JUDGMENT.-This appeal has been filed by the defendant in O.S. No. 3034 of 1966 in the City Civil Court at Madras. The plaintiffs are the daughters of one Mariammal who is herself a daughter of one Veerammal. Veerammal died leaving certain properties. These properties were inherited by Mariammal as her heir. Mariammal died in 1936 leaving behind her husband Govinda Chetty and her daughters the first two plaintiffs and one Jagannatha Ammal. Jagannatha Ammal died in 1950 leaving behind her husband Subbiah Chetty, the defendant in the suit and a daughter Sargunavalli. Sargunavalli died in or about 1966. The plaintiffs claimed that on the death of Jagannatha Ammal in the year 1950, they had become entitled to the properties left by Mariammal and, therefore, they sought to recover possession from Jagannatha Animal’s husband Subbiah Chetty who was in enjoyment of the said properties. The defendant Subbiah Chetty contended that the properties under consideration were the properties of one Govinda Chetty, the husband of Mariammal and that the said properties had been divided between him and his sons by a registered deed of partition dated 27th June, 1963 in which these two items fell to the share of Govinda Chetty. Govinda Chetty is said to have made a settlement of the said properties by a registered document dated 3rd July, 1963 under which the suit property was given to the first plaintiff and the defendant’s daughter, since deceased, to be taken by them absolutely in equal shares. The defendant claimed that he was in possession of the suit property in his own right. 2. The trial Court held that the suit property belonged to Veerammal and that the plaintiffs became entitled to the suit property after the death of Jagannatha Ammal. It was also held that the deed of settlement executed by Govinda. Chetty was not valid and binding on the plaintiffs and that Govinda Chetty had. not acquired any interest in the property by adverse possession. The result was that the suit was decreed as prayed for. The defendant is now in appeal. 3. The first submission urged on behalf of the appellant is that on the death of Mariammal, her three daughters became the heirs, that on the death of Jagannatha Animal one of the three daughters, her share devolved on her daughter Sargunavalli on whose death the defendant himself became entitled to her share. The defendant is now in appeal. 3. The first submission urged on behalf of the appellant is that on the death of Mariammal, her three daughters became the heirs, that on the death of Jagannatha Animal one of the three daughters, her share devolved on her daughter Sargunavalli on whose death the defendant himself became entitled to her share. The learned counsel for the appellant, therefore, claimed that he was one of the three co-owners of the suit property and that there could no adverse possession as against him. As he continued to be a co-owner of the suit property, his one third share in the suit property had to be recognised. The learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the heirs of Mariammal were her daughters who took the properties jointly and on the death of Jagannatha Ammal, there was a right of survivorship available in favour of the plaintiffs so that the defendant had absolutely no right over those properties. 4. The question that has to be considered is whether the defendant had any title to the suit property either on the death of his wife Jagannatha Ammal in 1950 or on the death of his daughter Sargunavalli in the year 1966. The position of a property inherited by a female heir either from males or from females is now well-settled: It is stated in Mulla’s Hindu Law I4th Edition, paragraph 130. "(1) A woman may inherit the ordinary property of a male such as her husband, father, son and the rest. She may also inherit the stridhana of a female such as her mother, daughter, and the rest. (2) According to the Dayabhaga School, as well as the Benares, Mithila, and Madras Schools property inherited by a woman whether from a male or from a female, does not become her stridhans. She takes only a limited interest in the property, and on her death the property passes not to her heirs, but to the next heir of the person from whom she inherited it.“ Again in paragraph 169, it is stated:- "According to the Bengal, Benares, Mithila and Madras schools, the rule laid down in paragraph 168, subparagraph (3), as to property inherited by a female from a male, applies also to property inherited by her from a female. Consequently a female inheriting property (stridhana) from a female takes only a limited estate in such property, and at her death the property passes not to her heirs, but to the next stridhana heir of the female from whom she inherited it.“ "These propositions are indisputable. The result is that on the death of Jagannatha Ammal in this particular case the succession had to be ascertained as if it had gone back to Mariammal, her mother. The other stridhana heir of her mother would get it as Jagannatha Ammal was, at the relevant time, only a limited owner and could not prescribe her own line of descent. In P. Venkateswaralu v. D. Chinna Raghavalu1Subba Rao, CJ. as he then expressed the legal position as follows: — “Under Hindu Law, a female succeeding to the property of an absolute owner, whether a female or a male, does not take an absolute interest. She never becomes a fresh stock of descent. After her death, it reverts back to the heirs of the last male or female holder as the case may be. In the case of a stridhanam holder, after the death of a daughter the property reverts back to the mother, but the next heir of the stridhanam holder is the daughter’s daughter, and the daughter’s daughter takes it not as the heir of her mother, but as the stridhanam heir of her grandmother”. In that particular case, there was no other daughter who could be the stridhanam heir of her mother and, therefore, it was observed that the grand daughter would inherit the property as the heir of the grandmother and not as the heir of the mother. In the present case, there are daughters and, therefore they would be the stridhana heirs of the mother Mariammal and on the death of Jagannatha Ammal, the daughters of Mariammal would be entitled to her share also. 5. The question as to whether the daughters succeeding to their father’s estate take as joint tenants with rights of survivorship or not has been considered in several cases of this and other High Courts. Those decisions have been noticed by the Supreme Court in Karpagathachi v. Nagarathinathachi2. 5. The question as to whether the daughters succeeding to their father’s estate take as joint tenants with rights of survivorship or not has been considered in several cases of this and other High Courts. Those decisions have been noticed by the Supreme Court in Karpagathachi v. Nagarathinathachi2. In that case, it was pointed out that the two daughters succeeding to their father’s estate took as joint tenants with rights of survivorship and that they, just as two widows of a deceased Hindu, could also enter into an arrangement regarding their respective rights in the properties during the continuance of their estate. It is this aspect which has also been noticed in Mulla’s Hindu Law at page 114 of the 14th Edition as follows:- “Two or more daughters of a class take the estate jointly as in the case of widows, with rights of survivorship.” Therefore, even on the principle of survivorship, the two plaintiffs would be entitled to the entire properties left by Mariammal as the surviving heirs on the death of Jagannatha Ammal. Consequently, the defendant cannot claim’ any right over this property on the death) of Jagannatha Ammal in 1950. The legal position as already discussed shows that Jagannatha Animal could not have been a stock of descent and, therefore, Sargunavalli could not become her heir with respect to these properties so that on the death of Sargunavalli the property could devolve on Subbiah Chetty. 6. The only other aspect that was canvassed by the learned counsel for the appellant was that Mariammal’s husband Govinda Chetty had executed a settlement deed on 3rd July, 1973 marked as Exhibit A-1 in the case. Under the said document he claimed that this property had been in his undisputed enjoyment for a period of thirty years and he left part of the properties in favour of the first plaintiff and the other part in favour of the second plaintiff and Sargunavelli who was then alive. This document is relied on in support of the defendant’s title to a share. It is in this context that the competence Of Govinda Chetty to execute a settlement in respect of this property has to be gone into. Govinda Chetty had certain other properties which he had obtained on partition. I am not concerned with the settlement covering those properties. It is in this context that the competence Of Govinda Chetty to execute a settlement in respect of this property has to be gone into. Govinda Chetty had certain other properties which he had obtained on partition. I am not concerned with the settlement covering those properties. I am only concerned with the settlement of the properties left by Mariammal, his wife. He had no title to these properties. The assertion in the document that he was in undisputed possession of the property on his own for a period of thirty years does not appear to be a correct one. At any rate, there is no evidence to show that he put forward any rights adverse to his own daughters at any time prior to 3rd July, 1963. At the time when Mariammal died in 1936, her daughters were all young. It is only subsequently that they were married. Govinda Chetty could only have been in possession of these properties on the death of Mariammal for and on behalf of his own children. It is now well-settled that a permissive possession cannot be converted into an adverse possession unless it is proved that the person in possession asserted an adverse title to the property to the knowledge of the true owners for a period of twelve years or more. (See State Bank of Travancore v. A. K. Panicker1. As there is no evidence of any assertion of any title hostile to any daughters by Govinda Chetty at any point of time earlier than 3rd July, 1963, the settlement under Exhibit A-l can only be taken as such assertion on that particular date. The present suit has been filed within a period of three years from the said assertion and, therefore, the defendant cannot derive any benefit under the said document. Govinda Chetty had absolutely no right or interest over the said properties so as to settle them on others and, therefore, the defendant cannot claim any right under the said settlement either. The result is that the Court below acted rightly in decreeing the suit in the manner done. There is no merit in this appeal. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs. The Court-fee payable on the memorandum of appeal filed as pauper will be paid within a period of three months from this date. Time for four months is granted for delivery of possession.