A. K. SEN, B. C. CHAKRABARTI ( 1 ) THIS is an appeal by the plaintiff against a decree of dismissal passed in O. C. Suit No. 7 of 1976 of the 6th Court of Addl. District Judge, Alipore. ( 2 ) THE plaintiff-appellant instituted the above suit for grant of probate in respect of two wills allegedly executed by his mother, one on 27. 12. 1963 and the other on 18. 3. 1968 in respect of different items of properties. The case of plaintiff briefly is as follows:- ( 3 ) THE two wills, one relating to 89 Dilkhusa Street and the other relating to 91 Dilkhusa Street were the last wills executed by Uttama Debi, mother of the plaintiff. The plaintiff has been nominated as the executor in both the wills. The wills were duly executed and attested. She died on 17. 1. 1973 leaving four sons, Nirmal Narendra, Chandi and Shibdas (plaintiff) and six daughters Bindubasini, Subhasini, Pravabati, Ashalata, Padmabati and Lili Dutta. The plaintiff as executor applied for grant of probate in respect of both the wills. ( 4 ) DEFENDANT No. 4 Bindubasini resisted the claim by filing a written statement. Her case is that the wills are not genuine documents that Uttama Dutta was a pardanashin and illiterate woman and the wills were procured by the propounder without letting her know the contents thereof, that the wills contain false recitals and seek to extend substantial personal benefits to the propounder and that the wills were not free acts of a capable and conscious testatrix. ( 5 ) DEFENDANTS 7 and 9, Ashalata Bose and Lily Datta also filed a joint written statement almost in the same lines as above. On these pleadings the following issues were settled for decision:- (1) Are the wills in question genuine and valid documents? (2) Were the wills duly executed and attested according to law? (3) Had the testatrix sound disposing mind at the time of execution of the wills? (4) Is the plaintiff entitled to get grant of the probate of the wills? (5) What relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled to? ( 6 ) EXT. 1a is the will dated 27. 12. 1963 and Ext. 1 is the later will dated 18. 3. 1968 the former relating to 89 Dilkhusa Street and the latter to 91 Dilkhusa Street. Ext. 1 (b) is another will dated 27. (5) What relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled to? ( 6 ) EXT. 1a is the will dated 27. 12. 1963 and Ext. 1 is the later will dated 18. 3. 1968 the former relating to 89 Dilkhusa Street and the latter to 91 Dilkhusa Street. Ext. 1 (b) is another will dated 27. 12. 1963 in respect of certain properties at Agarpara in favour of Lily Datta. All the three wills appear to have been registered on the same date namely March 21, 1968. By a subsequent deed of gift, the properties covered by the 3rd Will, were gifted to Lily Datta (Ext. 3a dated 3. 5. 1968 ). Besides will Uttama Datta appears to have disposed of various other properties, by different documents, between 1961 and 1968. Ext. 3 (b) is a registered arpannama dated 25. 1. 1961, in respect of the residential house at 40, A, B and C Kareya Road, Calcutta dedicating the property to Sri Sri Siva. Ext. C and C1, both dated 11. 9. 1961 are registered deeds of gift in respect of half share each of 72b, Park Street and 6a Meher Ali Road. The donee is Shibdas Datta, the plaintiff, Ext. 1a, one of the disputed wills, is in favour of Nirmal Chandra Datta and Chandi Charan Datta. Ext. 1, the other will is in favour of Shibdas Datta. Ext. 3 is a deed of gift in favour of Lily Datta in respect of certain properties in mouza Tarapukur. Ext. 2 dated 28. 3. 1969 is a deed of relinquishment by Uttama Datta of the office of Sebait in favour of her four sons. These are the principal documentary evidence adduced in the suit. ( 7 ) BESIDES the documentary evidence, several witnesses were examined on both sides. P. W. 1 is the propounder himself. P. W. 2 Sushil Kumar Ghosh is a nephew of Uttama Datta and cousin of the contesting parties. He is an attesting witness to Ext. 1 and the deed of relinquishment, Ext. 2 P. W. 3 Sasanka Bhowmick is an attesting witness to the other will Ext. 1a. ( 8 ) D. W. 1 is Bindubasini. D. W. 2 is Asha Bose and D. W. 3 is Lily Datta. He is an attesting witness to Ext. 1 and the deed of relinquishment, Ext. 2 P. W. 3 Sasanka Bhowmick is an attesting witness to the other will Ext. 1a. ( 8 ) D. W. 1 is Bindubasini. D. W. 2 is Asha Bose and D. W. 3 is Lily Datta. The three D. W. s who are none other than the contesting defendants have all stated in one voice that the wills are not genuine documents and that the brothers managed to procure the same from their mother Uttama without letting her know the purport and implications of the documents she executed. ( 9 ) UPON a consideration of the evidence on record, the Ld. Judge found that Uttama had a sound disposing mind, that initial evidence of execution and attestation were adduced but that there were as many as ten items of suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the will which could not be reasonably explained by the propounder. This suspicious not having been dispelled, the Ld. Judge found in the ultimate analysis that the wills were not genuine and valid documents. The suspicious circumstances found by the Ld. Judge may be enumerated thus:- (1) The wills contain false recitals as to the financial status of the daughters. It was found that all the daughters, with the exception of Lily Datta were receiving financial assistance from Uttama but in the wills they are said to be happily married and well placed in life. (2) The propounder derived substantial benefits from Ext. 1 and he took active part in the matter of execution of this as also the other will. (3) The evidence indicates that the wills were neither read by Uttama nor read out to her. (4) The lawyer who prepared the wills allegedly under instructions from Uttama, though available was not examined. (5) There is an admission by PW I Sibdas that his mother executed other wills both before and after the two wills in question. (6) There is evidence that Uttama executed a will in 1963 in favour of Lily Datta and there is no reason why she would discriminate in favour of one daughter only without any apparent justification. (7) There is no mention in the second will Ext. 4 that another will was previously executed. (8) The other attesting witnesses to Ext. 4, and 1a have not been examined. (9) A portion of Ext. (7) There is no mention in the second will Ext. 4 that another will was previously executed. (8) The other attesting witnesses to Ext. 4, and 1a have not been examined. (9) A portion of Ext. 1a is not proved to have been duly attested. (10) The suspicious nature of the signature of Uttama in the Exts. 1 and 1a indicating an inroad upon the endorsements which were admittedly written not at the time of execution and attestation. ( 10 ) ON such findings the Ld. Judge dismissed the suit. Hence the appeal. ( 11 ) MR. Mitter appearing for the appellant argued the most of the circumstances enumerated by the Ld. Judge are not suspicious at all, that the Ld. Judge has jumbled up the evidence and read the evidence of one into the other resulting in confused and erroneous findings, and that Uttama had the right to choose to show and bestow her favour and no grievance can be made of the fact that the bequest might with justice have been made in a different manner. ( 12 ) IN application for grant of probate the propounder is required to prove the will. What the requirements are to discharge the onus proof is now well settled. In the case of (1) Sashi Kr. v. Subodh Kr. reported in AIR 1964 SC Page 529 it has been observed that the mode of proving the will does not ordinarily differ from that of proving any other document except as to the special requirements of attestation prescribed by section 63 of the Succession Act. In the absence of suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the will proof of testamentary capacity and the signature of the testator as required by law is sufficient to discharge the onus. In the case of (2) H. Venkatachala Iyengar v. B. N. Thimmajamma, reported in AIR 1959 SC page 443 it has been observed that there is one important feature which distinguishes a will from other documents namely that the will speaks from the death of testator so that when it is propounded before a Court, the testator who is no longer available cannot say whether it is his will or not. The propounder, therefore, is called upon to show by satisfactory evidence that the will was signed by the testator, that the testator at the relevant time was in a sound and disposing state of mind, that he understood the nature and effect of the disposition and put his signature to the document of his own free will. It is further laid down that on proof of the signature of the deceased or his acknowledgement that he has signed the will, he will be presumed to have known the provisions of the instrument he has singed. But the said presumption is liable to be rebutted by proof of suspicious circumstances. The presence of suspicious circumstances naturally tends to make the initial onus very heavy and calls up on the propounder to satisfactorily explain the circumstances. It would be a part of the initial onus to remove such suspicious and legitimate doubts in the matter. The same principle has been laid down in the case of (3) Surendra Pal v. Saraswati Aurora, AIR 1974 SC page 1999. ( 13 ) BESIDES these decisions Mr. Mitter appearing for the appellant also referred to the case of (4) Rani Purnima Debi v. Kr. Khagendra Narayan AIR 1962 SC page 567 which lays down that if a will has been registered that should be considered as a circumstance which may, having regard to the circumstances prove its genuineness. Mr. Mitter also made a grievance at the initial stage that the learned Judge from the very start has tried to smell suspicion where there is really none and has looked upon everything with disbelief. This certainly is not a proper approach. In the case of (5) Harmes v. Hinkson, AIR 1946 P. C. page 156, it is observed that where a will is ? charged with suspicion the rules enjoin a reasonable skepticism and not an obdurate persistence in disbelief?. ( 14 ) BEARING these guide lines in mind, the evidence may now be looked into. Ext. 1a dated 27. 12. 1963 is the earlier will in respect of 89 Dilkhusha Street, the legatee being Nirmal Chandra Datta and Chandi Charan Datta, two of the sons of the testatrix Uttama Debi Ext. 1 dated 18. 3. 68 is the will in favour of the propounder Shibdas in respect of 91 Dilkhusa Street. The attesting witnesses to Ext. 1a dated 27. 12. 1963 is the earlier will in respect of 89 Dilkhusha Street, the legatee being Nirmal Chandra Datta and Chandi Charan Datta, two of the sons of the testatrix Uttama Debi Ext. 1 dated 18. 3. 68 is the will in favour of the propounder Shibdas in respect of 91 Dilkhusa Street. The attesting witnesses to Ext. 1a are Gouranga Behari Bose, husband of a daughter of Uttama named Padmabati, Manasha Charan Datta husband of the testatrix and Sashanka Kr. Bhowmick a neighbour. The witnesses to Ext. 1 are Sushil Kr. Ghosh and Manik Kr. Ghosh both cousins of the propunder and the contesting parties. The recitals in the two wills are more or less identical. It is stated that she had grown old in age that the properties covered by the wills were acquired from her Stridhan assets, that the testatrix has four sons and six daughters, that the daughters are happily married and financially well off and living in their respective families in peace and comfort and that there is nothing to worry about them. Then the dispositions are made in the manner aforesaid. The wills are type written but there is an endorsement in handwriting at the bottom of both the wills indicating that Shibdas Dutta would be the executor in both the wills. This endorsement is written by the hand of one Pankaj Kumar Bose and the endorsements, themselves indicate that they were made at the registry office at the time of registration of the wills on 21. 3. 1968. There in evidence that the attesting witnesses were not present at the time of registration. Consequently, it follows that the endorsement is not attested according to law. There is also no evidence that the endorsements were under instruction from Uttama or that they were read over to her. Mr. Mitter has rightly pointed out that this infirmity is of no consequence at least with regard to Ext. 1 where Shibdas's appointment as Executor is recited in the body of the will itself. It is, therefore, clear that the endorsement in Ext. 1 was redundant. So far as Ext. 1a is concerned the endorsement is clearly of no avail. ( 15 ) BEFORE coming to the oral evidence it may be useful to bear in mind certain admitted facts. The testatrix was aged about 70 years when she executed Ext. It is, therefore, clear that the endorsement in Ext. 1 was redundant. So far as Ext. 1a is concerned the endorsement is clearly of no avail. ( 15 ) BEFORE coming to the oral evidence it may be useful to bear in mind certain admitted facts. The testatrix was aged about 70 years when she executed Ext. 1a and was about 74-75 years when she executed Ext. 1. She had four sons and six daughter four of whom had lost their husbands long age. The husband of the testatrix Manasha Charan Datta died in 1966. ( 16 ) THE three witnesses examined on behalf of the propounder are the propounder himself (P. W. 1) Sushil Kumar Ghosh (P. W. 2) and Sasanka Bhowmick (P. W. 3 ). The evidence of P. W. 1 is that his mother Uttama personally went to the lawyer Soumendra Nath Mukherjee and gave instruction for writing out the wills. The lawyer prepared drafts and thereafter P. W. 1 got them typed by a typist of the Sealdah Court. He proves that his mother executed the wills in presence of the witness and that the wills were duly attested by the attesting witnesses. He admits that the wills were read by his mother herself and hence it was not read out to her. ( 17 ) P. W. 2 Sushil Ghosh is a nephew of Uttama. He says that Uttama had a keen sense of understanding that she used to look after her properties herself, and that Uttama had five daughters of whom Lily Datta the youngest reside in the family dwelling house at 40 A,b,c Kareya Road. It is also his evidence that Uttama did not read the will in his presence. P. W. 3 Sasanka is an attesting witness to the first will. He also does not say that the will was read over to Uttama or that she read it herself in his presence. He, however, says that on his query Uttama admitted that she was executing the will voluntarily and consciously. ( 18 ) THE witnesses on behalf of the caveators are D. W. 1 Bindu Basini, D. W. 2 Ashalata Bose and D. W. 3 Lily Datta. They denied that their mother had executed the wills set up by the propounder. D. W. 1 admittedly became a widow in 1946. ( 18 ) THE witnesses on behalf of the caveators are D. W. 1 Bindu Basini, D. W. 2 Ashalata Bose and D. W. 3 Lily Datta. They denied that their mother had executed the wills set up by the propounder. D. W. 1 admittedly became a widow in 1946. She lives in house belonging to the testatrix without payment of rent, the house being made by brick walls and tin roof. It is also her evidence that the other three widowed sisters namely Subhasini, Provabati and Asha have been living in the family dwelling house at 40, A, Kareya Road, and that due to their indigent circumstance the mother used to help them financially for their maintenance. D. W. 2 Ashalata also asserts that her mother brought her to the house when she became a widow and maintained her and her children. She also says that her sister Subhasini has also been residing at 40 A, Kareya Road and living on the charity of her mother. D. W. 3 Lily Datta admittedly resides in a self contained three roomed flat of the house with her husband who is a government employee. She says that Subhasini, Provabati and Ashalata all reside in the same house and that formerly their mother Uttama helped them financially and that now their sons are maintaining themselves somehow. As regards the other sister Padmabati, whose husband Gouranga is an attesting witness to Ext. 1a the evidence of D. W. 3 is that Gouranga belongs to the camp of her brothers, that he lives at Bijoy Mukherjee Lane with wife in a house belonging to Narendra Nath Datta, but not as a tenant. It is also her evidence that Gouranga is unemployed. It was however, pointed out that D. W. 3 has said in her evidence that her mother told her about execution of the wills. This is practically the sum and substance of the oral evidence adduced in this case. The learned Judge has found that the wills contained certain false recitals regarding the financial standing of the daughters. It is said in the wills that they are well off and happily residing in their respective families so that there is no cause for anxiety about them. These recitals stand disproved by the evidence already discussed above. The learned Judge has found that the wills contained certain false recitals regarding the financial standing of the daughters. It is said in the wills that they are well off and happily residing in their respective families so that there is no cause for anxiety about them. These recitals stand disproved by the evidence already discussed above. We are satisfied from the evidence that three of the daughters since their widow-hood been residing in the family of Uttama that another daughter Bindu Basini has been residing in a tin roof house belonging to Uttama without payment of rent and that they were receiving assistance from Uttama for their maintenance. P. W. 's 1 and 2 were constrained to admit that the mother namely Uttama occasionally helped the daughters. The evidence thus indicates that these daughters instead of being affluent were constrained to receive financial help from their mother. The recitals in the wills therefore, are patently false. The next suspicious circumstances, which the learned Judge has considered is that the propounder himself having received substantial benefits was found to participate actively in the matter of preparation and execution of the wills. Mr. Mitter contended that in fact the propounder Sibdas did not stand to derive any benefit under the will Ext. 1a and he made a grievance that the learned Judge read the evidence regarding Ext. 1 into the other will and thus arrived at an erroneous and confused finding. It may be pointed out that the learned Judge did not say that the propounder derived benefits under both the will. He found that the propounder received benefits under Exhibit 1 and took an active part in the execution of that will as also of Ext. 1a. The fact that Sibdas actively participated in the matter of execution of the two wills could not be disputed. It was, he who took the mother to the lawyer on both occasion it was he who collected the drafts and arranged for their typing. He was present at the time of execution of both and it was he, who took mother at the time of registration as well. If these two wills were the only dispositions made by Uttama then certainly it could not be said that participation by Sibdas in the matter of execution of the two wills was a suspicious circumstances at least with regard to Ext. If these two wills were the only dispositions made by Uttama then certainly it could not be said that participation by Sibdas in the matter of execution of the two wills was a suspicious circumstances at least with regard to Ext. 1a which apparently did not confer any benefit to him. Mr. Ghosh appearing for the respondents however contended that the two wills ought not to be considered independently of other dispositions made by her which show a consistent attempt at disposing of her properties all in favour of the sons and in favour of one daughter who was more affluent than the others. He argued therefore that the entire series of transactions should be considered as a whole to find out if the participation of Sibdas was of any consequence or not. We have already indicated the various deeds executed by Uttama since 1961. It may be useful to recapitulate the same here, again. Ext. 3b dated 25. 1. 1961 is a deed of Arpannama dedicating the family dwelling house to Sri Sri Siva appointing the four sons as sebaits after herself. Ext. 2 dated 28. 3. 1969 is a relinquishment by Uttama in favour of her four sons. This relates to yet another premises namely 52 Haldar Para Road. Ext. C and C1 both dated 11. 9. 1961 are registered deeds of gift in respect of half share of 72b, Park Street and 6 A, Meher Ali Road in favour of Shibdas Datta. Ext. 1b is a registered will dated 27. 12. 1963 in respect of certain properties at Agarpara in favour of Lily Datta. Ext. 3a a registered deed of gift in respect of the identical property in favour of the identical person namely Lily Datta. These are some of the transactions that have come to light during the trial and they undoubtedly show that Uttama had been executing various deeds in a series in which the brothers were mostly to gain. Considered in that light, though Ext, 1a does not purport to confer any benefit directly upon Shibdas the document cannot be isolated from the series of transactions. Ext. 1a was a link in a chain of transactions and hence the participation of Shibdas in the matter of execution of Ext. 1a does not appear to us to be as innocuous or inconsequential as contended by Mr. Mitter. Ext. 1a was a link in a chain of transactions and hence the participation of Shibdas in the matter of execution of Ext. 1a does not appear to us to be as innocuous or inconsequential as contended by Mr. Mitter. ( 19 ) THE next suspicious circumstance enunciated by the learned Judge is with regard to the execution of the document. We have already indicated the evidence on the point. Shibdas says that he took the mother on both occasions to the lawyer, that the mother gave instruction, that the draft was read by the mother and that after the final typing the document was executed and attested. None of the three witnesses say that the documents were read over and explained to Uttama or that she understood the contents of the documents before executing the same. The evidence of Shibdas is that the wills were not read out as she had read the same herself. P. W. 2 Sushil does not say that she read the will in question in his presence. Similar is the evidence of Sasanka although they said that Uttama told them that she had read the same. The evidence certainly raises some suspicious and doubts as to whether she did really read the wills herself and whether she was competent to read and understand the import on her own. The suspicion is aggravated by the fact that according to the evidence of the daughters Uttama was not sufficiently literate to be able to read the documents far less to understand the same. Their evidence is that her literacy extended merely to the ability of writing her name and nothing more. This evidence finds indirect support from the manner in which her name has been signed in the documents. The writing indicates that it was the work of some novice not sufficiently acquainted with the art of writing. The nature of the writing cannot be attributed merely to her old age because the similar characteristics. Therefore it is clear that the writing she put on the wills was the best that she was capable of and they do not indicate the writing of a sufficiently literate person. Consequently the necessity of reading out the wills and explaining the same to her assumes importance. A cursory statement that she had read it herself is not sufficient. Therefore it is clear that the writing she put on the wills was the best that she was capable of and they do not indicate the writing of a sufficiently literate person. Consequently the necessity of reading out the wills and explaining the same to her assumes importance. A cursory statement that she had read it herself is not sufficient. ( 20 ) THIS apart, there is intrinsic evidence contained in Ext. 2 indicating the state of health and mind of the testatrix at the relevant time. She states in Ext. 2 that her husband Manasha Charan Datta, due to old age became incapable of performing the duties of sebait and relinquished the office in April, 1962. Since the Uttama became the sebait. It is then recited that since the death of her husband in September, 1966 she has been completely incapacitated due to disease, grief and old age. This statement clearly indicates that since 1962 and more particularly since 1966 she became physically and mentally crippled. This admission clearly affects at least the 2nd will and the registration of both. She was not in a proper mental and physical frame at the time. And this again called for clear proof of the fact that she understood the nature of the documents she executed. Such evidence is absolutely wanting. ( 21 ) MR. Mitter also contended that the documents were registered wills and that the fact of registration imports and element of genuineness to the transaction. The decision reported in AIR 1962 SC page 567 was referred to in this connection. It lays down that a will if registered, that is a circumstance which may prove its genuineness. But this decision also lays down that the mere fact that a will is registered, will not by itself be sufficient to dispel all suspicious regarding it where suspicion exists, without submitting the evidence of registration to a close examination. If the evidence as to registration reveals that it was made in such manner that it was brought home to the testator that the documents of which h was admitting execution was a will disposing of his property and there after he admitted its execution, the registration will dispel the doubt as to the genuineness of the will. If the evidence as to registration reveals that it was made in such manner that it was brought home to the testator that the documents of which h was admitting execution was a will disposing of his property and there after he admitted its execution, the registration will dispel the doubt as to the genuineness of the will. But if the evidence shows that it was done in a perfunctory manner, that the officer registering the will did not read out over to the testator or did not satisfy himself in some other way that the testator knew that it was a will, the fact that the will was registered could not be of much value. In the instant suit the evidence of registration was not submitted for scrutiny. All that we find is that the documents are registered and nothing more. Shibdas does not say what happened at the registration office. Pankaj Kr. Bose who admittedly wrote the endorsements at the registration office and who identified Uttama there, was not called to the witness box. In such circumstances and in the absence of the evidence that it was brought home to the testatrix that she understood the implication and nature of the document she was admitting, the fact that it was registered is inconsequential. ( 22 ) THE next suspicious circumstances is the non examination of witnesses who might have thrown some light as to the nature of transaction. The learned Judge feels that this was a case in which the lawyer who drafted the wills should have been examined. Shibdas concedes that the lawyer had acted on their behalf on several other occasions and that he was present in Court during the trial of the suit. Since the evidence as to whether the wills were read over or explained to the testatrix is doubtful if not entirely lacking, the non examination of the lawyer who prepared the drafts allegedly under instruction from Uttama assumes importance. Mr. Mitter however contends that Shibdas was a layman and did not realise the importance of non examination of the lawyer. It was also pointed out that the lawyer himself was conducting the case of the propounder in the trial Court. Mr. Mitter however contends that Shibdas was a layman and did not realise the importance of non examination of the lawyer. It was also pointed out that the lawyer himself was conducting the case of the propounder in the trial Court. The fact that Shibdas was a layman does not seem to be a matter of much moment because at the time when the question of examination of the lawyer arose, that is to say during the trial, he was certainly acting under legal advice and not on his own independent judgment. Mr. Ghosh on the other hand referred to a decision in the case of (6) Sarat Kumari Debi v. Raj Sakhi Chand Bahadur, reported in AIR 1929 P. C. , page 45. In that case the lawyer who drafted the will was not called as a witness. The explanation for the absence of the latter from the witness box was that he was appearing as a Vakeel for the executors at the hearing of the case. A particular clause in the will in that case was in question. The clause was held to be suspicious and one of the reasons for such suspicion was the non examination of the lawyer, in spite of the fact that he was acting as a Vokeel at the trial. ( 23 ) IN this connection it is also pertinent to refer to the non examination of Gouranga Bhushan Bose an attesting witness to Ext. 1a. This Gouranga Bhushan Bose is the husband of Padmabati. The evidence of Lily Datta that Gouranga resides in a house of Narendra without payment of rent and that he is at the moment unemployed lends some support to the theory that he could not possibly dis-oblige Narendra by refusing to be an attesting witness. His evidence if available, might have given some indication as to the circumstances and manner in which the will in question was done. It was however pointed out that Gouranga verified the application for grant of probate stating that he was a witness to the will dated 27. 12. 1963. The verification cannot be looked upon as evidence. ( 24 ) BEFORE leaving this aspect of the matter it may be mentioned that P. W. 3 Sasanka is also not an independent witness. He is a co-employee of the propounder Shibdas. 12. 1963. The verification cannot be looked upon as evidence. ( 24 ) BEFORE leaving this aspect of the matter it may be mentioned that P. W. 3 Sasanka is also not an independent witness. He is a co-employee of the propounder Shibdas. He admits that he is a sub-tenant under Nirmal and that he has no receipts to show his sub-tenancy. Evidently his rights as a sub-tenant not being supported by any receipts is a precarious one. Necessarily he is interested to oblige Nirmal. Sushil though admittedly a relation of the parties, does not seem to know much of the family, for he says that Uttama had five daughters while it is the admitted case of the parties that she has six daughters. This is the quality and caliber of the witnesses examined and we do not feel very much impressed by their performances. In that view of the matter also non examination of the other attesting witnesses and more particularly of the lawyer is of some consequence. ( 25 ) THE next suspicious circumstance relied on by the learned Judge is a statement by Shibdas in cross-examination admitting that not only before but also after the two wills in question his mother executed other wills. Mr. Mitter however drew our attention to the subsequent statement of Shibdas that there is no other will except the three wills. Shibdas has undoubtedly said so on his further cross-examination after recall. He was recalled seven days after his examination and cross-examination was over. Be that as it may we do not consider it proper to attach too much importance to this fact for the simple reason that no other will besides the three came to light and there was no suggestion that there were other wills executed by the testatrix. In this context the evidence of Shibdas with regard to the endorsement in the wills made by the Pankaj Mr. Bose at the time of registration may be considered. The evidence of Shibdas is that only the name of his father Manasha Ch. Datta was written at the registratioin office by Pankaj Mr. Bose and not the six lines, meaning thereby the hand written endorsement. This evidence is ambiguous and meaningless. The will Ext, 1a shows that a signature purporting to be of Manasha Ch. Appears at the bottom as an attesting witnss. Datta was written at the registratioin office by Pankaj Mr. Bose and not the six lines, meaning thereby the hand written endorsement. This evidence is ambiguous and meaningless. The will Ext, 1a shows that a signature purporting to be of Manasha Ch. Appears at the bottom as an attesting witnss. If the evidence of Shibdas is believed then it would mean as if this name was written at the registration office which certainly he did not intend to say. If the evidence is disbelieved it only shows his anxiety to embellish. ( 26 ) THE next important suspicious circumstance is the manner of disposition namely exclusion of the daughters except Lili Datta. Mr. Mitter argued upon a reference to a decision in the case of (7) Sushiladebi v. Pandit Krishna Kr. AIR 1971 SC page 2236 that if the execution of the will be satisfactorily proved, the fact that the testator had not bequeathed any property to one of his children cannot make the will invalid. The decision however further lays down that if the bequest mad in the will appear to be unnatural then the Court has to scrutinize the evidence in support of the execution of the will with a greater degree of care than usual. There is no gain-saying the fact that some individuals do behave in an abnormal manner. Their Lordships have therefore, stated that Judges cannot impose their own standard of behavior on those who execute wills. While it is true that once the probate Court is satisfied that the testator's mind was clear and that he was conscious of the implications of the document he was about to execute, it is not the function of the Court to investigate whether a bequest more consonant with reason and justice could or could not have been made. In the instance case, we are not satisfied from the evidence that the testatrix knew or comprehended the nature of the act she was doing and consequently this goes to the very root of the case and shakes the foundation of the propounder's claim. In any event it cannot be denied that the nature of the disposition is unusual, if not unnatural. This is more so because some attempt has been made to explain the exclusion of the daughters in the wills themselves and the explanation, we have already found is false. In any event it cannot be denied that the nature of the disposition is unusual, if not unnatural. This is more so because some attempt has been made to explain the exclusion of the daughters in the wills themselves and the explanation, we have already found is false. ( 27 ) THE next suspicious circumstance considered by the learned Judge is the fact that the existence of the earlier will is not referred to in the subsequent will dated 18. 3. 1968. This, we are unable to consider as a suspicious circumstance. The next suspicious circumstance is said to be non-examination of the other attesting witnesses. It is not necessary that all the attesting witnesses need be examined. All that is necessary is to prove due attestation. If the evidence is convincing such attestation may be proved without examination of all the attesting witnesses. In this case, however, we have found that in the peculiar circumstances of the case that Gouranga should have been examined. The other two suspicious circumstances relied on by the learned Judge, namely, that a portion of the earlier will was not duly attested, meaning thereby the hand-written endorsement and the position of the Uttama's signature in the wills vis-?-vis, the hand-written endorsements are not really suspicious circumstances at all. They prove nothing this way or the other. ( 28 ) HAVING thus considered the entire evidence and the circumstances of the case, we find that the wills contain false recitals, that there is no satisfactory evidence that she could, in fact, read the documents or that she had read the same, nor is there any evidence that it was read out to her. There is no evidence that she comprehended the nature and import of the disposition. We further find that the disposition was rather unusual in character and that though this may not by itself be a sufficient ground to invalidate the will, yet read in the context of the falsity of the recitals to justify the unusualness, it assumes a suspicious character not clarified by the evidence furnished by the propounder. We further find that some very vital and important witnesses have not been examined and no explanation is forth coming for their non-examination. Considering all the circumstances we are unable to find that the genuineness of the will has been satisfactorily proved. We further find that some very vital and important witnesses have not been examined and no explanation is forth coming for their non-examination. Considering all the circumstances we are unable to find that the genuineness of the will has been satisfactorily proved. The onus that lay on the propounder has not been discharged. The appeal, accordingly, should fail. The appeal is dismissed. We make no order as to costs. Sen, J. : i agree. Appeal dismissed. .