusual interest to have the Administrator installed, has been categorically denied. It has been stated further that the impugned order under S.26 was issued by the State Government after careful scrutiny and consideration of the inspection report. The deponent to the said affidavit has further stated that since the order in question has been duly issued in terms of the stipulations of S. 26, the grounds of super-session which were the basis, were not required to be staled in the notice itself or the findings of the inspection reports and the particulars thereof were not also required to be stated in the notice. The validity of S. 26, which was submitted by the petitioner, has also been denied. In fact, it has been stated that the reports as mentioned hereinbefore, showed a dismal picture so far the said Society is concerned and as such, on consideration of report and after duly complying with the statutory requirements, the impugned order was made. The deponent to the said affidavit has further mentioned that since the petitioner bas no financial interest, so he would not be prejudiced in any way whatsoever by the order as made. 18. Shri Paresh Nath Mukherjee, who is the Managing Director of the said Society, has filed an affidavit-in-opposition, which is the second opposition ill the Rule. He, in his said affidavit, has in fact reiterated the stand as taken by the deponent in the first affidavit. 18. Shri Paresh Nath Mukherjee, who is the Managing Director of the said Society, has filed an affidavit-in-opposition, which is the second opposition ill the Rule. He, in his said affidavit, has in fact reiterated the stand as taken by the deponent in the first affidavit. These apart, he has further stated that he had no responsibility in the matter of the working of the said Society and whatever he did, he did that under the advice of the petitioner. He in fact has mentioned that without the help and assistance or direction of the petitioner, he had no independent existence or he could not exercise the power independently. He has also categorically stated that he along with the petitioner used to work after office work and as such it was not unusual that the Administrator, Respondent No.6 could take possession of the Society after 2 p.m. on Saturday. He in fact has mentioned that the Administrator duly took over possession after 2 p.m. on Saturday, when he along with the petitioner, apart from other officers of the said Society, was' present. The deponent to this affidavit has also stated that the action in instant case under S.26 of the said Act was duly taken and there was no political motivation as alleged. He has further stated that since the petitioner has no pecuniary interest, he is not expected to suffer any loss or prejudice in the matter of super-session of the said Society. 19. The third affidavit has been filed by Shri Arun Chowdhury, who is respondent No.6 and has been appointed as the Administrator of the said Society. He has categorically mentioned that on 29th October, 1977 at about 2 p.m. he assumed charge and thereafter requested the respondent No.5 the Managing Director to communicate the fact of such taking over charge to the Respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3. He, in fact has denied any suggestion of any machination or political motivation in the matter of taking over charge of the said Society. He has also denied any collusion between himself and the Managing Director, respondent No.5 in the matter of taking over charge. 20. By several replies the allegations contained the aforesaid affidavits, have been denied by the petitioner. 21. During the course of hearing and more particularly on 24th February, 1978 Mr. Somnath Chatterjee. who is appearing for the respondent Nos. He has also denied any collusion between himself and the Managing Director, respondent No.5 in the matter of taking over charge. 20. By several replies the allegations contained the aforesaid affidavits, have been denied by the petitioner. 21. During the course of hearing and more particularly on 24th February, 1978 Mr. Somnath Chatterjee. who is appearing for the respondent Nos. 5 and 6, produced a report dated 28th September, 1977, so also a summary of inspection report dated 12th September. 1977 which according to him was the basis of the order for superseding the said Society. On such production and reliance Mr. Dipankar Gupta asked for particulars and to have inspection of the documents and reports and for further opportunity to file a supplementary affidavit on behalf of the petitioner. Such leave, after hearing the parties, was granted and consequently the respondents were also given opportunities to file their opposition, if any to such supplementary affidavit by the petitioner, if filed. In fact the necessary supplementary affidavit by the petitioner which was affirmed on 10th March, 1978, was filed in Court and to that, the answering respondents have also filed their affidavit in opposition. 22. In his supplementary affidavit, after inspection of the documents as referred to hereinbefore, the petitioner has contended that the Registrar concerned, in view of the subsisting order in Civil Rule No. 5001(W) of 1977, particulars whereof have been mentioned hereinbefore, did not act properly or with authority, to submit the report in question dated September 20, 1977 to the State Government. The report, in view of the above, was contended to be invalid in law and inoperative. That apart, it has been contended that the said Report was baseless, concocted and manufactured. The statements of the answering Respondents that the inspection by the Inspecting 9fficer was completed on September 10, 1977 was denied. It was also contended that since such a long report was filed on September 12, 1977, on completion of the inspection on September 10. 1977, i.e. within 2 days, there was not only no application of mind but everything was done in a hot haste and in a premeditated way and that too with the object of making the said pending Civil Rule No.5001(W) of 1977 infructuous. The allegations in the Report that the business of the said Society was conducted in an un-business like manner was denied. The allegations in the Report that the business of the said Society was conducted in an un-business like manner was denied. The Report as referred to hereinbefore is a long one and contains various allegations against the said Society, its workings and dealings. In fact, the Report contains allegations and the basis of such allegations run about to seventeen typed pages. I direct the said Report to be kept in the record being marked a s Ext. 1 (From paragraphs 23 to 49 Lordship discussed the Report) 50. Mr. Gupta, on, a reference to the Bye-laws of the said Society and more particularly to Bye-law 40 stated that the Managing Committee, with the approval of the Registrar of Co-operative Societies, West Bengal, is authorised and is required to appoint a qualified person to be the whole time Secretary for the conduct of the affairs of the Federation and the Respondent No.5 viz., Paresh Nath Mookherjee, was so appointed and he was also the Managing Director at the relevant time. Such Bye-law, he has also submitted, was duly framed and formulated in the light of or terms of Rule 51 of the said Rules, which lays down the procedure and manner as to how the Managing Director or Secretary of an Apex Society and Manager of a Central Co-operative Bank or Co-operative Land Development Bank, is to be appointed and with what powers. The powers and duties of the Managing Committee are incorporated in Rules 43 and 44 respectively and Mr. Gupta, on a reference to the provisions in Ss. 79, 80, 81, 82 and 84 of the said Act, which deal with and lays down the ultimate Controlling power with the Government, submitted firstly, that as such, the petitioner could not in any event be held liable or responsible for the purported allegations, which incidentally are the basis or materials for the order of super-session. He, secondly referred to S.26 of the said Act, the particulars whereof have been quoted hereinbefore, and on the basis whereof the impugned order of super-session, was made, and has submitted that the conditions precedent for exercise of power under the said section has not been fulfilled and because of such laches or defect the action as taken, was improper, void, arbitrary, without jurisdiction and in violation of principles of natural justice. It was submitted that the said S.26 require firstly, a report and secondly, the materials which would be the basis of that report must contain in the report itself, thirdly, such materials must be relevant on the question that (a) Mananging Committee has (i) persistently made defaults or has been grossly negligent, in the performance of the duties imposed on it by the said Act or by the said Rules or the bye-laws or (ii) committed any act, which is prejudicial to the interest of the said Society or the Co-operative Societies, or (iii) wilfully disobeyed or wilfully failed to comply with any lawful order or direction issued by the State Government or the Registrar of (b) the affairs of the business of the said Society have, due to persistent default or negligence in the performance of duties on the part of the members of the Managing Committee or a section thereof, or otherwise, came to a standstill fourthly, the conclusion drawn on the basis of the report and the materials must be that of a reasonable man and fifthly, the reasons relevant, must appear in the notification itself. As such it was contended by Mr. Gupta that the reasons must be given or incorporated in the order itself and such should also be the manner and procedure, if the procedure as required to be followed, is sought to be dispensed with. It was thirdly argued by Mr. Gupta that the office of the Apex Society is at Calcutta and the Respondent No.6, who is a school teacher from Birbhum and has been appointed the Administrator, on the face of the records show and establish mala fide and non-application of mind, apart from the fact that such appointment was motivated and was made with some purpose. He fourthly, contended that the existence of other remedy by way of appeal under S.134 of the said Act, as has been pointed out by the answering Respondents in their return to the Rules, would be of no consequence and avail in the facts of this case and the more so when, no reasons for the super-session has been disclosed in the notice in Annexure D to the petition. It was contended fifthly by Mr. It was contended fifthly by Mr. Gupta that the filing of the Report, the particulars of which have been mentioned above was improper, irregular, un-authorised and not boda fide in view of the pendency of Civil Rule No. 5001 (W) of 1974 and the orders as made therein. The Report which is the basis of the super-session was made on the basis of a report obtained by the Registrar Co-operative Societies, West Bengal, under S. 82(1) of the said Act, through his delegate Shri C.R. Bhattacharyya, Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies, West Bengal and as such it was also contended that even if such report could be made, the same was improper because the report by the said delegate was not the report by the Registrar as defined in S.2(23) of the said Act. It was also contended that the Registrar under S. 10 is in fact the delegate of the State Government and as such the further delegation in favour of the Deputy Registrar by him, was not proper and even if such delegation was possible and permissible, there was in fact no report of the Registrar and the report as was acted upon, was not his report. While on the point it was contended that under S. 83 of the said Act which deals with inspection by the Registrar of financing Bank, delegation, only in certain specific and specified classes of cases and circumstances, are permissible and the preamble of the concerned Report would show and establish on the face of the same that those or such exigencies as are mentioned or required under the said section, are absent. In fact, it was contended that since in this case there was admittedly no delegation by the State Government and the Registrar was or is not the State, of there was or has been no report to the State by the Registrar and the more so and particularly when there is admittedly no report by the Registrar. 51. In support of his first contentions as aforesaid and more particularly that satisfaction must be gathered or available from the report itself, Mr. Gupta referred to a Bench decision of this Court, in the case of State of West Bengal & Ors. v. Narendra Narayan Das, 1977 (l) CLJ 374. This was a case under the provisions of Article 311 (2)(c) and the proviso thereunder. Gupta referred to a Bench decision of this Court, in the case of State of West Bengal & Ors. v. Narendra Narayan Das, 1977 (l) CLJ 374. This was a case under the provisions of Article 311 (2)(c) and the proviso thereunder. It has been observed in that case that when an order under sub-clause (c) of the proviso to clause (2) of Article 311 is made in exercise of administrative power by the executive, the same would be subject to judicial review. The scope of such judicial review is well settled. The Court is to examine whether the opinion or satisfaction in question was formed bona fide. The Court must also examine whether there were any materials relevant or germane to the question at issue and is however not concerned with the sufficiency of the materials or with the question whether on the materials available the Court would have formed the opinion or come to the same decision. It has also been observed that there must be factual basis for the decision taken or the satisfaction arrived at. It has also been observed that by such requirement it is not obligatory to examine the truth or otherwise of the materials upon which the executive or the administrative authorities have acted. But what is required to be scrutinised is to see that there are some materials relevant to the question upon which the authority concerned has acted. 52. On the branch of the submissions under consideration, it was secondly contended that recording of due reason was a must and such reasons must also appear from the order itself. It was contended that mere quotation of the concerned section or the terms thereof in the involved notice, would be no compliance with the statute and such non-disclosure of the reasons in the notice, as is admittedly the case in the proceeding would also establish non-application of mind. There is no doubt that the impugned notice dated 28th October 1977 (Annexure D to the petition) has not disclosed the reasons as disclosed in the Report as referred to hereinbefore, but has only quoted the relevant provisions of S.26 of the said Act as grounds for superseding the said Society. There is no doubt that the impugned notice dated 28th October 1977 (Annexure D to the petition) has not disclosed the reasons as disclosed in the Report as referred to hereinbefore, but has only quoted the relevant provisions of S.26 of the said Act as grounds for superseding the said Society. To substantiate the contentions that the impugned order was void and inoperative and the same was no order in the eye of law or would not become an effective order by merely reciting the section, reference was made to the determinations of this Court in the case of Sachi Nath Chose & ors. v. West Bengal Board of Secondary Education & ors. 1976 (2) CLL 289 (=1976 CHN 810). In that case the President of the Board of Secondary Education, West Bengal passed an order of super-session of the Managing Committee of the School by invoking S. 28(2) of the West Bengal Board of Secondary Education Act, 1963 read with Rule 8 of the 1969 Rules. Since there are certain prerequisites or preconditions mentioned in the section for the exercise of the emergency powers by the President of the Hoard, it has been observed that a bare statement in the order that "prompt action is required", does not constitute an emergency, justifying Presidential action under S. 28(2) of the Act. It has also been observed that incidentally the powers under S. 28(2) are not intended to be a substitute for a routine procedure. The super-session order in the case was held and found to be bad as the basis of the conclusions arrived at or the inference as drawn by the President of the Board were not to be found either in the impugned order or in the records. 53. The next case on the point, on which reliance was placed, was the determinations of this Court in the case of Surja Mohan Chakraborty & Ors v. State of West Bengal & Ors, 1976 CHN 242. In that case a notice under the provisions of Bengal Finance Sales Tax Act. 53. The next case on the point, on which reliance was placed, was the determinations of this Court in the case of Surja Mohan Chakraborty & Ors v. State of West Bengal & Ors, 1976 CHN 242. In that case a notice under the provisions of Bengal Finance Sales Tax Act. 1941 was issued to show cause why security should not be demanded, under S. 7(4a) (1) of the Act for the proper payment of tax as payable under the Act and it has been held that on the materials on record, which showed that the authority concerned had perused the report placed before it, could and did form the opinion and no case was made out for interference with such formation of opinion. It has also been observed in that case that the purpose of prescribing that the reasons should be recorded in writing in S. 7(4a) of the Act is to enable the dealer to know exactly the reasons for which the security is demanded, the recording of reasons as made in the case, which was to the following effect:- “Seen proposal of the C.T.O. for demanding security for Rs. 1,00000/under S 7(4a)( I) of the Act, Please issue show cause notice fixing hearing on 13.9.72 at 11 A.M." was found to be not sufficient enough to comply with the terms "reasons to be recorded in writing", as used in the section. It was submitted that the reasons are really intended to be recorded so that reading such recording, the person sought to be proceeded with feels no difficulty in understanding the requirements to be complied with by him or in following the same. "Reason" according to Mr. Gupta is some visible manifestation viz., some manifestation in the order in Annexure 'D' itself in the instant case because that is the only document put forward or relied upon in justification of the super-session. In support of such submissions, reliance was first placed on the determinations of the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. M.L. Kapoor & Ors. AIR 1974 SC 87 . In support of such submissions, reliance was first placed on the determinations of the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. M.L. Kapoor & Ors. AIR 1974 SC 87 . That was a case of super-session of the employees concerned by the selection committee at the time of publishing the: selection list and the manner and procedure as adopted and followed on being challenged, it has been observed that: It is incumbent on the Selection Committee to state reasons in a manner which would disclose how the record of each superseded officer stood in relation to records of others who were to be preferred. This is the context of the effect upon the rights of aggrieved persons who are entitled to protection under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and particularly this is the only remaining visible safeguard against possible injustice and arbitrariness in making selections. As stated hereinbefore, Mr. Gupta contended that there was no visible manifestation of the due considerations or the basis of the reasons in the order itself, so the same was void, inoperative, irregular and bad. Reliance was next placed by Mr. Gupta in the case of M/s. Hochtief Gammon v. State of Orissa & ors, AIR 1976 SC 2226. In that case, the power of scrutiny by Courts over the decision of the appropriate Government in the matter of referring a dispute under S. 10 of the Industrial Dispute~ Act, 1947 came up for consideration and it has been observed that: The executive have to reach their decisions by taking into account relevant considerations. They should not refuse to consider relevant matter nor should they take into account wholly irrelevant or extraneous consideration. They should not misdirect themselves on a point of law. Only such a decision will be lawful. The Courts have power to see that the executive acts lawfully. It is no answer to the exercise of that power to say that the Executive acted bona fide nor that they have bestowed painstaking consideration. They cannot avoid scrutiny by courts by failing to give reasons. If they give reasons and they are not good reasons, the court can direct them to reconsider the matter in the light of relevant matters, though the propriety, adequacy or satisfactory character of these reasons may not be open to judicial scrutiny. They cannot avoid scrutiny by courts by failing to give reasons. If they give reasons and they are not good reasons, the court can direct them to reconsider the matter in the light of relevant matters, though the propriety, adequacy or satisfactory character of these reasons may not be open to judicial scrutiny. Even if the Executive considers it inexpedient to exercise their powers they should state their reasons and there must be material to show that they have considered all the relevant facts. 54 Mr. Arun Prokash Chatterjee, appearing for the Respondent Nos. 1-3 and 24, in reply to the aforementioned breach of the submissions of Mr. Gupta, contended that no doubt there is a report, in the instant case and when there is such report, he also agreed that materials of the same must be relevant to the terms of requirements of S. 26(a) and (b). He of course contended that the materials in the report are relevant materials and/or materials in terms of the provisions as mentioned above. He also denied the allegations of non-application of mind and contended that the position as appears from or depicted through the concerned report proves otherwise. It was submitted by him that the first part of S. 26 speaks about the opinion of the Registrar and contemplates also circumstances, where he may not either serve notice on the Society or give the same any opportunity before the action is taken. In fact, he submitted that there may be some such grave irregularities or cases of extreme emergency, when either giving of notice or opportunity may not be possible or feasable and it is one of these cases of such nature. Mr. Chatterjee submitted further that second part of the said S. 26 also contemplates of emergent situation or circumstances and the opinion as formed by the State Government in terms or the proviso thereunder, is conclusive and is not ordinarily justiciable. It was contended by him that the scope and ambit of such formation of the opinion is very wide and the same may be formed where immediate dissolution is necessary and required, on the basis or existence of one or more of the circumstances as mentioned in the section. He contended further that when the• necessary opinion is formed there is no other way out to dissolve the Society. He contended further that when the• necessary opinion is formed there is no other way out to dissolve the Society. To dissolve the Society being the actual reason no other reason according to Mr. Chatterjee is required to be given in the notification. It was therefore contended that the said Society was not entitled to get any other reason than those mentioned in the notification itself. These apart, it was contended that dissolution when a subjective opinion, the question of giving reasons may not always arise. Thus the words reasons in S.26, would mean the reasons for not giving the notice to the said Society or its Committee. 55. Mr. Chatterjee then referred to the notification (Annexure D) to the petition and reading the same contended further that when two circumstances are mentioned there, that would be enough to prove and establish due formation of opinion and application of mind. He contended that reasons would mean conclusion and not conclusion of facts. Thus, in terms of the requirements of S. 26 also only conclusive viz., the ultimate dissolution and not the reasons according to him can be given and any other construction would make it difficult for the two lines of the section to be harmonised which is not the rule of construction. It was then submitted by Mr. Chatterjee that even if reasons are not given, that would not make the order bad, if it can be established that the circumstances justifying the action as taken, do exist. 56. In Support of his contentions Mr. Chatterjee first relied on the determinations in the case of Hubli Electricity Co. Ltd. v. Province of Bombay, AIR 1949 PC 136: 76 IA 57. There the words opinion of the Provincial Government as referred to in S. 4(1)(a) of the Indian. Electricity Act 1910, was construed and it has been observed that those words would mean the subjective opinion of the Government and not an opinion subject to objective tests it has also. There the words opinion of the Provincial Government as referred to in S. 4(1)(a) of the Indian. Electricity Act 1910, was construed and it has been observed that those words would mean the subjective opinion of the Government and not an opinion subject to objective tests it has also. been observed that the language of the sub-section leaves no room for the reliance of a judicial examination as to the sufficiency of the grounds, on which the Government acted in forming the opinion' and the question on which the opinion of the Government is relevant, is not whether a default has been wilful and unreasonably prolonged, but whether there has been a wilful and unreasonably prolonged default and on that point the opinion is the determining matter and if not for good cause, displaced as a relevant opinion, is conclusive. Thus, it was submitted by Mr. Chatterjee that when inference have been drawn from relevant materials, such inference should not ordinarily be interfered with and judicial scrutiny of the existence of the materials would not be permissible. To find out how far judicial scrutiny would be possible and permissible, reference was made by Mr. Chatterjee to the determinations in the case of M.A. Rasheed & Ors., v. The State of Kerala, AIR 1974 SC 2249 . In the six appeals which were disposed of by the same judgment challenge was thrown to validity of a notification dated 26th July, 1975 issued by the Kerala Government under Rule 114 (2) of the Defence of India Rules, 1971. Such notification was challenged by the appellants, who are owners of Small Scale Industrial Units and employ mechanised process for decoration of retted cocoanut husks. Those appellants used to apply some process for such manufacture and the State Government declared defibiring of cocoanut husks by mechanical means as a Small Scale industry eligible for financial assistance under the Small Scale Industries Development Scheme. The challenge of the appellants was on the ground that the formation of opinion of the State Government for the purpose of exercise of power under Rule 114(2) is justiciable and the Court should call for the materials, on which the opinion has been formed and examine the same to find out whether a reasonable man or authority could have come to the same conclusion for securing equitable distribution and availability of retted husks at fair prices. It was alleged that the reasons mentioned in the notification justifying the imposition of the total ban on the use of machinery for defibring husks are wholly erroneous and prima facie no reasonable person will consider the same as justifying the said ban. The High court rejected the contentions and on appeal to the Supreme Court. it has been observed:- (Lordship quated from paras 7, 8 and 9 of the report) 57. It was then contended by Mr. Arun Prokash Chatterjee that the object of or the underlying idea of S. 26 would be that in cases of emergency, where there is no other way but to dissolve the concerned Society immediately, neither any opportunity is required to be given nor any reason is necessary to be disclosed in the relevant order or notification. In short, he submitted that in case of grave emergency or any emergent situation arising, which is the one in this case, steps in dissolving the concerned Society can be lawfully taken, without disclosing the reasons or affording any opportunity. It was also contended that there is no evidence that the opinion in the instant case has not been formed duly and honesty and thus when the opinion has been formed honestly, no interference should or could be made, and this Court in this jurisdiction will not be authorised to look or probe into the extent of the said opinion. In support or such submissions, reliance was placed on the determinations in the case of Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies. Madras & Ors. v. P.S. Rajagopal Naidu. Govindarajalu & Ors. AIR 1970 SC 992 . In that case, the Registrar of Madras Co-operative Societies, took action against the concerned Co-operative Society under S.72 of the Madras Co-operative Societies Act. 196l, and in superseding the same under S.71 did not take recourse to S.64 to 67. The contentions of the Society were upheld by the High Court and on appeal, the Supreme Court has observed that : (Lordship quoted from para 8 of the report) It was also submitted by Mr. Arun Prokash Chatterjee that the test of reasonableness would also be satisfied when and where there has been impartial formation of opinion, which according to him is also the case ill this proceedings. Arun Prokash Chatterjee that the test of reasonableness would also be satisfied when and where there has been impartial formation of opinion, which according to him is also the case ill this proceedings. He further contended that the Registrar in the instant case, had the jurisdiction or authority to get himself satisfied on the basis of a report obtained from his delegate and when he has formed his opinion on the basis of such report so and duly obtained, there would be no illegality or any irregularity. To substantiate such submissions reliance was first placed on the determinations in the case of Harakh Bhagat & Anr. v. Assistant Registrar. Co-operative Societies & Ors., AIR 1968 Patna 211. That was a case under Bihar and Orissa Co-operative Societies Act, 1935 and Rule 39 of the Bihar Co-operative Rules 1959 as framed there under. The validity or the said Rule providing for compulsory amalgamation of Societies was under challenge and a point arose specifically as to whether the said Rule was in excess of the rule making power under S.66(2) of the Act and it has been observed firstly that: (Lordship quoted from paras 7 and 8 of the report) Thereafter, reliance was placed on the determinations of this Court in the Case of Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxis v. ITCO (P) LTD., 79 CWN 562, which was a case under the provisions of Bengal Finance Sales Tax Act. 1941 and wherein, amongst other points the question and effect of delegation of power of Commissioner or Assistant Commissioner, was considered and it has been observed that a delegation of the powers of the Commissioner to the Assistant Commissioner is not made to the Assistant Commissioner in his personal capacity but is made in his official capacity. 58. Mr. Somnath Chatterjee, appearing for Respondent No.5 followed the arguments of Mr. Arun Prokash Chatterjee, apart from making his own submissions on the points as urged by Mr. Gupta. On the question of disclosure of the reasons, it was contended by him that the entire report which he has produced and which is the basis of the super-session, is not required to be quoted in the: order. It was contended that all the relevant materials are available in the order and the basis in which the said materials were considered or their particulars are not required to be quoted. Mr. It was contended that all the relevant materials are available in the order and the basis in which the said materials were considered or their particulars are not required to be quoted. Mr. Somnath Chatterjee also contended that even on the admitted non-disclosure of the reasons, if the same is required, the petitioner has not suffered any prejudice and at least that is why he has not asked for the reasons or the particulars thereof to be disclosed. He contended that in fact there was no claim by the petitioner, as he himself such cause any occasion for such was aware of the relevant reasons. 59. In support of his submissions, Mr. Somnath Chatterjee first relied on the determinations in the case of Chief Mechanical Engineer, Eastern Railway & Anr. v. Jyoti Prosad Benerjee & Ors, 1975(1) CLJ 537 (:1975 CHN 195(N). This was a case under Rule 14(ii) of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules. The Respondent employees were removed from service without an enquiry and the defence for not holding the enquiry was that the same was not possible and practicable. The points for consideration in the case amongst others were, whether the reasons which satisfied the Disciplinary Authority about the impracticability of holding the enquiry, should be set out in the order of removal itself and satisfaction of such authority, whether should be subjective or objective. That apart, the jurisdiction of the Court to interfere and to find out the validity of such order was also in issue and it has been held that if the reasons are recorded elsewhere in the relevant departmental files before the orders are made, there would be sufficient compliance. It has of course been had further that on demand, it would be incumbent on the disciplinary authority to furnish the employee proceeded with, with the reasons. It should be noted that in the case under reference, the reason had been recorded in the department file before the orders were issued. Therafter, Mr. Somnath Chatterjee referred to the determinations in the Case of Union of India v. P. C. Choudhury, 1976 CHN 689 : 80 CWN 946, in furtherance of his submissions that even if the reasons have not been communicated, in the facts as aforesaid and of this case, the order as made, would not be vitiated. The case as referred to by Mr. The case as referred to by Mr. Chatterjee was also one under the provisions of Rules 2 and 14(ii) of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1948. The points for consideration were whether the dismissal of a Railway Servant under Rule 14(ii) as aforesaid, without hearing him before passing tile order was valid, and if the non-communication of the reasons for dispensing with the enquiry vitiates the order M dismissal. It has been observed that non-communication of the reasons for dispensing with the enquiry for the time being, when reasons are in fact recorded in the order, will not vitiate the order for removal from service. In view of the above, the impugned order was contended by Mr. Somnath Chatterjee, to be valid and not bad as alleged. Mr. Chatterjee submitted that reasons are either to be found out in the impugned order or in the records and records can be looked into for finding out the basis for the satisfaction as arrived at. In fact, he produced the report from the records which I have by consent of parties, directed to be kept in the record and have also considered the same in this determination with corresponding opportunities to the petitioner to refute the charges or allegations as contained therein. On a reference to the said report. which admittedly is the basis of the impugned order of super-session, Mr. Chatterjee contended that since the allegations as contained therein are not only voluminous, serious and grave, the said Society should no longer be allowed to be kept in charge and control of the petitioner, if not for any other reason, at least for the protection of the interest of the said Society, its members and on public policy. Mr. Chatterjee repeated that since the allegations were well known to the petitioner or he was aware of them, so the materials in support of the reasons, were not required to be given in the notice. 60. Mr. Chatterjee submitted further that the words "reasons thereof" as in the proviso to S.26(1)(b), would mean that all the supporting materials to be disclosed in future or subsequently. In fact it was contended by Mr. 60. Mr. Chatterjee submitted further that the words "reasons thereof" as in the proviso to S.26(1)(b), would mean that all the supporting materials to be disclosed in future or subsequently. In fact it was contended by Mr. Chatterjee that reasons, in cases where the claims of contesting claimants are required to be considered, may be given for the purpose of assessing their respective suitabilities over the other, but not in a case like this where there is no contest between two or more Societies or reasons for super-session are not the basis of such recording of suitability. He also referred to the determinations in the case of Union of India v. M.L. Capoor & Ors., (supra), in which a Selection Committee preferred the cases of others than the Respondents in the Appeals, in the matter of preparation of the selection list and it has been observed and as submitted by Mr. Chatterjee, on the basis of his arguments as aforementioned, that it is incumbent on such Committee to state reasons in a manner which would disclose how the record of each superseded officer stood in relation to the records of others, who were to be preferred. In this way Mr. Chatterjee wanted to distinguish the said determinations of the Supreme Court so far the facts of the present case are concerned. 61. Me. Chatterjee then referred to each and every allegations in the report as mentioned hereinbefore and which has been directed to be kept in the records and submitted that in view of the grave irregularities and the dismal picture of the administration and affairs of the said Society as depicted therein, there was certainly a situation of emergency which called for the exercise of power" under S. 26 of the said Act and such power having been exercised duly, bona fide and for protection of the said Society from ruination in the hands of the petitioner, no interference should or need be made. He also contended that on grounds of public policy and when the State Government has a very high and heavy financial stake in the matter the application should not also be entertained or and interference made, and the more so when on the basis of the report as duly obtained the necessary opinion was appropriately formed by the Registrar concerned on proper materials. 62. The other cases as cited by Mr. 62. The other cases as cited by Mr. Gupta on the point at issue were contended by both the learned Advocates appearing for the Respondents to be inapplicable in the facts of this case. 63. Both the learned Advocates for the Respondents also contended the application to be not maintainable under Article 226(3) of the Constitution in view of the other remedy available under S. 134 which lays down that: (Lordship quoted the section) and when admittedly the petitioner has not availed of the same. It was also contended by Mr. Arun Prokash Chatterjee that since, by the said S.134. enough safeguard has been provided for, so without approaching the relevant Tribunal, this application would not be maintainable. He argued that even such other remedy the statute would be available even against a tentative decision and as such no interference at this stage should be made in this jurisdiction. These apart, Mr. Arun Prakash Chatterjee further contended that when the petition has been sought to be moved and in fact has been moved by one person and not by the other members of the said Society, so it can very well be imagined that those other members are not aggrieved and they have no grievance and as such also, this proceedings at the instance of the petitioner alone, is not bona fide and should not be entertained. Mr. Somnath Chatterjee in his turn contended that this Court should not use its discretionary jurisdiction in favour of the petitioner and on an application filed by him only as the result of order, if made in favour of the petitioner would be that a group of persons, who on merits are not entitled to be in the control of the affairs of the said Society, would continue, even though they have elected not to approach this Court or to challenge the order as made. He, as mentioned here-in-before, submitted that interference, if any, in this case, would be against public policy. It was contended by him in particular that when public policy or matter of public nature and office, is involved, interference by this Court in this jurisdiction should be made sparingly and with great caution. In support of his submissions, Mr. He, as mentioned here-in-before, submitted that interference, if any, in this case, would be against public policy. It was contended by him in particular that when public policy or matter of public nature and office, is involved, interference by this Court in this jurisdiction should be made sparingly and with great caution. In support of his submissions, Mr. Somnath Chatterjee relied on the case of Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Rashan Kumar, Haji Basir Ahmed & Ors., 1976(l) SCC 671, wherein it has beer observed that (Lordship quoted from paras 11, 49, 12, & 13 of the report) He then relied on the determinations in the case of D.N. Banerjee v. P.R. Mukherjee & ors., AIR 1953 SC 58 and submitted that no interference should further and also be made unless there was any grave miscarrige of justice or flagrant violation of law calling for intervention. On the question of S.134 of the said Act to be a bar, he relied on the determinations in the case of Collector of Central Exercise and Customs. West Bengal & Ors., v. Sumanlal Parekh & Ors. 1974 TLR 2389 and contended that the petitioner must show, prove and establish why such other or alternative remedy has not been availed of. In the case as mentioned above it has been observed that a writ petition is liable to be dismissed if it is not shown why it was not possible for the petitioners to pursue alternative remedies. In fact, on a reference to the pleadings it was contended that there is no statement or allegation as to why such available procedure has not been availed of. Mr. Chatterjee has contended that the petitioner has not disclosed anything or any such circumstances in the case, as cited above. In support of the aforesaid submissions, reliance was also placed on the determinations in the case of Union of India & Ors, v. Bholanath Karmakar, 1977 CHN 972, which lays down that in the petition indications must be there to show why the available alternative remedies could not be pursued to seek appropriate reliefs and in such averments, an application under Article 226 would not be maintainable. It must also be recorded that Mr. It must also be recorded that Mr. Arun Prakash Chatterjee also contended that when the petitioner has admittedly no financial interest, he has also no legal right and at least, when he has not been able to prove and establish any infringement of such of his rights, the present proceedings would not also be maintainable. 64. In reply u the other points as put forward by the learned Advocates for the Respondents on the question of maintainability of the petition, Mr. Gupta contended that S.82 of the said Act which deals with inspection by Registrar of Financing Bank is to the following effect :- (Lordship quoted the section) and when admittedly the findings in the instant case has been arrived at, as appears from the returns to the Rule, on the basis of inspection report, there was thus violation of sub-section (3) of S.82, as admittedly there was no communication to the said Society either the connected report or the summary thereof, within the stipulated time and as such also the action as taken was improper. He submitted that the requirements of S.82(3) are mandatory and there were no compliance with them. He submitted that in view of the above and in view of the admitted illegalities and irregularities in the procedure, there was is improper exercise or at least misuse of power and jurisdiction and as such the other remedy, even if available in the statute, would not debar the petitioner from maintaining this proceedings. It was also contended by Mr. Gupta that the provisions of the Constitution (Forty Second Amendment), Act 1976 would not also be a bar in maintaining the petition became the question of infringement of fundamental right under Article 29 is involved. Mr. Gupta contended further that when the act or action complained of is unsupported by the provisions of the statute and such act of action infringes the fundamental right of a subject, then even in spite of the availability of the other remedy, the application, as in this case, would be maintainable and the more so when even subject has the inherent right to be proceeded with in the manner as prescribed or authorised by law. In fact Mr. In fact Mr. Gupta, on a reference to the determination in the case of State of West Bengal & Ors., v. Sarada and Sons, 81 CWN 312 contended that when the action in the instant case was totally without jurisdiction, the application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would be maintainable. In the case as cited above it has been observed that in view of the fact that the entire action of the Government in retaining the documents beyond the prescribed period was without jurisdiction, an application under Article 226 would be maintainable. 65. Mr. Gupta then contended that in the instant case, when action has not been taken in accordance with statute, there was not only violation of principles of natural justice but such inaction or wrongful act, has given the petitioner the right to approach this Court even without taking recourse to other remedy, if any, in the statute. He submitted with reference to the determinations in the case of Hukum Chand Shyam Lal v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1974 SC 789 that an authority as in this case, would be acting unauthorisedly and improperly, if he fails to exercise duly, the power and authority which has been reposed on him by the statute. While on this branch of his submissions, Mr. Gupta also referred to the determinations in the case of Hindusthan Pilkington Glass Works Ltd., v. Superintendent, Central Exeise. Assansol & Ors, 1977 (2) CLJ 408 . (: 1978 CHN 7 ) In that case, the effect of the availability of other remedy on the question of maintainability of an application under Article 226 was considered and it has been observed that violation of principles of natural justice would mean miscarriage of justice and that cannot be cured by preferring an appeal as provided in the statute. 66. In answer to the arguments that the petitioner would not be in a position to maintain the petitioner as he has no legal right, because he has no pecuniary interest, Mr. Gupta contended that it is not the interest only as mentioned which is relevant and the petitioner would have the locus standie to maintain the petition when his office including the office; of the said Society has been wrongfully superseded. Gupta contended that it is not the interest only as mentioned which is relevant and the petitioner would have the locus standie to maintain the petition when his office including the office; of the said Society has been wrongfully superseded. It was also contended by him that S. 26 can only be invoked in case of emergent action and no such occasion has either arisen or has been established in this case. He submitted that if there is visible injustice viz., injustice apparent from the order itself then the petition would not only be maintainable even on the face of the availability of other remedy, but the same would also be maintainable at the instance of the petitioner, who is the Secretary of the said Society which is being superseded. 67. On the irregularities as pointed out in the report, which incidentally is the basis of the suppression, the relevant answers of the petitioner have been mentioned hereinbefore and referring to the said report and the answers, Mr. Gupta contended that such irregularities as pointed out cannot be and in fact is not the report of the Registrar concerned, in terms of S.26. But the same was only by his delegate and-as such was not authorised and could not be looked into or should be considered. From the pleadings and records as produced, it was further contended by him that the State Government considered that report and the one of or by the Registrar in terms of the requirements of the section and the more so the forwarding report or note by him can not admittedly the basis of taking the action of super-session. It was also and further submitted by him that even if the said report is considered to be a proper basis and relevant in this matter, the same has not established any such emergent situation which warrants the action to be taken under S. 26, the more so when there are good and substantial or possible answers to all the allegations as contained therein and all the more so when any misappropriation or misutilisation of the funds of the said Society or the powers of the office as held by the petitioner has not been legally established. The submission of the report, in view of the pendency of Civil Rule No. 5001(W) of 1947 and the interim order as made therein and as duly communicated, was argued by Mr. Gupta to be improper and that too also according to him, should make the report non-est or at least that should be the consideration. These apart, Mr. Gupta contended that since the audit of the said Society is being done and conducted by auditors appointed by the Government and those auditors are also appointed as internal auditors, there would be no cause of any apprehension of misappropriation of the funds either by the petitioner or by the members of his Committee. 68. Mr. Gupta refuted the submissions of the leaned Advocate for the Respondents that the reasons are not required to be stated in the order itself and the quoting of the section was enough and at least by such quoting of the section the requirements of the same were substantially complied with. He argued that it is no valid ground or any justification that reasons need not be given in the order as argued by Mr. Somnath Chatterjee, where reasons are voluminous, as in this case. He contended that to record the reasons in the order in the instant case was a mandatory requirement and to establish such mandatory character and nature, he sought to draw the analogy from the determinations of the Supreme Court in the case of M/s Ajantha Industries & Ors. v. Central Board of Direct Taxes, New Delhi & Ors., AIR 1976 SC 437 . The said determination was under S. 127(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, which deals with transfer of Case file to another area. It has been observed in that case that the recording to reasons in S. 127(1) are mandatory and non-communication of them is not saved by showing that the reasons exist in the file although not communicated to the assessee or that the reasons were given in the prior show cause notice issued to the assessee against the proposed transfer. It has been observed in that case that the recording to reasons in S. 127(1) are mandatory and non-communication of them is not saved by showing that the reasons exist in the file although not communicated to the assessee or that the reasons were given in the prior show cause notice issued to the assessee against the proposed transfer. It has also been observed that when law requires reasons to be recorded in a particular order, affecting prejudicially the, interests of any person, who can challenge the order in Court, it ceases to be a mere administrative order and the vice of violation of the principles of natural justice on account of omission to communicate the reason is not expiated. It was then contended by Mr. Gupta that the ordinary procedure in this case was to record the reasons in the order and such ordinary procedure has been deviated. He submitted, on the basis of the observations in the case of Collector of Monghyr & Ors. v. Keshav Prasad Goenka & Ors. AIR 1962 SC 1694 , that when such ordinary required procedure of statute has been given a go by or has been deviated, so the authorities concerned should have recorded their reasons why they had so departed from the said ordinary procedure. 69. The cases as cited by Mr. Gupta, in support of his submissions in reply and as referred to hereinbefore have been contended by the learned Advocates for the answering Respondents, to be inapplicable in the facts of this case. 70. Thus, on the pleadings, the first and foremost thing for consideration would be, the scope and effect of S.26 of the said Act, and super-session, if at all whether can be made, as in this case, not only without any opportunity to the said Society but also without disclosing the reason, in the order in question and furthermore, whether the order in the instant case was a proper one, having been based on an appropriate report. Such report is admittedly a prerequisite for the exercise of power under S.26 and the materials of the same must be relevant to and material in terms of sub-clause (a) and (b) thereunder. On such formation of opinion, the Registrar may have the Committee of a Society dissolved, after due and necessary opportunities of being heard and that too, by an order in writing. On such formation of opinion, the Registrar may have the Committee of a Society dissolved, after due and necessary opportunities of being heard and that too, by an order in writing. The Registrar is also empowered, in appropriate cases, to appoint Administrator or Administrators, to manage the affairs of the Society so superseded, for the period as stipulated. But in cases of grave urgency or in Cases of emergent situation, arising out of the conduct of a Society or its affairs and management, under the proviso to S.26(b), the State Government, on the report of the Registrar concerned, may form an opinion that immediate dissolution of the Managing Committee of a society is essential in the interest of either of such society or the co-operative movement in general Such opinion should be formed on the basis of or in view of the conduct of the Society, which may, come either within clause (a) or (b) S.26 only when the necessary opinion is formed, the State Government may, without giving the defalting Committee any notice by notification in official Gazette and by giving reasons therefore, dissolve such managing Commite. The consequences of such dissolution, have been mentioned in the relevant proviso. It is true that there may be some such grave irregularities or cases of extreme emergency, when either the giving of notice or opportunity, may not be possible or feasible, Such opinion, once formed by the State Government, would be conclusive and would not ordinarily be justiciable. It would be justiciable, if such opinion by the State Government has not been duly formed on proper or relevant materials. The report, which is the basis of super-session in the instant case, was admittedly made on a report obtained from the delegate of the Registrar, under S.82 of the said Act and in fact the same was not the report of the Registrar, Thus, the further question would be, whether such a report was the report of the Registrar in terms of the definition in S.2(33) of the said Act. In my view, the delegation, which in the case was the basis of the report by the delegate and as a result whereof the said Society has ultimately been superseded, was not proper and as such there was no due and proper report before the State Government by the Registrar concerned, for the exercise of powers in terms of the proviso to S. 26(b) of the said Act. As mentioned hereinbefore, the Court, in appropriate cases would be entitled and authorised to examine whether the opinion or satisfaction, was formed bona fide and whether there were and are materials relevant or germane to the question at issue, hut is not concerned or interested with the sufficiency of the materials or with the question whether un the materials, the opinion was duly formed. 71. But one thing is certain that the recording of due reasons, is a must, and such reasons must also appear from the order itself and mere quoting of the section in the notice may not always be enough or sufficient compliance. It should be remembered that reasons have been disclosed in this proceedings later and the notice in Annexure 'D' only recites the terms of S.26, as the grounds fur super-session. The very basis of the recording of reasons being opportunities to the alleged defaulting party or that the default should be made known to them, so that steps can be taken either to rectify or to explain the conduct and that being the requirements of principles of natural justice also, I fail to understand why such opportunity should Act be given to the petitioner or why he should be deprived of such opportunities and the more so when, the allegations as disclosed, do not absolutely require the use and exercise of the special emergency power as in the proviso to S.26(b) and furthermore when, there are some explanation to be offered by the petitioner and the said Society. In fact, the items of allegations in the report, have been replied to by the petitioner in the supplementary affidavit and such explanations in my view are required to be considered. In fact, the items of allegations in the report, have been replied to by the petitioner in the supplementary affidavit and such explanations in my view are required to be considered. Reasons would really mean visible manifestation or manifestations in this case in Annexure 'D', so that reading the reasons, tire persons or authorities charged with the allegations may know or get some idea about the charges that are required to be met and it is no explanation that since the reasons are voluminous, they cannot either be incorporated in the order itself or as the dissolution was the reason, so the said Society was not en titled to get any other reason than those mentioned in the notification. If such reasons are not communicated on due recording, then the very purpose of the reasons to be recorded in writing, as in S.26, would be frustrated. In view of the above, the determinations in the case of Hubli Electricity Co. Ltd, v. Province of Bombay (supra), will have no application in this case. These apart, in view of the admitted pendency of Civil Rule No. 5001(W) of 1974 and the interim order as made therein, the filing of the concerned report was not also bona fide and proper. 72. It is true that the Registrar in the instant case had and under the said Act, he has, power to get a preliminary report through his delegate. But even when he secures such report, he himself also should be satisfied and form his opinion, on the basis whereof, the State Government may form its opinion, for exercising the emergency power. In this case such opinion by the State Government appears to be not duly and appropriately formed. Since I have held that the opinion has not been duly and properly formed in this case, the determinations in the cases of Harakh Bhagat & Anr. v. Assistant Registrar, Co-operative Societies & Ors., (supra) and Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes v. ITCo.(P) Ltd., (supra), would have no application in this case. 73. There cannot be any dispute that the provisions under consideration, the recording of reasons was and is a mandatory requirement and although under a different statute, such submissions of Mr. Gupta, get support, from the determinations in the Case of M/s. Ajantha Industries & Ors., v. Central Board of Direct Taxes, New Delhi & Ors., (supra). 73. There cannot be any dispute that the provisions under consideration, the recording of reasons was and is a mandatory requirement and although under a different statute, such submissions of Mr. Gupta, get support, from the determinations in the Case of M/s. Ajantha Industries & Ors., v. Central Board of Direct Taxes, New Delhi & Ors., (supra). But the question would be, if the necessary reasons are recorded and they are not communicated, whether at a later it age if and when the records are produced, the Court can look into them and when the reasons are available from the records and duly recorded, would that be sufficient formalities with the necessary and sufficient compliance with the statute, in this case, the proviso to S. 26(b) Here, admittedly, a report has been produced, contending the same to be the reasons for basis of the ultimate order of super-session. Since for the reasons as recorded hereinbefore, I am of the view that those reasons are no reasons at all of the Registrar, which could be the basis for the formation of the opinion by the State Government, even without determining the point. on the case as referred to hereinbefore, it can be observed that as the opinion was formed not on appropriate reasons duly formed by the Registrar concerned, but the same was formed on the basis of a report of the delegate of the Registrar the entire action was invalid, inoperative, without jurisdiction bad and void, to any event, I hold further that when the basis for the use and exercise of emergency power has not been established in this case, the Respondents had the duty and obligation to communicate the reasons for super-session and that not having admittedly been done, the impugned order in Annexure 'D', must be quashed and should also be held to have been passed in violat1on of principles of natural justice. Since the basis for the use of the emergency power, which was available to them, has not been established, the deviation as has been done in this case by the Respondents, was not proper. Since the basis for the use of the emergency power, which was available to them, has not been established, the deviation as has been done in this case by the Respondents, was not proper. Even if the Respondents, wanted to deviate from the required procedure, they should have done so, in terms of the determinations of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector of Monghyr & Ors., v, Keshav Prosad Goenka & Ors., (supra), by duly recording the reasons for such deviation, But in fact, such reasons have also not been duly recorded in this case or produced. 74. The opinion in the instant case, is the opinion, which under the said Act the Registrar will have to form and on the basis of such formation of necessary opinion by the Registrar, the State Government can, in appropriate cases exercise the emergency power to supersede a Co-operative Society, with opportunity and without disclosing the reasons. Since the opinion in the instant case was not formed by the Registrar concerned, so there was in fact and effect and for all purposes, no due formation of opinion or exercise of power on that basis and as such, there was also no application of mind. For these reasons the determinations in the case of M.A. Rasheed & Ors. v. The State of Kerala (supra), would be of no avail or assistance to the Respondents. I further find that the circumstances as disclosed later in these proceedings, do not also justify the action to supersede the said Society without opportunities or disclosure of reasons. The language of S. 26 would mean that the opinion should be the subjective opinion of the Government and not an opinion subject to objective tests. But even then, when inferences are drawn, they cannot be claimed to be absolutely outside the purview and scope of judicial scrutiny. Such scrutiny, would not of course be possible by this Court, if an emergency exists or the since has been established to be actually existing. But even then, when inferences are drawn, they cannot be claimed to be absolutely outside the purview and scope of judicial scrutiny. Such scrutiny, would not of course be possible by this Court, if an emergency exists or the since has been established to be actually existing. Since in this case, on the pleadings and consideration of documents and records, I am satisfied that answering Respondents have not been able to establish any emergency or the actual existence thereof, the action as taken in the matter of super-session, without opportunities and disclosure of due reasons was improper and such failure on the part of the Respondents concerned, would entitle' this Court to look into the reasons and the bona fides of the opinion as formed and thus the validity thereof. In view of these findings, I hold that the determination in the case of point Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Madras & ors. V. P.S. Rajagopal Naidu, Govindrajolu., (supra) would have no application in this case and is distinguishable on facts. While on this point, I must also hold that in cases of grave emergency or any emergent situation arising or existing, steps in dissolving a Society under the said Act, can be lawfully taken, without disclosing the reasons or affording any opportunity. In appropriate cases, the Court, in my view would not be powerless to examine whether the opinion has been formed duly or honestly or whether there are circumstances relevant for the use and exercise of the emergent power as mentioned above. 75. As mentioned above, it is no answer to the question as posed in this case that since, all the relevant materials are available in the order in question, the basis or the reasons for super-session, are not required to be quoted or mentioned in the order. If this be the true scope and effect of the section, as contended then the very purpose of the same as mentioned above, would be frustrated. The petitioner was not certainly aware of the reasons which were and are the basis of the report, on the basis whereof, the opinion was formed, till the disclosure of the report was made in this Rule, and on receipt of the information of the relevant allegations, he has now given his replies, which according to me, are required to be considered and thus. I am also of the view that there is no substance on the arguments of Mr. Somnath Chatterjee that since the reasons were known to the petitioner, so he had or has no prejudice. This special feature of this case makes the same distinguishable from the determinations in the case of Chief Mechanical Engineer. Eastern Railway & Anr. v. Jyoti Prasad Banerjee & Ors. (supra). Moreover, there is no evidence in this case that the holding of an enquiry, after show cause in this case. was not possible or practicable In the impugned order in this case, the particulars of the reasons of super-session have not been mentioned, but only the terms of the section has been quoted. On the basis of the determinations in the case of Union of India v. A.C. Choudhury (supra), non-communication of the reasons for dispensing with the enquiry for the time being, when reasons are in fact recorded in the order, will not vitiate the order for removal from service. That was a case under Rule 14(ii) of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968. The said Rule 14 lays down special procedure in certain cases and sub-rule (ii) makes it clear that where the disciplinary authority is satisfied, for reasons to be recorded in writing, that it is not reasonably practicable to hold an enquiry in the manner provided in the rules, they may consider the circumstances of the case and make such orders thereon as it deem fit. Here in this case, we have no such categorical evidence from the record as to whether and if at all and why, the holding of the enquiry was not reasonably possible or practicable. The reasons which have been disclosed are to be found only in the order in Annexure 'D' to the petition. The reasons fur the invalidity of the report I have mentioned earlier. 76. These apart, I am also of the view that unless said until it is established beyond any reasonable doubt and on evidence that steps for super-session have been taken under the emergency powers, the supporting materials, evidence and documents relevant for such super-session, must be disclosed along with the order or notice and disclosure of such materials in future, would not be of enough or any compliance with the requirements of S.26(1)(b) or the proviso thereunder. The case of Union of India v. M.L. Capoor & Ors. The case of Union of India v. M.L. Capoor & Ors. (supra), in my view has no application on the facts and circumstances of this case. Thus, there has been in my view, no appropriate compliance with the provisions of S. 26 of the said Act in the facts of the case and no case has been made out or established for the exercise of emergency powers under the proviso to S. 26(b). 77. It is true that ordinarily a proceeding under Article 226 would be barred under the provisions of Article 226(3), if there is any other remedy in the statute itself. So, unless exceptional circumstances as referred to hereinafter or anyone of them is established, this Court would not be justified in making any interference, as admittedly the petitioner has not followed the course of statutory appeal in terms of S. 134. It is also true that the provisions for such appeal would be a safeguard for the aggrieved and in an appropriate case, the tribunal under the Slid Act, which I am informed has been set up and is functioning, would be able to deal with the matter and grant appropriate relief or remedy the defects, if any. It is also admitted fact further that there is no statement in the petition as to why the petitioner has not availed of the necessary alternative and other remedy and it has been observed in the case of Collector of Central Excise and Customs. West Bengal & Ors., v. Sumanlal Parekh & Ors. (supra), that there must be some such statements in the petition to prove and show the reasons for not availing of such remedy. The said rule, in my view, would be applicable in cases where the order as impeached, has been passed duly, with authority and jurisdiction and there is no violation of any principles of natural justice and furthermore the connected order is not perverse on the Lice of the records. Such rule would not be applicable in cases where orders are passed or made without any basis, For the view which I have taken, I hold that the determinations in tile case Union of India & Ors. v. Bholanath Kormakar (supra), would also be of no help and assistance to the Respondents. Such rule would not be applicable in cases where orders are passed or made without any basis, For the view which I have taken, I hold that the determinations in tile case Union of India & Ors. v. Bholanath Kormakar (supra), would also be of no help and assistance to the Respondents. These apart, when the determination of the Supreme Court in the case of D.N Banerjee v. P.R Mukherjee (supra), in effect lay down that interference can be made in case of miscarriage of justice or flagrant violation of law even in cases where the alternative remedy has not been availed of, I am of the view that the arguments as advanced by Mr. Somnath Chatterjee, on the basis of such determination, in the facts of this case would not be available or would be of no substance. I further hold that when the statute requires the compliance of some necessary prerequisites to some action to be taken against all alleged offending party and unless the extreme stale or case of emergency as mentioned or contemplated in the proviso to S. 26(b) of the said act is established and proved beyond any reasonable doubt, that would not entitle the authorities concerned to give a go-bye to such mandatory requirements on the pretended ground of public policy. In view of the above, the determinations in the case of Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Rashan Kumar Haji Basir Ahmed & Ors., (supra), would not be applicable in the case. 78. As the findings in the instant case appear to have been arrived at on the basis of an inspection report by a delegate, there was thus admitted violation of S.82(3) of the said Act, the more so when the said report or the summary thereof was not communicated to the said Society within the time as stipulated. Thus, it can also be observed that there was improper exercise of power, apart from illegal and irregular or misuse of the same, which would mean, the determination as made, to be wholly without jurisdiction and totally unauthorised and as such, the existence of an "other remedy" in the statute, which is ordinarily a bar, would not be so, in the case. If the action as taken is totally without jurisdiction or perverse or in violation of principles of natural justice, then in terms of the determinations in the cases of State of West Bengal & Ors. v. Sarada & Sons (supra), Hukum Chand Shyam Lal v. Union of India & Ors., (supra) and Hindusthan Pilkington Glass Works Ltd. v. Superintendent. Central Excise, Asansol & Ors., (supra) a writ application, even in spite of the existence of other remedy, would be m1intainable. These apart, if there is visible injustice viz., injustice is patent or apparent on the face of the record, then an application for a writ, would also be maintainable, even though other remedy in the concerned statute is provided. 79. It is true that the present Rule has been obtained only by the Chairman of the said Society and not by either the said Society or the other members of the same. In my view, it is not the interest only as submitted by Mr. Gupta, is relevant, and the petitioner would be entitled to maintain the petition, when his office including the office of the said Society is wrongfully superseded and in any event or in any view, he would be entitled to maintain the petition, to protect the interest of' his office at least and furthermore when the constituent Societies and the members have been made parties and they have not contended otherwise. I must also record and hold that where on production of the records, the reasons as recorded can be looked into or not, has lost all its efficacy in this case, because the Respondents have themselves produced their pretended report and has relied on the same with corresponding and necessary production to the petitioner. I am of course of the view that in appropriate cases, the Court is not powerless and for ends of justice, can look into the reasons as recorded in the records, when such record, are produced or relied upon. 80. On the question of non-application of mind by the authorities concerned. Mr. I am of course of the view that in appropriate cases, the Court is not powerless and for ends of justice, can look into the reasons as recorded in the records, when such record, are produced or relied upon. 80. On the question of non-application of mind by the authorities concerned. Mr. Gupta submitted that since the Apex Society and its office is at Calcutta and the relevant authorities, who are Respondents herein have appointed the Administrator, Respondent No.6, a person from Suri, that fact also would justify and establish the charges as mentioned above viz., there was total non-application of mind and that apart, for the reasons as mentioned above, the appointment of the said Respondent No.6, was motivated and not bona fide. The allegations as aforesaid have of course been denied. On being asked as to why and for what consideration the said Respondent No.6, admittedly a teacher from Birbhum, Suri, has been appointed, Mr. Amn Prokash Chatterjee contended that there is no bar and it would not be difficult for the said Respondent No.6 to discharge the functions of the Administrator of the said Society even though he resides at Suri. He further stated that if necessary and if the Court so directs, the personnel of the Administrator as appointed, can be changed. Mr. Somnath Chatterjee also contended that there is no bar in such an appointment as made in this case. He also denied the allegations of mala fide and political motivation in the appointment as alleged. That apart, Mr. Chatterjee stated that it is true that the Respondent No. 6 is a teacher at Birbhum Suri and if necessary, he would relinquish the said post and carryon the duties of the Administrator of the said Society. There really cannot be a bar in law in making the appointment as has been done in this case. But considering the fact that the said Respondent No. 6 admittedly stays at Birbhum, Suri, the question to be considered is whether it would be possible for him to duly discharge the functions of the Administrator of the said Society, which has certainly a large number of activities involving great financial stakes, apart from other responsibilities. The selection of an administrator is the sole function of the Respondents and this Court would not be justified in interfering with such appointment and even on the basis of the arguments as advanced. The selection of an administrator is the sole function of the Respondents and this Court would not be justified in interfering with such appointment and even on the basis of the arguments as advanced. The appointment as made in this case may be a case of indecision, but that has not prima facie established mala fide. 81. In view of my determinations as above, the Rule should succeed and the same is made absolute. There will be no order for costs. 82. This order will not however prejudice the Respondents from superseding the said Society in accordance with law, if they so like and are so advised. Rule made absolute.