JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THE petitioners, all employees of the Madhya Pradesh State road Transport Corporation (here-in-after called the Corporation), were posted in different capacities in the Depots of the Corporation at Seoni, Sagar and chhindwara on 6-10-1967, when, it is alleged by the Corporation, there was a total strike in those Depots. The Corporation filed an application in the labour Court for a declaration under section 61 of the Madhya Pradesh industrial Relations Act, 1960 (here-ic-after called the Act) that this strike held on 6-10-1967 without even submitting any charter of demands and giving a notice of change as required under section 31 (2) of the Act was illegal by virtue of the provisions of clause (b) of section 80 of the Act. This contention of the Corporation was upheld by the Labour Court which allowed that application. That conclusion has been affirmed by the State Industrial Court which has dismissed the employees revision filed under section 66 of the Act. This has led to the filing of this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution by the petitioners for quashing the order of the Labour Court dated 29-11-1969 (Annexure-C) and that of the Industrial Court, dated 8-2-1971 (Annexure-E ). ( 2. ) ADMITTEDLY no charter of demands was submitted by any representative of the employees to the employer and a notice of change as envisaged by section 31 (2) of the Act was not given before the alleged strike held on 6-10-67. It is also not in dispute that one "m. P. Motor Karmachari Maha Sangh" which is not even a recognised trade union and admittedly not a representative of the employees according to the Act had earlier given a notice making certain demands pertaining to bonus and dearness allowance. It is common ground that this notice of the "m. P. Motor Karmachari Maha Sangh" raising these demands was not a notice by a representative of the employees as contemplated by section 31 (2) of the Act. However, it has been found as a fact by the Labour Court that the alleged strike held on 6-10-1967 was connected with and was to support the forthcoming demand of bonus and dearness allowance in respect of which no notice of change had till then been given by a representative of the employees under section 31 (2) of the Act. However, it has been found as a fact by the Labour Court that the alleged strike held on 6-10-1967 was connected with and was to support the forthcoming demand of bonus and dearness allowance in respect of which no notice of change had till then been given by a representative of the employees under section 31 (2) of the Act. There is no interference with this finding of the Labour Court by the Industrial Court. The question is whether on these facts there is any ground to interfere with the impugned orders which have declared the strike held on 6-10-1967 to be illegal by virtue of section 80 (b) of the Act. ( 3. ) THE main argument of Shri Gulab Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioners, is that there was no strike within the meaning of the word "strike" as defined in section 2 (32) of the Act. as a result of which it could not be treated as an illegal strike by virtue of clause (b) of section 80 of the Act. He argued that a strike could be treated as illegal by virtue of section 80, only if it first fully satisfied the definition of "strike" as contained in section 2 (32) of the Act. He does not dispute that the earlier part of the definition of "strike contained in section 2 (32) was fully satisfied inasmuch as there was a total cessation of work by the employees acting in combination but he contends that the last part of the definition was not satisfied inasmuch as it has not been shown that such cessation of work by the employee was in anticipation of an industrial dispute, it being common ground that the cessation of work was not in consequence of an industrial dispute. Shri Gupta has built up this argument to contend that clause (b) of section 80 applies only to cases where a charter of demands has been submitted by a representative of the employees to the employer but the strike has been resorted to without giving notice in accordance with the provisions of section 31 (2) after submission of the charter of demands. According to Shri Gupta, clause (b) of section 80 applies only to cases where the cessation of work by the employees has been after submission of a charter of demands by their representative and before the requisite notice of change has been given as required by section 31 (2) of the Act. Shri Gupta has referred to the definition of industrial dispute in section 2 (17) for construction of the meaning of that expression used in the definition of "strike" contained in section 2 (32 ). He has also relied on sub-section (2) of section 31 requiring the notice of change to be given in such a case. ( 4. ) BEFORE considering the argument of Shri Gupta, it would be appropriate to notice certain provisions of the Act which have been referred to by him during his argument. The material part of section 80 reads as under :- "s. 80. Illegal strikes and lock-outs.-A lock-out or strike shall be illegal if it is commenced or continued-X X X (b) without giving notice in accordance with the provisions of section 31; x X X" The only requirement of this provision is that for a strike to be treated as illegal, it should be without giving a notice in accordance with the provisions of section 31. There is no other requirement in section 80 to be satisfied for treating a strike to be illegal if it is shown that the strike in question was commenced or continued without giving the notice required by section 31. There is nothing in this provision to indicate that it is not attracted till a charter of demands has earlier been submitted by a representative of the employees. It is obvious that a case where no notice as required by section 31 has been given would also include a situation where nothing has been done by the employees to indicate their grievance to the employer before resorting to the strike. It is no doubt true that the act of the employees should amount to a "strike" as defined in section 2 (32) of the Act before section 80 is attracted and it is for this reason that Shri Gupta has relied on the definition of "strike" contained in section 2 (32 ). "strike" is defined in section 2 (32) as under : - "s. 2 (32 ). "strike" is defined in section 2 (32) as under : - "s. 2 (32 ). "strike" means a total or partial cessation of work by the employees in an industry acting in combination or a concerted refusal or a refusal under a common understanding of employees to continue to work or to accept work, where such cessation or refusal is in consequence or in anticipation of an industrial dispute". The last part of the definition requires that the cessation of work by the employees should either be in consequence or in anticipation of an industrial dispute. . There is no difficulty where the cessation of work is in consequence of an industrial dispute. The question arises only where it is in anticipation of an industrial dispute as in the present case. It is actually the meaning of this expression which is decisive of the question involved in the present case. The definition of "industrial dispute" in section 2 (17) is as under:- "s. 2 (17 ). "industrial dispute" means any dispute or difference between an employer and employee or between employers and employees or between employees and employees and which is connected with any industrial matter;" This definition is wide enough to include any dispute between persons specified "which is connected with any industrial matter". Thus, any reasonable nexus of such a dispute with any industrial matter is sufficient to bring the dispute within the meaning of "industrial dispute" as defined in section 2 (17 ). Section 2 (18) contains a very wide definition of "industrial matter" which includes, inter alia, wages. The word "wages" is defined in section 2 (35) to include any bonus and allowances (including dearness allowance ). Thus, any dispute between the employees and their employer connected with any bonus or dearness allowance would fall within the ambit of "industrial dispute" as defined in section 2 (17 ). The wide and inclusive definitions of "industrial dispute" and "industrial matter" in the Act indicate the anxiety to include within their ambit all possible disputes or differences arising between the specified persons in an industry. The object clearly is to avoid industrial unrest, as far as possible, by providing for their settlement in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Section 2 (27) defines "representative of employees" to mean a reptesenta-tive of employees entitled to appear or act as provided in section 27. The object clearly is to avoid industrial unrest, as far as possible, by providing for their settlement in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Section 2 (27) defines "representative of employees" to mean a reptesenta-tive of employees entitled to appear or act as provided in section 27. Section 27 permits only a representative union for the industry or any union of which the employee is a member to act and appear as a representative of the employees. "union" is defined in section 2 (34) as meaning "a registered trade Union of employees". Section 2 (28) defines "representative Union" to mean a union for the time being recognised as a Representative Union. It is, therefore, clear that a union claiming to represent the employees has first to be a registered Trade Union and then duly recognised under the Act before it can be treated as a representative of the employees. Section 31 (2) is as under : - "s. 31. Notice of change.-X X X (2) A representative of employees desiring a change in respect of an industrial matter, which is neither covered by standing ciders nor is specified in Schedule II shall give notice thereof in the prescribed manner to the employer concerned and to such other persons as may be prescribed. X X X". It is clear from this section that where a change is desired by the employees in respect of an industrial matter which is neither covered by standing orders nor is specified in Schedule II to the Act, a representative of the employees is required to give a notice thereof in the prescribed manner to the employer concerned and the other persons specified. ( 5. ) AS already pointed out, clause (b) of section 80 lays down that a strike shall be illegal if it is commenced or continued without giving notice in accordance with the provisions of section 31. Thus, a cessation of work by the employees satisfying the definition of "strike" as contained in section 2 (32) would be illegal if it has been commenced or continued without giving the requisite notice under section 31 (2) of the Act. The wordings of section 80 (b) are wide enough to include within their ambit all cases wherein there has been a "strike" at a stage prior to giving a notice under section 31. The wordings of section 80 (b) are wide enough to include within their ambit all cases wherein there has been a "strike" at a stage prior to giving a notice under section 31. Nothing more is required to attract section 80 (b) for rendering such a strike illegal. It is clear that where there has been a strike even before the employees demand has been made known to the employer in any manner, that strike would be illegal according to section 80 (b ). The only question is whether there can be no such "strike" till alter submission of a charter of demands to the employer by a representative of the employees as contended by Shri Gupta. ( 6. ) NO statutory provision requiring in addition, the submission of a charter of demands prior to the giving of a notice of change under section 31 (2), to bring into existence an industrial dispute as defined in section 2 (17) of the Act, has been shown to us. Shri Gupta has referred to the provisions relating to conciliation commencing with section 39 in the Act. It is sufficient to say that all these provisions relate to a stage subsequent to the giving of a notice of change under section 31 of the Act. They do not indicate that there is any statutory requirement of submitting a charter of demands prior to giving a notice of change under section 31 (2) to bring into existence an industrial dispute. The scheme of the Act indicates that the first step in the process which brings into existence such an industrial dispute is the giving of a notice of change under section 31 (2) whereby the demands of the employees are made known to the employer. The object of enacting section 80 (b) clearly is to prevent any strike before the employees have even cared to inform the employer of their demands. This being so, the contention of shri Gupta that section 80 (b) of the Act applies only to cases where a strike has taken place subsequent to submission of a charter of demands by a representative of employees but prior to the giving of a notice of change under section 31 (2) has no merit. This being so, the contention of shri Gupta that section 80 (b) of the Act applies only to cases where a strike has taken place subsequent to submission of a charter of demands by a representative of employees but prior to the giving of a notice of change under section 31 (2) has no merit. It is also not possible to accept his argument that an industrial dispute arises only on commencement of conciliation proceedings, because the stage for conciliation is reached only after a notice of change being given by a representative of employees to the employer, no agreement is reached between them and it becomes necessary for the conciliator to intervene because of a failure of the employees and the employer to come to an agreement. The provisions of the Act do not envisage a stage between submission of demands and giving a notice of change under section 31 (2), which is the foundation of shri Guptas argument. ( 7. ) AS for the fulfilment of the requirements of the definition of "strike" contained in section 2 (32), there is no difficulty when the strike takes place as a consequence of an industrial dispute. The only question is whether this definition can be satisfied where the cessation of work by the employees, satisfying the earlier part of the definition contained in section 2 (32), has taken place in anticipation of an industrial dispute. It is reasonable to assume that the Legislature has enacted a provision which is workable. Any meaning which would render it otiose has to be rejected, unless that is the only meaning which can be given to it. The expression in anticipation of an industrial dispute is wide enough to include every stage prior to the coming into existence of an industrial dispute, at which the act done can be shown to have a reasonable nexus with the anticipated industrial dispute. It is, therefore, obvious that this expression must refer to a stage before the giving of a notice of change under section 31 (2) and not subsequent to it; and the expression "industrial dispute" as defined in section 2 (17) is wide enough to include any dispute or difference connected with any industrial matter. As earlier shown, the definition of "industrial matter" is also very wide. As earlier shown, the definition of "industrial matter" is also very wide. Thus, to satisfy the requirement of the definition of "strike" contained in section 2 (32) all that is necessary to be shown in such a case is that the strike had a reasonable nexus with some forthcoming demand of the employees, to be raised, in future which could result into an industrial dispute. If that is shown, there is full compliance with the requirement of the definition contained in section 2 (32 ). We are satisfied that the construction suggested by Shri Gupta, if accepted, would render clause (b) of section 80 nugatory, and the provision being workable on the view taken by us, the argument of Shri Gupta must be rejected. ( 8. ) IN the present case, it has been found as a fact that the strike resorted to by the petitioners on 6-10-1967 was connected with, and was to support the employees forthcoming demand of bonus and dearness allowance. As earlier indicated, a dispute arising from a demand relating to bonus and dearness allowance, amounts to an industrial dispute within the meaning of that expression defined in section 2 (17) of the Act. That being so, the facts found clearly show that the definition of "strike" contained in section 2 (32) of the act was fully satisfied in the present case inasmuch as the cessation of work by the employees was in anticipation of an industrial dispute. The finding of the Labour Court that there was a notice of change given by the m. P. Motor Karmachari Maha Sangh making these demands is relevant to show that the strike was connected with and was in anticipation of an industrial dispute which had yet to be raised by a representative of the employees. Admittedly, no notice of change was given in this connection by a representative of the employees under section 31 (2) of the Act. Section 80 (b) of the act was, therefore, clearly attracted to render illegal the aforesaid strike held on 6 10-1967. There is thus no infirmity in the conclusion reached by the labour Court and affirmed by the Industrial Court, even though the process of reasoning by which that conclusion was reached by them may not be wholly correct. ( 9. ) THE result is that the main argument advanced in support of the petition fails and is rejected. ( 10. There is thus no infirmity in the conclusion reached by the labour Court and affirmed by the Industrial Court, even though the process of reasoning by which that conclusion was reached by them may not be wholly correct. ( 9. ) THE result is that the main argument advanced in support of the petition fails and is rejected. ( 10. ) IT was then urged by Shri Gupta that the averments made in the employers application to the Labour Court were not sufficient to make out a case of the strike being resorted to in anticipation of an industrial dispute and at any rate the findings recorded by the Labour Court do not satisfy that requirement. There is no merit also in this argument. The copy of the employers application annexed to the petition does not contain the amendment made in paragraph 4 of that application. The original application present in the record shows that it was expressly pleaded that the employees had certain demands which were given out by the M. P. Motor Karmachari Maha Sangh, not a representative of the employees, which would have resulted in an industrial dispute; and it was in support of those demands that the petitioners had resorted to the illegal strike. The requisite averments were, therefore, contained in the employers application. Moreover, as already shown, the Labour court has recorded the requisite findings after full enquiry which satisfy the definition of "strike" contained in section 2 (32) of the Act. ( 11. ) THE last contention of Shri Gupta was that the Divisional Manager of the M. P. State Road Transport Corporation was not competent to file the application in the Labour Court on behalf of the Corporation. This contention was considered and rightly rejected by the Industrial Court which has said that the definition of the word "employer" contained in section 2 (14) of the act is wide enough and includes even an agent of an employer on account of which the Divisional Manager of the Corporation is undoubtedly included within that definition. This argument has also, therefore, no merit and is rejected. ( 12. ) CONSEQUENTLY, this petition fails and is dismissed, but in the circumstances without any costs. The outstanding amount of the security deposit shall be refunded to the petitioners. Petition dismissed.