JUDGN1ENT Bajpai, J. This second appeal is at the instance of the plaintiff landlord whose suit has been dismissed by the lower appellate Court. The trial Court passed a decree for eviction from the tenanted premises. The lower appellate Court set aside the same. The ground on which eviction of the tenant was ordered by the trial Court was under section 12 (1) (a) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (herein-after referred to as the 'Act'), i.e., default in payment of arrears of rent within the prescribed period of two months despite service of the notice of demand. 2. It was not disputed before this Court that the defendant respondent No. 1 was in arrears of rent. It was also not in dispute that dispute service of notice of demand, he failed to tender or make payment of the amount of arrears of rent. It was also not in dispute that even after the institution of the suit, the defendant-tenant failed to comply with the provisions of section 13 of the Act and did not deposit the amount of arrears of rent within one months of the service of the summons of the suit and also did not take care to deposit the amount of rent every month during the pendency of the suit. 3. The only point which could be and was pressed was that since the original landlord who instituted the suit for eviction on the ground under section 12 (1) (a) of the Act happened to transfer the suit-house in favour of the present appellant Ashok Kumar who had later on prosecuted the suit in place of the original plaintiff, the ground under section 12 (1)(a) did not exist. The argument was that after the sale of the house, the arrears of rent, even if assigned to the transferee, lost the character of arrears and assumed that of a debt. On this argument it was contended that so far as the transferee-landlord was concerned, the ground under section 12 (1) (a) was not available because the same can be availed of only in respect of arrears of rent and not of debt. 4. Seeming ingenuity does not pay in the Court of law as elsewhere. The argument put forth by the respondent Number 1 is absolutely misconceived as demonstrated herein-after. 4. Seeming ingenuity does not pay in the Court of law as elsewhere. The argument put forth by the respondent Number 1 is absolutely misconceived as demonstrated herein-after. The original landlord had the right to claim eviction on the ground of default in payment of arrears of rent despite service of notice of demand. He himself had actually instituted the suit on the said ground. The effect of assignment of the suit-house during the pendency of the suit naturally was that the assignee got all the rights of the lessor including the right to enforce the claim in suit for eviction of the tenant. The right to evict the defendant-tenant also passed with the transfer of the demised premises. This is the effect of section 109 of the Transfer of Property Act. All the rights including the right to enforce the claim in suit for eviction automatically reverted to the assignee. Even otherwise, there remains no doubt in this position because the wide definition of the term 'landlord' as given in section 2 (b) of the Act covers an assignee of the landlord also. This definition is in consonance with the provisions of section 109 of the Transfer of the Property Act. One, therefore, cannot say after obtaining the suit-house on transfer from the original landlord, the transferee could not prosecute the suit for eviction on the ground under section 12 (1) (a) of the Act. 5. It is true that in cases where eviction is sought on grounds, which are personal to the particular landlord there may be scope to contend that the particular need ceases to exist, but, where eviction is sought not on such personal grounds like that of bonafide genuine need of the landlord but in on such grounds like default in payment of rent which had given rise to a right in favour of the landlord to evict the tenant, the said right definitely passed to the transferee and the suit on such a ground can be continued and decreed. The argument put forth by the learned counsel for the respondent Number 1 could have been sustained if the original landlord might not have instituted the suit on the ground under section 12 (1) (a) of the Act after making the demand of arrears of rent before transferring the suit-house In that case, the amount of arrears of rent, even if assigned to the transferee, could have been in the nature of a debt and could not be demanded and recovered as arrears of rent by the assignee. But in the present case, the position is not so and this is the distinguishing feature of the present case with that of the decision in N.K. Kame v. Biharilal, 1968 JLJ 337 = 1968 MPLJ 276. In that case, the suit was instituted by the transferee landlord by contending that the amount of arrears of rent which had been assigned to him while selling the house, was not paid by the tenant on demand, In that case it was held that on assignment of the amount due towards arrears of rent, the same became a debt and, therefore could not be made the basis for claiming eviction under section 12 (1) (a) read with section 13 of the Act. In the present case, the suit having been already instituted after making a demand of arrears of rent and the defendant-tenant having failed to comply with the same within the prescribed period of two months, the original plaintiff did acquire a right to evict the tenant under section 12 (1) (a) of the Act. It was the said right which he enforced by filing the present wit. With the assignment of the demises premises those rights passed over to the transferee, i.e., the present appellant and, if the trial Court decreed the claim for eviction in the context of the undisputed circumstances, as stated earlier, there was no error of law or of fact in the judgment and decree of the said Court. Similar was the view taken in the case of Chandmal v. Inayat Khan and others 1972 JLJ SN 23. The lower appellant Court therefore, committed an error of law in setting aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court. 6. No other point was pressed. 7. The result is that the appeal is allowed with costs. Similar was the view taken in the case of Chandmal v. Inayat Khan and others 1972 JLJ SN 23. The lower appellant Court therefore, committed an error of law in setting aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court. 6. No other point was pressed. 7. The result is that the appeal is allowed with costs. The judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court arc set aside and that of the trial Court are restored. Counsel's fee according to schedule, if certified.