M. K. SHAH, P. D. DESAI, J. ( 1 ) THE accident giving rise to the appeal occurred on April 2 1975 at about 10 P. M. near Race Course Circle (Opposite Gujarat Electricity Board Office) on the road from Fatehganj camp to Haribhakti Colony in the city of Baroda. The appellant Nirmaladevi was at the material time on the pillion of a scooter which was driven by her husband Dilipkumar Along with the couple was their minor daughter Sonali aged about 6. The party was proceeding from Fatehganj camp to Haribhakti Colony that is to say from north to south. At that time bus No. GTE 4912 owned by the second respondent Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation and driven by the first respondent Gulamnabi approached from the Railway Station side that is to say from the eastern direction. The bus was proceeding towards the S. T. Depot which is in the nothern direction. At the traffic circle therefore it had to take a turn towards the right side. It appears that instead of going round the traffic circle the bus took a short turn on the right side and collided with the scooter coming from the opposite direction causing injuries to the appellant her husband and their minor daughter. The appellant sustained fracture of fibula and tibia of the right leg besides other injuries. She also sustained a fracture in the left leg as found on later investigation. She was taken to the S. S. G. Hospital at Baroda. At about 10-30 P. M. she was admitted in the hospital and discharged on April 5 1975 The appellants father Dr. S. S. Shah who was once upon a time serving as Civil Surgeon in the Madhya Pradesh Medical Service came down from Indore on the day next after the day of the accident. At the material time he was serving as Superintendent of Govindlal Seksaria Nursing Home at Indore after his superannuation. He took the appellant and her husband and child to Indore on April 6 1975 by a taxi. The appellant was treated there at her fathers house. Her left leg was in plaster upto August 1975 and the right leg was in plaster upto January 1976. He took the appellant and her husband and child to Indore on April 6 1975 by a taxi. The appellant was treated there at her fathers house. Her left leg was in plaster upto August 1975 and the right leg was in plaster upto January 1976. She returned to Baroda on February 22 1976 ( 2 ) IN the meantime on September 25 1975 she instituted the claim application out of which this appeal arises in the Tribunal. In the claim application she made a claim for compensation in the sum of Rs. 25 0the claim was split up as under:- rs. 5000/- : Medical treatment rs. 6000/- : Pecuniary loss rs. 14000/- : Pain and suffering and loss of amenities and enjoyment of life. - rs. 25000/- - ( 3 ) THE Tribunal found that the injuries complained of were sustained by the appellant during the course of the accident which occurred under the circumstances mentioned above. The Tribunal further found that the first respondent was driving the bus at the material time in the course of his employment and that the accident occurred on account of his rash and negligent Act. The Tribunal also found that on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the second respondent was vicariously liable to pay damages for the tortious act of its employee. The Tribunal then proceeded to assess the damages and awarded compensation under different sub heads as follows:rs. 1500/- : Medical treatment. Rs. 500/- : Conveyance charges from Baroda to Indore. Rs. 2500/- : Pain and suffering and loss of amenities and enjoyment of life. Rs. 4500/- it is this award which is under challenge in the present appeal. The claim in the appeal is restricted to Rs 9000/ -. ( 4 ) AGAINST the aforesaid background let us now proceed to consider the question of compensation. We shall first deal with the award in so far as it relates to the sub head of medical treatment. We have already referred to Ex. 22 which is the memo issued by Dr. Shah and which shows that an expenditure of Rs. 2600. 00 was incurred at Indore. In addi- tion there are on record certain other documents in the shape of bills and receipts. Those documents are at Exs. 23 to 26 29 30 and 33 to 54. We have already referred to Ex. 22 which is the memo issued by Dr. Shah and which shows that an expenditure of Rs. 2600. 00 was incurred at Indore. In addi- tion there are on record certain other documents in the shape of bills and receipts. Those documents are at Exs. 23 to 26 29 30 and 33 to 54. These documents relate to expenditure incurred both at Baroda and Indore. The total expenditure incurred as per these documents comes to Rs. 800. 00. Besides the evidence of Dr. Shah there is the evidence of Dilipkumar Ex. 67 husband of the appellant on this aspect of the case. According to the said witness he had spent about Rs. 3000. 00 for the appellant s treatment at Indore. The Tribunal was of the view that the evidence of Dr. Shah suffered from subjectivity and that it was not fully acceptable. The Tribunal appears to have doubted the version of Dr. Shah that the doctors who attended upon the appellant at Indore had charged their fees although they were attached to the Nursing Home with which he was connected more so because no bills or receipts were produced evidencing such payment. The Tribunal in terms held that Ex. 22 was a certificate prepared by Dr. Shah more with the object of claiming the amount in this case than giving a true account of the expenditure incurred by him. The Tribunal therefore appears to have discarded that document from. consideration. On the basis however of the other documentary evidence the Tribunal came to the conclusion that an amount of Rs. 1000. 00 approximately must have been spent on the medical treatment of the appellant as evidenced by those documents. Besides a sum of Rs. 500. 00 was considered as having been expended on medical treatment in respect of which no bills were forthcoming. The Tribunal accordingly awarded compensation in the sum of Rs. 1500. 00 under this sub head. ( 5 ) BE it noted that the tenor of the discussion in para 22 of the award indicates that the Tribunal was influenced to some extent by a twofold consideration in awarding compensation in the aforesaid sum; first that Dr. The Tribunal accordingly awarded compensation in the sum of Rs. 1500. 00 under this sub head. ( 5 ) BE it noted that the tenor of the discussion in para 22 of the award indicates that the Tribunal was influenced to some extent by a twofold consideration in awarding compensation in the aforesaid sum; first that Dr. Shah could not really have incurred all the expenditure that he claimed on payment of fees to doctors because he was himself a doctor and the doctors who attended upon the appellant could not have charged him for the services rendered more so because those doctors were attached to the Nursing Home of which Dr. Shah was the Superintendent and. secondly that Dr. Shah did not appear to have been reimbursed for the expenses incurred by him on the treatment of the appellant and therefore there was no loss sustained by the appellant. In our opinion the Tribunal erred in law in being influenced by these considerations. ( 6 ) IT cannot be disputed it is indeed not in dispute that having regard to the nature of injuries and prolonged period of treatment the appellant must have been medically treated not only by Dr. Shah but also by other doctors. Besides expenditure must also have been incurred on some at least if not all of the items set out in Ex. 22. Even assuming that the services of medical practitioners were made available to the appellant free of charge because she was treated by her own father who was a doctor and also because the other doctors who attended upon her were his colleagues and they would not under such circumstances ordinarily charge any fees for rendering services to the appellant there is no reason to deny to the appellant compensation in respect of services gratuitously rendered to her in that manner. In our recent decision in Bharat Premji v. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation First Appeal No. 620 of 1974 decided on April 7th 1978 (XIX G. L. R. 585) we have at length considered the question of compensation in respect of gratuitous services provided by a third party (including a close relative) which were reasonable required by the claimant because of his physical needs attributable to the accident. We have there held that the question whether there is any contractual obligation or legal liability to pay for the services was irrelevant so far as the tortfeasor and his liability are concerned. Damages are awardable in such a case on the principle that the claimants loss is the existence of the need for those services. The value of such loss for purposes of damages or to put it differently for the purpose of the ascertainment of the amount of his loss is the fair and reasonable cost of supplying those needs. These observations were made in the context of gratuitous nursing services provided to the claimant following upon an accident. The same principle would however apply even in case of gratuitous medical services rendered to a claimant. In other words even if a claimant has received free medical service at his own residence or at the residence or private nursing home or clinic of a medical practitioner who is his friend or relative or from a private medical practitioner who is not thus connected with him but who has chosen to render free services for some other personal or social consideration the claimant must still be compensated by estimating the fair and reasonable cost of supplying those services. The tortfeasor cannot benefit under such circumstances by escaping his liability to compensate the claimant on the ground that the medical services were rendered to him entirely free. The question from what source the claimants needs have been met the question who has given the services the question whether the claimant was under a legal or moral liability to pay or reimburse the provider of services are all irrelevant so far as the tortfeasor is concerned. The claimant when he recovers such damages will hold them in trust for the person who rendered the services to him. In our opinion therefore the Tribunals approach to the question of compensation under this sub head is vitiated by an extraneous consideration and the same his consequently affected its award. ( 7 ) WE might make it clear that we are confining these observations to free medical services rendered to a claimant in circumstances such as those mentioned above. In our opinion therefore the Tribunals approach to the question of compensation under this sub head is vitiated by an extraneous consideration and the same his consequently affected its award. ( 7 ) WE might make it clear that we are confining these observations to free medical services rendered to a claimant in circumstances such as those mentioned above. We do not wish to express any opinion on the question as to whether when free medical service is rendered to a claimant at a general public hospital he would still be entitled to be compensated even though he was not required to pay for the treatment. Such a case is not before us and what we have said above should not be held to apply necessarily in such circumstances. We are making this reservation because the question of compensation in such a case is not free from doubt and even in England there appears prima facie to be some inconsistency in judicial approach on the question (see Daish v. Wauton, 1972 2 QB 262 ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 8 ) THEN comes the award in the sum of Rs. 2500. 00 for pain and suffering and temporary loss of enjoyment and amenities of life. The relevant facts pertaining to that aspect of the case have been set out earlier This is a case in which there was a fracture in both the legs. There wa an initial period of hospitalization for four days followed by confinement a home for a pretty long period. One of the legs was in plaster for a period of approximately four months and the other leg was in plaster for period of approximately nine months. It is obvious that with both the legs in plaster she could not have had any movement at least for period of four months. Even thereafter the movements must have been considerably restricted. The evidence of Dr. Shah shows that though there is no permanent disablement the pain and restriction in movements would continue for a period of about 12 years after the unison of the bones. Even on the date of the deposition of Dr. Shah the position was that the appellant got tired if she stood for a long time. She was unable to run or walk fast. Even on the date of the deposition of Dr. Shah the position was that the appellant got tired if she stood for a long time. She was unable to run or walk fast. To the same effect is the evidence of the appellant. She he deposed that she got pain if she walked long distance or stood for a long time. The accident occurred in April 1975 and this was the position even in July 1976. In other words for a period of approximately 1 year and months the restriction in movement and pain has persisted. There was likelihood of the persistence of these after effects even for some further period of time. Two vital limbs of the body are involved. The Tribunal has awarded Rs 2500/- on the footing that it was the outer limit of the bracket of Rs. 1500. 00 to Rs. 2500. 00 within which compensation is awarded in such case where there is fracture not resulting in permanent disability As observed by us in Babu Mansa v. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation First Appeal No. 1030 of 1973 decided on April 5 1978 (XIX G. L. R. 492) damages awarded for pain and suffering and loss of amenities constitute a conventional sum which is taken to be the sum which society deems fair fairness being interpreted by the courts in the light of previous decisions. The set of conventional principles evolved for providing a provision guide to the comparative severity of different injuries and indicating a bracket of damages in which a particular injury will currently fall would provide the necessary guideline but the circumstances of the claimant including his age and any unusual deprivation he may suffer is reflected in the actual amount of the award. Besides the fall in the value of money leads to a continuing reassessment of these awards and to periodic reassessments of damages at certain key points in the pattern where the disability is readily identifiable and not subject to large variations in individual cases. The Tribunal has not cited any decision in support of its observation that Rs. 1500. 00 to Rs. 2500. 00 is the bracket of damages in which damages for fracture without permanent disability would fall. No such decision has been shown to us on behalf of the respondents. The Tribunal has not cited any decision in support of its observation that Rs. 1500. 00 to Rs. 2500. 00 is the bracket of damages in which damages for fracture without permanent disability would fall. No such decision has been shown to us on behalf of the respondents. Even assuming however that that might be the bracket of damages so far as fracture without permanent disability is concerned it cannot be overlooked that in the present case we are concerned with a young lady aged about 29 who had such a fracture in both the legs and who was consequently required to be confined to bed and to undergo prolonged treatment. She had in fact to remain away from her marital home so that she could be well attended to by her father who was a medical practitioner. In our opinion therefore this is not a case in which the conventional amount if any of Rs. 2500. 00 could be adhered to. With the passage of time and the falling value of money apart from any other circumstances such bracket will have to be revised. Under all these circumstances in our opinion the fair amount of compensation under this head must be in the sum of Rs. 5000. 00 and not Rs. 2500. 00 as awarded by the Tribunal. ( 9 ) IN the result the appeal succeeds partly and is allowed accordingly. The additional award made herein is as follows:rs. 1000/- : Medical treatment etc. Rs. 2500/- : Pain and suffering and loss of amenities and enjoyment of life. Rs. 800/- : Pecuniary loss. Rs. 4300/- the appellant will accordingly be entitled to additional compensation in the sum of Rs. 4300. 00 with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of the claim petition and proportionate costs throughout. The respondents shall deposit the said amount in the Tribunal within two months. There will be no order as to the costs of the respondents. .