Judgement Petitioner No. 1 is defendant 1 and petitioners Nos. 2 to 6 are defendants 6 to 10. Respondent No. 1 is the plaintiff. Respondents 2 to 8 are the other defendants. Respondent 9 is the Advocate who appeared on behalf of the plaintiff in the lower Court. This revision petition is directed against the order dated 6-6-1975 passed by the Assistant District Judge, Dibrugarh and Lakhimpur in Title Suit No. 5 of 1973 restoring the suit which had been dismissed for default on 4-6-1975. 2. The suit was filed for specific performance of an agreement of lease dated 15-10-1969 said to have been executed by defendants 1, 2, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 in favour of the plaintiff and for compensation of Rs. 40,000/-, or in the alternative for Rs. 2,00,000/- as well as for refund of Rs. 6850/- said to have been paid to defendant No. 1. 3. The suit had been posted for hearing on 4-6-75. On that date, the plaintiff was absent and had not taken any steps. The suit was therefore dismissed. Later on the same day an application was filed on behalf of the plaintiff, being petition No. 1487/75, by respondent 9. On that application, the Court ordered that the record will be put up in the presence of both the parties on 5-6-75. The order sheet of 5-6-75 states that the learned Advocates of both the parties were heard and 6-6-75 was the date fixed for orders. On 6-6-75 the order sheet states that the Advocates for both the parties were heard. In the course of its order, the Court observed that immediately after the order of dismissal of the suit had been passed, the revival petition had been submitted; that the Advocate for the plaintiff was away from Dibrugarh and was therefore not present. It also observed that the Advocate before going out should have intimated to the plaintiff and have taken steps and that for the fault of the Advocate, the plaintiff should not suffer. It, therefore, purporting to exercise its power under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, restored the suit on payment of cost of Rs. 60/-. It is against that order that the present revision petition has been presented. 4. It, therefore, purporting to exercise its power under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, restored the suit on payment of cost of Rs. 60/-. It is against that order that the present revision petition has been presented. 4. It is submitted on behalf of the petitioners that there was no proper application in the eye of law before the lower Court and that therefore the lower Court had no jurisdiction to restore the suit; the lower Court could not exercise its inherent powers under Section 151 C.P.C. in view of the specific provisions of law providing a remedy for such contingency, namely, O.9 R.9 C.P.C.; the Assam amendment to O.9 R.9 was intended to make it obligatory on the applicant to serve copies of the application on the opposite parties and since no such copies were served on the petitioners or their Advocates in the lower Court, the lower Court had no jurisdiction to allow the application. In any case, the petitioners got vested with certain rights when the suit was dismissed and they could not be deprived of those rights without their being afforded opportunity of being heard and, therefore, the principles of natural justice have been violated and that the order of the lower Court is therefore without jurisdiction. 5. As against these contentions it is urged on behalf of respondent 1-plaintiff that the application presented in the lower Court was maintainable and though it can be said to be defective, the defect was only curable since at the worst it was only an irregularity. Even if Section 151 C.P.C. is not applicable, the lower Court had jurisdiction to restore the suit under O.9 R.9 of the C.P.C.; since there was no lack of jurisdiction, the order of the lower Court cannot be interfered with under Section 115 C.P.C. In any case, in the circumstances of the case no injustice can be said to have been caused to the petitioners by the order restoring the suit, it is within the discretion of this Court whether to interfere or not, even if it is a case which can be interfered with under Section 115 C.P.C. and that this is not a fit case for interference. 6. The application presented in the lower Court on 4-6-75 was drawn up and signed by respondent 9. 6. The application presented in the lower Court on 4-6-75 was drawn up and signed by respondent 9. Two senior Advocates were originally appearing for the plaintiff in the suit, namely, Shri A.B. Rai and Shri K.P. Singhania. The application states that the plaintiff was suffering badly from fever since last 3 days and therefore could not attend the Court on that day since he had been laid up in bed due to the fever; that Shri K.P. Singhania who was in charge of the case had suddenly left for Rajasthan for some religious purposes and that serious loss would be caused to the plaintiff if the suit is not revived. On the application the Court passed the order that a copy of the application should be served on the learned Advocate for the defendant and the application may be put up in the presence of both the parties. 7. In this court respondent 1, the plaintiff and the plaintiffs Advocate, Shri K.P. Singhania, have filed counter affidavits. A counter affidavit has also been filed by respondent 9, the learned Advocate who prepared the application and appeared for the plaintiff in the lower Court on 4-6-75. According to the affidavit of respondent 9, since he had no time to prepare copies of his application the application itself was shown to the learned counsel for respondents 2 to 4 through the peon of the Court. What is clear from the facts stated in the affidavits is that no copy of the application was served on nor was it shown to the learned counsel who appeared for the present petitioners in the lower Court. Thus on 6-6-75, Shri A.B. Rai, senior Advocate on behalf of the plaintiff as well as the Advocate for respondents 2 to 4, the other contesting defendants, were present in the Court and heard. Since the petitioners or their counsel were not aware of the application presented on 4-6-75, they were not present when the application was heard on 6-6-75. 8. Though the application purports to be both under Section 151, C.P.C. as well as under O.9 R.9, C.P.C., since there is a specific provision which enables the Court to set aside the order of dismissal, the lower Court could not resort to its inherent powers under Section 151, C.P.C. 9. Under R.784 cl. (6) of Chap. 8. Though the application purports to be both under Section 151, C.P.C. as well as under O.9 R.9, C.P.C., since there is a specific provision which enables the Court to set aside the order of dismissal, the lower Court could not resort to its inherent powers under Section 151, C.P.C. 9. Under R.784 cl. (6) of Chap. 38 of Civil Rules and Orders (Volume I) issued by the High Court, a vakalatnama or mukhtarnama, which has been filed in Court may subsequently, with the permission of the presiding Judge, be accepted by an Advocate, pleader or Mukhtar, if his name appeared in the vakalatnama or mukhtarnama at the time when it was first filed; in the case of such subsequent acceptance the endorsement should contain the particulars which are required in the case of the first acceptance under sub-rule (5) of the said Rule. As can be gathered from the affidavit of respondent 9, what happened in the present case was that on 4-6-75 respondent 9 sought the permission of the Court to accept the vakalatnama on behalf of the plaintiff. The permission was granted. Accordingly, respondent 9 also signed in token of acceptance the vakalatnama which contained the names of the two advocates abovesaid but his name was not in the vakalatnama as required under sub-rule (6) of Rule 784. 10. It is the contention of the petitioners that the said vakalatnama was presented in the Court in Jan., 1973; that respondent 9 was enrolled as an Advocate only in February 1975 and that his name could not be mentioned in the vakalatnama and in fact was not so mentioned. Since the requirement of sub-rule (6) was not satisfied, the appearance of respondent 9 could not be recognised by the Court. In any case, respondent 9 could not act on behalf of the plaintiff and therefore the application presented by him on 4-6-75 was not maintainable and no action can be taken on it by the Court. Reliance is placed on the provisions of O.3 R.4. C.P.C. 11. In Chhita v. Mt. Jaffo (AIR 1931 All 767), the name of the pleader through oversight was omitted from the body of the vakalatnama but at a late stage of the case the defect was discovered by the counsel for the defendant. The objection was sustained by the trial Court. C.P.C. 11. In Chhita v. Mt. Jaffo (AIR 1931 All 767), the name of the pleader through oversight was omitted from the body of the vakalatnama but at a late stage of the case the defect was discovered by the counsel for the defendant. The objection was sustained by the trial Court. The trial Court ordered that the case be struck off the file with a direction that the plaint be returned to the vakil for proper presentation. It was held that under O.3 R.4, C.P.C. the pleader was not validly appointed and that the plaint lodged by him was unauthorised and the order of the trial Court was confirmed. 12. In Sakrappa Neelappa v. Shidranappa Gangappa Katti (AIR 1960 Mys 217) it was held that where a pleader is merely authorised by any other pleader holding a vakalatnama from a party, the scope of his authority is merely to plead as stated in the proviso to sub-rule (5) of R.4 of O.3 and that if while so pleading he stated to the Court that he gave up part of the case of his party, it would be in excess of his authority and the party would not be bound by such a concession. It was also held that pleading may also include arguing and interpreting the partys case. 13. As against these decisions, reliance is placed on the following decisions on behalf of respondent 1. 14. In Muhfoozul Huq v. Mazhorul Huq (AIR 1918 Cal 482), an application for execution was filed on the last day of the period of limitation by a pleader on the authority of a vakalatnama executed by the decree-holder and accepted by the pleader, though the latters name did not appear in the body of the vakalatnama. It was held that the absence of the name of the pleader in the vakalatnama was merely a clerical error and that in the absence of any evidence to show that the pleader was not in fact engaged by the decree-holder, it should be presumed that the decree-holder engaged the pleader to make the application and the clerical error might be rectified by the decree-holder being allowed to amend the vakalatnama by insertion of the pleaders name. 14A. 14A. In Mulchand v. Radhabai (AIR 1923 Nag 281), the vakalatnama was signed by the plaintiff and accepted by the pleader but the name of the pleader was not in the body of the vakalatnama. It was held that it was a mere irregularity which does not vitiate the employment of the pleader by the party. The plaint was held to have been properly presented since the omission of the pleaders name was due to oversight. 15. In Nadella Satyanarayana v. Yamanoori Venkata Subbiah (AIR 1957 Andh Pra 172) (FB), the execution petition was signed by the party as well as by the pleader but it was presented by another pleader who had no vakalatnama. The question referred to the Full Bench was whether the presentation of an application by a pleader to whom the authority in the prescribed manner under R.4 of O.3, C.P.C. was not given is a nullity or only an irregularity which could be cured at a subsequent stage. It was held by the Full Bench that acting includes applying and a pleader who makes an application on behalf of the party acts for him and cannot do so unless he is duly authorised in that behalf and, further, the presentation of an application by a pleader to whom the authority in the prescribed manner under R.4 of O.3, C.P.C., was not given is only an irregularity which could be cured at a subsequent stage and that it was not a nullity. It was further held in that case that the provisions of O.3 R.4, C.P.C., are not mandatory but are only directory and that substantial compliance therewith is sufficient. 16. In Govind Singh v. Deoraj ( AIR 1958 Raj 128 ), the vakalatnama did not contain the signature of the decree holder. It was further held in that case that the provisions of O.3 R.4, C.P.C., are not mandatory but are only directory and that substantial compliance therewith is sufficient. 16. In Govind Singh v. Deoraj ( AIR 1958 Raj 128 ), the vakalatnama did not contain the signature of the decree holder. It was held that the presentation of an execution application is an "act" as contemplated by O.3 R.4 and the pleader presenting the same should be appointed for the purpose by a document in writing signed by such person or by his recognised agent or by some other person duly authorised to make such an appointment but that it does not mean that if there is some lacuna or defect left in the vakalatnama on account of a bona fide mistake or error either on the part of the decree-holder or his counsel the defect in presentation would make the execution application a nullity; nor can the defects be called an illegality which must be necessarily fatal to the case. It was held to be an irregularity which may be allowed to be cured by the Court but only in those cases where it finds that the mistake has been committed bona fide and where the party was not guilty of gross negligence. 17. In the Hyderabad Import Export Co. v. United Trading Co. (AIR 1958 Andh Pra 652), the suit had been dismissed for default. Subsequently on the same date an Advocate, purporting to act as the junior of the Advocate who appeared for the plaintiff, presented an application for restoration of the suit. The question was whether he was not competent to file the application for restoration since he had not filed the vakalatnama under O.3 R.4. The Advocate who presented the application subsequently filed his vakalatnama before the application had been rejected on the ground that he was not competent to present it. It was held that the relation between a pleader and his client is that of principal and agent. Hence, the client may ratify the acts of his pleader and that when he ratifies it by means of a written instrument as required by O.3 R.4, the same effect will follow as if the presentation of the application for restoration of suit had been made with proper authority. 18. Hence, the client may ratify the acts of his pleader and that when he ratifies it by means of a written instrument as required by O.3 R.4, the same effect will follow as if the presentation of the application for restoration of suit had been made with proper authority. 18. In Jhumarmull Sethia v. Champalal Bothra ( AIR 1960 Cal 61 ) a petition was filed to set aside an ex parte decree and the accompanying vakalatnama was signed by a person not legally authorised to sign for the defendant. It was held that such a defect merely amounted to a formal defect which can be validated by the signature of the defendant himself at a later stage of the proceeding and when so rectified it can relate back to the date of the presentation of the petition. 19. In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Yatendra Prasad Sharma (AIR 1963 Madh Pra 127), a memorandum of appeal was filed by the pleader without a vakalatnama duly signed by the party authorising him to act and appear on his behalf in the said appeal. It was held that the omission to file a vakalatnama was purely technical in nature and that an opportunity should have been allowed to satisfy the Court that the counsel had been duly authorised to present the memorandum of appeal by the party and to file a vakalatnama duly signed by the party in proof of that fact and that the subsequent filing of the vakalatnama even at a late point of time would cure the defect. 20. In Shastri Yagnapurushdasji v. Muldas Bhundardas Vaishya ( AIR 1966 SC 1119 ), respondent No. 1 had authorised the Government Pleader to file the appeal on his behalf whereas the appeal had actually been filed by the Assistant Government Pleader. The appeal memo as well as the vakalatnama filed along with it were signed by the Assistant Government Pleader but the vakalatnama had been signed by respondent No. 1 in favour of the Government Pleader. It was urged that the acceptance of the vakalatnama by the Assistant Government Pleader was invalid and rendered the presentation of the appeal incompetent. The appeal memo as well as the vakalatnama filed along with it were signed by the Assistant Government Pleader but the vakalatnama had been signed by respondent No. 1 in favour of the Government Pleader. It was urged that the acceptance of the vakalatnama by the Assistant Government Pleader was invalid and rendered the presentation of the appeal incompetent. It was held that though technically the presentation of the appeal suffered from an infirmity, but the said appeal memo was accepted by the office of the Registrar of the High Court since it regarded the presentation of the appeal to be proper; the appeal was in due course admitted and it finally came up for hearing before the High Court and that if the office had returned the appeal as irregularly presented, the irregularity could have been immediately corrected and the Government Pleader would have signed both the memo of appeal and the vakalatnama. It was further held that no party should suffer for the mistake of the Court or its office and that the appellate Court was right in allowing the Government Pleader to sign the memo of appeal and the vakalatnama in order to remove the irregularity committed in the presentation of the appeal and that the appeal preferred by respondent 1 was competent. 21. The affidavits filed in this Court show that the plaintiff had asked respondent 9 on 4-6-75 to present the application for restoration. Moreover, the senior counsel appearing for the plaintiff, Mr. K.P. Singhania, had earlier asked respondent 9 to take steps in the suit. Hence respondent 9 had been authorised by the plaintiff to present the restoration petition; if the name of respondent 9 was included among the Advocates mentioned in the vakalatnama filed on behalf of the plaintiff, then there would have been compliance with sub-rule (6) of Rule 784 of the Civil Rules and Orders and the presentation of the application would not have been irregular in any manner. In fact, the application was entertained by the Court and action was taken on it by the Court. Though there was not strict compliance with the requirements of sub-rule (6) of Rule 784 if the Court had refused to entertain the application respondent 9 would have presented a duly executed vakalatnama in his favour. In fact, the application was entertained by the Court and action was taken on it by the Court. Though there was not strict compliance with the requirements of sub-rule (6) of Rule 784 if the Court had refused to entertain the application respondent 9 would have presented a duly executed vakalatnama in his favour. Hence the observations in Shastri Yagnapurushdasji v. Muldas Bhundardas Vaishya ( AIR 1966 SC 1119 ) apply to the facts of the present case. Moreover, in view of the decisions referred to above, the irregularity in the presentation of the application cannot be said to be fatal to the presentation of the application. It cannot therefore be said that the lower Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the application or that the application was not maintainable. 22. According to the Assam amendment to Rule 9 of Order 9, C.P.C., sub-rule (2) is renumbered as sub-rule (3) and after the words "notice of the application", the words "with a copy thereof (or concise statements as the case may be)" have been inserted, and the following sub-rule (2) has been inserted : "(2) The plaintiff shall, for service on the opposite parties present along with his application under this rule either - (i) as many copies thereof on plain paper as there are opposite parties; or (ii) if the Court by reason of the length of the application or the number of opposite parties or for any other sufficient reason grants permission in this behalf, a like number of concise statements." 23. It is, therefore, clear that a copy of the application presented by respondent 9 on 4-6-75 had to be served on the petitioners or their counsel before the Court proceeded to pass an order on the application. In the present case though the counsel appearing for the other contesting defendants was made aware of the contents of the application, no attempt was made to serve a copy of the application on the petitioners or their counsel appearing in the lower Court. Hence there was non-compliance with the requirements of Rule 9 of Order 9. Hence the order passed by the lower Court can be said to be contrary to the provisions "of Order 9, Rule 9. 24. The next question is whether the order of the lower Court can be interfered with in revision under Section 115 of the C.P.C. 25. Hence there was non-compliance with the requirements of Rule 9 of Order 9. Hence the order passed by the lower Court can be said to be contrary to the provisions "of Order 9, Rule 9. 24. The next question is whether the order of the lower Court can be interfered with in revision under Section 115 of the C.P.C. 25. In Chaube Jagdish Prosad v. Ganga Prasad Chaturvedi ( AIR 1959 SC 492 ), following the decision in Keshardeo Chamaria v. Radha Kisen ( AIR 1953 SC 23 ) it was held that (at pp. 497, 498) : ".... Section 115, C.P.C. applies to matters of jurisdiction alone, the irregular exercise or non-exercise of it or the illegal assumption of it. Thus if a subordinate court had jurisdiction to make the order it made and had not acted in breach of any provision of law or committed any error of procedure which is material and may have affected the ultimate decision, then the High Court has no power to interfere. But if on the other hand it decides a jurisdictional fact erroneously and thereby assumes jurisdiction not vested in it or deprives itself of jurisdiction so vested then the power of interference under Section 115, C.P.C., becomes operative." 26. On the basis of the abovesaid observation it is contended on behalf of the petitioners that where a subordinate court acts in breach of any provision of law or commits any error of procedure which is material and affects the ultimate decision, then the order could be interfered with under S.115, C.P.C. But the earlier part of the abovesaid observation makes it clear that the Section applies only to matters of jurisdiction alone. 27. In Manindra Land and Building Corporation Ltd. v. Bhutnath Banerjee ( AIR 1964 SC 1336 ), an application under Order 22 Rule 9(2), C.P.C., for setting aside abatement of a suit was made beyond the period of limitation. The trial Court held that the plaintiff was prevented by sufficient cause from continuing the suit and allowed the application and set aside the abatement. In revision, the High Court disagreed with the trial Court and held that the plaintiff had failed to make out any good cause for the delay. The trial Court held that the plaintiff was prevented by sufficient cause from continuing the suit and allowed the application and set aside the abatement. In revision, the High Court disagreed with the trial Court and held that the plaintiff had failed to make out any good cause for the delay. It was held that the trial Court had jurisdiction to determine whether there was sufficient cause for the plaintiff for not making the application in time and that the High Court was in error interfering with the finding of fact. It was urged before the Supreme Court, relying on the observations in Keshardeo Chamaria v. Radha Kissen Chamaria ( AIR 1953 SC 23 ) that the High Court was entitled to interfere with the decision of the trial Court since it related to the question of limitation. Rejecting the said contention it was observed as follows (at p. 1339) : "These remarks are not applicable to the facts of the present case. They apply to cases in which the law definitely ousts the jurisdiction of the Court to try a certain dispute, between the parties and not to cases in which there is no such ouster of jurisdiction under the provisions of any law, but where it is left to the Court itself to determine certain matters as a result of which determination the Court has to pass a certain order and may, if necessary, proceed to decide the dispute between the parties. The distinction between the two classes of cases is this. In one, the Court decides a question of law pertaining to jurisdiction. By a wrong decision it clutches at jurisdiction or refuses to exercise jurisdiction. In the other, it decides a question within its jurisdiction. In the present case, the question whether there was a sufficient cause was exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Court and the Court could decide it rightly or wrongly." 28. The scope of Section 115 C.P.C., has been considered by a bench of five learned Judges in Pandurang Dhondi Chougule v. Maruti Hari Jadhav ( AIR 1966 SC 153 ) and it has been observed as follows (at pp. 155, 156) : "The provisions of Section 115 of the Code have been examined by judicial decisions on several occasions. The scope of Section 115 C.P.C., has been considered by a bench of five learned Judges in Pandurang Dhondi Chougule v. Maruti Hari Jadhav ( AIR 1966 SC 153 ) and it has been observed as follows (at pp. 155, 156) : "The provisions of Section 115 of the Code have been examined by judicial decisions on several occasions. While exercising its jurisdiction under S.115, it is not competent to the High Court to correct errors of fact, however gross they may be, or even errors of law, unless the said errors have relation to the jurisdiction of the Court to try the dispute itself. As Cls. (a), (b) and (c) of Section 115 indicate, it is only in cases where the subordinate Court has exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or has acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity that the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court can be properly invoked. It is conceivable that points of law may arise in proceedings instituted before subordinate Courts which are related to questions of jurisdiction. It is well-settled that a plea of limitation or a plea of res judicata is a plea of law which concerns the jurisdiction of the Court which tries the proceedings. A finding on these pleas in favour of the party raising them would oust the jurisdiction of the Court, and so, an erroneous decision on these pleas can be said to be concerned with questions of jurisdiction which fall within the purview of Section 115 of the Code. But an erroneous decision on a question of law reached by the subordinate Court which has no relation to questions of jurisdiction of that Court, cannot be corrected by the High Court under Section 115. The history of recent legislation in India shows that when Legislatures pass Acts dealing with socio-economic matters, or make provisions for the levy of sales- tax, it is realized that the operative provisions of such legislation present difficult problems of construction; and so, sometimes, the Act in question provides for a revisional application to the High Court in respect of such matters or authorises a reference to be made to it. In such cases, the High Court will undoubtedly deal with the problems raised by the construction of the relevant provisions in accordance with the extent of the jurisdiction conferred on it by the material provisions contained in the statute itself. Sometimes, however, no such specific provision is made and the questions raised in regard to the construction of the provisions of such a statute reach the High Court under its general revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code. In this class of cases, the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court has to be exercised in accordance with the limits prescribed by the said Section. It is true that in order to afford guidance to subordinate Courts and to avoid confusion in the administration of the specific law in question, important questions relating to the construction of the operative provisions contained in such an Act must be finally determined by the High Court but in doing so, the High Court must enquire whether a complaint made against the decision of the subordinate Court on the ground that it has misconstrued the relevant provisions of the statute, attracts the provisions of Section 115. Does the alleged misconstruction of the statutory provision have relation to the erroneous assumption of jurisdiction, or the erroneous failure to exercise jurisdiction, or the exercise of jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity by the subordinate Court ? These are the tests laid down by Section 115 of the Code and they have to be borne in mind before the High Court decides to exercise its revisional jurisdiction under it." 29. Thus an erroneous decision on a question of law reached by the subordinate Court which has no relation to the question of jurisdiction of that Court cannot be corrected under Section 115 but an erroneous decision on a plea of limitation or a plea of res judicata has been held to be a plea of law which concerns the jurisdiction of the Court which tries the proceeding and would, therefore, come within the scope of Section 115 of the C.P.C. It is, therefore, clear that unless the error of law relates to jurisdiction of the lower Court there is no scope for interference in revision. Applying the above test to the present case, even if it is to be assumed that there is violation of Order 9 Rule 9, C.P.C., it could not be an erroneous decision which touches the jurisdiction of the lower Court. It is also clear from the above observation that there may be cases of jurisdiction conferred on prescribed authorities under special statutes, like the Rent Control Acts etc. In such a case, the jurisdiction conferred on the specified authority will be limited by the terms of the statute conferring jurisdiction. In such cases the fact that the prescribed authority is a Civil Court would make no difference to the extent of jurisdiction conferred under the special statutes. 30. M.K. Palaniappa Chettiar v. A. Ponnuswami Pillai, (1970) 2 SCC 290 , is a case under the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act No. 18 of 1960. In that case the High Court in exercise of its powers under Section 115 C.P.C. set aside the decisions of the subordinate Courts and granted a decree for eviction holding that the building had been used for a purpose other than that for which it had been let out. It was held that the High Court had no power to set aside the findings of the Courts below under Section 115 C.P.C. The following observations in the said decision are relied on by the petitioners : "..... At the highest the only criticism that could be levelled was that their decision suffered from an error of law but however gross an error of law was committed by those courts, the High Court could not interfere under Section 115, C.P.C., specially when there was no procedural error committed by those courts." 31. Relying on the above said observation it is contended that if there had been an error with regard to the procedure adopted by the lower Courts, the Supreme Court would have approved of the interference by the High Court under Section 115, C.P.C. But the above observation must be read subject to the following observations made immediately thereafter : " ……… The errors committed by the Courts do not relate to any question of fact which would determine their jurisdiction to deal with the proceedings before them. The error was purely in giving the decision in a case in which they had jurisdiction to decide the dispute that was raised before them. The error was purely in giving the decision in a case in which they had jurisdiction to decide the dispute that was raised before them. In these circumstances, it is clear that the High Court was wrong in interfering with and setting aside the concurrent findings of the three lower courts, acting under Section 115 of the C.P.C." 32. In M/s. D.L.P. Housing and Construction Co. (P) Ltd. v. Sarup Singh ( AIR 1971 SC 2324 ), the lower Court had stayed the proceedings under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act pending decision of suit for specific performance. The High Court reversed the said order in its revisional jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the High Court was in error in interfering with the order of the trial Court. After holding that cls. (a) and (b) of Section 115 C.P.C. are not applicable, the following observations were made, which are relied on by the petitioners, while referring to clause (c) of Section 115 (at pp. 2327, 2328) : " ... Clause (c) also does not seem to apply to the case in hand. The words "illegally" and "with material irregularity" as used in this clause do not cover either errors of fact or of law; they do not refer to the decision arrived at but merely to the manner in which it is reached. The errors contemplated by this clause may, in our view, relate either to breach of some provision of law or to material defects of procedure affecting the ultimate decision, and not to errors either of fact or of law, after the prescribed formalities have been complied with." 33. It is, therefore, contended that if in that case, there was breach of some provision of law or material defect of procedure affecting the ultimate decision, the Supreme Court would have affirmed the order of the High Court. It is thus contended that since there is an error of law committed by the lower Court in the present case, namely, that the procedure prescribed under Order 9 Rule 9 C.P.C. has not been complied with, the order is liable to interference in revision. It is thus contended that since there is an error of law committed by the lower Court in the present case, namely, that the procedure prescribed under Order 9 Rule 9 C.P.C. has not been complied with, the order is liable to interference in revision. But the above observations are subject to the earlier observations made immediately before the said observations after considerations of the decisions of the Privy Council and the decision in Keshar Deo v. Radha Kissan ( AIR 1953 SC 23 ), which are as follows : "The position thus seems to be firmly established that while exercising the jurisdiction under Section 115, it is not competent to the High Court to correct errors of fact however gross or even errors of law unless the said errors have relation to the jurisdiction of the Court to try the dispute itself." 34. Hence, the scope of Section 115 C.P.C. cannot be said to have been enlarged by the later portion of the observations relied on by the petitioners. 35. In the Managing Director (MIG) Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. v. Ajit Prasad Tarway, (1972) 3 SCC 195 : ( AIR 1973 SC 76 ), an interim order had been passed by the trial Court in the suit staying the operation of an order of suspension of the plaintiff by his employer. That order was later revoked after hearing both the parties. The plaintiff went up in appeal. The appellate Court modified the order of the trial Court. Both the plaintiff and defendant went up in revision. The High Court accepted the revision petition by the plaintiff but rejected that by the defendant. It stayed the operation of the suspension order as well as the proceedings in the enquiry. It was held that the High Court had no jurisdiction to interfere with the order of the first appellate Court irrespective of the fact whether the first appellate Court was right on wrong, its order may be in accordance with law or may not be in accordance with law, since it had jurisdiction to make that order. It is also observed that the first appellate Court had not exercised its jurisdiction either illegally or with material irregularity. It is also observed that the first appellate Court had not exercised its jurisdiction either illegally or with material irregularity. Relying on the last observation it is contended by the petitioners that in the present case the lower Court had exercised its jurisdiction illegally and with material irregularity and therefore the order is liable to be interfered with in revision. But the above observations do not lend themselves to such an interpretation. 36. Strong reliance is placed on certain observations in Shri A.L. Sethi v. Shri N.P. Kapur ( AIR 1972 SC 2379 ). In that case, the High Court in revision had set aside certain orders passed by the trial Court directing discovery of documents and dismissing an application for permission to sue in forma pauperis. The order of the High Court was set aside holding that there was not even an error of law committed by the trial Court in passing the order for discovery . The dismissal of the petition for permission to sue in forma pauperis also held not to involve any jurisdictional error. But while so deciding, certain observations were made by the learned Judges which would appear to throw some doubt on the rationale behind the decision in Pandurang Dhondi Chougule v. Maruti Hari Jadhav ( AIR 1966 SC 153 ) but the learned Judges have not adopted a view contrary to the interpretation as to the scope of Section 115 therein, Moreover, as a rule this Court should follow the view expressed by the larger bench of five learned Judges in Pandurang Dhondi Chougule v. Maruti Hari Jadhav ( AIR 1966 SC 153 ). 37. Reliance is placed on Ajantha Transports (P) Ltd. v. M/s. T.V.K. Transports ( AIR 1975 SC 123 ). That was a case under Section 47 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. Section 115 C.P.C. has been made applicable to such cases. While considering the scope of Section 115 C.P.C. it was observed as follows (at p. 132) : "Relevancy or otherwise of one or more grounds of grant or refusal of a permit could be a jurisdictional matter. A grant or its refusal on totally irrelevant grounds would be ultra vires or a case of excess of power. While considering the scope of Section 115 C.P.C. it was observed as follows (at p. 132) : "Relevancy or otherwise of one or more grounds of grant or refusal of a permit could be a jurisdictional matter. A grant or its refusal on totally irrelevant grounds would be ultra vires or a case of excess of power. If a ground which is irrelevant is taken into account with others which are relevant, or, a relevant ground, which exists, is unjustifiably ignored, it could be said to be a case of exercise of power under Section 47 of the Act, which is quasi-judicial, in a manner which suffers from a material irregularity. Both will be covered by Section 115, C.P.C." 38. That was a case of a specific authority being conferred with limited jurisdiction under a special statute referred to in the later part of the observations of the Supreme Court in Pandurang Dhondi Chougule v. Maruti Hari Jadhav ( AIR 1966 SC 153 ) referred to above. In such cases an erroneous decision as to the existence or otherwise of certain facts which are jurisdictional in nature would be liable to interference under Section 115 C.P.C. Since in such a case the specified authority would deprive itself of jurisdiction by its erroneous decision or would clutch a jurisdiction which it did not possess by an erroneous decision. Such a test cannot be applied to a case like the present one where the lower Court had jurisdiction to decide whether to allow the application or not under, O.9, R.9, C.P. Code. 39. The next decision relied on is one in Hukum Chand Shyam Lal v. Union of India ( AIR 1976 SC 789 ) but it does not deal with the scope of S.115 of the Civil P.C. 40. In Ratnakar Ray v. Kulomoni Roy (AIR 1951 Orissa 266) the order passed under O.9, R.9, without service of notice of the application on all the defendants was set aside in revision on the ground that the order contravened O.9 R.9, C.P.C. 41. In Satya Narayan Maity v. Suniramalendu Maity ( AIR 1973 Cal 201 ) the trial Court directed the defendant to unlock and make over the documents and materials kept under lock and key as mentioned in the application. In Satya Narayan Maity v. Suniramalendu Maity ( AIR 1973 Cal 201 ) the trial Court directed the defendant to unlock and make over the documents and materials kept under lock and key as mentioned in the application. That order was set aside in revision on the ground that it was passed without affording opportunity to the opposite party to file objections to the statements contained in the application. Both the above decisions appear to assume that the order passed in such cases can be interfered with under S.115 of the Civil P. Code Moreover, since they are contrary to the decisions of the Supreme Court explaining the scope of S.115 of the Civil P.C., they cannot be considered to be good law. 42. Thus it is seen that none of the later decisions of the Supreme Court can be said to take a different view from that expressed in Pandurang Dhondi Chougule v. Maruti Hari Jadhav ( AIR 1966 SC 153 ) as to the scope of revision under S.115 of the C.P.C. 43. It is next urged on behalf of the petitioners that the failure to afford opportunity to the petitioners of being heard on the application made by the plaintiff before setting aside the order of dismissal of the suit amounts to violation of principles of natural justice and that, therefore, the order of the lower Court is without jurisdiction or beyond its jurisdiction. The right conferred on the petitioners is one which arises out of the order of dismissal of the suit. That order is one which is passed under the provisions of the C.P. Code. Hence the right conferred on the petitioners by the order of dismissal is subject to the said order being varied or set aside under the provisions of the Civil P.C. itself. There is no right conferred on the petitioners apart from the order of dismissal of the suit. Hence the petitioners can be deprived of the said right by another order of the same Court. There is no right conferred on the petitioners apart from the order of dismissal of the suit. Hence the petitioners can be deprived of the said right by another order of the same Court. Therefore, the only right that the petitioners have is one under the provisions of the Civil P.C. If the order of dismissal is erroneously set aside by the lower Court under O.9, R.9, the remedy of the petitioners is only by way of revision under S.115 of the C.P.C. Advisedly there is no provision for appeal against an order setting aside an ex parte order of dismissal of a suit though an appeal would lie against an order refusing to set aside such dismissal. Hence the question of violation of principles of natural justice does not arise in the present case. 44. The order of the lower Court is therefore not liable to be interfered with in revision. This revision petition is accordingly dismissed with costs. 45. Since the suit is a very old one, the lower Court is directed to dispose of the same expeditiously. Records to be despatched to the lower Court expeditiously. Revision dismissed.