JUDGMENT - R.A. JAHAGIRDAR, J.:---This petition arises out of the proceedings under section 38-G of the Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands, Act 1950, hereinafter referred to as "the Hyderabad Tenancy Act". One Shamji claimed to be a tenant of the land bearing Survey No. 50 in village Pachegaon of Jintoor Taluka in Parbhani District. Respondent No. 2 to this petition was admittedly the landlord of the suit land. In the proceedings originally held under section 37, read with section 38-E of the Hyderabad Tenancy Act it was declared that Shamji was the protected tenant and he became owner by virtue of the provisions contained in section 38-E of the Hyderabad Tenancy Act. This order was challenged in higher courts, by respondent No. 2 and ultimately on 28th November, 1961 the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal set aside the declaration that Shamji was the protected tenant of the land and also the consequential order under section 38-E of the Hyderabad Tenancy Act. The Tribunal further directed that the name of Shamji should be deleted from the record of rights as a tenant. 2. Thereafter the petitioner seems to have entered the land as a tenant and from the year 1964-65 at least his name appears in the register of tenants. By sale deed dated 23rd September, 1967 the respondent No. 2 sold the land to the petitioner but in the meantime proceedings under section 38-G of the Tenancy Act were taken up and Shamji was again declared as owner of the land with effect from 26th January, 1965. Final order in these proceedings were passed on 23rd July, 1960. The petitioner being threatened with dispossession by Shamji on the basis of this order, preferred an appeal on 22nd November, 1968 and that appeal was dismissed by the Deputy Collector by his judgment and order dated 7th June, 1969. While so dismissing the appeal, the learned Deputy Collector held that the appeal preferred by the petitioner was barred by time. Even on merits he was not convinced of the case of the petitioner. Against this order of the Deputy Collector the petitioner went in revision. During the pendency of the revision application a compromise petition signed by the petitioner impressed with the thumb mark of Shamji and signed by the Advocates appearing for Shamji and the petitioners appears in the register of tenants. Against this order of the Deputy Collector the petitioner went in revision. During the pendency of the revision application a compromise petition signed by the petitioner impressed with the thumb mark of Shamji and signed by the Advocates appearing for Shamji and the petitioners appears in the register of tenants. By a sale deed dated 23rd September 1967, respondent No. 2 sold the land to the petitioner but in the meantime proceeding under section 38-G of the Tenancy Act were taken up and Shamji was again declared as owner of the land with effect from 26th January, 1965. Final order in these proceedings were passed on 23rd July, 1966. The petitioner being threatened with dispossession by Shamji on the basis of this order, preferred an appeal on 22nd November, 1968 and that appeal was dismissed by the Deputy Collector by his judgment and order dated 7th June, 1969. While so dismissing the appeal, the learned Deputy Collector held that the appeal preferred by the petitioner was barred by time. Even on merits he was not convinced of the case of the petitioner. Against this order of the Deputy Collector the petitioner went in revision. During the pendency of the revision application, a compromise petition signed by the petitioner impressed with the thumb mark of Shamji and signed by the Advocates appearing for Shamji and the petitioner was presented to the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal on which however no final order was passed. After signing the compromise petition on 3rd December, 1969, Shamji died on 18th February, 1972 and his legal representatives were brought on record. Unfortunately the office of the Tribunal did not inform the parties to remain present for the purpose of verifying the consent petition. As a result no action was taken on the same. 3. The learned Member of the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal thereafter heard the revision application on merits and dismissed the same by holding that they Deputy Collectors order dismissing the petitioners appeal as barred by time was not shown to be wrong. On merits however the learned Member of the Tribunal thought that the remarks made by the Deputy Collector below him on the petitioner and his transactions were not warranted especially so in the light of the decision given by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal in 1961 to which I have made a reference above. On merits however the learned Member of the Tribunal thought that the remarks made by the Deputy Collector below him on the petitioner and his transactions were not warranted especially so in the light of the decision given by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal in 1961 to which I have made a reference above. Maharashtra Revenue Tribunals order dismissing the petitioners revision application was passed on 12th June, 1973 and this petition is directed against the said order. 4. Mr. Agrawal, the learned Advocate appearing in support of the petition, contended that the order of the Tahsildar under section 38-E of the Tenancy Act has been passed without notice to the petitioner and it is only after the petitioner came to acquire the knowledge of the same that he preferred an appeal. Since he was even according to the record of rights, in possession of the land in one or the other capacity he was entitled to be heard in the proceedings under section 38-E. Since there was no notice to him, there was admittedly no hearing given to him and, therefore, in the interest of justice it would be appropriate that the proceedings be held afresh and the petitioner be granted an opportunity of representing his case. 5. Normally, it would be impermissible for this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution to interfere with an order passed by the lower authorities on the ground that the petition was barred by time. The Deputy Collectors order however does not show what is views would have been if the petitioner had put forth before him the date of the knowledge of the order acquired by the petitioner. It is true that unfortunately the Advocate for the petitioner before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal was not in a position to explain to the Tribunal as to when exactly the petitioner acquired the knowledge of the date of the order of the Tahsildar. In these circumstances one cannot say whether the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal was wrong in upholding the order of dismissal of the appeal passed by the Deputy Collector below it. 6. In these circumstances one cannot say whether the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal was wrong in upholding the order of dismissal of the appeal passed by the Deputy Collector below it. 6. Dispute these circumstances it is evidence to me that if an opportunity has not been given to the petitioner in the proceedings under section 38-G it would be necessary that the case should be remitted to the Tahsildar for fresh inquiry and decision after hearing the representations that may be made by the petitioner. It must be noted that the order passed by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal on 28th November, 1961 had become final and in the face of the order prima facie the claim of Shamji to continue to be the tenant of the land could not have been acceptable. Indeed the compromise petition filed before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal is an indication of this fact. This Court has, on more than one occasion, taken the view that the procedure followed in proceedings under section 38-E giving notices to the party concerned by issuance of the public notice does not serve the ends of justice and does not satisfy the rules of natural justice. If during the course of such inquiry pursuant to the public notice a party has not appeared being unaware of the proceedings, it would be appropriate that the party should be given an opportunity of being heard. In the instant case in view of the decision of the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal in the earlier proceedings and in view of the compromise petition which was presented to the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, it could not be said that the petitioners case is prima facie false or untenable. From the facts and circumstances of this case I am satisfied that the petitioner should be given an opportunity of being heard in the matter. 7. In the result, I set aside the orders of all the three authorities below and direct that the Tahsildar shall hold fresh inquiry under section 28-G of the Hyderabad Tenancy Act after giving notice to all the parties concerned and thereafter pass appropriate orders. The petition is allowed. No order as to costs. -----