Judgment : The Court : In this Rule, the petitioners the first of whom is the Employees' Association of the Reserve Bank of India (hereinafter referred to as the Bank) and the others are individual employees of the Bank challenge an order of the Bank and also an order of the Government of India. These are two distinct and separate orders and are challenged on distinct and separate grounds. 2. The first one namely, the order of the Bank which is under challenge may be set out herein below :- "OFFICE ORDER NO. 367/76/77 Late Coming - Reducing the grace time to 15 minutes. With a view to achieving maximum efficiency, it has been decided to discontinue, henceforth the practice of permitting employees to attend office late on two occasions in a month up to 12 noon. With effect from 15th December, 1976, employees would be allowed on, not more than two occasions in a month, even with permission to come late up to a maximum period of 15 minutes only from the commencement of the working hours prescribed for the concerned category of staff. If an employee attends office late i.e. before the expiry of 15 minutes from the commencement of the working hours prescribed for him, on more than two occasions in a month, he will forfeit a day's casual leave or ordinary leave or such other leave as the competent authority may determine for every three days of such late attendance in a month and in addition will also be liable to disciplinary action in terms of Regulation 39(3) of the Reserve Bank of India Staff Regulations, 1948. 2. No employee will be permitted to attend office if he is late beyond a maximum of 15 minutes from the commencement of the working hours prescribed for him. 3. While the grace period for late attendance will normally be 15 minutes as provided above, the manager/Officer-in-Charge may, at his discretion, condone late attendance up to maximum of 30 minutes from the commencement of the working hours for the particular category of staff, where he is satisfied that such late attendance was entirely beyond the employee's control such as dislocation of transport system, etc. and where the grant of such permission will not cause inconvenience to the office. Sd/- Manager." 3. This circular is dated the 14th December, 1976. and where the grant of such permission will not cause inconvenience to the office. Sd/- Manager." 3. This circular is dated the 14th December, 1976. The genesis and background of the circular however goes back to the early part of that year and may be briefly noted. On the 30th March, 1976 the Personnel Manager, Reserve Bank of India by a Circular issued to all Managers and Heads of Department informed them that according to the existing practice the employees are permitted to attend office late on two occasions in a month upto 12 noon. This position has been reviewed by the Central Office in the context of improving the efficiency and for discipline in the Bank's Office. By the circular it was further stated that it has been decided that in future no employees should be permitted to attend office if he is late in attendance upto a maximum of 15 minutes from the commencement of the working hours applicable to the concerned category of staff. It was further stated that the Manager/Officer-in-Charge may in his discretion condone late attendance upto a maximum of 30 minutes where he is satisfied that such late attendance was entirely beyond the employees control such as dislocation transport system etc. and where such grant of permission will not cause inconvenience to the office. Such discretion should be exercised by the Manager/Officer-in-charge personally. 4. On the 6th April, 1976 pursuant to the above circular, a notice under Section 9A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was given by the Manager, Reserve Bank of India, Calcutta in the prescribed form. The notice contained the substance of the proposal contained in the circular set out above. 5. On the 21st April, 1976 All India Reserve Bank Employees' Association by letter to the Manager of the Bank recorded their opposition to the notice dated 6th April, 1976. Thereafter conciliation proceedings started and were held on several occasions. But, as is usual in such cases, the conciliation proceedings failed. On the 29th October, 1976 the Conciliation Officer submitted what is usually called the "failure Report." 6. Thereafter conciliation proceedings started and were held on several occasions. But, as is usual in such cases, the conciliation proceedings failed. On the 29th October, 1976 the Conciliation Officer submitted what is usually called the "failure Report." 6. In the "failure Report" of the Conciliation Officer dated the 29th October, 1976 the concluding paragraph is in the following terms ;- "While the Association was agreeable for reference of the dispute for arbitration or voluntary adjudication, the managements were not agreeable to either as according to them there was no merit in the dispute." 7. This clearly shows that the Association was quite keen of having this matter adjudicated as an industrial dispute. There is however no further correspondence on this subject from the side of the Association with the Government except the impugned order dated the 30th November, 1st December, 1976 issued by R.P. Narula Under Secretary, Ministry of Labour, Government of India. This letter and the decision contained therein was addressed amongst others to the Chief Manager of the Bank and the General Secretary of the Association. The contents of this letter are material for our purpose and may be set out herein below :- "Subject: Industrial Dispute between the managements of Reserve Bank of India and Unit Trust of India and their workmen over alleged change in service conditions in the matter of attendance time. Sir, In continuation of this Ministry's letter of even number dated 4-11-76 on the above subject, I am directed to say that the Government of India do not consider the dispute fit for reference to an Industrial Tribunal for adjudication because the workmen according to the conditions of their service are expected to attend office in time and the managements action in curtailing the concession, allowed to the workmen to attend office late on two occasions in a month does not appear to amount to a change in service conditions of their workmen." 8. As 1 have already said, it is this order of the Government of India refusing to refer the alleged dispute for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal and the Office Circular dated 14th December, 1976 issued by the Bank which are the subject matter of challenge before me in the present application. 9. As 1 have already said, it is this order of the Government of India refusing to refer the alleged dispute for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal and the Office Circular dated 14th December, 1976 issued by the Bank which are the subject matter of challenge before me in the present application. 9. I shall first of all take up the grounds of challenge to the Office Circular dated the 14th December, 1976 which I have already indicated are distinct and separate from the challenge to the order of refusal of the Government of India. 10. Mr. Somnath Chatterjee, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners contended in the first place that the impugned Circular amounted to a change in the conditions of service of the employees of the Bank. According to him, such a change in the conditions of service could not be brought about by a mere Office Circular. According to Mr. Chatterjee such a change to be a valid one could only be effected for framing proper regulations under the provisions of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). My attention was drawn to the provisions of Section 58 of the Act which, in so far as is material for our purpose, provides as follows :- "58(1) The Central Board may, with the previous sanction of the Central Government make regulations consistent with this Act to provide for all matters for which provisions is necessary or convenient for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of this Act. (2) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provision, such regulations may provide fur all or any of the following matters, namely :- (j) the constitution and management of staff and superannuation funds for the officers and servants of the Bank." 11. According to Mr. Chatterjee, the proper and legal procedure would have been to effect this change in the conditions of service of the employees of the Bank is by framing proper regulations under Section 58 (2) (j) of the Act. The Circular admittedly not having been issued under the provisions of Section 58(2)(j) of the Act must be declared to be invalid and of no effect whatsoever. 12. Mr. Subrata Roychowdhury, learned counsel appearing for the Bank and the Union of India invited me to read the language of Section 58(2) (j) of the Act carefully. The Circular admittedly not having been issued under the provisions of Section 58(2)(j) of the Act must be declared to be invalid and of no effect whatsoever. 12. Mr. Subrata Roychowdhury, learned counsel appearing for the Bank and the Union of India invited me to read the language of Section 58(2) (j) of the Act carefully. As already set out, that Sub-section speaks of the Constitution and management of Staff and Superannuation funds for the Officers and servants of the Bank. According to Mr. Somenath Chatterjee the Clause "management of staff" occuring in this sub-section is separate from the rest of it and empowers the Bank to frame regulations for the management of its staff. Mr. Roy Chowdhury on the other hand contends than this sub-section is only concerned with certain fund namely, the Staff funds and the Superannuation funds of the employees of the Bank. In other words, this sub-section does not empower the Bank to frame any Rules and Regulations concerning the conditions of service of its staff. He particularly draws my attention to the construction of Sub-section which speaks of (a) "Constitution" (b) "Management of Staff" and Superannuation fund". According to Mr. Roy Chowdhury these two expressions "Constitution" and "Management" have to be read together and to read it can only refer to the funds described therein and not to the staff as distinct from the funds. 13. In my view, this contention of Mr. Roy Chowdhury is sound and should be accepted. In my view, if the object of this sub-section (j) was to empower the Bank to frame the Rules and Regulations affecting the conditions of service of the Staff thereof I fail to seek how the Legislature in its wisdom could use the expression "Constitution". In other words to speak of the "Constitution" of the Staff of the Bank is to stretch the meaning of English language beyond its permissible limits. It therefore follows that this sub-section (J) is only confined to the staff and superannuation funds and has nothing whatsoever to do with the recruitment or the conditions of service of the staff or employees of the Bank. Mr. It therefore follows that this sub-section (J) is only confined to the staff and superannuation funds and has nothing whatsoever to do with the recruitment or the conditions of service of the staff or employees of the Bank. Mr. Roy Chowdhury fairly conceded that although sub-section (2) of Section 58 does not contain any express provisions for the recruitment Rules or the Rules relating to the terms and conditions of service of the employees of the Bank it could be done in exercise of the general power conferred on the Central Board of the Bank under Section 58(1) of the Act. 14. It was next contended on behalf of the petitioner that the impugned office order purports to impose a new condition with regard to the terms of employments of the petitioners. My attention is drawn in this connection to the provisions of Regulations 39(3) of the Reserve Bank of India (Staff) Regulations 1948 which provides as follows :- "39(3) An employee who is habitually late in attendance shall, in addition to such other penalty as the competent authority may deem fit to impose, have one day of casual leave forfeited for every three days he is late in a month. Where such an employee has no casual leave due to him, the period of leave to be so forfeited may be treated as ordinary or extraordinary leave as the competent authority may determine." 15. It was submitted that the expression "habitually late" in Regulations 39(3) of the Staff Regulations has a meaning which is distinct and separate from one, "casually late". It was submitted that the Office Circular in so far as it seeks to impose the penalty prescribed in Regulation 39(3) of the Staff Regulations which is only applicable to habitual late comes was now sought to be applied to casual late comes and to that extent sought to modify or extend the provisions of Regulations 39(3) of the Staff Regulations which it was contended was framed under Section 58 of the Act. Consequently the impugned Office Circular was ultra vires Section 58 of the Act. 16. As I have already indicated, in my view Section 58(2)(j) does not contemplate the framing of Staff Regulations. As I have also indicated according to Mr. Roy Chowdhury such Regulations could however be framed under Section 58(1) of the Act. Consequently, whether it has been so framed requires consideration. 16. As I have already indicated, in my view Section 58(2)(j) does not contemplate the framing of Staff Regulations. As I have also indicated according to Mr. Roy Chowdhury such Regulations could however be framed under Section 58(1) of the Act. Consequently, whether it has been so framed requires consideration. It would also have a bearing on the question whether these Regulations have statutory force or not. 17. Mr. Subrata Roy Chowdhury for the respondents drew my attention to the fact that Staff Regulations do not profess to have been framed in exercise of any statutory power under the Act and in particular under Section 58. He further drew my attention to the fact that under Section 58 of the Act previous sanction of the Central Government is necessary for making Regulations. It is stated on instruction that no such sanction of the Central Government has been obtained before framing of these Regulations. At the time of hearing a declaration in a printed form were produced a specimen copy of which has been tendered, by consent of parties, and forms part of the records of this case which shows that each and every employee of the Bank signs a declaration saying that he agrees to abide by the Reserve Bank of India (Staff) Regulations 1948. This according to Mr. Roy Chowdhury clearly shows that these Regulations are purely of a contractual nature and having been unilaterally framed by the Bank the acceptance thereof by way of a declaration is obtained from every employee. 18. Mr. Roy Chowdhury in this connection drew my attention to an unreported decision of the Bombay High Court in (1) the Misc. Petn. No. 206 of 1967 (Bimal Kumar Shome v. P.C. Bhattacharya & Ors). in which the judgment was delivered by Vimadalal J. on the 6th August, 1969. The question whether these Regulations had statutory force or not arose in that case. I set out hereinbelow relevant extracts from the judgment of Vimadalal J. in this connection. "Two preliminary objections were raised by Mr. Bhabra to the maintainability of this petition. in which the judgment was delivered by Vimadalal J. on the 6th August, 1969. The question whether these Regulations had statutory force or not arose in that case. I set out hereinbelow relevant extracts from the judgment of Vimadalal J. in this connection. "Two preliminary objections were raised by Mr. Bhabra to the maintainability of this petition. They were (1) that the Reserve Bank of India (Staff) Regulations, 1948, had no statutory force, but were merely contractual in nature, and a writ does not lie in a case like the present one which, in effect, is one of alleged breach of contract and (2) that there has been gross delay on the part of the petitioner in filing the present petition". "Turning to the facts of the present case in the light of that legal position, it may be stated that it is common ground that on the 21st of January, 1949 the petitioner signed a declaration electing to serve under the Reserve Bank of India (Staff) Regulations, 1948, in lieu of his existing Rules of Service, and agreed to subscribe and be bound by them. It is the contention of Mr. Rana that Regulation 26 has been framed under the Rule-making power conferred upon the Central Board of the 4th respondent Bank under section 58 of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934. He has, in that connection, relied on clauses (j) and (r) or sub-sec. (2) of the said section, but I am afraid the same have no application at all to the present case. The said clause (j) deals with the constitution and management of the staff and superannuation funds and has nothing whatsoever to do with the terms and conditions of service of the fourth respondent-Bank. As far as the said residuary, clause (r) is concerned. I am afraid, it is not possible to construe it in the widest possible sense as Mr. Rana contended as its very terms show that it can be applied only in regard to the conduct of the business of the Bank and, in my opinion, it would not cover the terms and conditions of service of the staff of the Bank. Rana contended as its very terms show that it can be applied only in regard to the conduct of the business of the Bank and, in my opinion, it would not cover the terms and conditions of service of the staff of the Bank. Moreover, the preamble to the Regulations themselves does not mention that it has been framed in exercise of the powers under section 58 of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934, nor does it recite that the necessary sanction of the Central Government had been obtained in respect of the said Rules, as is inveriably done in such cases. Moreover, Mr. Bhabra has made a statement from the Bar in specific terms that no such sanction was obtained from the Central Government for the purpose of framing the Reserve Bank of India (Staff) Regulations 1948. Mr. Rana sought to contend, on the strength of a decision in the case of Jagdish v. Accountant General, Bombay, (60 Bom. LR 241). The correct position on the facts placed before me is that, by signing the declaration dated 21st January 1949, the petitioner made Regulation 26 a part of the contract of service between him and the Reserve Bank of India, and the obligation which the petitioner seeks to enforce against the respondents, is, therefore, purely contractual obligation in respect of which a petition under Article 226 is not maintainable, and I hold accordingly." 19. My attention was next drawn to an unreported decision of this Court in (2) Civil Rule No. 2735 (W) of 1966 (Ashis Kumar Sen v. Reserve Bank of India and others), where the judgment of P. K. Banerjee J. was delivered on 12th January, 1973. I set out the relevant extracts from this judgment. "Mr. Ginwalla contended that the staff Regulation is a contractual obligation but not a statutory rule. I am of the opinion that the staff Regulation was not promulgated under section 58(2) (j) of the Reserve Bank of India Act. It is quite clear from the facts as appearing before me, that the staff Regulation was not promulgated under the rule making power of the Reserve Bank of India Act and as such it cannot be said to be a statutory regulation. Therefore, in my opinion rule 35A or for the matter the staff regulation is not statutory rule." 20. It is quite clear from the facts as appearing before me, that the staff Regulation was not promulgated under the rule making power of the Reserve Bank of India Act and as such it cannot be said to be a statutory regulation. Therefore, in my opinion rule 35A or for the matter the staff regulation is not statutory rule." 20. My attention was also drawn in this connection to an unreported decision of the Delhi High Court in (3) Civil Writ No. 116 of 1972 (D.P. Kapoor v. Governor, Reserve Bank of India and others), in which the judgment was delivered by Hardy C.J. on the 31st August, 1972. There is a short passage in the concluding portion of this which I set out below; "Apart from these matters, the respondents have also raised certain preliminary objections stating that the matters raised in the petition are covered by the Staff Regulations which are contractual in nature and no writ can be issued for the alleged breach of contract. Under the contract of service, which governs the petitioner, the entire matter being in the discretion of the Bank, therefore no enforceable right arises and as such the writ petition does not lie. In these circumstances, the petition is dismissed in limine." 21. Mr. Roy Chowdhury invited me to follow the above three judgments which have clearly and unequivocally held that the Staff Regulations have no statutory force. Having regard to the ratio of the above decision also having regard to my interpretation of Section 58 of the Act and on the evidence of the declaration signed by the employees, I am of the definite opinion that these Regulations are purely of contractual nature and have no statutory force. 22. I may mention in this connection that Mr. Roy Chowdhury pertinently drew my attention to another set of Regulations which is known as Reserve Bank of India Employees Provident Fund Regulations, preamable of which is as follows :- "In exercise of the power conferred by clause (j) of sub-section (2) of section 58 of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934, (II of 1934), the Central Board with the previous sanction of the Central Government hereby makes the following regulations, which shall be knows as the Reserve Bank of India Employees' Provident Fund Regulations, 1935, and shall come into force with effect from the 1st October 1935". 23. 23. The contrast between this Preamble and the fact that the Staff Regulations contained no such Preamble is clear that it does not require any further elaboration. This contention of Mr. Chatterjee for the petitioner therefore fails. 24. Lastly, Mr. Chatterjee argued on this aspect of the matter that assuming that the office order was not in exercise of any statutory power but merely contractual it was submitted that it was merely an offer of the Bank to alter the conditions of service which in order to be binding on the employees requires acceptance by them. It was strongly contended that there is no evidence on record to show that this office Circular has been accepted by the employees so as to ripen into binding contractual obligation. As such it should be struck down as illegal and not binding. 25. This argument was sought to be countered by Mr. Roy Chowdhury on two bases. He argued, in the first place, that in so far as the impugned office order is concerned the Bank was fully empowered to impose it unilaterally. He argued in the second place, that once it is conceded that this obligation imposed by the circular is contractual it cannot be enforced in the writ jurisdiction. 26. On the first point, Mr. Roy Chowdhury drew my attention to the A ward National Industrial Tribunal (Bank Dispute) between the Reserve Bank of India and its workmen of Class II, Class III, and Class IV Staff which was passed in September, 1962 by Kantilal T. Desai, Chief Justice of High Court of Gujarat popularly known as Desai Award. Without going into details it may be noted that this Award provided that the employees would have to work for 6½ hours on week days and 3½ hours on Saturdays. It was however specifically provided In sub-clause (4) of para 13.8 as follows :- "The banks will be at liberty to fix at their discretion the actual timing for work provided the maximum number of hours of work fixed by this award are being observed." 27. Mr. Roy Chowdhury, in this connection produced of the time of the hearing office orders issued from different branches of the Bank from time to time, which have been tendered by consent of parties, and forms part of the records of this case. Mr. Roy Chowdhury, in this connection produced of the time of the hearing office orders issued from different branches of the Bank from time to time, which have been tendered by consent of parties, and forms part of the records of this case. These orders show that the actual opening hours of the Bank and correspondingly the closing hours thereof vary from city to city. To give only two instances, it appears from one order that the opening hours of the Calcutta Branch of the Reserve Bank was 9.50 A.M. whereas the opening hours of the Bombay Branch was 10-45 A.M. This difference according to Mr. Roy Chowdhury is explained by the fact that in a city like Bombay where the employees are spread out in a more sprawling area and the problems of transportation are more acute the management decided in its wisdom in Bombay that the Bank should open at a later hour whereas in the case of Calcutta where that problem may be somewhat less acute, the management decided to open the Bank at an earlier hour. It was the submission of Mr. Roy Chowdhury that so long as the total number of working hours remains unaltered the Bank was the sole judge of when to open the Bank and this does not violate the binding obligations of the parties under the Desai Award which stood unmodified by a later award known as Aiyer Award. This position that the Aiyer Award did not modify the hours of work of the Bank was not disputed on behalf of the petitioner. 28. In this context Mr. Roy Chowdhury submits that the impugned office circular does not purport to effect any change in the working hours of Bank at Calcutta. He rightly concedes that if there was any change in the working hours it would definitely be a change in the condition of service of the employees of the Bank. The question whether employees would be allowed to come late if so for how long was no part of the conditions of service. It was merely a privilege or a concession granted to the workmen which could be withdrawn unilaterally by the Bank at any time it desired. 29. In this contention Mr. Roy Chowdhury lays strong emphasis on the circumstances under which the impugned Office Circular was issued curtailing the period of late attendance. It was merely a privilege or a concession granted to the workmen which could be withdrawn unilaterally by the Bank at any time it desired. 29. In this contention Mr. Roy Chowdhury lays strong emphasis on the circumstances under which the impugned Office Circular was issued curtailing the period of late attendance. My attention was drawn to Paragraph 5 of the affidavit of Deva Priya Mukherjee affirmed on 8th August, 1977. It is a long paragraph and I shall merely refer briefly to the salient features thereof. In paragraph 5(c) it has been stated that to enable the Bank to start its business transaction at the scheduled business hours, it is of utmost importance that the members of the Staff do attend office punctually in time. To quote "This is more important for the reasons that the members of the staff are to work generally in a team particularly in few sections like cash counters. If any particular employee is not present on any particular day, the management is to make arrangements, for the manning of the counters, handling cash balances by the appropriate category of staff, so that work does not suffer. If the regular incumbent does not turn up at the scheduled time of attendance there is a system in vogue in the Bank by which promotions are effected even for a day in the Cash Department, so that the work may be carried on smoothly. In para 5 (iv) it is stated as follows :- "The Bank is to open its counters sharply at the appointed time with a view to ensuring prompt service to the Governments, the Banks and the members of the public. The punctuality in attending office is essential for smooth functioning of the essential services rendered by the Bank. For this reason, the employees of the Bank enjoy certain special facilities which are not available to all members of the public e.g. housing loans at very low interest, residential quarters advances for purchase of bicycles, scooters etc., so that the employees can reach-office before the commencement of the prescribed working hours." 30. In support of the well-known proposition that contractual obligations cannot be enforced in the writ jurisdiction, and also the proposition that a statutory Authority may act in a purely private and contractual capacity. Mr. Subrata Roy Chowdhury cited a number of authorities. I shall only briefly notice some of them. 31. In support of the well-known proposition that contractual obligations cannot be enforced in the writ jurisdiction, and also the proposition that a statutory Authority may act in a purely private and contractual capacity. Mr. Subrata Roy Chowdhury cited a number of authorities. I shall only briefly notice some of them. 31. Reference was made to the case of (4) Kulchinder Singh v. Hardayal Singh Brar and others, reported in AIR 1976 SC 2216 . At paragraph 11 of the report V.R. Krishna Iyer., J., infer alia, observed as follows :- "The writ petition, stripped of embroidery and legalistics, stands naked as a simple contract between the staff and the society, agreeing upon a certain percentage of promotions to various posts or an ommi-bus, all-embracing promise to give a quota to the existing employees. At its best, the writ petition 5eeks enforcement of a binding contract hut the neat and the necessary repellant is that the remedy of Article 226 is unavailable to enforce a contract qua contract. We fail to see how a supplier of chalk to a government school or cheese to a government hospital can ask for a constitutional remedy under Art. 226 in the event of a breach of a contract, by-passing the normal channels of civil litigation. We are not convinced that a mere contract agreeing to a quota of promotions can be exalted into a service rule or statutory duty. What is immediately relevant is not whether the respondent is State or public authority but whether what is enforced is a statutory duty or sovereign obligation or public function of a public authority. Private law may involve a State, a statutory body, or a public body in contractual or tortious actions. But they cannot be siphoned off into the writ jurisdiction". Reference was next made to the well-known case of (5) Radhakrishna Agarwal and others v. State of Bihar and others, reported in AIR 1977 SC 1496 . In the above case the Supreme Court held that at the very threshold or at the time of entry into the field of consideration of persons with whom the Government could contract at all. the State, no doubt, acts purely in its executive capacity and is bound by the obligations which dealings Of the State with the individual citizens import into every transaction entered into in exercise of its constitutional powers. the State, no doubt, acts purely in its executive capacity and is bound by the obligations which dealings Of the State with the individual citizens import into every transaction entered into in exercise of its constitutional powers. But, after the State or its agents have entered into the field of ordinary contract the relations are no longer governed by the constitutional provisions but by the legally valid contract which determines the rights and obligations of the parties inter se. No question arises of violation of Art. 14 or of any other Constitutional provision when the State or its agents, purporting to act within this field perform any act. In this sphere, they can only claim rights conferred upon them by contract and are bound by the terms of contract only unless some statute steps in and confers some special statutory power or obligation on the State in the contractual field which is apart from contract. 32. Even in cases where the question is of choice or consideration of competing claims before an entry into the field of contract facts have to be investigated and found before the question of a violation of Art. 14 could arise. If those facts are disputed and require assessment of evidence the correctness of which can only be tested satisfactorily by taking detailed evidence, involving examination and cross-examination of witnesses, the case could not be conveniently or satisfactorily decided in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. 33. In that case it was held that the contracts entered into by the State Government did not contain any statutory terms or obligations and no statutory power or obligations could attract the application of Article 14. 34. The above decision makes it crystal clear that if a statutory body is acting in a private and contractual capacity the reliefs under the Writ jurisdiction cannot be attracted. In my view, in the light what I have already discussed above the Reserve Bank of India (Staff) Regulations 1948 has no statutory force. These are merely certain Contractual obligations sought to be imposed by the employer on the employees which have been accepted by the employees, in the form of the declarations mentioned above. The impugned Office Circular in my view, is a similar contractual obligation sought to be enforced by the employer. No doubt it is unilateral and has not been accepted by the employees. The impugned Office Circular in my view, is a similar contractual obligation sought to be enforced by the employer. No doubt it is unilateral and has not been accepted by the employees. That however does not make any difference because I accept Mr. Roychowdhury's contention that in view of the Desai Award and the Aiyar Award the Bank is fully competent to take a unilateral decision as to when the working hours could commence and how long after the commencement of working hours would the employees be entitled to attend office. The non-acceptance of these terms by the employees does not make any difference to its binding character. I also hold that the impugned Office Order cannot be challenged in the Writ jurisdiction in any event. 35. The next question is whether the refusal by the Government of India to refer the matter as an industrial dispute be contended to be illegal and liable to be set aside. The argument of the petitioner was that the disputes raised by virtue of the impugned office order was an industrial dispute within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act and it was obligatory on the part of the Government of India to refer it to an Industrial Tribunal for adjudication. My attention was drawn to Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 which provides that when the appropriate Government is of opinion that any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, it may at any time by order in writing refer to the appropriate authorities mentioned in the Section. 36. My attention was drawn to Section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 which defines Industrial Dispute as "any dispute or difference between employers and employers, or between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour, of any person." 37. It was submitted that the office order affects either the terms of employment or the conditions of labour and as such it was an industrial dispute. It was submitted that the office order affects either the terms of employment or the conditions of labour and as such it was an industrial dispute. Strong reliance was also placed on the fact that the bank had given a notice under Section 9A of the above Act which provides that no employer who proposes to effect any change in the condition of service applicable to any workmen in respect of any matter specified in the Fourth Schedule, shall effect such change without giving to the workmen likely to be affected by such change a notice in the prescribed manner of the nature of the change proposed to be effected; 38. Mr. Somenath Chatterjee argued that from fact that such a notice under Section 9A was given to the Bank shows that they were proposing to change a condition of service of the employees which is the something as changing the terms of employment within the meaning of Section 2(K) of the above Act. 39. My attention was drawn in this connection, although curiously at the stage of the reply, to the fact that under Section 10 of the Act an "industrial dispute" which relates to any matter specified in the Second and Third and Fourth Schedule of the Act it would be sent to a Tribunal for adjudication. My attention was next drawn to the Second Schedule of the Act. The heading of which is 'matters within the jurisdiction of the labour courts. Item No.4 in that Schedule reads as follows :- "Withdrawal of any customary concession, or privilege." 40. My attention was next drawn to the Fourth Schedule of the Act the heading of which is as follows :- "The condition of service for change of which would be given. Item No.8 of that Schedule reads as follows :- "Withdrawal of any customary Concession or change in usage." 41. On the strength of the above entries in the Second Schedule it was strongly urged that withdrawal of any customary concession would be an alteration in a condition of service in view of the Fourth Schedule and Section 9A of the Act and a fit subject matter for the adjudication by the appropriate authority under the Act in view of the Second Schedule thereof. It was urged that although it may not amount to a term of employment within the meaning of Section 2(K) of the Industrial Disputes Act in the strict sense of a term in view of the Second Schedule to the Act referred to above the workmen governed by the Act are protected to this extent that before any customary concession or privilege is withdrawn the workmen are entitled to claim to have an adjudication by the appropriate adjudicating machinery in respect thereof. 42. Mr. Roy chowdhury in answer to this contention relied on a certain number of cases which may now be noticed. 43. My attention was drawn to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (6) Prem Kakar v. State of Haryana, reported in A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 1474. In that case it was held that where the State Government on receipt of a Report of the Conciliation Officer referred to in Section 12(4) had found that the petitioner was not a workman within the meaning of the Act and therefore it was not a fit case for reference to adjudication it was held that the State could not be asked by a writ of mandamus to make a reference under Section 10(1) of the Act. With regard to this case, I must observe that if the employee was not a "workman" within the meaning of the Act none of the provisions of the Act could be applicable to him and therefore the question of making a reference under Section 10 (1) of the Act would not arise. 44. My attention was next drawn to the case of the (7) State of Bombay v. The Firestone Tyre and Rubber Company, reported in AIR 1960 S.C. 1223 . At paragraph 18 or the Report it was held that if the Government is refusing to make a reference on a ground which is totally irrelevant or extraneous, a case for the issue of writ of Mandamus is clearly established. It was however held if the Government had given some relevant reasons which were based or were the consequence of the misconduct to which reference is made it might have been another matter." 45. Lastly reference was made in this connection to the case of (8) M/s. Hochtief Gammon v. State of Orissa and others, reported in AIR 1975 SC 2226 . Lastly reference was made in this connection to the case of (8) M/s. Hochtief Gammon v. State of Orissa and others, reported in AIR 1975 SC 2226 . At paragraph 9 of the Report, Alagiriswami, J. referred to the case of (9) The State of Bombay v. K.P Krishnan, reported in, AIR 1960 SC 1223 and the (10) Bombay Union of Journalist v. The State of Bombay, reported in AIR 1964 SC 1617 . On the earlier case it was held that if the Government acted on totally irrelevant matters for refusing a reference the Court will be justified in issuing a writ of Mandamus. In the later case it was held that the appropriate government may after considering the relevant facts come to the conclusion that it would be inexpedient to make the reference, it would be competent for it to refuse to make such reference. If the appropriate Government however refused to make a reference for irrelevant considerations or on an extraneous ground or acts malafide a party would be entitled to move the High Court for a writ of mandamus. 46. In connection with the right of the Bank to organise its own business in its own way, Mr. Roy Chowdhury referred to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (11) Hindusthan Lever Ltd. v. Ram Mohan Ray and others, reported in 1973 (1) LLJ 427 . At Paragraph 13 of the Report the following observation occurs. "In the applications filed by the workers the Tribunal was conscious of the employer's right to reorganise his business in any fashion he likes for purposes of economy or convenience and that nobody is entitled to !ell him how he should conduct his business." Reference was also made in this connection with the decision (12) Indian Oxygen Limited v. Udaynath Singh & Others reported in 1970 2 LLJ 413 and the decision in (13) Ram Nath Koeri and another v. Sakshmi Devi Sugar Mills and two others, reported in 1956 2 LLJ 11. In connection with the question whether the office order impugned in this case was statutory or not. Mr. Roychowdhury referred me to a decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the case of (14) Vidyadaya University of Ceylon and others v. Silva, reported in 1964(3) AER 865. At page 875 the following passage occurs. In connection with the question whether the office order impugned in this case was statutory or not. Mr. Roychowdhury referred me to a decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the case of (14) Vidyadaya University of Ceylon and others v. Silva, reported in 1964(3) AER 865. At page 875 the following passage occurs. "The circumstance that the university was established by statute and is regulated by the statutory enactments contained in the Act of 1958 does not involve that contracts of employment, which are made with teachers and which are subject to the provisions of s. 18(e), are other than ordinary contracts of master and servant. Comparison may be made with the case of Barber v. Manchester Regional Hospital Board, 1958 1 AER 322. In his judgment in that case Barry, J. said 'here, despite the strong statutory flavour attaching to the plaintiff's contract, I have reached the conclusion that in essence it was an ordinary contract between master and servant and nothing more." On the strength of this observation Mr. Roy Chowdhury contended that the office order and the staff regulations may have a statutory flavour in view of the fact that the Bank was set up under a statutory instrument but were none the less merely contractual documents. 47. I refrain from dealing with these cases in any further detail because as will appear from what follows. The question of the nature of concession or the right of the Bank to organise its own business in its own way is not of much relevance in deciding the question in dispute. 48. On the question whether the impugned order amounted to a withdrawal of a customary concession Mr. Roy Chowdhury submitted that in order to be a customary concession within the meaning of the Second and Fourth Schedule of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 it has to be either express or implied term of the agreement and not merely a bounty or egrace. In support of this proposition Mr. Roy Chowdhury relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (15) The Mumbai Kamgar Sabha, Bombay v. M/s. Abdulbhai and others, reported in AIR 1976 SC 1455 . In support of this proposition Mr. Roy Chowdhury relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (15) The Mumbai Kamgar Sabha, Bombay v. M/s. Abdulbhai and others, reported in AIR 1976 SC 1455 . At paragraph 19 of the Report Krishna Iyer, J. observed as follows :- "There is hardly any doubt that custom has been recognised in the past as a source of the right to bonus, as the several decisions cited before us by Shri Tarkunde make out and Section 17(a) of the Bonus Act, in a way, recognizes such a root of title. In Churakulam Tea Estate, (1969) 1 SCR 931 this Court surveyed the relevant case law at sore length. Ispahani, (1960) 1 SCR 24 implied as a term of the contract the payment of bonus from an unbroken, long spell." 49. Lastly Mr. Roy Chowdhury relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (16) Shambu Nath Goyal v. Bank of Baroda, reported in (1978) 2 SCC 353 . At paragraph 7 of the Report, the following observation occurs. "The reference in the case before us was made under Section 10(1) which provides inter alia that where the appropriate government is of opinion that any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended it may at any time by order in writing refer the matter for adjudication as therein mentioned. The power conferred by Section 10(1) on the Government to refer the dispute can be exercised not only where an industrial dispute exists but when it is also apprehended. But in making a reference under Section 10(1) the Government is doing an administrative act and the fact that it has to form an opinion as to the factual existence of an industrial dispute as a preliminary step to the discharge of its function does not make it any the less administrative in character. The Court cannot therefore, canvass the order of reference closely to see if there was any material before the Government to support its conclusion, as if it was a judicial or quasi-judicial determination. No doubt it will be open to a party seeking to impugn the resulting award to show that what was referred by the Government was not an industrial dispute within the meaning of the Act, and that, therefore, the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to make the award. No doubt it will be open to a party seeking to impugn the resulting award to show that what was referred by the Government was not an industrial dispute within the meaning of the Act, and that, therefore, the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to make the award. But, if the dispute was an industrial dispute as defined in the Act, its factual existence and expediency of making a reference in the circumstances of a particular case are matters entirely for the Government to decide upon and it will not be competent for the Court to hold the reference bad and quash the proceedings for want of jurisdiction merely because in its opinion there was no material before the Government on which it could have come to an affirmative conclusion of those matters, (vide Madras State v. C. P. Sarthy, A I R 1953 SC 53" 50. After an anxious consideration of the entire matter, I have come to the conclusion that the contention of Mr. Roy Chowdhury on this point cannot be accepted. Undoubtedly the appropriate government is the authority to form an opinion whether an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended and if so whether it is expedient to make a reference under Section 10(1) of the Act. In view of the provisions of Section 9A read with the Second and Fourth Schedule of the Act I am clearly of the view that the withdrawal of a customary concession is a change in the condition of service of the workmen which is clearly an industrial dispute within the meaning of the Act. I am also of the view that the concession which admittedly existed since the very inception of the Bank of allowing its employees to be late upto 12 noon on two days in a month is clearly a customary-concession. As such, in refusing to make the reference the Union Government was clearly erroneous in law in holding that it was not a change in the condition of service of the workmen. 51. I am entirely in agreement with the observations of the Supreme Court with its own for the Court to order any reference under Section 10(1) of the Act. But in refusing to make a reference the appropriate Government clearly committed an error of law, it is the duty of the Court to correct that error. 51. I am entirely in agreement with the observations of the Supreme Court with its own for the Court to order any reference under Section 10(1) of the Act. But in refusing to make a reference the appropriate Government clearly committed an error of law, it is the duty of the Court to correct that error. It is to be noticed that the Government in the impugned order of the refusal does not say that it is inexpedient to make a reference although an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended. 52. In that view of the matter, it must be held that the Union of India in refusing to make the order of reference clearly acted on an erroneous assumption that the impugned office order did not amount to a change in the Conditions of service of the employees of the Bank. As such the impugned order of refusal to make a reference must be quashed. The contention of the petitioner on this point therefore succeeds. 53 In the result this application succeeds in part and the Rule is made absolute to that extent. 54. There will be a Writ in the nature of Mandamus directing the respondent the Union of India to forthwith, recall, cancel and withdraw the impugned order dated the 30th November, 1976/1st December, 1976 issued by R.P. Narula, Under Secretary in the Ministry of Labour. There will also be a Writ in the nature of Mandamus directing the respondent Union of India and the other respondents to act according to law in the Bight of my observations indicated above. There will be no order as to costs.