JUDGMENT K. C. Agrawal, J.:- By this petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution Munnoo Babu, the petitioner has challenged the validity of an order of the District Judge, Mirzapur dated 10th May, 1977. 2. The dispute in this case is with respect to a house situated in Mirzapur. This had been let out to the petitioner. Shrimati Vidyawati Devi, respondent 3 was admittedly the owner and landlord of the said house. She filed an application under section 21 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 for the release of the shop on the ground that the husband of respondent no. 3 was a known industrialist of the country and was engaged in manufacturing of Cinni fans, Tultu and Shiva water pumps. One of the sons of respondent 3 was intending to set up himself at Mirzapur and wanted to open a shop for the purposes of selling cinni fans, Tullu and Shiva water pumps and as the respondent 3 did not have any other accommodation at Mirzapur she required the disputed one for occupation by herself. Respondent no. 3 also alleged that the accommodation in dispute was best suited for the purpose of Ravindra Kumar Shah, as he could live on the first floor and carry on the business on the ground floor. 3. The application was contested by Munnoo Babu , He denied that the need of the respondent no. 3 for the house was genuine and bona fide. Denying the allegations of respondent 2 he claimed that he was living on the first floor and was carrying on the business of sale of Tendu leaves by storing them on the ground floor. The petitioner alleged that as there was no other accommodation available at Mirzapur, the loss and injury to the petitioner would be greater than that of the respondent no. 3 in case the application for release was allowed. 4. Both the parties adduced evidence in support of their respective cases. The application was allowed by the Prescribed Authority against which an appeal was filed by the petitioner before the District Judge. The appeal was also dismissed. Against the dismissal of the appeal, the petitioner filed writ petition No. 768 of 1976 in this Court. 4. Both the parties adduced evidence in support of their respective cases. The application was allowed by the Prescribed Authority against which an appeal was filed by the petitioner before the District Judge. The appeal was also dismissed. Against the dismissal of the appeal, the petitioner filed writ petition No. 768 of 1976 in this Court. During the pendency of the writ petition U P. Act No., 768 of 1976 came into force making a provision for the comparison of the needs of the landlord with that of the tenant. As the amendment was retrospective, Hon. N D. Ojha, J. allowed the writ petition and sent back the case to the District Judge for deciding the same order. After remand the case was again beard by the learned District Judge and the appeal was dismissed by the order dated 10.5.77. Aggrieved, Munoo Babu has preferred the present writ petition. 5. The first submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner was that the petitioner filed a number of documents in the appeal by way of additional evidence although was admitted by the District Judge but the same was not considered in the judgment. My attention was invited to various paragraphs of the writ petition and the rejoinder affidavit where the facts relating to the filing of the additional evidence has been asserted. The counter- affidavit filed by respondent 3 does not deny the admission of the additional evidence in the appeal. The copy of the application seeking permission of the District Judge to file additional evidence show that the same was intended to be brought on record for the purposes of showing that Munnoo Babu was living at Mirzapur along with his family members. At this place it may be worth while to mention that one of the disputes between the petitioner and the respondent no. 3 was whether Munnoo Babu was living at Mirzapur. The case of respondent No. 3 was that Munnoo Babu was living at Banda and did not reside at Mirzapur-Munnoo Babu, however, claimed that-he was living at Mirzapur. In order to support this plea that he was living at Mirzapur he filed a number of papers in appeal, the copies of which have been annexed along with the writ petition showing that his children were getting education at Mirzapur. In order to support this plea that he was living at Mirzapur he filed a number of papers in appeal, the copies of which have been annexed along with the writ petition showing that his children were getting education at Mirzapur. Assuming, that the Additional evidence filed by the petitioner and other evidence proved that Munnoo Babu was living at Mirzapur, with his family members, the same fact does not change the result inasmuch as the application of respondent no. 3 was not allowed either by the Prescribed Authority or by the District Judge on this ground. None of the two authorities held that as Munnoo Babu was not living at Mirzapur, the application of respondent No. 3 could be allowed. In view of this, the non-consideration of the additional evidence filed on this point was immaterial. 6. The other evidence filed by the petitioner was that Ravindra Kumar Shah, the son of respondent no. 3, for whose need the premises was required, was shown to be doing business along with his brothers at Varanasi. Firstly, the papers filed do not unclinchingly lead to the said conclusion, but assuming it to be so, the mere fact that he was doing some work at Varanasi would not disentitle him from getting the release of the premises situated at Mirzapur. What was required to be seen was whether the respondent no. 3 required the premises for her son. The petitioner did not bring any evidence on record to show that the application was filed on a fake ground and that the son of respondent no. 3 would not shift and start business at Mirzapur. In my opinion, therefore, the evidence filed by the petitioner was irrelevant and the omission to consider the same did not render the judgment of the District Judge invalid. 7. Reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner on a decision of the Supreme Court reported in Jagdish Prasad v. State of U.P., AIR 1971 Supreme Court 1224. In this case one Jagdish Prasad had filed a writ petition in the High Court challenging an order reverting him to the post of panchayat Secretary. During the pendency of the writ petition Jagdish Prasad filed a letter for the purposes of showing that the order was malafide. In this case one Jagdish Prasad had filed a writ petition in the High Court challenging an order reverting him to the post of panchayat Secretary. During the pendency of the writ petition Jagdish Prasad filed a letter for the purposes of showing that the order was malafide. The High Court allowed the letter to be brought on record but thereafter declined to consider whether it prejudicially affected Jagdish prasad. In this background the Supreme Court held that the refusal by the High Court to consider the letter after admission was open to serious objection. In the instant case, I have examined the evidence and have found that the same had no bearing on the controversy involved in the case. Hence the omission on the part of the learned District Judge not to have considered the same was inconsequential. Moreover, the present writ petition arises out of a decision of a Tribunal whereas the case relied upon by the petitioner was of a different nature. Dealing with the question about the non- consideration of evidence in a situation like the present, the Supreme Court observed in Babhutmal v. Smt. Laxmi Bai, AIR 1975 Supreme Court 1297 that the High Court could not claim to interfere with the findings of fact reached by the District Judge even on the ground that the District Judge misread a part of evidence and ignored another part. In my opinion, this decision of the Supreme Court clinches the controversy against the petitioner. 8. The second submission made by the learned counsel was that Sri K.K. Gupta, the prescribed Authority did not have jurisdiction to entertain the application filed under section 21 and to decide the same. Counsel urged that ss Sri K.K. Gupta had no jurisdiction to entertain the application, not only the decision given by him but the evidence taken was without jurisdiction and that on the basis of the evidence filed before him no decision could be given against the petitioner. The fact that Krishna Kumar Gupta was not the Prescribed Authority appointed by the District Magistrate was denied by the respondent 3 in the counter-affidavit. It, however, appears to me that even if Krishan Kumar Gupta had no jurisdiction to entertain the application and to decide it, the defect is not such that the entire proceedings could be quashed on that ground. It, however, appears to me that even if Krishan Kumar Gupta had no jurisdiction to entertain the application and to decide it, the defect is not such that the entire proceedings could be quashed on that ground. Admittedly, the appeal under section 22 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1577 could be filed to the District Judge, The appeal was filed by the petitioner himself to the District Judge and was decided against him. The District Judge gave the decision of the case on merits, the defect of jurisdiction of the prescribed, Authority, if any, was cured. Moreover, I have great doubts that this point was pressed by the petitioner before the District Judge. As he did not do so, he cannot be permitted to raise the same in the High Court. Further more, the point raised is of a highly technical nature. As no manifest injustice was done to the petitioner, it is not a ground on which interference should be made by the High Court in the exercise of its power under Article 226 of the Con- situation. 9. Reference may be made to a decision of this Court in the case of Ram Narain v. Vth Additional District and Sessions Judge, Moradabad, A.W.C. 626 a where a learned Single Judge was called upon to decide a similar controversy. The argument made was that as the prescribed Authority had no jurisdiction to entertain the application filed under section 21 of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972, the entire proceedings were vitiated and the judgments were liable to be quashed. Banerji J. did not accept the submission and held that the defect in the jurisdiction of the prescribed Authority was such which was cured as a result of the judgment of affirmance given by the court of appeal. Another decision to which reference may be made in this connection is reported in Abdul Hamid v. VIIth Additional District and Sessions Judge, Kanpur, 1976 A.W.C. 177. In this case also an application under section 21 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 was decided by a prescribed Authority. The judgment of the prescribed Authority was taken up in appeal. The appeal was dismissed. A writ petition was thereafter filed in this Court. In this case also an application under section 21 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 was decided by a prescribed Authority. The judgment of the prescribed Authority was taken up in appeal. The appeal was dismissed. A writ petition was thereafter filed in this Court. One of the grounds raised in the writ petition was that as the prescribed Authority had no jurisdiction to entertain the application, the proceedings of the entire case were vitiated. The argument was repelled. This Court held that the infirmity in the order of the prescribed Authority was cured and could no longer be a ground for setting aside the judgment of the prescribed Authority as well as that of the appellate authority. I agree with the view taken in these cases. In my opinion, the point raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is concluded by the decisions mentioned above. It may be mentioned that in arriving at the aforesaid conclusion the High Court relied on the decision of the Supreme Court given in the case of Janardan Reddy v. State of Hyderabad, AIR 1951 Supreme Court 217. This submission is, therefore, without substance and must be rejected. 10. The third submission made was that the petitioner would suffer greater hardship in case the application filed by respondent No. 3 was allowed. In this connection the learned counsel also stressed that as the respondent 3 was a monied woman the application filed by her ought to have been uprooted at the instance of the said respondent. There could be some substance in the submission of the petitioner if alternative accommodation would not have been available to the petitioner in Mirzapur. The finding of the District Judge was that the alternative accommodation was available and that the petitioner could shift his family to another house and could also obtain a godown for storing the Tendu leaves. The finding of the learned District Judge that alternative accommodation was available to the petitioner is one of fact it is a matter of common knowledge that Mirzapur is not such a big town where the paucity of accommodation is as acute as it has attempted to put in by the learned counsel for the petitioner. It is no doubt true that some inconvenience would be caused to the petitioner but as the respondent no. It is no doubt true that some inconvenience would be caused to the petitioner but as the respondent no. 3 made out a case of bona fide requirement and further that in case the accommodation in dispute was not given to her, the likely hardship which would be suffered by the said respondent would be greater as there was no way out. Moreover, the finding about the question of comparative hardship is one of fact and it is not open to this Court to reappraise the evidence and to record a finding of its own thereon. 11. The word 'hardship' has not been defined in the Act. It is, however, descriptive of adverse repercussions of every kind. It would, however, comprehend any matter of appreciable detriment whether physical, financial or otherwise. It is not possible to classify the manfold forms that a hardship may take as the aspects of detriment are as diverse and varied as the exigencies of human affairs, it is not possible to lay down an exhaustive list of the same. In fact, in most of the cases an evil that one may suffer cannot be measured in contrast and in such cases precise unite of comparison is not possible. The injury of either side may be of different kind. In such circumstances the Court should try to find out which of the two sides will suffer the least suffering. It may, however, he pointed out that any transient discomfort or inconvenience some thing causing little disadvantages would not have to be ignored and cannot form the basis of decision. In the instant case, as already observed, there would be a temporary inconvenience to the petitioner but as from the finding recorded by the District Judge it appears that the petitioner would be able to get another suitable accommodation at Mirzapur, the third point urged also has not substance. 12. The last submission made was that as the building was taken by the petitioner for the residential purpose, the application filed by the respondent 3 for the purpose of business-cum-residence was not maintainable due to the bar contained in clause (ii) of the third proviso to Section 21 of the Act. The submission made has no tenability. It has come in evidence that the premises in dispute was taken by the petitioner for purposes of business as well as residence. The submission made has no tenability. It has come in evidence that the premises in dispute was taken by the petitioner for purposes of business as well as residence. The ground floor was intended to be used as a godown whereas the first floor as residence. Respondent No. 3 has also filed an application under section 21 describing her need of the same nature. The allegations were that the ground floor would be used for the business purpose whereas the first floor would be utilised for residence of the family members of the son of respondent 3. 13. For all these reasons the writ petition fails and is dismissed, with Costs. The petitioner is granted four months time to vacate the premises.