JUDGMENT T. U. Metha, C. J.—This revision was initially filed as an appeal. But as a result of some indication given by a Division Bench on 10- -1972, the learned Advocate General was granted permission to convert the appeal into revision and that is how this matter has been treated as a revision. 2. The respondent Ram Saran was convicted by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Theog by his order dated 22-7-1971 for the offence of theft punishable under section 380 read with section 75,1. P. C, and was senteced to undergo rigorous imprisonment of one and a half year and to pay a fine of Rs. 100/- in default of which he was ordered to undergo further rigorous imprisonment of three months. This order of conviction was recorded by the learned Magistrate on the respondents own plea of guilty to the charge which was read over to him for the offence of theft punishable under section 380 read with section 75, I.P.C. 3. Against this order of conviction and sentence the respondent Ram Saran filed jail appeal which was registered as criminal jail appeal No. 74-M/10 of 1971. The appeal was heard by the learned Sessions Judge, Mahasu, who found that during investigation the police had not collected sufficient material and, therefore, the charge framed by the learned Magistrate was not sustainable and hence the respondent s plea of guilty ought not to have been taken into account. The learned Sessions Judge, therefore, accepted the appeal, quashed the order of conviction and sentence passed by the learned Magistrate and 1 discharged" the present respondent by his order, dated 31-12- 1971. 4. Against this order of "discharge", the State preferred an appeal which, as already stated above, was converted into the present revision application. The order passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court on 9-44975 shows that thereafter a controversy has arisen as to whether the impugned order of the learned Sessions Judge was an order of acquittal or an order of discharge of the accused within the meaning of section 436 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The learned Single Judge observed that if the order of the learned Sessions Judge was an order of discharge, the revision petition against that order would be maintainable. However, if it is an order of acquittal, the revision would not be maintainable under section 439 of the Code. The learned Single Judge observed that if the order of the learned Sessions Judge was an order of discharge, the revision petition against that order would be maintainable. However, if it is an order of acquittal, the revision would not be maintainable under section 439 of the Code. Thinking that this controversy was important, the learned Single Judge has referred the matter to the Division Bench and has observed that the Division Bench should consider whether any alteration in its order dated 10-5-1972 was required to be made. 5. Reference to the order-sheet shows that on 10th May, 1972, a Division Bench of this Court has made the following order :— "The learned Advocate General prays for permission to convert the appeal into a revision application. Permission granted." 6. The first question to be considered is whether any alteration in the above quoted order of 10-5-1972 is required to be made. 7. We find that the learned trial Magistrate framed the charge under section 251-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1898. Sub-section (3) of that section provided that upon the police documents being considered, and the prosecution and the accused having an opportunity of being heard, if the Magistrate is of the opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed the offence which the Magistrate is competent to try, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused. Under sub-section (4) of that section, such a charge was required to be read over and explained to the accused and the plea of the accused was required to be recorded. If the accused, however, pleaded guilty, the Magistrate was expected to record the pie* and in his discretion convict him on that plea. So far as the facts of this case are concerned, it is found that in his charge the Magistrate has recorded the necessary allegations with regard to the offence in question as well as with regard to the previous conviction of the respondent. This charge was framed by the learned Magistrate on 19-7-1977. On this charge the plea of the respondent-accused was recorded by the learned Magistrate. While giving this plea, the respondent-accused has stated many details with regard to the incident and has clearly admitted and shown how he committed the offence in question. This charge was framed by the learned Magistrate on 19-7-1977. On this charge the plea of the respondent-accused was recorded by the learned Magistrate. While giving this plea, the respondent-accused has stated many details with regard to the incident and has clearly admitted and shown how he committed the offence in question. Three days thereafter the Magistrate again recorded a detailed statement of the accused and then he accepted the plea of guily and passed the order of conviction. 8. Now under the provisions of the old Code as contained in section 412, where the accused person has pleaded quilty and has been convicted by a Magistrate on such plea, there shall be no appeal except as to the extent of legality of the sentence. Since in this case the respondent accused was convicted and sentenced upon his own plea of guilty, it was not open to him to prefer any appeal on merits before the learned Sessions Judge. However, the learned Sessions Judge has entertained the appeal and has allowed the same on the ground that the learned Magistrate was not justified in framing the charge because the evidence collected by the police was not sufficient to sustain the charge. According to the learned Sessions Judge, therefore, the plea recorded by the learned Magistrate was also not justified. Therefore, though the learned Sessions Judge has stated in his order that the accused was discharged, his order amounted in reality to an order of acquital. If that be so, the State was justified in filing an acquittal appeal against that order and, therefore, we find that it was not necessary to convert the appeal filed by the State into a revision. 9. So far as the reference made by the learned Single Judge is concerned, we, for the reasons stated above, are of the opinion that alteration in the order Gated 10-5-1972, quoted above, is required and this revision should be treated as an appeal. 10. We now come to the merits of the case. Since this revision is to be treated as an acquittal appeal, the question is whether the learned Sessions Judge was justified in acquitting the respondent-accused on the ground that the learned Magistrate ought not to have framed the charge against him. 10. We now come to the merits of the case. Since this revision is to be treated as an acquittal appeal, the question is whether the learned Sessions Judge was justified in acquitting the respondent-accused on the ground that the learned Magistrate ought not to have framed the charge against him. We find that the learned Sessions Judge was not justified in appreciating the evidence collected by the police as if it was the evidence recorded in judicial proceedings by a court of law. The reason is that the facts which are stated in the charge, if believed, do make out all the ingredients of the offence punishable under section 380 as well as section 75,1. P. C. Therefore, if the facts stated in the charge, were admitted to be true by the accused, these facts must be taken as proved, if the admission in form of plea of guilty is found acceptable. 11. Shri Ahuja who appeared on behalf of the respondent-accused, contended that it is always open to the appellate court or the revisional court to consider whether the Magistrate had justification to frame the charge. So far as the case filed on a police challan is concerned, the Magistrate looks to the police papers and comes to the conclusion as regards the question whether charge should be framed or not. It was contended that if this conclusion is not found to be justified, the appellate court can interfere with the order of the Magistrate even if his final order of conviction is based on a plea of guilty. 12. In our opinion this approach is wholly incorrect. Plea of guilty would be of no avail if the facts stated in the charge do not make out an offence. It would be of no avail even if the accused has pleaded guilty under some misapprehension or under pressure, threat etc. Again if the court finds that the plea of guilty in a particular case does not amount to that plea considering the manner in which the accused has raised the plea, the court can ignore the plea of guilty and can decide the matter on merits. Again if the court finds that the plea of guilty in a particular case does not amount to that plea considering the manner in which the accused has raised the plea, the court can ignore the plea of guilty and can decide the matter on merits. However, when the facts stated in the charge are clear enough to coyer all the ingredients of the offence in question and if the accused pleads guilty to these facts, then it is not open to the appellate court to appreciate the evidence which is collected by the police and which is taken by the Magistrate into consideration at the time of framing the charge. The reason is that after the facts with regard to a particular offence are clearly mentioned in the charge and if these facts bring the case within the ingredients of that offence, the admission of these facts by the accused in his plea of guilty would furnish the proof of the facts in question and no further proof would be required. It is for this reason that subsection (5) of section 251-A of the Code empowers the Magistrate to accept the plea of guilty in his discretion and to convict the accused thereon without recording any further evidence. 13. Our attention was drawn to several decisions which go .-to show that if the facts stated in the charge do not amount to an offence to which the accused has pleaded guilty then the court can ignore the plea of guilty and can decide the matter accordingly. We have no dispute about this principle. However, no decision was pointed out to us going to show that even if the charge read over to the accused covers all the ingredients of the offence regarding which the plea is recorded, the appellate court or the revisional court can appreciate the evidence which is appreciated by the learned Magistrate at the time of the framing of the charge. The Madhya Pradesh case of State v. Mustaq Hussain, reported in AIR 1955 Madh Pra 137, on which reliance was pleased by the learned Advocate of the respondent-accused, does not apply to the facts of our case because it appears that in that case the police challan which contained allegations with regard to Section 19 (5) of the Madhya Pradesh Public Security Act, was read over to the accused. But these allegations did not constitute any offence in question. The court, therefore, held that these allegations, even if taken as they were, did not amount to an offence in question. These are not the facts in our case because here the learned Magistrate considered the police papers and framed a charge which was read over to the accused. The facts stated in this charge did constitute an offence under section 380 read with section 75, I.P.C and the accused-respondent pleaded guilty to these facts. 14. We find that the learned Sessions Judge was not at all justified in appreciating the evidence collected by the police and in pointing out the loop holes in this evidence. As a matter of fact, inspite of what the learned Sessions Judge has said about this evidence, the accused in his plea of guilty has made an elaborate and detailed statement wherein he has admitted all the facts. The result, therefore, is that the accused, who has got personal knowledge of what he has done, has admitted to have done these acts. But the learned Sessions Judge has said that even if the accused, who is the best person to know what he has done, has admitted the facts, these facts are not proved. The approach adopted by the learned Sessions Judge, therefore, is on the face of it very ridiculous, because it takes the course of justice away from the stark realities and makes an indulgence in inferences which have got no foundation. Under the circumstances, we allow this appeal, set aside the order of acquittal passed by the learned Sessions Judge, and restore the order of sentence passed by the learned Magistrate, but order that the sentence already undergone by the respondent-accused as an under-trial person shall be set off. The respondent-accused to surrender to serve out the sentence passed on him.