Short Note : 1. The food grain entrusted to the accused on 21.9.1970 remained with the applicant and in March and April 1976 he was again asked by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Jaora to produce food grain but even then the seized wheat and Juwar was not produced. Consequently, on 28.10.1976 the accused was prosecuted by the Jaora Police for an offence under section 406 of the Indian Penal Code on the ground that he had misappropriated the aforesaid quantity of food-grains entrusted to him. 2. In this prosecution, the accused raised an objection that the learned Magistrate could not take congnisance of the offence alleged against him because of the specific bar created in section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure according to which as a period of three years had elapsed from the date of the alleged commission of the offence the prosecution was barred by time. The learned Magistrate by his impugned order rejected the plea of limitation raised by the applicant and held that provisions of section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 did not apply. It is against this order that this revision application has been. 3. Facts which are not in dispute are that it was 21.9.1970 that the aforesaid quantity of wheat and Juwar was entrusted on a Supurdginama executed by the accused, that Anwar Beg was prosecuted for certain offence under the Control Orders in Criminal Case No. 814 of 1970, that in that case notices were served both by the Food Inspector as well as by the Court for the production of the said seized quantity of food-grains and that the said orders were not complied with by the accused (see copies of notices issued by the Food Inspector and the Orders passed by the Magistrate in Criminal Case No. 814 of 1970). All these facts will therefore show that the offence alleged against the accused was committed by him after he failed to return the Food-grains entrusted to him even after the aforesaid notices were issued by the Food Inspector and orders were passed by the Magistrate in Criminal Case No. 814 of 1970 between December, 1970 and June, 1972. A reference, in this connection, may be made to the certified copies of the notices and orders filed by the accused in this case as per the list dated 25.1.1977. A reference, in this connection, may be made to the certified copies of the notices and orders filed by the accused in this case as per the list dated 25.1.1977. When the offences were committed between January 1970 and June 1971, a prayer for cognizance of these offences being taken by the Magistrate, should have been made by the prosecution within three years from the date of the commission of the offences as required by sections 468 and 469 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The fact that the offence was committed by the accused was known to the prosecution at least before June, 1972 when the complaint made by the Food Inspector against Anwar Beg was filed and the accused was discharged by the order passed on 3.6.1972. Consequently as provided by section 469 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the period of limitation pre scribed by section 468 of the Criminal Procedure Code shall be deemed to have commenced, if not from an earlier date, at least from 3rd June 1972 when final orders were passed in the complaint case against Anwar Beg in Criminal Case No. 814 of 1970. 4. The offence under section 406 of the Indian Penal Code is punishable upto three year's imprisonment. Consequently, the period of limitation of three years prescribed by section 468 of the Criminal Procedure Code will be clearly applicable. In this case, the police filed the report on 15.10.1976 on which date the learned Magistrate took cognizance of the offence allegedly committed by the applicant Omprakash. The cognizance of the offence was thus taken beyond the period of three years both from the date when the offence was committed as also from the date when the prosecution knew about the commission of offence. Cognizance, thus taken after the expiry of three years was against the provisions of section 468 red with section 469 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. 5. Learned counsel for the State then referred to section 473 Cr. P.C. 1973 and urged that on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the delay has been explained and that it was necessary to take cognizance after the expiry of period of three years in the interest of justice. I am unable to accept this contention. 6. Learned counsel for the State then referred to section 473 Cr. P.C. 1973 and urged that on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the delay has been explained and that it was necessary to take cognizance after the expiry of period of three years in the interest of justice. I am unable to accept this contention. 6. When the police filed the report, nothing was said as to why the prosecution was being launched after the expiry of a period of three years when it had become known in June, 1972 that the accused has misapproiated the property entrusted to him. The authorities concerned were quiet for more than 4 years. Provisions for providing period of limitation were introduced by section 488 Cr. P.C. with effect from 1.4.1974. Even though these provisions came into force on this date, the prosecution remained silent and took steps to prosecute the applicant in October, 1976 only. There is thus no material on record from which the inordinate delay has even been attempted to be explained. No doubt, the accused prima facie appears to have committed the offence but if the prosecution itself has not been diligent and has not even cared to place sufficient material before the Court to explain the delay so as to avoid the bar of limitation, it would not be just and proper to extend the benefit of section 473 of the Criminal Procedure Code in such a case. In my opinion, the objection raised by the accused under section 468 Cr. P.C. must prevail. Revision allowed.