Short Note : 1. (i) That the plaintiff-applicants Nos. 1, 2 and 3 and Mathuraprasad predecessor-in-title of applicants No. 4 to 8 had filed a suit for declaration of title in respect of agricultural land 12 bighas 6 biswas in area situate in village Persa. This was registered as Suit No. 2-A of 1966 in the Court of Civil Judge Class II, Ambah. (ii) The service of the summons in the said suit is alleged to have been personally effected on the defendants on 19.1.1966 vide summons Ex.D1 which purports to bear thumb mark of the defendant. (iii) The suit proceeded ex-parte and an ex-parte decree was passed on 11.2.1966. (iv) The original defendant Tersingh (also called Tojsingh) submitted application under Order 9, Rule 13 CPC for setting aside the aforesaid ex-parte decree on 26.4.1966 on the ground that there was fraudulent suppression of service of the summons. The summons were not served on him. He got knowledge of the decree when he obtained copy of the Khasra Ex.D-2 on 19.4.1966. Therefore, the application is within time and the ex-parte decree deserves to be set aside. During the pendency of the application Tersingh died and non-applicant Nos. 1 and 2 his daughters were brought on record as his legal representatives. (v) The plaintiff-applicants opposed the application and alleged that there was due service of the summons on the defendant. Therefore, the application is beyond time. (vi) The trial Court allowed the application and set aside ex-parte decree by the impugned order. This has led to filing of the present revision by the plaintiff-applicants. 2. Shri N.K. Jain, counsel for the applicants contended that there was due service of the summons on the defendant. Therefore, the application under Order 9, Rule 13 is time barred Even otherwise the application is time barred because on the basis of the impugned decree the plaintiffs had started mutation proceedings in the Court of Tahsil and notice of those mutation proceedings was served on the original defendant on 20.3.1966. The application for setting aside ex-parte decree has been filed thirty days beyond this date. Therefore, the impugned order deserves to be set aside. The other reasoning employed by the learned trial Judge is also illegal Shri D.K. Katare, appearing on behalf of non- applicants supported the impugned order and contended that there is no ground for interference by way of revision. 3. Therefore, the impugned order deserves to be set aside. The other reasoning employed by the learned trial Judge is also illegal Shri D.K. Katare, appearing on behalf of non- applicants supported the impugned order and contended that there is no ground for interference by way of revision. 3. In the instant case, it has to be seen that:- (1) Whether the summons of the suit were personally served on Tersingh, the original defendant on 19.1.1966 or not? (2) If not so served, when the applicant had knowledge of the decree-whether on 19.4.1966 as alleged by the original defendant or whether on 20.3.1966 when the notice of the mutation proceedings was served on Tersingh? 4. So far as the question of personal service on Tersingh of the summons of the suit vide Ex.D-1 is concerned, the trial Court has recorded a finding of fact properly arrived at. In view of the reasoning employed by the learned trial Judge, there appears to he no illegality or perversity in the finding that the service of the summons of the suit was not effected on Tersingh. It is true that the affidavit filed by Tersingh in support of his application under Order 9, Rule 13 cannot be treated as secondary evidence. The original affidavit is on record. It beats one's imagination how the trial Court happened to treat it as secondary evidence. But that does not affect the correctness of the impugned order. Therefore, the finding given by the trial Court on the point that the service of summons of the suit on Tersingh has not been proved, deserves to be upheld. 5. This brings me to the next question viz. what was the date of the knowledge of the ex-parte decree having been passed in the matter. Tersingh as alleged the date to be 19.4.1966 when copy of Khasra Ex.P-2 was supplied to him by the Patwari. In this Khasra, there is reference to the decree in question having been passed against Tersingh. It was for the plaintiff-applicants to have proved earlier knowledge of the decree to Tersingh. Copy of the notice issued to Tersingh in mutation proceedings is Ex.D-2. There is no reference in Ex.D-2 to the decree in question. It is also not shown that along with the notice Ex.D-2 copy of the application submitted by the plaintiffs for mutation in their favour was also served on Tersingh. Copy of the notice issued to Tersingh in mutation proceedings is Ex.D-2. There is no reference in Ex.D-2 to the decree in question. It is also not shown that along with the notice Ex.D-2 copy of the application submitted by the plaintiffs for mutation in their favour was also served on Tersingh. Therefore, looking to the contents of Ex.D-2 it cannot be held that Tersingh had knowledge of the ex-parte decree on 20.3.1966. Thus the plaintiff-applicants have failed to bring home earlier knowledge of the decree to Tersingh. In these proceedings although the initial burden of proving that the application is within time from the date of knowledge of the decree, yet after proof of knowledge on 19.4.1966, the onus of proof shifted to the plaintiffs. Shifting of onus of proof is a continuous process in the evolution of evidence as held in A. Raghavamma and Another vs. A. Chanchamma and Another, AIR 1964 SC 136 . Plaintiffs have failed to bring home knowledge earlier to this date. Revision dismissed.