Judgement BHATTACHARJEE, J.:- This is an application for the grant of a certificate under Art.133(1) of the Constitution of India for appeal to the Supreme Court from a judgment of this Court in C.A. No. 14 of 1976, dated 7th December, 1977.* *Reported in AIR 1980 Sikkim 13. 2. Under Art.133(1) of the Constitution, as amended by the Constitution (Thirtieth Amendment) Act, 1972, a certificate granted by the High Court, in order to amount to a valid passport for the entry of an appeal to the Supreme Court, must certify that the case not only involved a question of law but that the said question is a substantial one and is also of general importance and that in the opinion of the High Court, the said question needs to be decided by the Supreme Court. It has been observed by the Supreme Court in the State Bank of India v. N. Sundara Money (AIR 1976 SC 1111) that (at p. 1112):- "A substantial question of law of general importance is a sine qua non to certify fitness for hearing by the apex Court. Nay, more; the question, however, important and substantial, must be of such pervasive import and deep significance that in the High Court's judgment it imperatively needs to be settled at the national level by the highest bench." 3. In that case the Supreme Court has further observed that "the grant of a constitutional passport to the Supreme Court by the High Court is not a matter of easy insouciance but anxious advertence to the dual vital requirements built into Art.133(1) by specific amendment "and that failure thereof" stultifies the scheme of the Article and floods" the Supreme Court "with cases of lesser magnitude with illegitimate entry." Judged by these standards let me, therefore, consider whether we can grant a certificate as prayed for in this case. 4. 4. The suit giving rise to this Civil First Appeal No. 14 of 1975 was filed by the plaintiff-respondent against his tenant the defendant-appellant for eviction of the tenant on the ground of defaults made by the defendant in payment of rent and also on the ground that the occupation of the premises was reasonably and bona fide required as the two sons of the plaintiff "wanted to start their own independent business" and that some additional structure was to be made in the building which could not be made unless the defendant vacated. 5. The learned District Judge, who tried the suit, held that the defendant defaulted in payment of rent, but as the period of default was for three months only, a decree for ejectment could not be passed on the ground of such default under the provisions of the Gangtok Rent Control and Eviction Act, 1956, which require rent in arrears to "amount to four months rent or more" to justify ejectment. We have accepted and agreed with this finding of the learned District Judge in Appeal. 6. The learned District Judge further held that requirement for making additional structures has been expressly excluded from the grounds of ejectment under the provisions of the Gangtok Rent Control and Eviction Act, 1956, whereunder the required constructional works must amount to "thorough overhauling" in order to justify ejectment and accordingly the learned District Judge held the plaintiff not to be entitled to the decree of ejectment on the ground of requirement for making additional structures. We have, in this appeal, agreed with and accepted this finding of the learned District Judge. 7. The learned District Judge, however, held that the plaintiff required the "premises in dispute for bona fide necessity of his dependents", being his two sons. We have held that since the provisions of Section 4 of the Gangtok Rent Control and Eviction Act, 1956, enable a landlord to eject his tenant only when the premises are required for the bona fide occupation of "the landlord or his dependents" requirement for the occupation of any person other than the landlord, to furnish a ground for ejectment, must be requirement of a person who is dependent on the landlord. We have held that if the relevant law used only the expression "landlord" and made the requirement of "landlord" only a ground of ejectment, then the expression "landlord might have been required to be construed as not applying only to the "landlord" himself but to include other members of his family or dependents or other normal emanations. As the relevant enactment being the Gangtok Rent Control and Eviction Act, 1956, uses both the expressions "landlord" and also "his dependents" and expressly provides, as an exception of the avowed legislative declaration as to the non-ejectability of the tenants as declared in the opening words of Section 4, that a landlord may evict a tenant when the whole or part of the premises are required for the bona fide occupation of the landlord or his dependents only, we have held that it was not possible to allow the expression "landlord" to expand and emanate indefinitely and to include within its ambit members of his family, whether dependent upon him or not. 8. But even assuming we are wrong, can it be said that the question whether the expression "landlord" in Section 4 of the Gangtok Rent Control and Eviction Act, 1956, also includes sons of the landlord, "needs to be decided by the Supreme Court" in this case? On the evidence recorded in this case, we have held that there is nothing on the record to prove that the suit premises were bona fide required for any business which the two sons were alleged to have intended to start and that being so, the question whether the sons are to be regarded to be included within the expression "landlord" or within the expression "his dependents" is not at all pertinent or material and does not need to be settled at the national level by the highest Bench in this case. 9. In the appeal before us and also in the trial Court, the parties proceeded on the basis that the law relating to eviction of tenants of premises is contained in the Gangtok Rent Control and Eviction Act, 1956. In Jokhiram v. Mangturam Agarwalla ((1977) 1 Sikkim LJ 30) it was urged before us that the Gangtok Rent Control and Eviction Act, 1956 does not and cannot apply to any premises. In Jokhiram v. Mangturam Agarwalla ((1977) 1 Sikkim LJ 30) it was urged before us that the Gangtok Rent Control and Eviction Act, 1956 does not and cannot apply to any premises. Relying on the provisions of Section 1(iii) of the said Act, which provides that the said Act extends to "all buildings and constructions situated within the area of Gangtok Bazar which may be fixed from time to time by the Sikkim Darbar", it was urged before us in that case that the said Act does not and cannot apply to any premises as the area of "Gangtok Bazar" has never been fixed by the Sikkim Darbar or by the State Government at any time. In that case, it was, however, held that whether or not the said Act applied, the suit for ejectment was to fail for want of notice of the termination of tenancy in accordance with the agreement between the parties and it was not, therefore, necessary for us to decide the question as to the applicability of the said Act and we left that question open. We, however, pointed out in the said Jokhiram's case that even if the Act of 1956 was not applicable to any premises in the absence of any fixation of the area of Gangtok Bazar by the Sikkim Durbar or the State Government under Section 1(iii) of the said Act, the earlier law contained in the Notification No.6326-600/H and WB dated 14th April, 1949 would continue to apply and that the said law also contains provisions relating to ejectment of tenant which are similar to those contained in the Act of 1956. The same question came up before this Court in Smt. Shakuntala Bai v. K.N. Dewan ((1977)1 Sikkim LJ 33), a case decided by my Lord the Chief Justice sitting singly and it appears that in that case also the point was not expressly decided and it was only observed, relying on Jokhiram's case, that even if the Act of 1956 was not applicable, the similar provisions contained in the aforesaid Notification of 1949 would continue to anply. As already noted, both in the trial Court and also before us in the appeal, the parties proceeded on the basis that he Act of 1956 applied and we have also proceeded on that basis. As already noted, both in the trial Court and also before us in the appeal, the parties proceeded on the basis that he Act of 1956 applied and we have also proceeded on that basis. But we have also considered the provisions of the law of 1949 and have held that, on the evidence on record, the plaintiff has failed to make out any case of reasonable requirement under the provisions of the said law also. We have no doubt observed that we should as early as possible decide once for all the question as to which of the two provisions of laws is really applicable. But as in this case we have held that on the evidence on record the plaintiff has not been able to make out a case of reasonable requirement under any of the two sets of laws, the said question can no longer be said to be a question which "needs to be decided by the Supreme Court" in this case. The expression "involves" and also the expression "needs to be decided by the Supreme Court" in Article 133(1) of the Constitution clearly imply that unless the decision of the case depends on the consideration of the question of law and the question of law is likely to affect the merits of the case, such a question, even if substantial, cannot be regarded to be one which "needs to be decided by the Supreme Court" within the meaning of Article 133(1) of the Constitution. 10. I am, therefore, of opinion that under the provisions of the laws governing the matter at hand, it is not possible for us to grant the certificate prayed for. The application, therefore, fails and stands rejected, but without costs. MAN MOHAN SINGH GUJRAL, C. J.:- I agree.