JUDGMENT - G.N. VAIDYA, J.:---The above first appeal under section 30 of the Workmens Compensation Act, 1923 in directed against on order of the Additional Commissioner for Workmens Compensation, Bombay, dated December 27, 1969, dismissing the application for compensation made by the widow and minor children (who are the appellants), of one Harchandrai Hakikatrai Hargunani a Cost Accountant, whose monthly wages were Rs. 1,500/- in the employment of respondent M/s. De Smet (India) Pvt. Ltd., Thane, in respect of an accident in the course of which the said Harchandrai Hargunani died, on May 20, 1967. 2. The application was filed by the widow and the six minor children of the deceased on September 26, 1967, making the following allegations: The deceased was the workman employed as Cost Accountant by M/s. De Smet (India) Pvt. Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as De Smet). When the accident occurred the deceased has, as usual, wanted to go with the office work to the Head Office of De Smet at Worli and got a lift from one Suraj Rupchand Hingorani who had come to the factory of De Smet at Thane in Car No. MRS 3394. Suraj was known to the Production Manager Malhotra who requested Suraj to give a lift to the deceased. Suraj consented. The deceased got into the front seat of the car next to the driver Balan Eswar. The driver drove the car rashly and negligently at high speed and while so driving, he struck the car against a stationary lorry on the Eastern Express Highway, near Tagore Nagar at Vikhroli within the limits of the Bhandup Police Station. 3. As a result of this accident, the deceased received serious injuries and became unconscious. He was taken to the Sion Hospital, where after half an hour of his arrival in the hospital, the deceased died. The deceased received injuries by accident within a very short time after leaving the premises where he was employed and working and while going to the Head Office of De Smet. 4. Appellant No. 1 was his widow aged 29 years. Appellant No. 2 was his son aged 13, appellate No. 3 a daughter aged 11, appellant No. 4 another son aged 5, appellant No. 5 a daughter aged 8 years, appellant No. 6 another daughter aged 3 years and appellant No. 7 last son aged 4 months when the application was filed. 5. Appellant No. 2 was his son aged 13, appellate No. 3 a daughter aged 11, appellant No. 4 another son aged 5, appellant No. 5 a daughter aged 8 years, appellant No. 6 another daughter aged 3 years and appellant No. 7 last son aged 4 months when the application was filed. 5. As usual the employers De Smet stoutly opposed the application raising highly technical points based on the much interpreted set of words, "accident arising out of and in the course of his employment" in section 3 of the Workmens Compensation Act, 1923. It was contended that though the deceased was in the employment of De Smet as the Cost Accountant and they had their registered office in Worli, Bombay 18, on May 20, 1967, the deceased had taken a short leave from the Production Manager from 2.00 p.m. onwards for his personal work, as per the gate pass, produced by De Smet before the Commissioner, at Exhibit 42, which was written by himself and hence he was not at the relevant time carrying on any employment of De Smet. De Smet, therefore, denied that the deceased was sent out for office work at the Head Office and at the time as mentioned in the application. It was further contended that the car in which the accident occurred did not belong to the company but to one Suraj who was not in the employment of De Smet and who was requested by the deceased himself to give him a lift and that it is clear that the deceased was doing his own personal work at the relevant time and De Smet had not instructed the deceased to travel by the car involved in the accident, and, therefore, they were not responsible for paying any compensation to the widow and the minor children. 6. In support of the claim for compensation the widow, appellant No. 1, examined herself and stated that, on the date of the accident, her deceased husband told her that he would be coming late as he had to go to the Head Office for office work. She denied that she had any relations at Ghatkopar as suggested on behalf of De Smet where her husband could have gone. She denied that she had any relations at Ghatkopar as suggested on behalf of De Smet where her husband could have gone. She said in the cross-examination that her husband was returning at about 7.30 p.m. No question was put to her as to whether on Saturday, the day of the accident, he was to return earlier or to leave office at 2.00 p.m. or at what usual time he used to return from the office on Saturday. 7. Besides, appellant No. 1 examined S.I. Naik, who was at the relevant time attached to Bhandup Police Station and who produced the copies of the Panchnama and other statements which were recorded at the time of the accident by the police and which were all Exhibits by consent as Exhibits 26 to 30, though neither the Panchas nor all the persons who were alleged to have made the statements were examined before the Workmens Compensation Authority, S.I. Douze was examine to show that one Kewal Ramani of De Smet had made some enquiry with S.I. Kulkarni who was dead, and in this connection he produced a diary of S.I. Kulkarni and also produced the report sent by S.I. Kulkarni, stating that the deceased has lost the bag. The only other witness examined by the claimants was Suraj, who was an Engineer working with Valcan Engineers Pvt. Ltd., and of whom to be reproduced as he appears to the ambivalent since he had connection even with the respondent De Smet. He has stated :--- "In the month of May 1967, I had been to the opposite party company. I had gone there on 28th May, 1967 in a car. It belonged to my friend. The time was about 1.45 p.m. When I reached the factory. I know that the deceased was working in M/s. De Smet Pvt. Ltd. I was not acquainted with him. Deceased requested me to give a lift since I was going to the city. He said that he had some work. He did not tell me the nature of work I permitted him to travel in my car. One Sharma also requested me to give him a lift. Deceased was sitting in the front next to the driver. Myself and Sharma were in the back seat. On the way the car met with an accident near Tagore Nagar, Vikhroli. My car was not going with high speed. One Sharma also requested me to give him a lift. Deceased was sitting in the front next to the driver. Myself and Sharma were in the back seat. On the way the car met with an accident near Tagore Nagar, Vikhroli. My car was not going with high speed. It dashed against a standing lorry on the road because of the intervention of another car. The driver died on the spot. Myself and Hargonani were taken to the hospital. Hargonani was in great pains. I was myself dazed. I was treated and taken to Bhandup P.S. Hargonani was admitted in the hospital. The deceased had a hand bag. Subsequently came to know that the bag contained some office papers of M/s. De Smet Pvt. Ltd. and some money. Opposite party Company has an office in the city at Worli and we were coming to that side only as my office was on Peddar Road. Police recorded my statement. The hand bag of the deceased was delivered at my house. I opened the bag and finding some office papers and money I sealed the bag and delivered the same to Mr. Kewal Ramani at my office. At that time Mr. Kewal Ramani was an employee of M/s. De Smet Pvt. Ltd." 8. In the cross-examination nothing was brought out to suggest that the deceased wanted a lift only upto Ghatkopar. On the contrary, when he was asked to say whether any destination was pointed out by the deceased, he said that he had not given any destination and he admitted that he gave lift to the deceased in the premises of the factory of De Smet at Thane. 9. As against the above evidence, the only witness examine on behalf of De Smet, the employers, was their own Engineer and Production Manager at the Factory at Thane. Malhotra who denied that the deceased was going to the Head Office for any work and stated that he did not request Hingorani to give a life to the deceased in his car to go to Worli Office. In the course of the cross-examination on behalf of the applicants, he admitted that the deceased was required to go to the Head Office for office work in connection with accounts of statistics relevant to the production. In the course of the cross-examination on behalf of the applicants, he admitted that the deceased was required to go to the Head Office for office work in connection with accounts of statistics relevant to the production. He stated in the examination-in-chief that the deceased had filled up the gate pass at Exhibit 42, but in the cross-examination he had to admit that at the relevant time he was not the Production Manager, but only a Production Engineer and there was also in the factory a Works Manager by name, Parihar who was the head of the factory where about 300 persons worked in 1967. He claimed to be the head of the office of 80 persons working in the office of the factory. He said though he was subordinate to the Works Manager, either her or the Works Manager used to grant leave to the workers. He had to admit that the deceased had not made any application for short leave and he was not aware of any circular about not making such application for short leave was prevailing in practice in the factory. It may be noted here that on behalf of the applicants an application was made to the Authority to compel De Smet to produce all the relevant papers with regard to leave which they refused to produce. They had asked for leave applications and other record in the office relating to the deceased. 10. Malhotra was very closely cross-examined on behalf of the applicants, with regard to the contents of Exhibit 42, which appears to be in a cycle-styled form of gate pass issued in the factory of De Smet at Thane and which reads as follows :--- "GATE PASS DE SMET (INDIA) PRIVATE LIMITED, THANE. Ref. 1...... Date : 20-5-67 Security Officer, Please allow Mr. H.H. Hargunani Designation/C No. C.A. to pass throughthe main gate for on leave/on duty to......... Time out : 2.00 P.M. Time in : ...... Sd/illegible S/d- illegible Head of the Department/I.O. Works Manager." 11. Malhotra did not say that he had signed the gate pass or the deceased had signed the gate pass at any place to further question he said :--- "There is no practice to accept applications even for short leave. If somebody makes the application in writing we do accept is as there is no bar to make written application for short leave. If somebody makes the application in writing we do accept is as there is no bar to make written application for short leave. The word "Ref." in the gate pass does not mean reference to the leave application. Mr. Babu was the Security Officer. The pass goes to the Security Office ultimately through the watchman at the gate. The sanctioning authority scores out the words in the pass which are not necessary. The persons requiring short leave has to file up the gate pass. If he is on duty nothing is scored out. If he is on leave the words "on duty" have to be scored out. The gate pass produced was filled in my presence. Except my signature I have not entered anything on the pass. Hargonani was himself the head of the cost accounts department and, therefore, he was not require to obtain signature of the head of his department and no other person has signed the gate pass as head of the dept. One of the Time Keepers has signed the gate pass I cannot identity the signatures. There is a tick mark to show that the head of the dept., has signed it. It was intended to be signed by the Works Manager or Production Manager and at the time of exhit by the Time Officer." 12. I am told by Mr. Kampani that the signature in red ink over the Works Manager is that of Malhotra although he himself has not stated so in the examination-in-chief or even in the cross-examination. As stated above, he denied that he was the Works Manager at the relevant time; and there is nothing to show also that the word "H.H. Hargunani" which, according to Malhotra, were written by the deceased in his presence in his own hand writing, were in fact written by the deceased. No evidence is led by De Smet to show that they were in his hand writing and the witness, as stated above, could not recognise his hand writing. 13. The gate pass appears to be a false and dishonest document desired to be produced by De Smet and I most seriously considered whether to prosecute De Smet and Malhotra for producing such document. 13. The gate pass appears to be a false and dishonest document desired to be produced by De Smet and I most seriously considered whether to prosecute De Smet and Malhotra for producing such document. But having regard to the fact that 11 years have passed away since that document was filed : and many more years will pass if any such case is investigated and prosecuted, in Court. I do not think that the ends of justice, in the present state of arrears in courts, would justify prosecuting the respondent and its employee, who have not even cared to examine the Works Manager Parihar to explain under what circumstances Malhotra was authorised to sign the gate pass. At least the Security Officer concerned who is alleged to have received the gate pass from the deceased ought to have been examined by De Smet to show that it was genuine, and, therefore, it is clear that it is a document which Malhotra has produced and testified about only to support the false contention of De Smet to resist the claim for compensation made by the widow and the minor children of the deceased. If it was a genuine document they could have easily produced the Security Officer and Parihar to explain why it was not actually signed by the Head of the Department as required and as to why there was no reference to the application made by the worker in that gate pass and why the Works Manager had made an application. The gate pass appears to have been produced without any regard for facts to mislead the Workmens Compensation Authority which unfortunately appears to have been misled by the document. It has not discussed it by applying its mind to these aspects in any way in the judgment. The gate pass appears to have been produced without any regard for facts to mislead the Workmens Compensation Authority which unfortunately appears to have been misled by the document. It has not discussed it by applying its mind to these aspects in any way in the judgment. Notwithstanding the above State of the evidence, it is surprising that the Additional Commissioner for Workmens Compensation dismissed the application holding that the peril which the deceased had incurred by taking a lift from Hingorani was not a peril which could be regarded as a possible incident of his employment but was of his own creation; that the evidence of the applicants witness Hingorani did not prove that the deceased was going to the opposite party Company for office work and the gate pass and the evidence of Malhotra showed that the deceased had ceased to be in the course of the employment and was on short leave when he was going in the car of his own, observing as under : "The accident did not take place in the course of and out of employment. Besides, the unfortunate deceased lost his life through the new and added peril to which by his own conduct he exposed himself. He was not at all obliged to encounter the said peril, which was not reasonably incidental to his employment. Accepting the lift for the purpose of going to Head Office from the factory was not even known to any responsible officer from the factory. The practice of accepting a lift was not so notorious that an inference can be drawn that it must have been known and acquiesced in by the opposite Party. It is a mere matter of conjecture and a pure case of guess work. The evidence on record shows that the accepting of the lift was not done with the knowledge or connivance of the opposite Party. I cannot help feeling a good deal of sympathy with the applicants but I must administer the Act according to what I believe to be its fair meaning and having regard to the decisions which have been arrived at in similar cases." The learned Judge did not even refer to any of those "similar cases." 14. The decision of the learned Judge is challenged in the above First Appeal on behalf of the appellants by Mr. The decision of the learned Judge is challenged in the above First Appeal on behalf of the appellants by Mr. Sali, the learned Counsel for the widow and the minor children, on the ground that the learned Additional Commissioner for Workmens Compensation failed to apply his mind to the evidence on record which clearly established that the deceased was going from the factory at Thane to the Head Office at Worli belonging to De Smet, and in any event he was leaving his place of work at Thana for when the accident had taken place, and, therefore, the learned Additional Commissioner erred in similar cases the employers were held not liable or that the incident would not be said to have arisen out of and in the course of employment under section 3 of the Workmens Compensation Act. He relied upon a judgment of Chagla, C.J. and Dixit, J. in (Bhagubai v. The General Manager, Central Railway, V.T. Bombay)1, 56 Bom.L.R. 509 : A.I.R. 1959 Bom. 105, and a decision of the Supreme Court in (General Manager, B.E.S.T. Under taking Bombay, v. Mrs. Agnes)2, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 193. 15. Mr. Sali further submitted that the defences raised by the De Smet were all false and fraudulent and in support of their contention they had produced a false and forged document in the form of a gate pass at Exhibit 42, and it suppressed all the papers: that as deposed to by Hingorani, who was not in favour of the applicants and who had forwarded the hand-bag of the deceased to one Kewal Ramani, Mr. Sali submitted that Kewal Ramani was not examined by De Smet and the applicants had examined the Sub-Inspector who said that he had made an entry in respect of Kulkarni who was dead, and also having regard to the fact that De Smet did not even care to produce all the papers relating to the office work of the deceased, it must be concluded that an adverse inference should be drawn against the respondent, and the wife should be believed when she said that her husband used to come home after doing his office work at 7.30 p.m. and he was to come home on the unfortunate day after going to the Head Office and, therefore, the accident was in the course of and out of the employment with the respondent. 16. Mr. 16. Mr. Kampani, the learned Counsel for the respondent De Smet, vigorously tried to support the judgment of the Additional Commissioner for Workmens Compensation relying on the judgment of the Supreme Court in (Saurashtra Salt Manufacturing Co. v. Bai Valu Baja)3, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 881, where the limits of what was called the notional extension of the employers premises were indicated. He submitted that the papers of the police included a statement of Sharma, who was one of the four occupants of the car, along with Hingorani, which showed that the deceased wanted to go to Ghatkopar and not to the Head Office, and the evidence led by the applicants did not clearly indicate that the deceased was going to the Head Office. 17. He relied on the gate pass and contended that merely because Malhotra who was not the Works Manager at the relevant time and signed as Works Manager, it did not mean that the gate pass was forged or false and was produced only for the purpose of this case, and it is not necessary for De Smet Company to produce any more papers of their factory relating to the witnesss contention and leave application of the deceased, as the applicants themselves have not proved satisfactorily that the deceased was going to the Head Office or that he was not going to Ghatkopar as stated by Sharma before the police. 18. He also drew my attention to Exhibit 44, a statement prepared by De Smet regarding the various visits of the deceased to the Head Office in the course of one year from July 1966 to May 1967 and contended that the visit of the deceased to the Head Office was very rare and abnormal and no presumption could be made that when he was travelling to the City, as stated by Hingorani, the deceased was going to the Head Office or just because he had a bag which contained some office papers, he was travelling to the Head Office. 19. Having carefully considered the material on the record of the Workmens Compensation, Bombay, and here before me, I find that the learned Additional Commissioner failed to apply his mind to the evidence led by the applicants, as already stated above and, to the infirmities in the so-called evidence led by De Smet in the form of a gate pass and the testimony of Malhotra. The learned Commissioner also erred in law in not following thereto in Bhagubai v. The General Manager, Central Railway, V.T. Bombay. 20. In that case the deceased who was employed by the Central Railway at a station on the Railway lived in the railway quarters adjoining the station. The only access for the deceased from his quarters to the station was through the compound of the railway quarters. One night the deceased left his quarters a few minutes before midnight in order to joint duty and immediately thereafter he was stabbed to death by some unknown person. On a claim for compensation in respect of the death of the deceased, it was not disputed that the deceased died as a result of an accident, nor was it disposed that the accident arose in the course of his employment. It was, however, disputed, that the accident did arise out of the employment of the deceased. It was laid down that it was established in that case that the deceased was at a particular place, that he was there because he had to be there by reason of his employment, and that because he was there he met with an accident, a proximate casual connection was established between the employment and the accident and that, therefore, the accident arose out of the employment of the deceased. 21. Again the attention of the learned Additional Commissioner does not appear to have been drawn to the decision of the Supreme Court in General Manager, B.E.S.T. Undertaking, Bombay v. Mrs. Agnes, In that case a B.E.S.T. driver met with an accident while going home from the depot. It was held that the widow was entitled to compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act, observing as follows :--- "Under section 3(1) of the Act injury must be caused to the workmen by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. The question, when does an employment begin and when does it cease, depends upon the facts of each case. But the courts have agreed that the employment does not necessarily and when the "down tool" signal is given or when the workman leaves the actual workshop where he is working. There is a notional extension at both the entry and exit by time an space. The scope of such extension must necessarily depend on the circumstances of a given case." 22. Mr. There is a notional extension at both the entry and exit by time an space. The scope of such extension must necessarily depend on the circumstances of a given case." 22. Mr. Kampani, the learned Counsel for the respondent has sought to distinguish the above two cases on the ground that in Bhagubais case the premises were the railway premises and in the B.E.S.T.s case the entire Bombay was considered to be the premises and the decision must be read in the co ntext of the rules and regulations of the B.E.S.T. and could not be logically extended to a case like the present one. In other words, Mr. Kampani submitted that, in the present case unlike in the B.E.S.T. case that De Smet Company had not provided the car in which the deceased took a lift and as the Additional Commissioner had come to the conclusion that there was no evidence to show that the Production Manager Malhotra had asked the deceased to go by a car or ask Hingorani to give a lift, the notional extension referred to in the said case cannot be made in the present case. In this connection he also relied on the evidence in the case and contended that the evidence did not establish that the deceased was travelling to the Head Office as contended by the applicants. 23. In view of the patently false gate pass unsupported by any evidence produced by the respondent and in the absence of examination of the Works Manager and the Security Officer and also having regard to the conduct of De Smet in not producing the documents which were called for by the applicants, the learned Additional Commissioner was not justified in holding that there was no evidence that the deceased was going to the Head Office. The evidence of the wife and the evidence of Hingorani who said that he wanted to go to the city when he gave the lift at Thana and who also said that the bag which the deceased had contained office papers, which was sent to Kewal Ramanni or De Smet, clearly indicate that the deceased was travelling from the factory of De Smet at Thana to the Head Office. 24. 24. The learned Additional Commissioner, in my opinion, ignored all the relevant material on record referred to above and brushed aside the evidence led by the applicants in coming to the conclusion that the deceased was not going to the Head Office. Normally such a finding would be a finding of facts and the limits of Court under section 30 cannot be exceeded by interfering with the finding of facts. But the present case the learned Additional Commissioner not only ignored the entire evidence led by the applicants on the point, but has also not drawn the inference which any Court of justice or reasonable person ought to have drawn from the evidence of Hingorani that when he was going from Thana to Bombay the deceased was going to the Head Office as he was carrying office papers in his bag. The learned Additional Commissioner ignored all the relevant evidence on the point when he came to the contrary conclusion and this Court would be justified in interfering with the finding recorded by the Additional Commissioner under section 30. 25. Mr. Kampani, relied on the statement before the Police Officer Sharma referred to above. But if at all De Smet wanted to rely on the statement wherein Sharma had stated that the deceased wanted to go to Ghatkopar, De Smet thought to have examined Sharma and proved that statement. Merely because by consent all the papers produced as to the subject-matter were marked Exhibits, it cannot be said to be evidence before the Commissioner and no inference can be drawn on such a statement when Sharma was not made available for cross-examination by the applicants. 26. Even assuming for a moment that the deceased was going only the Ghatkopar for personal work, as it is undisputed that he was going from the factory where he was working though according to Malhotra he was on leave, the notional extension must be in the circumstances extended to his travelling from his factory to the place where the accident occurred in all the facts and circumstances of the case, and, therefore, even accepting the argument of Mr. Kampani that the deceased was only going to Ghatkopar for personal work, which he had not disclosed to his wife, it must be held that the accident occurred out of and in the course of his employment with De Smet, as he had left in the car from the premises of the factory of De Smet in the course in his employment after his duty as alleged by Malhotra, whom I am not prepared to believe for moment, in this case, as he had to sign the gate pass as Works Manager when he was not the Works Manager and produce the gate pass before the Workmenss Compensation Authority which, as already indicated above, appears to have been a false and forged document prima facie. The Additional Commissioner failed to apply his mind to the infirmities in the evidence of Malhotra very prominently brought in the cross-examination of the witness. He merely discussed the law point without even referring to the cases and the evidence in the course of his judgment which was through unjustified. 27. Lastly, Mr. Kampani tried to argue that as the car was not provided by De Smet of the lift was not given at the instance of Malhotra, as alleged in the application, the accident which the deceased met while travelling in a car can never be said to be having any connection whatsoever with the work of the factory of De Smet at Thana and hence the Additional Commissioner for Workmens Compensation was right in dismissing the application. I asked Mr. Kampani who appeared to be familiar with the present transport difficulties, not only in the city of Greater Bombay but also in the surrounding areas like Thana whether an ordinary reasonable person who finds it difficult to get a bus would consider it unreasonable or abnormal or unusual or imprudent to take a lift when he has to travel some distance in Greater Bombay or to Greater Bombay from some place outside. Being familiar with Greater Bombay, Mr. Kampani felt no difficulty in saying that ordinarily it cannot be unreasonable or unusual or abnormal or imprudent to take such a lift. Being familiar with Greater Bombay, Mr. Kampani felt no difficulty in saying that ordinarily it cannot be unreasonable or unusual or abnormal or imprudent to take such a lift. But he contended that taking such a lift would not result in creating or imposing a liability on the employers just because an employee was taking a lift when he was going to his office or when he was returning from his office. In my opinion, this is exactly covered by the Supreme Court decision in the B.E.S.T.s case referred to above. If somebody obliges a person in Bombay to take a lift, it is not considered as a means of transport which is undesirable or unwarranted of dangerous or an extra ordinary peril which an employee cannot take. Accident may occur not only in such cars, but also in trains, B.E.S.T. buses or even in office buses just as it may occur in the course of a lift taken by such person. 28. In other words, once it is held that the deceased was going in the course of the employment when he left his office and when he was going to the Head Office, the mere fact that he took a left with or without the permission of the Work Manager, makes no difference to the liability of the employer as the accident clearly arises, having regard to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business in relation to the transport condition prevailing in Greater Bombay and round about in an industrial are a which is teaming with population at present. It is, therefore, contrary to common sense contend that merely because the deceased employee took a lift from a person who was not authorised by the employer, it cannot be said that the accident did not arise out of or in the course of the employment within the meaning of section 3 of the Workmens Compensation Act. 29. Mr. It is, therefore, contrary to common sense contend that merely because the deceased employee took a lift from a person who was not authorised by the employer, it cannot be said that the accident did not arise out of or in the course of the employment within the meaning of section 3 of the Workmens Compensation Act. 29. Mr. Sali, the learned Counsel for the appellants, urged that although the compensation which was claimed on the date of the application was on the basis of the table of compensation contained in Schedule IV as it existed on the date of the accident and on the date of the application, as the present appeal is the continuation of the proceedings and as in the meanwhile the Parliament has amended the Act including Schedule IV by increasing compensation, the proper compensation to which the appellants are entitled now is not only Rs. 10,000/- as per the old Schedule for a salary of Rs. 400/- but Rs. 19,200/- as per the new Schedule substituted in the Act by the Workmens Compensation Amendment Act 1976. (Act No. 65 of 1976) which brought the schedule into force on October 1, 1975. There is some force in this contention. But according to the ordinary rules of interpretation of statutes, a claimant is entitled to that compensation to which he would have been entitled under law on the date of the application. Mr. Sali relied in this connection on my judgment in (Kasturbai Ratanchand Gandhi v. S.S. Sadole)4, 76 Bom.L.R. 79. But in that case on the date on which the application was made the then amendment by Act 64 of 1962 had already come into force. In the present case, however, the amendment came into force much later on October 1, 1973 as stated above. The Application was filed on September 26, 1967 and it was even decided by the Additional Commissioner for Workmens Compensation on December 27, 1969. In these circumstances, it is no possible to give retrospective effect to the Schedule as amended in the present case. 30. In the result, the judgment and order passed by the learned Additional Commissioner for Workmens Compensation at Bombay on December 27, 1969 are set aside. In these circumstances, it is no possible to give retrospective effect to the Schedule as amended in the present case. 30. In the result, the judgment and order passed by the learned Additional Commissioner for Workmens Compensation at Bombay on December 27, 1969 are set aside. The application for compensation made by the appellants on September 26, 1967, is allowed and it is ordered that the respondent De Smet shall pay to the applicants by depositing before the Commissioner a sum of Rs. 10,000/- with interest at the rate of Rs. 6/- per cent per annum on the said sum from the date of the accident on May 20, 1967 till the amount is deposited before the Commissioner. On such deposit the Additional Commissioner or any other Commissioner for Workmens Compensation having authority shall distribute the compensation and interest on the amount deposited among the appellants in accordance with the provisions of section 8 of the Workmens Compensation Act, 1923. The Commissioner shall further call upon the Respondent to show cause why a penalty should not be imposed on them for producing a false document like the gate pas referred to above and delaying the payment of compensation in exercise of the powers under section 4-A(3) of the Workmens Compensation Act, 1923. The application is restored to the file of the Commissioner for the purpose of passing the orders under section 8 and section 4-A(3) as directed above in the light of the observations made in the above judgment. 31. Appeal is allowed with costs throughout. -----