Judgment :- 1. The plaintiff in O.S. No. 58 of 1967 on the file of the Court of the Additional District Munsif of Namakkal who lost before the Courts below is the appellant herein. The suit was one for declaration of title and for injuntion. 2. For the purpose of understaading the circumstances under which the suit came to be filed, it is necessary to refer to a few facts. The plaintiff is the minor son of the first defendant. The second defendant is the husband of the first defendant. The third defendant is the second wife of the second defendant. Defendants 4 and 5 are said to be the persons in possession of the property. Ex. A.2, d. 14th December 1955 is said to be an unregistered Will executed by one Nallammal. Under that Will the first defendant herein was given a life interest and after her death the properties were to go absolutely to the male issue of the first defendant, and in the absence of a male issue, to the female issue and, in the absence of any issue, the properties should go to the family deity of the testatrix, namely Rathnagiri Easwarar. The testatrix herself died on 10th February, 1956. After the death of the testatrix the first defendant filed O.S. No. 118 of 1962 on the file of the Court of the District Munsif, Namakkal, for the purpose of enforcing her rights under the Will, Ex. A.2. It was decided in that suit that the Will was not a genuine one. That conclusion of the trial Court was affirmed by the first appellate Court, and it is also represented, a Second Appeal to this Court was dismissed at the stage of admission. Admittedly, on the date when the first defendant instituted O.S. No. 118 of 1962, the appellant herein was not born. Subsequently, the appellant filed the present suit for declaration that he is the remainderman entitled to the properties after the demise of the first defendant herein, and therefore, defendants 2 and 3 will have no right to deal with and dispose of the proper-ties in question. Subsequently, the appellant filed the present suit for declaration that he is the remainderman entitled to the properties after the demise of the first defendant herein, and therefore, defendants 2 and 3 will have no right to deal with and dispose of the proper-ties in question. When the appellant came forward with this claim in the suit, the second and third defendants put forward the contention that the suit was barred by the principle of res judicata in view of the decision in O.S. No. 118 of 1962, admittedly instituted by the first defendant on the basis of the identical Will. The Courts below accepted this case of the second and third defendants and dismissed the suit instituted by the plaintiff, and hence the present Second Appeal by the plaintiff. 3. Consequently, the sole question for consideration is whether the decision in O.S. No. 118 of 1962 instituted by the first defendant herein, holding that the Ex. A.2 Will was not genuine, is res judicata binding on the appellant herein so as to disable him from instituting the present suit claiming rights under the very same Will on the ground that the Will is a genuine one. 4. Before the Courts below reliance had been placed on a Bench decision of this Court reported in M. Narayanaswami Naidu and others v. Parsathi Bai and others A.I.R. 1949 Mad. 379=61 L.W. 542 and before me also reliance has been placed on the very same decision. That was also a case where a suit was originally instituted by the parents of the appellants and the contention was that the decision rendered in that suit would constitute res judicata so as to prevent their children thereafter instituting a fresh suit on the same document. Paragraph 6 of the Judgment of the Bench deals with this question, and the same reads thus:— “Mr. K. Krfshnaswami Ayyangar, learned counsel for the appellants, contended that the learned trial Judge erred in holding that the suit was not barred by the rule of res judicata and he relied, in particular, on Explanation 6 to S. 11, C.P.C. which runs as follows:—Where persons litigate bona fide in respect of a public right or of a private right claimed in common for themselves and others, all persons interested in such right shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed to claim under the person so litigating’. Kunhiraman, J. refused to accept the appellants contention on the ground that there were two distinct rights in this case, one right conferred on the parents of the plaintiffs and the other right conferred on the plaintiffs themselves and therefore it could not be said that there was a private right claimed in common for themselves and others. With due respect to the learned Judge, we are of opinion that he overlooked the fact that in this case both the plaintiffs and their parents rely on the same settlement deed as the source of their title. In the prior case the parents relied upon the deed and in the present case the children rely upon the same deed. We think, on principle the parents of the plaintiffs in the prior case must be deemed to have represented not only the interest but also the interest of their children under the same deed. This is a salutary principle which prevents multiplicity of proceedings and the anomaly of conflicting decisions on the effect of the same deed in respect of the same land. As early as 1789 in Pyke v. Crouch 731- E.R. 1387Lord Raym, it was ruled thus: ‘If several estates in remainder be limited in a deed, and one of the remaindermen obtains a verdict for him in an action brought against him for the same land; that verdict may be given in evidence for the subsequent remainderman in an action brought against him for the same land, though he does not claim any estate under the first remainderman because they all claims under the same deed” “That this principle would apply to the construction of Explanation 6 to S. 11 of the Code appears to be clear to us: Vide also Hukum-Chands Treatise on res judicata, page 192. If this principle were not accepted, it would mean that the parents and after them their children and probably the children one after the other can be permitted to agitate the same question over and over again in respect of the same title to the same land. The rule of res judicata was certainly intended to cover this class of cases in which all the donees under the settlement claim a common right.” I am of the opinion that the above statement contained in the Bench judgment has no application to the facts of the present case. The rule of res judicata was certainly intended to cover this class of cases in which all the donees under the settlement claim a common right.” I am of the opinion that the above statement contained in the Bench judgment has no application to the facts of the present case. Admittedly, in that case, when the parents instituted the suit on the basis of the settlement deed, the children were alive. Therefore, there was every scope for holding that the parents, not having any interest adverse to the children, must be deemed to have represented their children also in seeking to enforce the rights created under the settlement deed. In the present case, admittedly, on the date when the first defendant instituted O.S. No. 118 of 1962. no child was born to her and therefore, it cannot be, by any stretch of imagination, contended that she must be deemed to have represented her unborn children also. Therefore, the principle laid down in the Bench judgment cannot be invoked to sustain the conclusion of the Courts below in the present case because, admittedly, the title of the first defendant and that of her children are distinct under the Will and the child, viz., the appellant in the present case, does not seek to derive his title from the first defendant who was the plaintiff in the earlier suit. If the appellant claimed title through or from the first defendant herein, the position would undoubtedly be different. But, the appellant claims title not through or from the first defendant, but independently of her, under the Will itself. To such a case, when the appellant was not born on the date when the first defendant instituted O.S. No. 118 of 1962, the principle laid down by the Bench decision will have no application whatever. It is not necessary for me to decide in the present case whether this conclusion of mine will not lead to the possibility of child after child of the first defendant independently instituting suits ignoring the earlier adverse decisions and claiming rights. It is not necessary for me to decide in the present case whether this conclusion of mine will not lead to the possibility of child after child of the first defendant independently instituting suits ignoring the earlier adverse decisions and claiming rights. A possible answer to that question may be found in the extract from the judgment of Pyke v. Crouch Lord Raym 731; 91 E.R. 1387 given in the Bench judgment itself, from which a principle can be deduced that one child represents the entire body of the children, born or to be born, and therefore, there may not be any scope for the subsequent child or children filing separate suits because, under the Will, the legacy is for life in favour of the first defendant and the reminder in favour of the male issue of the first defendant and in the absence of male issue, in favour of the female issue of the first defendant. In such circumstances, it is possible to hold that the children as a whole, constitute one body of legatees, and therefore, any decision rendered in a suit filed by one of the children will be binding on the other children, even though those other children might not have been parties to that suit. 5. In these circumstances, I am clearly of the opinion that the conclusion of the Courts below is erroneous and the appeal is allowed and the judgments and decrees of the Courts below are set aside and the learned District Munsif, Namakkal, is directed to dispose of O.S. No. 58 of 1967 on merits, independant, of the question of res judicata. The parties will bear their respective costs throughout.