Judgment.- This appeal is directed against the order passed by the learned Judicial Second Class Magistrate, Vinukonda in Crl.M.P. No. 86 of 1977 in C.C. No. 62 of 1977 on the file of this Court. The appellant filed a complaint under sections 343 and 347, Indian Penal Code, against the respondents who are police officers. At the commencement of the trial, the respondents filed the Crl. M.P. No. 86 of 1977 objecting to the trial of the case on the ground that the Court should not have taken cognizance of the offences except with the previous sanction of the concerned authority as required under section 6(1)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. After due consideration of the objection raised by the respondents, the Magistrate allowed the petition and declined to proceed with the case any further. 2. In allowing the petition, the learned Magistrate observed as follows: “The facts of the complaint petition as a whole, as well as the concluding allegation against the accused will certainly reveal the fact that the accused allegedly confined two persons in police lockup and demanded illegal gratification of about five sovereigns of gold for their release when the complainant and his list of witnesses approached the police. Therefore, ends will justify the means. In such circumstances, it is evident hat the accused made a demand of illegal gratification as revealed from the facts of the complaint petition. It is also not the case of the complaint that the accused detained he said two persons wrongfully to recover the stolen property but only 10 extort some illegal gratification. So much, so, the main offence, according to the facts of the complaint petition, will only attract section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act as urged by the learned defence counsel and therefore section 6(c) of the said Act is attracted.” 3. Sri E.V. Bhagiratha Rao, the learned Counsel for the appellant contends that the allegations in the complaint petition disclose not only an offence punishable under section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act but also offence punishable under sections 343 and 347 of the Indian Penal Code and that it is perfectly open to the complainant to prosecute the respondents for the offences punishable under sections 343 and 347, Indian Penal Code without any previous sanction. It is argued that the question of previous sanction arises only if the complainant seeks to prosecute the accused for the offence under section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. In support of his submission the relies on Baijnath v. State of M.P.1 Durgacharan v. State of Orissa2and Govinda Mehta v. State of Bihar3. 4. The law is well-settled that when the facts alleged in a complaint petition disclose primarily an offence to prosecute for which a sanction is necessary, it would not be open to the prosecutor to evade: the requirement of sanction by any camoeflage or device so as to prosecute the offender under some other section of law not requiring a sanction. It is also well-settled that when a person commits several offences in the course of the same transaction and if the more serious offence requires a previous sanction or a special complaint, it would not be open to the prosecution to ignore the serious charges and prosecute the offender for the less serious charges which do not require a special complaint or previous sanction. 5. In Baijnath’s case1, their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that no sanction under section 197(1), Criminal Procedure Code, was necessary for the prosecution of the accused for the offence under section 409, Indian Penal Code, even though the accused committed an offence punishable under section 477-A read with section 109, Indian Penal Code, and section 409, Indian Penal Code, in so far as the action of the accused under section 409, Indian Penal Code, could not be deemed to have been committed by the accused-public servant while acting In the discharge of his official duty. Section 477-A read with 109, Indian Penal Code, in respect of which sanction was necessary under section 197, Criminal Procedure Code, is a minor offence when compared with the offence punishable under section 409, Indian Penal Code. In Durgacharan’s case4, the Supreme Court pointed out that the prosecution of the accused under section 353, Indian Penal Code, is not invalid though his prosecution under section 186. Indian Penal Code, is invalid for want of the necessary sanction in so far as the offence under section 186, Indian Penal Code, is far less graverthan the offence under section 353, Indian Penal Code. The same principle was applied even in the case of Govind Mehta5. 6. In S. Dutt v. State of U.P.6. Indian Penal Code, is invalid for want of the necessary sanction in so far as the offence under section 186, Indian Penal Code, is far less graverthan the offence under section 353, Indian Penal Code. The same principle was applied even in the case of Govind Mehta5. 6. In S. Dutt v. State of U.P.6. their Lordships of the Supreme Court have clearly pointed out as follows: “In this connection we may again recall the words of this Court which were put in the forefront by Mr. Chari that it is not permissible for the prosecution to drop a serious charge and select one which does not require the procedure under section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. If the offence was under section 196, Indian Penal Code, a complaint in writing by the Court concerned was required. Before a complaint is made the Court has to consider whether it is expedient in the interests of justice to order a prosecution. In the lesser offence no such complaint by the Court is necessary and it is obvious that the lesser offence was chosen to by-pass the Sessions Judge who had earlier decided that Dr. Dutt should not be prosecuted for perjury. Such a device is not to be commended.” 7. In the instant case the offence under section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act is a more serious offence than the offences under sections 343 and 347, Indian Penal Code. The allegations in the complaint essentially and substantially disclose an offence punishable under section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The prosecution should ordinarily be for the graver offence punishable under section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and not merely for the minor offences under sections 343 and 347, Indian Penal Code. In re Govindaswami1a question arose whether when a person commits offences punishable under section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and also under section 409 of the Penal Code it was open to the prosecution to prosecute the offender for the offence under section 409, Indian Penal Code, ignoring the offence under section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The question was answered in the affirmative on the ground that the offence under section 409, Indian Penal Code is graver than the offence under section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The question was answered in the affirmative on the ground that the offence under section 409, Indian Penal Code is graver than the offence under section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. It was observed as follows in that case: “Apart from this as pointed out in Dholiah v. Sub-Inspector of Police, Wellington Station2, when a complaint sets forth certain facts disclosing a minor offence and also a graver offence the prosecution should ordinarily be for the graver offence. In this case the offence under section 409, Indian Penal Code, is punishable with transportation for life whereas an offence under section 5(1) (c) of Act II of 1947 is punishable only with seven years rigorous imprisonment or with fine or with both. There is no doubt that the offence under section 409, Indian Penal Code, is graver than the offence under section 5(1)(c) of Act II of 1947. The prosecution must therefore, be for the graver offence under section 409, Indian Penal Code, even though the facts disclosed fall within section 5(1)(c) of Act II of 1947.” The offence under section 343, Indian Penal Code, is punishable with imprisonment for two years of fine or both. The offence under section 347, Indian Penal Code, is punishable with imprisonment for three years and fine. The offence under section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act is punishable with seven years imprisonment and fine. The prosecution should therefore be launched for the graver offence punishable under section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. If the complainant-appellant applied to the competent authority for the necessary sanction to prosecute the accused for the offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act. the authority would have considered whether it is necessary in the interests of justice to sanction the prosecution. The requirement of sanction under section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act is a safeguard for tire public servants against frivolous or inexpedient prosecutions. Where allegations are made against a public servant and the allegations essentially and primarily constitute an offence for which a sanction is necessary it cannot lie in the whim or caprice of the prosecutor to change the garb or to put a different label and then prosecute without the sanction. Further. Where allegations are made against a public servant and the allegations essentially and primarily constitute an offence for which a sanction is necessary it cannot lie in the whim or caprice of the prosecutor to change the garb or to put a different label and then prosecute without the sanction. Further. when the allegations constitute several offences and the gravest offence requires a sanction, then also it would not be open to the prosecutor to dispense with the requirement of a sanction by prosecuting the public servant for the minor offences for which no sanction is necessary. 8. For the reasons recorded I am of the view that the impugned order of the learned Magistrate allowing the objection of the respondents-accused to the prosecution against them is eminently justified and does not call for any interference. The appeal is therefore dismissed.