Judgment :- 1. We are unable to endorse the reasoning or the conclusion of the learned judge and we think that this appeal should be allowed. The writ petitioner-respondent was a Block Development Officer, Kasaragod, whose terms of deputation to that office were governed by Ext.R-1 G 0. (MS) 621/ 62/ DD, dated 26th July 1962, filed along with the counter-affidavit of the 1st respondent in the writ petition, viz., the State, the appellant in the writ appeal. Clause.8 of the said G.O reads as follows: "8. Persons selected for the post of Block Development Officers in pursuance of the principles laid down above will be considered as on deputation to the Development Department for a period of five years, the Development Commissioner having the right to revert any of them to his parent Department if his work proves unsatisfactory, and to extend the period of deputation beyond five years in exceptional cases." In pursuance of the above clause, the writ petitioner's deputation was terminated Ext P-4 is a copy of the message which contained the order terminating the deputation of the writ petitioner Ext. P-4 reads as follows: No 16344/EI/74/DD. Dated 3rd April 1974. Sri. C. Thiruviam Pillai, Block Development Officer, Kasaragod is reverted to his parent Department viz. Agriculture Department as per G.O.Rt. 634/74/DD., of even date. Relieve Sri Pillai forthwith with instructions to report himself before the Director of Agriculture, Trivandrum for posting orders. Eodt. H617442/74 of District Collector, Cannanore, dated 4th April, 1914 Individual, through the R.D.O. Kasaragod (Sd) Collector." This order terminating the deputation of the writ-petitioner as Block Development Officer and sending him back to his parent Department (Agriculture Department) was attacked as punitive in character and therefore illegal and unsustainable. The learned judge allowed the writ petition holding that the impugned order sounded in the region of punishment and was punitive in character. In Para.2 of his judgment the learned judge rightly formulated the question as to whether the writ petitioner's revision was by way of punishment or a termination simpliciter of his deputation on account of unsatisfactory performance of his work in accordance with the principles of Ext. R-1. The learned judge referred to the decision of Mathew, J. of this court (as he then was) in a batch of writ petitions, O.P. Nos 160 etc. R-1. The learned judge referred to the decision of Mathew, J. of this court (as he then was) in a batch of writ petitions, O.P. Nos 160 etc. of 1966, where a termination of deputation in accordance with the principles of the very same Ext. R-1 G.O was dealt with and considered by the learned Judge. The learned judge had there stated that if the orders are simple and straight-forward orders of discharge there should be no question of the violation of Art.3 :1; and that if, on the other hand, they are orders dismissing the petitioners from the posts of Block Development Officers on the ground that they are unfit for work, there was a punitive element in the orders and the same could not be passed without affording the aggrieved persons an opportunity to show cause. The batch of writ petitions dealt with by the learned judge was actually dismissed. Referring to the Clause.8 in Ext. RI. the learned judge observed that the clause only embodied the undoubted right of a master to terminate the services of a servant in the event of his work proving unsatisfactory, that there was nothing penal about it, and that a termination under the clause was only one in pursuance of an express term of employment. The learned judge recogni sed that it is open to show that the termination was really not in pursuance of the power, but was with an idea to punish. The Judgment in O.P. No 1601 of 1966, etc. was carried up in appeal in W.A. Nos. 86, 87, 91, 103,104 and 210 of 1966 and was dismissed as having become infructuous. 2. Besides noticing the above unreported judgment of Mathew, J., the learned judge in the decision under appeal, noticed several decisions dealing with the termination of the services of a probationer for unsatisfactory conduct. These decisions are well known; and we really think it unnecessary to cover them in detail. It would be enough to note that the learned judge noticed decisions in Union Territory of Tripura, Agarthala v. Gopal Chander Dutta Choudhury 1963 Supp.1 SCR 266 State of Bihar v. Gopi Kishore AIR. 1960 SC 689, Jagdish Mitter v. Union of India AIR. 1964 SC. 449, State of unjab v. Sukh Raj Bahadur AIR. 1968 SC. 1089, R.S. Sial v. State of U. P. AIR. 1974 SC. 1960 SC 689, Jagdish Mitter v. Union of India AIR. 1964 SC. 449, State of unjab v. Sukh Raj Bahadur AIR. 1968 SC. 1089, R.S. Sial v. State of U. P. AIR. 1974 SC. 1317, State of Bihar v S. B. Mishra AIR. 1971 SC. 1011. Madan Mohan v. State of Bihar AIR. 1973 SC. 1133 and State of U P v. Sughar Singh AIR. 1974 SC. 423. We spare ourselves the trouble of examining these decisions in detail as most, if not all of them, were surveyed in detail by the recent decision of the Supreme Court in State of U. P. v. Ramchandra AIR. 1976 SC. 2547. This decision and the other relevant decisions were again fully surveyed and examined by a Full Bench of this court of which one of us (myself) was a member, recently, in W. A. No 450 of 1976. To briefly restate the principles laid down by the decisions surveyed, and reiterated by the Full Bench, in the recent judgment of ours: it is well-recognised and well-settled that an order of termination seemingly innocuous may well be shown to be punitive in character and the burden of showing it, is upon the party challenging the order as punitive or penal in character. Five propositions were laid down in State of Punjab v. Sukh Raj Bahadur AIR. 1968 SC. 1089. Propositions 3 and 4 laid down by that Court were as follows: "(3) If the order visits the public servant with any evil consequences or casts an aspersion against his character or integrity, it must be considered to be one by way of punishment, no matter whether he was a mere probationer or a temporary servant. (4) An order of termination of service in unexceptionable form preceded by an enquiry launched by the superior authorities only to ascertain whether the public servant should be retained in service, does not attract the operation of Art.311 of the Constitution." The learned judge in Para.6 of the judgment under appeal held that it was not established that the Development Commissioner had honestly appraised the petitioner's work as required by Clause.8 in Ext R-1 and assessed the suitability to continue as Block Development Officer He was therefore of the view that propositions 1 and 4 of AIR. 1968 SC. 1089 would not apply, and that proposition No. 5 had obviously no application. 1968 SC. 1089 would not apply, and that proposition No. 5 had obviously no application. The case, according to the learned judge, fell within the 3rd proposition mentioned above, and the impugned order was by way of punishment. 3. We cannot agree with the learned Judge. The order of termination in so far as shown by the records, is, on the face of it, innocuous The burden of proving that it was otherwise is on the petitioner It is well established that a preliminary survey and assessment of the record of work and performance of the writ petitioner is permissible and possible even for taking action under Clause.8 of Ext. R-1, very much in the same way as for terminating the probation of a probationer. Such preliminary survey and assessment, do not, it has been well-recognised, sound in the region of punishment and cannot render the action punitive in character. To put the test as propounded by the Supreme Court, in the recent decision in AIR. 1976 SC. 2547, and followed by us in the Full Bench decision referred to, the question for consideration is whether the sinister cause alleged was really the foundation of the proposed termination or was only the motive for the termination Viewed in the light of the said principle again, we are of the opinion that there was no material in the instant case to show that the unsuitability of conduct of the writ-petitioner respondent, and the complaints regarding the nature of his work and conduct, which might have rendered him open to disciplinary proceedings, were really the foundation of the action and not merely the motive for it We think it was only the latter. A preliminary assessment of work and conduct, is. as we observed, quite necessary and permissible, even for action under Clause.8 of Ext. R-1. We are therefore of the view that she learned judge's reasoning and conclusion that the order was punitive in nature cannot be sustained. 4. The argument that Rules of natural justice require that before the writ petitioner was discharged in accordance with the clause in Ext. R-1, notice and opportunity should have been afforded, had been found against by Mathew, J., in the judgment in O. P Nos. 1601 etc. of 1966, and was but faintly repeated before us. In Para.6 of the said judgment the learned judge stated: "6. R-1, notice and opportunity should have been afforded, had been found against by Mathew, J., in the judgment in O. P Nos. 1601 etc. of 1966, and was but faintly repeated before us. In Para.6 of the said judgment the learned judge stated: "6. It was then submitted by him that the rules of natural justice required that before the petitioners were discharged from the posts of Block Development Officers they should have been told the reasons for the same. I was not referred to any authority in support of this proposition. Here is a case of an employment on the basis of the G. O. referred to above. The terms of the employment are to be sought within the four corners of the G. O. and in terminating the employment in pursuance to the provision in that behalf in the G.O., the master or anybody authorised to exercise his authority need not have given reasons for terminating the services." 5. For reasons indicated, we allow this appeal, and set aside the order of the learned judge and direct that O. P. No. 1797 of 1974 will stand dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.