ORDER Mishra, J.— This is a revision against order dated 16-8-1974 passed by the Civil Judge, Class II, Morena rejecting the application for leave to sue in forma-pauperis. 2. Facts essential for purposes of this revision are as under :- (a) The plaintiff-applicant had sold the suit land by registered sale deed in favour of the defendant-non-applicant for Rs. 3000/-. The plaintiff further averred that the defendant had agreed to reconvey the property on return of the sale price but he is not honouring his promise. Therefore, the plaintiff applied for leave to sue in forma pauperis for specific performance of the agreement for sale on 22-1-1974. (b) On this date the trial Judge examined the applicant under Order 33 rule 4, wherein the applicant stated that he offered the money for payment to the defendant-non-applicant but he has refused to reconvey the suit land. (c) On 22-1-1974 the Court ordered issuance of notice to the Collector as well as non-applicant. (d) The notice issued to the Collector did not return after service. (e) No enquiry was ordered and held yet by the impugned order the learned trial Judge has rejected the application for leave to sue in forma-pauperis. 3. Shri Swami Saran, learned counsel for the applicant has contended that the impugned order has been passed without holding inquiry which is necessary prior to rejection of application to sue in forma-pauperis. Shri B.N. Kulshrestha, learned counsel for the non-applicant is not present today but he had fully argued the matter yesterday and had submitted that the impugned order is in accordance with law and the revision deserves to be dismissed in view of the fact that the suit (i.e. the main petition) has been dismissed for non-payment of the Court fee. 4. After having heard the learned counsel for the parties, I am of the opinion that the revision deserves to be allowed. 5. From perusal of the order-sheets, it is clear that the trial Court never afforded any opportunity to the applicant to lead evidence in support of his claim to be a pauper. Even notice sent to the Collector had not returned after service. Thus the impugned order appears to have been passed with undue haste and in contravention of the mandatory provisions of Order 33 rules 6 and 7 CPC. Even notice sent to the Collector had not returned after service. Thus the impugned order appears to have been passed with undue haste and in contravention of the mandatory provisions of Order 33 rules 6 and 7 CPC. It appears that the learned trial Judge has gone by the so called admission of the applicant considered to have been made in his examination dated 22-1-1974 under Order 33 rule 4 C.P.C. wherein he has stated that the defendant-non-applicant had refused to accept the money when he tendered. The learned trial Judge has taken this statement to be an admission of being possessed of means sufficient to pay the Court fee. Such admission cannot be spelled out from the aforesaid statement. The plaintiff applicant has not admitted that it was his own money. It may be that he had borrowed it from some body else. Statement has to be taken as it is. Nothing can be read into it, as appears to have been done by the learned trial Judge. Thus the impugned order appears to be wholly illegal and passed with material irregularity in exercise of the jurisdiction. 6. This brings me to the objection raised by Shri B.N. Kulshrestha, learned counsel for the non-applicant which's to the effect that the application itself has been rejected for non-payment of Court fees by the applicant, therefore, the revision against the impugned order does not survived. This objection has no force. 7. It is true that as a consequence of refusal of stay order by this Court and as a consequence of non-payment of Court fee, the application has been rejected on 18.9.1974. However, Shri Swami Saran, learned counsel for the applicant contends that if the impugned order is set aside all subsequent orders will also automatically fall down. His further contention is that prior to the dismissal of the main petition, this revision had been filed and admitted by this Court. Therefore, if in the meantime, the application happens to be dismissed the revision will not be rendered infructuous. There appears to be great force in this argument advanced by Shri Swami Saran. 8. His further contention is that prior to the dismissal of the main petition, this revision had been filed and admitted by this Court. Therefore, if in the meantime, the application happens to be dismissed the revision will not be rendered infructuous. There appears to be great force in this argument advanced by Shri Swami Saran. 8. In the case of Sital Prashad and others v. Kishorilal, AIR 1967 SC 1236 their Lordships of the Supreme Court have laid down several principles one of which is:- "If in appeal the preliminary decree is reversed, the final decree must fall to the ground for there is no preliminary decree thereafter in support of it. It is not necessary in such a case for the defendant to go to the Court passing the final decree and ask it to set aside the final decree. Even if the defendant does not make an application to the Court for setting aside the final decree within three years because the preliminary decree has been reversed, the decree holder cannot get the right to execute the final decree which has no preliminary decree in support of it. If an execution petition is made on such a final decree even though more than three years after the decree in appeal has been reversed, the defendant has simply to ask the Court where the execution petition is made to refuse to execute the decree on the ground that the preliminary decree in support of it has been set aside. It seems that in such a case it is the duty of the executing Court to take note of the fact that the preliminary decree in support of the final decree has been reversed and it should refuse to execute the final decree even though the fact is brought to its notice more than three years after the decree in appeal reversing the preliminary decree. In such a case no question of limitation arises." 9. Viswanatha Sastri, J. has laid down the law on the topic as follows, AIR 1951 Mad 218 :- "There is no provision any-where in the Code that takes away the right of a party to appeal from a preliminary decree or an order of remand, if a final decree happens to be passed in the suit before the appeal against the preliminary decree or the order of remand is presented. Nor is there any provision in the Code, that an appeal against a preliminary decree or an order of remand properly presented becomes defunct by the passing of a final decree pending the appeal." 10. The view of this Court reported in Madhorao Paikaji v. Eknathrao Balappa and others, 34 MPLC 466 = AIR 1948 Nag. 56 is also in line with the principles laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Sital Prashad (supra) The Nagpur view in the case of Madhorao Paikaji (supra) was as under : "There is no provision in the Code making an appeal filed against the preliminary decree infructuous if an appeal against the final decree is not filed. The function of a final decree is merely to restate and apply with precision what the preliminary decree has ordained and the decree being in the same suit the Court in appeal from the preliminary decree, as it has power to reverse or vary the preliminary decree, has also power to effect the final decree. A passing of a final decree subsequent to the institution of the appeal will not affect the maintainability of the appeal against the preliminary decree." 11. The ratio of (Taleb Ali and another v. Aziz and others, AIR 1929 Calcutta 689) is also as under : "An appeal from a preliminary decree is not incompetent even if a final decree is made before the appeal is presented. Nor is it necessary for a party aggrieved by a preliminary decree to appeal both from that decree and against the final decree in order to maintain his appeal against the preliminary decree although the final decree apart from its being based on the preliminary decree may be otherwise correct." 12. In (Lakshmi v. Marudevi and others, AIR 1915 Mad. 197) as has been laid down thus : "The District Judge's final order did not affect the defendant's right of appeal against the preliminary order, if the appeal was preferred within the period allowed by law as the later order did not supersede the first. The reversal of the first order would have the effect of nullifying the final order." 13. The logic of the aforesaid cases can very well be extended to cases of the present nature also. There is no legal impedimeat in extending the same principle to the present situation. The reversal of the first order would have the effect of nullifying the final order." 13. The logic of the aforesaid cases can very well be extended to cases of the present nature also. There is no legal impedimeat in extending the same principle to the present situation. The similar principle has come to be applied in the following cases : In G. Sundarnm Chettiar v. A.P. Valli Ammal, AIR 1935 Mad. 43 ) it has been held that : "The first case upon this point to which our attention was drawn was 1915 Mad. 197 (4). There it was held that an appeal against a preliminary order in execution can be filed even after the date of the final order wh.ch merely carries out and is consequential to the preliminary order though no appeal has been filed against the final order and that with the reversal of the earlier order, the later order which depends for its validity upon the earlier one ipso facto ceases to have any force. It is argued therefore that if in this appeal it is held that Stone, J's order was wrong, the latter order namely the decree which was passed in consequence of it, is of no force. There is another decision upon this point, viz., 1914 Mad. 473 (5) to the same effect, and there is also a decision of Calcutta High Court, 1929 Cal 689 (6); It is quite true that those cases were cases in which preliminary decree had been passed but it seems to me, although I say so with some hesitation, that the same effect must be given to cases where a wrong order has resulted in a wrong decree. Clearly, if in this case the order which is under appeal and which in my opinion was a wrong order has not been made, the defendant would have been given leave to defend and the result might have been quite different from that it has been." Though in different context the same principle has been laid down in (Chappila and others v. Chemmaran and others, AIR 1961 Kerala 200). The ratio of this case is as under :- "Where the appellate Court wrongly disallows the transposition sought by the petitionees so as to enable them to prosecute the appeal which was abandoned by the plaintiff appellant and as a consequence, the appeal is dismissed as not pressed, the dismissal of the appeal does not render infructuous a revision petition by the petitioners against the order disallowing their application for being transposed as appellants The dismissal of the appeal is a direct consequence of the wrong order and the result of allowing the revision petition and transposing the petitioners as appellants would be that the appeal would remain disposed of only so far as the appellant plaintiff was concerned and that it must be regarded as pending so far as the petitioners were concerned. The Court can prevent the miscarriage of justice which the wrong order of the appellate Court will doubtless occasion. AIR 1951 Mad 218 and AIR 1935 Mad 43 Relied. on." In (Mitra Mukherjee and Co. and another v. Ajit Kumar Sarkar, AIR 1963 Cal. 9 ) the law on the point is laid down in para 8 of the judgment which runs as under : "(8) Mr. Banerjee, learned counsel for the plaintiff raised a preliminary objection that as the defendants have preferred an appeal only from the order directing the furnishing of security and not from the decree which was drawn up later the appeal ought not to be allowed as it will leave the decree untouched. In my opinion this objection is not sound. The decree in this case does not stand by itself but rests on the order for furnishing security and was expressly conditional on the defendants' failure to furnish security. In my opinion this objection is not sound. The decree in this case does not stand by itself but rests on the order for furnishing security and was expressly conditional on the defendants' failure to furnish security. If we find that the order for furnishing security should not have been made and allow an appeal there from, the decree which is based on the order should automatically disappear and there should be no occasion for filing an appeal from the decree which will only go to swell up the costs In the case of G. Sundaram Chettiar v. P.A Valli Ammal, ILR 58 116, ( AIR 1935 Mad 43 ) on a suit filed under the provisions of O. 37 of CPC based on a promissory note the master of Madras High Court being of the opinion that the defence was not bona fide gave leave to defend on condition that the defendant should, within a week, pay the full amount claimed in the plaint into Court. Stone, J. upheld the Master's order granting conditional leave to defend but varied the condition altering it to one of security for the full amount claim ill the suit to be given within fourteen days from the date of the order. The security was not given and the decree was drawn up. No appeal was preferred from the decree and the only appeal filed by the defendant was against Stone J’s order imposing the condition. It was urged before the division bench of the Madras High Court that where a decree had been passed and no appeal had been presented against it the Court of appeal had no proper seisin of the matter and could not order stay of execution. As against this it was argued that if the appeal presented was allowed and it was found that Stone J.’s order was wrong then the decree which was passed in consequence of it was of no force. The learned Judges of the Madras High Court after referring to the judgment of this Court in Talebali v. Abdul Aziz ILR 57 Cal 1013, (AIR 1929 Cal 689) (FB) held that the appellant's contention should be given effect to. As against this Mr. Banerjee drew our attention to the case of Haji Mohamuddin and Co. v. The Eastern Japan Trading Co. ILR 50 Cal. 215: (AIR 1923 Cal. 639). As against this Mr. Banerjee drew our attention to the case of Haji Mohamuddin and Co. v. The Eastern Japan Trading Co. ILR 50 Cal. 215: (AIR 1923 Cal. 639). In this case a suit was brought for the balance due in respect of certain drafts. The plaintiff presented an application for attachment before judgment and the defendants were called upon to show cause why they should not furnish security for the claim and costs of the plaintiffs or why in default, their stock in-trade at 55-11 Canning Street should not be attached until the final determination of the suit or until further order of the Court, Buckland, J. ordered the defendant firm to give security at once to the satisfaction of the Registrar of this Court to the extent of the plaintiff firm’s claim and costs in the suit in default thereof a writ of attachment was to issue out of and under the seal of this Court commending the sheriff of Calcutta to attach until the final determination of this suit or until further order of this Court the stock-in trade of the defendant firm lying at No. 55-11 Canning Street, Calcutta. An appeal being preferred against the said order it was contended by counsel for tae plaintiffs that no appeal lay thereform. Considering the provisions of O. 38 and O.43 of the Code of Civil Procedure Sanderson C. J. said that in his judgment taking the said provisions as a guide it might reasonably be held that the order in so far as it directed the attachment of the property, was a judgment and was appealable, but in so far as it directed security to be furnished, it was not appealable. It was to this observation that Mr. Banerjee referred in support of his contention that as the order appealed from is one for furnishing security no appeal lay from it and that even if we are disposed to hold that on the facts of the case that the defendants have disclosed a good and bona fide defence we could not entertain any appeal from the order directing the furnishing of security. The proposition seems to be an astounding one. The result of the order is that if security is not furnished a decree against the defendants would be drawn up and the suit finally disposed of. The proposition seems to be an astounding one. The result of the order is that if security is not furnished a decree against the defendants would be drawn up and the suit finally disposed of. It is absurd to suggest that such an order is not appealable or that there is any reason to hold that the appeal from the order directing security to be furnished is not maintainable. The effect of non-compliance with the order, as I have already pointed out, is to deprive the defendants of a valuable right, namely, to defend the suit and clearly in such a case it can not be said that the order directing security, in default whereof a decree was to be drawn up against the defendants is not appealable. This point in my opinion has no merits." The view of Allahabad High Court on the point is condensed in the AIR Commentaries CPC, 9th Edition, Vol. II at page 576 under 16 as under :- "An order rejecting an appeal during the pendency of the revision petition will not be a final order. Therefore, it will not be res-judicata against the quashing order to be passed in the revision petition. Even if that order dismissing the suit has merged in the order rejecting the appeal therefrom or the latter order is not challenged by a separate revision petition. Yet that quashing order can be passed. 1972 All W.R. (H. C.) 347 (352), Relied on." 12. The ratio of the case reported in (Chetram v. Ram), 1976 MPLJ Short Notes 1, is also to the same effect. It runs as under:- "Though when there is another remedy open the High Court may not interfere in revision, it has power to do so if circumstances so demand. On 19-11-1973 the Court allowed defendant's application for setting aside exparte order and directed deposit of costs within 7 days. Defendant however deposited costs on 10-12-1973 and applied for exending time. On 12-4-1974 case was adjourned to 19-6-74 on which date the Court rejected defendant's application for extending time and proceeded exparte. Eventually an exparte decree was passed. Defendant filed revision against order rejecting application for extending time. It was contended that as a decree was already passed and an appeal could be filed the revision was not tenable. On 12-4-1974 case was adjourned to 19-6-74 on which date the Court rejected defendant's application for extending time and proceeded exparte. Eventually an exparte decree was passed. Defendant filed revision against order rejecting application for extending time. It was contended that as a decree was already passed and an appeal could be filed the revision was not tenable. Held: that though a decree was passed the order rejecting extension of time was the foundation of the decree and revision against the order was competent and that the High Court would interfere in the circumstances. AIR 1960 AP 540 AIR 1961 Ker. 200 ; 1966 KLR 915 and CR. 420/74 Dt-1-31.3-1975 Followed. AIR 1967 SC 681 ref. 1971, MPLJ Note 14 Distinguished". 13. The following principles emerge from the aforesaid cases:- (1) If order on the basis of which consequential orderers have been passed in a given case is set aside in revision, all consequential orders passed thereafter will automatically fall to the ground. (2) Passing of merely consequential order cannot be set up an impediment for exercise of revisory jurisdiction vested in this Court under section 115 CPC. 14. Accordingly, it cannot be held that the revision has been rendered infructuous. Since the impugned order has been passed in flagrant violation of the provisions of law as contained in Order 33 rules 6 and 7 and is based on the erroneous assumption of fact pertaining to the applicant's admission regarding availability of sufficient means to pay Court fee, the present case is a fit case for exercise of the revisory jurisdiction of this Court. As such the revision is allowed and the impugned order is set aside. Accordingly, all subsequent proceedings also fall to the ground. The trial Court is now directed to proceed from the stage of inquiry into the application for leave to sue in forma-pauperis affording opportunity to the applicant to lead evidence in support of his application and decide the matter denovo in accordance with law. There will be no order as to costs in the facts and circumstances of the present case. 15. This order will govern the fate of Civil Revision Nos. 454 of 1974 and 456 of 974 also since they arise out of almost identical facts and questions of law involved therein are also identical.