Judgement P. D. DESAI, J. :- The petitioner who is a young girl aged about 19 has invoked the writ jurisdiction of this Court to challenge the decision of the Syndicate of the South Gujarat University (hereinafter referred to as 'the University') recorded in its resolution No. 23 dated March 8, 1978 : (1) cancelling the admission given to her in the Pre-University Science Class in the academic year 1976-77, (2) cancelling the result of the Pre-University Science Examination held in March/April 1977 in so far as it concerned the petitioner, (3) directing the concerned College to cancel her admission to pre-medical class in the academic year 1977-78 and (4) debarring her from appearing at any University Examination or joining any affiliated college or recognized institution up to May 31, 1979. The impugned action was taken against the petitioner on the ground that although she was not eligible to secure admission to the Pre-University Science Class, having regard to the provision of Ordinance 144 of the University, she had secured such admission by deliberately furnishing false information while obtaining the certificate of eligibility. In order to decide the validity or otherwise of the challenge, it would be necessary to set out a few facts and we proceed to do so. 2. It appears that the father of the petitioner hails from Surat District. He had, however, settled down in Bombay where he was carrying on business as transport contractor until June 12, 1976. On and with effect from the said date the father of the petitioner closed down his business at Bombay and shifted with his family to Surat. The petitioner received her schooling in Bombay. She passed the S.S.C. Examination held by the S.S.C.E. Board, Poona in March, 1974. She secured 82% marks and was awarded gold medal. Thereafter, she prosecuted her studies in First Year Science and Inter Science in a college affiliated to the Bombay University. She appeared in the First Year Science Examination in April, 1975 and in the Inter Science Examination in April, 1976. Both these examinations were held by the Bombay University and she was declared successful at those examinations. It is the case of the petitioner that her father having migrated to Surat in June 1976, she was required to discontinue her studies at Bombay and to pursue studies at Surat. Both these examinations were held by the Bombay University and she was declared successful at those examinations. It is the case of the petitioner that her father having migrated to Surat in June 1976, she was required to discontinue her studies at Bombay and to pursue studies at Surat. It is further the case of the petitioner that she was very much keen and desirous of taking up medical course and that for that purpose she was required to join Pre-University Science Class in any of the colleges affiliated to the University. On Oct. 14, 1976 she obtained a migration certificate from the Maharashtra State Board of Secondary Education, Poona Divisional Board, Poona. The certificate, inter alia, stated that the petitioner had passed the S.S.C. Examination held in March 1974 in the first grade. According to the petitioner, she then applied for admission to the Pre-University Science Class in the P.T. Sarvajanik Science College, Surat, which is a college affiliated to the University. The college authorities required the petitioner to produce an eligibility certificate from the University. The petitioner thereupon applied for certificate of eligibility on Sept. 9, 1976 in the prescribed form. She was granted provisional eligibility certificate on Sept. 14, 1976 by the University and on the strength of the said provisional eligibility certificate she was admitted in Pre-University Science Class in P.T. Sarvajanik Science College for the academic year 1976-77. The final eligibility certificate was issued by the University to the petitioner on Oct. 18, 1976. The petitioner completed her terms and appeared in the Pre-University Science Examination held by the University in April, 1977. She was declared successful at the said examination, she having passed the same in First Class obtaining 756 marks out of 1000 marks. In June 1977 she secured admission in the Pre-medical Class of the same College and was prosecuting her studies in the said class when towards the end of the term the impugned action was taken against her by the Syndicate of the University. The circumstances under which the impugned action came to be taken, as gathered from the affidavit-in-reply dated April 20, 1978 filed by G.A. Desai, Registrar of the University may now be adverted to. 3. The circumstances under which the impugned action came to be taken, as gathered from the affidavit-in-reply dated April 20, 1978 filed by G.A. Desai, Registrar of the University may now be adverted to. 3. It appears that the attention of the University authorities was drawn by a student through a letter that the petitioner could not have been admitted to the Pre-University Science Class and that she could not have secured admission to the Pre-medical Class in view of the provisions of Ordinance 144 according to which a student who has passed any examination of a Statutory University in India is not allowed to appear at the same examination of the University with the same subject. Thereupon the University made an inquiry and it was found that the petitioner had passed her First Year Science Examination from Mithibai College of Arts and Chauhan Institute of Science in the year 1975 and that she had also passed Inter-Science Examination from the said institution in 1976. According to the University authorities, First Year Science Examination of the Bombay University is the same examination with the same subjects or equivalent examination of the Pre-University Science Examination of the South Gujarat University. The petitioner could not, under these circumstances, have secured admission in the Pre-University Science Class in any of the colleges affiliated to the University. It is the case of the University authorities that the petitioner was fully conversant with this situation in view of the fact that in the application form for admission to P.T. Sarvajanik College of Science, there was a clear reference made to the provision of Ordinance 144 and similar reference was also found in the prospectus of the said College for the year 1976-77. Ordinarily, therefore, if the petitioner was acting bona fide, she would not have sought admission to the Pre-University Science Class in the said College. She, however, not only sought admission to the said class but also made certain misleading and false statements in her application for eligibility certificate made on Sept. 9, 1976. The University authorities rely upon the following statements made by the petitioner in different columns of the said application :- 10. She, however, not only sought admission to the said class but also made certain misleading and false statements in her application for eligibility certificate made on Sept. 9, 1976. The University authorities rely upon the following statements made by the petitioner in different columns of the said application :- 10. Name of the College or Institution last attended by the applicant in another University or public body, and whether the applicant was a student of such college for Two academic years undergoing the courses of instruction for the Examination qualifying for admission to this University. The percentage of attendance in each subject is not required. (The period of attendance at such a College should also be specified.) 14. Certificate (in original) to be attached together with a certified copy of each certificate. The original certificates will be returned with the Final Eligibility Certificates. Because of marriage and social reason I could not attend College during 2 years." According to the University authorities, in furnishing particulars against each of the aforesaid columns the petitioner was guilty of suppressio veri and suggestio falsi. By placing merely a dash (-) in column 8, the petitioner not only suppressed the material fact that she had passed the First Year Science and Inter Science Examinations of the Bombay University but she also misled the University authorities into believing that she had not taken any such examination. Similarly, in column 9, which speaks of "the last qualifying examination passed by the applicant in another University or public body", the petitioner failed to disclose the fact that she had passed the First Year Science Examination and Inter Science Examination and referred only to her having passed S.S.C. Examination in March, 1974. In column 10 the petitioner was supposed to give "name of the College or Institution last attended by the applicant in another University or public body" (underlining supplied) and other connected particulars. In the said column also the petitioner failed to disclose that the College which she last attended was Mithibai College of Arts and Chauhan Institute of Science affiliated to the Bombay University and that she was a student of the said College for two academic years undergoing courses of instructions for First Year Science and Inter Science Examinations. In the said column also the petitioner failed to disclose that the College which she last attended was Mithibai College of Arts and Chauhan Institute of Science affiliated to the Bombay University and that she was a student of the said College for two academic years undergoing courses of instructions for First Year Science and Inter Science Examinations. Instead, the only information which she supplied was that she was a student of Sir B.J. Girls' School, Goregaon, Bombay and that the last two academic years during which she had attended the said school were 1972-73 and 1973-74. In that manner, the petitioner misled the University into believing that Sir B.J. Girls' School was the last institution which she had attended. What was still more misleading, according to the University authorities, was the endorsement below column 14 which contained a positively false statement to the effect that because of marriage and social reasons, the petitioner could not attend College during two years, that is to say, for academic years 1974-75 and 1975-76. According to the University authorities, the application for eligibility certificate was filled in English by the petitioner and it was duly signed by her. The provisional eligibility certificate and the final eligibility certificate came to be granted to her because the University had no reason to doubt the veracity of the statements made by the petitioner. If, however, she had acted fairly and honestly and disclosed all the material facts which she was bound to disclose, she would not have been granted eligibility certificate for the purpose of being admitted to Pre-University Science Class. As the petitioner was fully aware of this situation having been forewarned, inter alia, by the relevant information supplied in the application form for admission to and prospectus of Sir P.T. Sarvajanik Science College, she deliberately made false statements and in that manner committed a fraud and cheated the University. 4. When all these facts came to light, a show cause notice dated Feb. 14/15, 1978 was issued by the University to the petitioner under the signature of the Registrar. In para 1 of the show cause notice, reference was made to the furnishing of false information and suppression of correct information in the application for eligibility certificate. 4. When all these facts came to light, a show cause notice dated Feb. 14/15, 1978 was issued by the University to the petitioner under the signature of the Registrar. In para 1 of the show cause notice, reference was made to the furnishing of false information and suppression of correct information in the application for eligibility certificate. In para 2 reference was made to the false endorsement below column 14 in the application for eligibility certificate in order to explain the interval of two years from the date of the passing of the S.S.C. Examination to the date of seeking admission in the Pre-University Science Class of Sir P.T. Sarvajanik Science College. In para 3, reference was made to the "complaint" received by the University about the petitioner having secured admission in the Pre-University Science Class on furnishing false information. Reference was then made to the inquiry held by the University and the outcome of such inquiry which showed that the petitioner had passed First Year Science and Inter Science Examinations of the Bombay University. The show cause notice then proceeded to state as under (when translated from Gujarati into English) : "Apropos the aforesaid facts, the reasons given by you in the application for obtaining eligibility certificate of this University in regard to the interval of time after the passing of the S.S.C, Examination are totally false and it is established that in that manner you have attempted to cheat the University, According to Ordinance 144 of this University, a student appearing in an examination of this University should not have passed similar/equivalent (original in Gujarathi omitted-Ed.) examination of another University with the same subjects. In your case there has been a breach of the said Ordinance. You secured admission in a college affiliated to this University and appeared in the Pre-Science Examination, although you had passed First Year Science and Inter Science Examinations of the Bombay University by furnishing false information and suppressing correct information. This is illegal according to Ordinance 144 of the University. You secured admission in a college affiliated to this University and appeared in the Pre-Science Examination, although you had passed First Year Science and Inter Science Examinations of the Bombay University by furnishing false information and suppressing correct information. This is illegal according to Ordinance 144 of the University. Therefore, you are called upon to show cause to the University in writing within seven days of the receipt of this communication why the admission secured by you in June, 1976 to Pre-University Science Class and your consequential result of the Pre-University Science Examination held in April, 1977 and other ancillary benefits (obtained by you) should not be cancelled in view of the false information furnished to the University and correct information suppressed by you in your application for eligibility certificate. In case no explanation is received from you, or explanation, if any, furnished is found to be unsatisfactory, the University authorities will take such decision as they deem fit and proper in light of the facts in their possession which please note." 5. The petitioner showed cause by her letter dated March 2, 1978 addressed to the Registrar of the University. After having stated that it caused her great regret to know that failure on her part to disclose the particulars referred to in the letter under reply could assume such serious proportion, the petitioner proceeded to give the following explanation : "My native place is village Bharthana Taluka Kamrej, District Surat. My father was carrying on business at Bombay for quite some time. He, however, decided to wind up his business and to settle down at Surat and accordingly, he migrated from Bombay. Under these circumstances, it was decided that I should prosecute my studies at Surat. I am interested in prosecuting studies in Science. I being a woman, (it was my belief) that if I could prosecute studies in Medical Science, I should read for the same, in South Gujarat University, it is necessary to pass pre-University Science Examination in order to get admission to medical course and, therefore, I acted accordingly. After prosecuting studies in Pre-University Science and obtained higher class at the said examination I could procure admission to medical course. After prosecuting studies in Pre-University Science and obtained higher class at the said examination I could procure admission to medical course. At this stage it transpires from your letter that I was bound to disclose that I had prosecuted studies in the Bombay University for two years and that my failure to disclose the same amounts to an offence. I had no intention whatever of cheating the University. If a decision is arrived at as informed by you and my admission is treated as cancelled, then it would give a serious blow to my future giving an entirely new turn to the future direction of my life. Under the circumstances, I humbly request that no such penalty should be imposed upon me and that I should be granted pardon." 6. It is disclosed in the affidavit-in-reply that the show cause notice and the explanation of the petitioner were put up before the Syndicate at its meeting held on March 8, 1978. The members of the Syndicate, after taking into account the relevant facts and having considered that the petitioner had made positive misrepresentation and suppressed material facts, decided that she should not be allowed to enjoy benefits which she had obtained by false representation and she having committed a gross act of indiscipline, she should be debarred from appearing in any examination up to May 31, 1979. The Syndicate incorporated its decision in resolution No. 23 which, when translated into English, reads as under :- "Hereby resolved that the abovementioned student, who was not eligible for admission to the Pre-University Science Class in terms of the provisions of Ordinance 144 procured or secured admission by making false statement in her application for eligibility certificate. Therefore, the admission secured by her to the Pre-University Science Class should be cancelled and her result of the Pre-University Science Examination at which she appeared in March/April, 1977 pursuant upon her wrongful admission to the said class should also be cancelled. Consequent upon these decisions, P.T. Science College and Government Medical College should be informed to cancel her admission to the pre-medical Class in the academic year 1977-78. Consequent upon these decisions, P.T. Science College and Government Medical College should be informed to cancel her admission to the pre-medical Class in the academic year 1977-78. In addition, in view of the fact that the abovementioned student has, in the aforesaid manner, deliberately furnished wrong information, she should be debarred till May 31, 1979 from being admitted as a student in any institution affiliated to or recognized by the University and she should also be debarred from appearing in any examination conducted by the University till the said date." 7. Pursuant to the aforesaid resolution of the Syndicate, the University issued two notifications. The first of such notifications issued on March 22, 1978 reads as follows :- "In pursuance of Resolution No. 23 of the Syndicate dated 8-3-1978, the result of Kum. Damayanti Hasmukhbhai Patel, Candidate No. 1980 at Pre-University Science Examination held in March/April, 1977 who was declared successful in first class vide this office Result Notification No. 58/77, dated 27-6-1977, is hereby cancelled as her admission to the Pre-University Science Class is also cancelled." 8. The second notification dated March 23, 1978 reads as under :- "In pursuance of Syndicate Resolution No. 23 dated 8-3-1978, it is hereby notified that Kumari Damyanti Hasmukbhai Patel who had secured admission to the Pre-University Science Class in P.T. Sarvajanik College of Science, Surat during the academic year 1976-77 by deliberately furnishing false information while obtaining the Certificate of Eligibility of this University, is hereby debarred from appearing at any University Examination or joining any affiliated Colleges or recognised institution up to 31st May 1979." 9. The decision of the Syndicate was communicated to the petitioner under letter dated March 21/23, 1978 under the signature of the Registrar. The said communication set out in extenso the resolution dated March 8, 1978 passed by the Syndicate and along with the said communication were sent the two notifications issued by the University which have been set out above. 10. By a communication dated March 27, 1978 the petitioner was informed by the Vice-Principal of P.T. Sarvajanik College of Science that her application form to appear at the University Examination (Pre-medical) of March/April, 1978 was being withdrawn in pursuance of the "University letter .......... dated 21/23-3-78 and Syndicate Resolution No. 23 of 8-3-1978............" 11. 10. By a communication dated March 27, 1978 the petitioner was informed by the Vice-Principal of P.T. Sarvajanik College of Science that her application form to appear at the University Examination (Pre-medical) of March/April, 1978 was being withdrawn in pursuance of the "University letter .......... dated 21/23-3-78 and Syndicate Resolution No. 23 of 8-3-1978............" 11. The petitioner has thereupon filed this petition on April 12, 1978 praying, inter alia, (1) that Ordinance 144 be declared ultra vires Arts.14 and 19 of the Constitution and Statute 223 framed by the University; (2) that notifications dated March 22, 1978 and March 23, 1978 issued by the University be quashed and set aside; and (3) that the University be restrained from taking any action against the petitioner pursuant to the said two notifications and debarring her from appearing in any examination up to March 31, 1979. The petition was placed for preliminary hearing before this Court on April 13, 1978. Rule nisi was issued on the same day and interim relief permitting the petitioner to appear at the Pre-medical examination scheduled to be held on and from April 24, 1978 was granted on the condition that the result of such examination should not be declared and that the rights of the parties would be subject to the final decision of this petition. 12. At the hearing of the petition, the following grounds alone were urged on behalf of the petitioner :- (1) Ordinance 144 on the basis of which the show cause notice was issued and the impugned action is taken has worked itself out in the case of the petitioner inasmuch as the petitioner has already appeared and passed the Pre-University Science Examination. Under such circumstances, Ordinance 144 cannot be invoked and relying upon the said Ordinance, the admission of the petitioner to the Pre-University Science Class and her result of the Pre-University Science Examination cannot be cancelled. (2) Pre-University Science Examination of the University is not the same examination with the same subject as the First Year Science Examination of the Bombay University within the meaning of Ordinance 144 and there is, therefore, no breach of the said Ordinance warranting any penal action against the petitioner. (2) Pre-University Science Examination of the University is not the same examination with the same subject as the First Year Science Examination of the Bombay University within the meaning of Ordinance 144 and there is, therefore, no breach of the said Ordinance warranting any penal action against the petitioner. (3) Even assuming that there is breach of Ordinance 144, there is no power in the Syndicate of the University to take the impugned action against the petitioner under any provision of the South Gujarat University Act, 1965 or any of the statutes or Ordinances framed under the Act. (4) The impugned action is in any case vitiated on account of non-compliance with rules of natural justice inasmuch as :- (a) Copy of the complaint on the basis of which the show cause notice was issued is not furnished to the petitioner; (b) Copy of the report of the inquiry held by the University pursuant to the said complaint has not been furnished to the petitioner nor has the petitioner been communicated the material collected at the fact-finding inquiry held by the University and the petitioner has not been afforded any opportunity to correct or controvert any matter prejudicial to the petitioner appearing in the report or in the material gathered at her back; (c) Under the show cause notice the petitioner was not informed that it was, inter alia, proposed by the University to debar her from appearing at any University Examination or joining any affiliated college or recognized institution up to May 31, 1979 and, therefore, such penalty having been imposed without affording to the petitioner an opportunity of showing cause is ultra vires. (d) No opportunity of personal hearing was afforded to the petitioner by the Syndicate. (5) Ordinance 144 is in conflict with Statute 223 and to the extent of inconsistency it is invalid. (6) The conclusion reached by the Syndicate of the University that the petitioner deliberately furnished false information while obtaining the certificate of eligibility and in that manner cheated the University is not justified and warranted in the facts and circumstances of the case. 13. Before proceeding to deal with these various grounds dealt with, it would be convenient to refer to the relevant statutory provisions. 13. Before proceeding to deal with these various grounds dealt with, it would be convenient to refer to the relevant statutory provisions. The South Gujarat University Act, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'), as its preamble shows, is an Act to establish and incorporate a teaching and affiliating University at Surat in the State of Gujarat. Section 4 of the Act prescribes the powers of the University, Sub-Section (23) of the said Section provides that subject to such conditions as may be prescribed by or under the provisions of the Act, the University shall have power to co-ordinate, supervise, regulate and control the residence, conduct and discipline of the students of the University and to make arrangements for promoting their health and general welfare. S.15 prescribes the authorities of the University and amongst the authorities named therein are : (1) the Senate, (2) the Syndicate, and (3) the Academic Council. S.20 prescribes the powers and duties of the Syndicate, Clause (xix) of Sub-Sec. (1) of the said Section provides that subject to such conditions as may be prescribed by or under the Act, the Syndicate shall exercise the powers and perform the duty to supervise and control the residence, conduct and discipline of the students of the University and to make arrangements for promoting their health and general welfare. Clause (xxvii) confers upon the Syndicate the power and duty to exercise such other powers and perform such other duties as may be conferred or imposed on it by the Act, Statute, Ordinances and Regulations. Clause (xxviii), in the same manner, confers upon the Syndicate the power and duty to exercise all powers of the University not otherwise provided for in the Act or the Statutes and all other powers which are requisite to give effect to the provisions of the Act or the Statutes. Section 22 deals with the powers and duties of the Academic Council. Clause (ix) of Sub-Sec. (2) thereof confers upon the Academic Council power to make Regulations regarding the examinations of the University and the conditions on which students shall be admitted to such examinations, Cl.(x) confers power on the Academic Council to approve Regulations prescribing equivalence of examinations. Sec. 30 confers power upon the Senate to make Statutes or to amend, repeal or add to them in the manner therein provided. Sec. 30 confers power upon the Senate to make Statutes or to amend, repeal or add to them in the manner therein provided. Sec. 29, which precedes S.30, prescribes the matters in respect of which Statutes may be framed and the residuary Cl.(x) of the said Section provides that the Statutes may be made in respect of all matters which by the Act are to be or may be prescribed by the Statutes. Section 31 deals with Ordinances and it provides that subject to such conditions as may be prescribed by or under the provisions of the Act, the Syndicate may make Ordinances to provide for the matters enumerated therein. One of the matters in respect of which Ordinance can be made is conditions of residence, conduct and discipline of students of the University and this is provided in Cl.(v) of S.31. Section 43, in so far as it is material for the purpose of the present case, reads as under : "No student shall be enrolled as a student of the University unless he passed - (i) the Secondary School Certificate Examination conducted by the Secondary School Certificate Examination Board in such subjects and with such standards of attainment as may be prescribed by the Statutes, or (ii) .... .... .... (iii) any other examination prescribed as equivalent to the examinations referred to in Cls.(i) and (ii), and possess such further qualifications, if any, as may be prescribed by the Statutes." In pursuance of the power conferred by this Section, the Senate has framed Statute 223 the material part of which reads as under :- "A candidate who has passed the S.S.C. Examination conducted by the S.S.C. Examination Board of the Gujarat State or an examination equivalent thereto shall be considered eligible for admission to : (ii) Pre-University Course in the Faculty of Science if he has passed......" There is a proviso to the Statute which is not material and it need not be quoted. Part III of the Ordinances framed by the Syndicate is entitled "Admission of Students from other Universities." Ordinance 52 occurs in the said part. Part III of the Ordinances framed by the Syndicate is entitled "Admission of Students from other Universities." Ordinance 52 occurs in the said part. Clauses (1) and (3) of the said Ordinance are material and they may be set out : "(1) A student migrating from the jurisdiction of another University or Statutory Examining Body and seeking admission to this University shall apply to the Registrar of this University for a Certificate of Eligibility and shall at the same time pay a fee of Rs. 20. Notwithstanding what is stated above, a student of any other statutory University in Gujarat and Gujarat Vidyapith, Ahmedabad seeking admission here, shall pay a certificate fee of Rs. 2/- only. Such fee shall not be refunded, if an Eligibility Certificate is issued to the applicant; provided, however, that a student to whom the Eligibility Certificate is issued will not be required to pay a fresh fee if he/she desires a change over from one course to another for admission to which he/she is otherwise eligible. (3) No student from the jurisdiction of another University or Statutory Examining Body, shall be admitted to any Department/Institution/College maintained by or affiliated to the University, except on production of a certificate of Eligibility signed by the Registrar of this University, in the following form : CERTIFICATE OF ELIGIBILITY This is to certify that Shri/Miss/Mrs..................has passed the............:.. Examination from the affiliated college of the ............... University/Board in the year ...... 19 . He/She is eligible for admission to ............... Class in the ...............College affiliated to this University." Part XVI contains Ordinances relating to Examinations. There are different headings under which various Ordinances appear under this part. The first heading is "(A) Appointment of Examiners". There are only three Ordinances appearing under this heading, but none of them is relevant. 19 . He/She is eligible for admission to ............... Class in the ...............College affiliated to this University." Part XVI contains Ordinances relating to Examinations. There are different headings under which various Ordinances appear under this part. The first heading is "(A) Appointment of Examiners". There are only three Ordinances appearing under this heading, but none of them is relevant. The second heading is "(B) Conduct of Examinations." Ordinances 142, 143 and 144 occurring under this heading may be set out verbatim as follows :- "O.142 : On receipt of a report regarding the misconduct of any student at any University or College Examination, including breach of any of the rules laid down by the Syndicate for the proper conduct of examination, the Syndicate shall have power to punish such misconduct or breach of rules by exclusion of such candidate from any University or College Examination of any University courses in a College or the University, or from any convocation for the purpose of conferring degrees, either permanently or for a specified period, or by the cancellation of the result of the candidate in the University Examination for which the candidate appeared or by the deprivation of any University scholarship held by him, or by the cancellation of the award of any University prize or medal to him, or in any two or more of the aforesaid ways. O.143 : The Syndicate shall have the power to exclude any candidate from a University Examination, on being satisfied that he is suffering from an infectious or contagious disease. Whenever any candidate is thus excluded, the fee paid by him for admission to the examination shall be refunded to him. O.143 : The Syndicate shall have the power to exclude any candidate from a University Examination, on being satisfied that he is suffering from an infectious or contagious disease. Whenever any candidate is thus excluded, the fee paid by him for admission to the examination shall be refunded to him. O.144 : Students who have passed any examination of a Statutory University in India will not be allowed to appear at the same examination of the University with the same subject." The third heading is "(C) Results, Condonation and Certificates." Two ordinances occurring under this heading are relevant and they may be set out in extenso :- O.156 : In any case where it is found that the result of an examination has been affected by error, malpractice, fraud, improper conduct or other matter whatsoever nature it shall be competent for the Syndicate to cancel or amend such result in such manner as be in accordance with the true position and to make such declaration the Syndicate shall in its discretion consider necessary in that behalf; provided that, but subject to ordinances Nos. 142 and 157 no result shall be cancelled or amended after the expiration of six months from the date of publication of the result by the University. Notwithstanding anything coned above the result of no candidate at any University Examination shall be altered to his detriment after two months from the declaration of the result except when his case falls under Ordinances 142 and 157. Ord. Notwithstanding anything coned above the result of no candidate at any University Examination shall be altered to his detriment after two months from the declaration of the result except when his case falls under Ordinances 142 and 157. Ord. 157 : In any case where the result of an examination has been ascertained and published and it is found that such result has been affected by any malpractice, fraud, or any other improper conduct whereby an examinee been benefited, and that such examinee has, in the opinion of the Syndicate, been party or privy to, or connived such malpractice, fraud, or improper conduct, the Syndicate shall have power at any time, notwithstanding the issue of a certificate or the award of a prize or scholarship, to amend or cancel the result of such examinee or to punish such misconduct by exclusion of such examinee from any University or College Examination of any University courses in a College of the University or from any convocation for the purpose of conferring degrees, either permanently or for a specified period, or by the deprivation of any University Scholarship held by him, or by the cancellation of the award of any University prize or Medal to him, or any two or more of the aforesaid ways and to make such declaration as the Syndicate shall consider necessary in that behalf." With the rest of the Ordinances occurring under different headings we are not concerned in the present case and no reference needs to be made to the same. It is against the background of the provisions that the various questions raised at the hearing will require to be resolved. We now proceed to deal with those grounds seriatim. 14. Re. Ground No. 1 : The argument under this head was that Ordinance 144, its true construction, would operate at a point of time antecedent to the holding of an examination and that thereunder a student would not be allowed to appear at such examination if he has passed any examination of a Statutory University which is "the same examination...... Re. Ground No. 1 : The argument under this head was that Ordinance 144, its true construction, would operate at a point of time antecedent to the holding of an examination and that thereunder a student would not be allowed to appear at such examination if he has passed any examination of a Statutory University which is "the same examination...... with the same subject." In other words, the argument was that Ordinance 144 could be invoked only before the examination was actually held and that once the examination was held, no action could be taken against the student who has appeared at such examination even if it is subsequently found that such student had previously passed any examination of another Statutory University which is similar or equivalent examination with the same subject. Basing himself upon this construction, counsel for the petitioner argued that even assuming that First Year Science Examination of the Bombay University was the same examination with the same subject as the Pre-University Science Examination of the South Gujarat University, once the petitioner had appeared in the Pre-University Science Examination in April, 1976 and was declared successful thereat, it would not be open to the University to invoke Ordinance 144 in 1978 and to hold that there was a breach of the said Ordinance warranting penal action against the petitioner. In support of this submission, reliance was placed on the decision in Krishnan v. Kurukshetra University, AIR 1976 SC 376 . 15. We are unable to accede to this submission. Ordinance 144, in our opinion, does not deal with a point of time. It deals with a fact-situation. If that fact-situation is found to exist in any given case, then Ordinance 144 would be attracted, irrespective of whether the fact-situation came to the notice of the University before or after the examination in respect of which breach was complained was held. In this connection, it requires to be borne in mind that the object underlying Ordinance 144 is to ensure that no student, whether of this University or of any other statutory University, having been declared successful at an examination, should be permitted to join the same or similar course and appear in an equivalent examination of the University. In this connection, it requires to be borne in mind that the object underlying Ordinance 144 is to ensure that no student, whether of this University or of any other statutory University, having been declared successful at an examination, should be permitted to join the same or similar course and appear in an equivalent examination of the University. Apart from the consideration that in courses where there are limited seats, admission will have to be given to those who have already successfully completed such or similar or equivalent courses, thereby denying chances to fresh entrants, if this were to be permitted, there is every likelihood of a student, who has been declared successful, appearing in the same examination again, in order only to secure a better grading or class and consequential benefits. It is with the object of suppressing this mischief that the Ordinance enacts in a negative form a mandatory provision enjoining the University not to allow a student who has passed any examination of a statutory University to appear in the same examination of this University with the same subject. If such a salutary provision is allowed to be disregarded merely on the ground that once a student has appeared in an examination in breach thereof, it ceases to apply, the very purpose and object intended to be secured would be frustrated. It is true that Ordinance 144 uses the expression "....will not be allowed to appear at the same examination.....". We do not think, however, that by reason of the use of such expression, the Ordinance must operate only before the examination is held and that if the Ordinance is not invoked at that stage, it cannot be invoked at all and any purposeful breach thereof cannot be adequately dealt with. It is well known that the expression "will not be allowed" is often used to denote a command. When it is so used, the expression really means "shall not be allowed". When the expression is so used, it lays down a mandatory rule the breach of which itself results into invalidity. Prohibitive or negative words can rarely be directory and they are indicative of the intent that the provision is to be mandatory (see Crawford on Construction of Statutes, pp. 523-4, approvingly cited in Haridwar Singh v. Bagun Sumbrui, AIR 1972 SC 1242 at p. 1247). Prohibitive or negative words can rarely be directory and they are indicative of the intent that the provision is to be mandatory (see Crawford on Construction of Statutes, pp. 523-4, approvingly cited in Haridwar Singh v. Bagun Sumbrui, AIR 1972 SC 1242 at p. 1247). As the learned author has pointed out, there is but one way to obey the command "thou shalt not", and that is to completely refrain from doing the forbidden act and this is so, even though the statute provides no penalty for disobedience. It is obvious that any act done in breach of such mandatory provision which cannot be waived as it is conceived in public interest would be a nullity (see Dhirendra Nath v. Sudhir Chandra, AIR 1964 SC 1300 ). It is not as if it would be a nullity only if the act complained of comes to light at one point of time. It would be a nullity for all times. In our opinion, therefore, it is not possible to link the operation of Ordinance 144 with any particular point of time. The Ordinance would apply proprio vigore in the fact situation covered by it and any act in breach thereof would be invalid, irrespective of whether such act has come to the notice of the University before the examination is held or thereafter. 16. The decision in Krishnan's case ( AIR 1976 SC 376 ) (supra) upon which reliance was placed in support of this argument has no application. The Supreme Court was there concerned with Cl.2 of Ordinance X of Kurukshetra University. Under the relevant provision, each candidate for an examination was required to submit, inter alia, a certificate signed by the Principal of the College/Head of Department concerned, stating that he had attended regular course of study for the prescribed number of academic years. Such a certificate would be provisional and could be withdrawn "at any time before the examination" if the candidate failed to attend the prescribed course of lectures before the end of his term. Such a certificate would be provisional and could be withdrawn "at any time before the examination" if the candidate failed to attend the prescribed course of lectures before the end of his term. It was in the context of such provision that the Supreme Court observed that the University could withdraw the certificate only before the examination and that once the candidate was allowed to take the examination, rightly or wrongly, then the statute which empowered the University to withdraw the candidature had worked itself out and the candidate could not be refused admission subsequently for any infirmity which should have been looked into before giving the candidate permission to appear. The language of the Ordinance there under consideration is entirely different from the language of Ordinance 144. In terms the said Ordinance had provided that action regarding the withdrawal could be taken "at any time before the examination". We do not think that the expression "will not be allowed to appear" occurring in Ordinance 144 could be equated or is similar to the expression "at any time before the examination" occurring in the Ordinance under consideration before the Supreme Court. Besides, it was in terms found in that case that the petitioner was not guilty of suggestio falsi or suppressio veri and that, therefore, if the University authorities acquiesced in the infirmity without making any effort to discover the fraud, then they had no power to withdraw the candidature of the petitioner. The facts here are altogether different. No assistance could, therefore, possibly be derived from the decision in Krishnan's case which is distinguishable both on law and facts. 17. We are of the opinion, therefore, that there is no substance in the first ground of challenge and that it must be rejected. 18. Re. Ground No. 2 : In support of this ground of challenge it was emphasized that Ordinance 144 speaks of "same examination" and "same subject", that though the word "same", when used in conjunction with the word "examination", might be taken to mean similar, when that word is again used in conjunction with the word "subject", it must be taken to mean identical and that, therefore, what was to be seen was whether in a similar examination of another University at which the student had successfully appeared, he had to study identical subjects. Counsel for the petitioner, basing himself upon this interpretation, placed reliance on some difference in the curriculum of the First Year Science course of the Bombay University and that of the Pre-University Science Course of the University. The particulars in this regard are to be found in Annexure-'A' to the affidavit-in-rejoinder dated April 28, 1978 filed by the petitioner. Though in the said annexure, several points of difference have been emphasized, at the hearing of the petition only one distinguishing feature in the curricula of the two courses was relied upon and that was that whereas Organic Chemistry was a subject in the curriculum of the South Gujarat University for the Pre-University Science Examination, no such subject was included in the curriculum of First Year Science Examination of the Bombay University. Having regard to this difference in the curricula of the two examinations, it was urged that the petitioner could not be taken to have appeared in "the same examination of the University with the same subject." 19. We are of the view that it is not open to the petitioner to invite us to go into this aspect of the case and that on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, we are not competent to express any opinion on this matter. For the purposes of this argument, we will assume, without conceding, that the construction sought to be placed on behalf of the petitioner upon Ordinance 144, so far as the use of the word "same" is concerned, is correct. In other words, we will assume, without admitting, that the examination of the other University passed by the student concerned should be similar or corresponding to the examination in which he proposes to or has appeared and that the subjects at both the examinations must be identical. Even then, in our opinion, the petitioner cannot succeed herein on the basis of aforesaid ground. In the first place, it was never the case of the petitioner in reply to the show cause notice that the First Year Science Examination of the Bombay University was not the same examination with the same subject as the Pre-University Science Examination of the University. As would be apparent from the reply dated March 2, 1978 sent by the petitioner to the Registrar of the University in response to the show cause notice, she never raised dispute of this kind. As would be apparent from the reply dated March 2, 1978 sent by the petitioner to the Registrar of the University in response to the show cause notice, she never raised dispute of this kind. Under such circumstances, in our opinion, the petitioner could not be allowed to take up such a dispute at this stage. In the next place - and this is more important - the Academic Council of the University has treated the 1st Year Science Examination of the Bombay University as equivalent to the Pre -University Science Examination of the University. Our attention in this behalf was drawn to Regn. 7 approved by the Academic Council in exercise of the power conferred upon it under S.22(x) of the Act. The Regulation sets out the examinations of other Universities and bodies which have been recognized as equivalent to the corresponding examinations of the University as on March, 1973. In column 1 of the said Regulation, the name of the University is set out and in column 2, particulars of the examinations which are equivalent are given. We find in columns 1 and 2, in so far as it is material for the purpose of this case, the following entry :- BOMBAY …… "Pre. Uni. (F.Y.) Science……" It would thus appear that the Academic Council of the University which is the academic body of the University and which consists, inter alia, of the Vice-Chancellor, the Deans of Faculties and one member other than the Dean elected by each faculty from amongst its members, has, in exercise of its statutory powers, approved the Regulation whereunder Pre-University Science Examination of the University is recognised as equivalent to First Year Science Examination of the Bombay University Even apart from Regulation 7, in the affidavit in Surrejoinder dated May 1, 1978 filed by the Assistant Registrar of the University, it has been in terms stated that First Year Science Examination of the Bombay University is equivalent to Pre-University. Science Examination of the South Gujarat University and that the subjects of First Year Science Examination of the Bombay University and the Pre-University Science Examination of the University are identically the same. Even the Registrar of the University in his affidavit-in-reply dated April 20, 1978 has stated that First Year Science Examination of the Bombay University is held to be the same examination and/or equivalent examination of the South Gujarat University. Even the Registrar of the University in his affidavit-in-reply dated April 20, 1978 has stated that First Year Science Examination of the Bombay University is held to be the same examination and/or equivalent examination of the South Gujarat University. In view of Regulation 7 and assertions made in the affidavits filed on behalf of the University, it is not possible for us to take a different view on this academic matter. 20. In University of Mysore v. Govinda Rao, AIR 1965 SC 491 , one of the questions was whether one of the appellants satisfied one of the qualifications for the appointment to the post of Research Reader in the University, namely, a First or High Second Class Master's Degree of an Indian University or an equivalent qualification of a Foreign University in the subject concerned. The Board of Appointments of the University had recommended the appointment of the appellant holding that he satisfied the aforesaid qualification. In the writ petition filed in the High Court of Mysore, the High Court found that the candidate selected did not satisfy the qualification in question. On appeal, the Supreme Court observed (at p. 496) :- "The High Court does not appear to have considered the question as to whether it would be appropriate for the High Court to differ from the opinion of the Board when it was quite likely that the Board may have taken the view that the Degree of Master of Arts of the Durham University, which appellant No. 2 had obtained, was equivalent to a high Second Class Master's Degree of an Indian University. This aspect of the question relates purely to an academic matter and courts would naturally hesitate to express a definite opinion, particularly, when it appears that the Board of experts was satisfied that appellant No. 2 fulfilled the first qualification….. …… Therefore, there is no doubt that the High Court was in error in coming to the conclusion that since appellant No. 2 could not be said to have secured a High Second Class Master's Degree of an Indian University, he did not satisfy the first qualification. …… Therefore, there is no doubt that the High Court was in error in coming to the conclusion that since appellant No. 2 could not be said to have secured a High Second Class Master's Degree of an Indian University, he did not satisfy the first qualification. It is plain that Master's Degree of the Durham University, which appellant No. 2 has obtained, can be and must have been taken by the Board to be equivalent to a High Second Class Master's Degree of an Indian University, and that means the first qualification is satisfied by appellant No. 2. That being so, we must hold that the High Court was in error in issuing a writ of quo warranto, quashing the appointment of appellant No. 2." Be it noted that whereas in that case there was merely the decision of the Board of Appointees as regards equivalence of degrees, herein we have a Regulation which has been approved by the Academic Council in exercise of its statutory powers wherein the two concerned examinations have been held to be equivalent. The case before us, therefore, stands on a much stronger footing and what the Supreme Court stated in that case would apply with greater force in the facts and circumstances of the present case. Reference may also be made to yet another decision of the Supreme Court in Mohammad Shujat Ali v. Union of India, AIR 1974 SC 1631 . It was there observed (at p. 1644) :- "It must be noted that the question in regard to equivalence of educational qualifications is a technical question based on proper assessment and evaluation of the relevant academic standards and practical attainments of such qualifications and where the decision of the Government is based on the recommendation of an expert body which possesses the requisite knowledge, skill and expertise for adequately discharging such function, the Court, uninformed of relevant data and unaided by the technical insights necessary for the purpose of determining equivalence, would not lightly disturb the decision of the Government. It is only where the decision of the Government is shown to be based on extraneous or irrelevant considerations or actuated by mala fides or irrational and perverse or manifestly wrong that the Court would reach out its lethal arm and strike down the decision of the Government." It is true that these observations are made in the context of equivalence of educational qualifications. The principle underlying would however apply - and possibly apply with greater force to the question of equivalence of examinations. The content of curricula in a technical subject like Science requires a proper assessment and evaluation in the context of relevant academic standards and when the Academic Council of the University has stated that First Year Science of the Bombay University is equivalent to the Pre-University Science Examination of the University, it would be hazardous for us to differ from that opinion on the basis of there being one more or less subject in one or the other curriculum. 21. Even assuming, however, that two views are possible on the question under consideration, the question which still requires consideration is whether this Court should take a view different than that taken by the University Authorities. In Principal, Patna College v. K.S. Raman, AIR 1966 SC 707 the Supreme Court made the following observations (at p. 913) :- "Even on the merits, we think that we ought to point out that where the question involved is one of interpreting a regulation framed by the Academic Council of a University, the High Court should ordinarily be reluctant to issue a writ of certiorari where it is plain that the regulation in question is capable of two constructions, and it would generally not be expedient for the High Court to reverse a decision of the educational authorities on the ground that the construction placed by the said authorities on the relevant regulation appears to the High Court less reasonable than the alternative construction which it is pleased to accept. The limits of the High Court's jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari are well recognised and it is, on the whole, desirable that the requirements prescribed by judicial decisions in the exercise of writ jurisdiction in dealing with such matters should be carefully borne in mind." Therefore, even proceeding on the footing that another view is possible on the question whether the two examinations in question are the same and the subjects thereat are the same and, on that basis, regarding the applicability of Ordinance 144 on its true construction, once the Academic Council of the University has held the First Year Science Examination of the Bombay University to be equivalent to the Pre-University Science Examination of the University, and the Syndicate has also proceeded on that footing and the University authorities have reasserted before us that both the examinations are equivalent and the subjects thereat are identical, it would not be expedient for us to interfere with the decision of the educational authorities on the ground that the view of all the said authorities on the relevant matters is less reasonable and that the alternative standpoint, which has been canvassed on behalf of the petitioner, is preferable. 22. In our opinion, therefore, there is no substance even in this ground of challenge and it must be rejected. Re. Ground No. 3 : 23. The argument under this head ran on the following lines. Ordinance 144 does not itself prescribe the penalty for its breach. The power to punish a student for the breach of the said Ordinance must, therefore be found elsewhere. The only Ordinances which deal with penalty are Ordinance 142, which occurs under the title "Conduct of Examination" and Ordinances 156 and 157 which occur under the title "Results Condonation and Certificates". The penalty could, therefore, have been imposed only under any one or more of these Ordinances and if they do not apply, then the University had no power to impose any penalty notwithstanding a clear breach of Ordinance 144. So far as those three Ordinances are concerned, having regard to their setting in the scheme of Ordinances and on their true construction, it was clear that they applied only when there was any misconduct or breach of rule, error, malpractice, fraud, improper conduct, etc. at an examination. So far as those three Ordinances are concerned, having regard to their setting in the scheme of Ordinances and on their true construction, it was clear that they applied only when there was any misconduct or breach of rule, error, malpractice, fraud, improper conduct, etc. at an examination. Besides, Ordinances 156 and 157 applied only where the result of an examination had been affected by any such conduct at the examination. In the present case, even assuming that there is breach of Ordinance 144, such breach would not amount to misconduct or breach of rule at any University examination nor could it be said that such breach had affected the result of the University Examination. Under these circumstances, there was no power in the University to penalize the petitioner for the breach of Ordinance 144 and the impugned action was, therefore, ultra vires. 24. On behalf of the University this ground of challenge was met on a twofold basis. It was urged in the first place that Ordinance 157 on its true construction was attracted on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and the impugned action was taken thereunder and, in the next place, that in any event, the Syndicate had the power under Section 20(xix), inter alia, to control the conduct and discipline of the students of the University and that the impugned action could be sustained even on the strength of the said power. 25. In view of the stand adopted on behalf of the University, the controversy between the parties lies in a narrow compass and the only question which requires consideration is whether on a true construction of Ordinance 157 and Section 20(xix), the Syndicate could have taken the impugned action against the petitioner. We shall first deal with the question in the context of Ordinance 157 and then in the context of S.20(xix). 26. Ordinance 157 has been quoted above. On an analysis of the said Ordinance it would appear that three conditions must be satisfied before power thereunder conferred could be exercised by the Syndicate. We shall first deal with the question in the context of Ordinance 157 and then in the context of S.20(xix). 26. Ordinance 157 has been quoted above. On an analysis of the said Ordinance it would appear that three conditions must be satisfied before power thereunder conferred could be exercised by the Syndicate. Those three conditions are as follows :- (1) the result of an examination must have been ascertained and published, (2) it must have been found that such result has been affected by any malpractice, fraud or any other improper conduct whereby an examinee has been benefited, and (3) such examinee has, in the opinion of the Syndicate, been party or privy to, or connived at such malpractice, fraud or improper conduct. Once these three conditions are satisfied, the Syndicate will have the power at any time, notwithstanding the issue of a certificate or the award of a prize or scholarship (a) to amend or cancel the result of such examinee, or (b) to punish such misconduct by exclusion of such examinee from any University or College Examination of any University courses in a College or the University or from any convocation for the purpose of conferring degrees, either permanently or for a specified period, or by the deprivation of any University scholarship held by him, or by the cancellation of the award of any University Prize or Medal to him, or in any two or more of the aforesaid ways and to make such declaration as the Syndicate shall consider necessary in that behalf. There could not be much controversy with regard to the true meaning and content of pre-conditions Nos. 1 and 3. The expression "where the result of an examination has been ascertained and published" is simple and self-explanatory and it really requires no interpretation. So also the expression "such examinee has in the opinion of the Syndicate, been party or privy to, or connived at such malpractice, fraud, or improper conduct" is also not capable of much interpretative exercise. In fact, the question whether those two conditions are satisfied in a given case or not would turn more on the facts of the case than on any legal quibbles. In fact, the question whether those two conditions are satisfied in a given case or not would turn more on the facts of the case than on any legal quibbles. There was, however, considerable argument before us with regard to the true meaning of the second condition, namely, "it is found that such result has been affected by any malpractice, fraud, or any other improper conduct whereby an examinee has been benefited". The main plank of the argument on behalf of the petitioner was that having regard to the context and collocation and the setting of Ordinance 157 in the scheme of Ordinances, in order that the said Ordinance can apply, the malpractice, fraud or any other improper conduct whereby an examinee has been benefited must be at an examination and not before or after the examination. A subsidiary argument was that such malpractice, fraud or any other improper conduct must not be merely touching or relating to or concerning the examination but it must have directly influenced, altered or shaped the entire result of the examination. The argument, looked at as a whole, was that there must have been some malpractice, fraud or any other improper conduct at an examination whereby an examinee has been benefited and such examinee in the opinion of the Syndicate, must have been a party or privy to, or connived at such malpractice, fraud or improper conduct and that as a result of such malpractice, fraud or any other improper conduct the result of the examination must have been affected, that is to say, influenced, altered or shaped as a whole. Considerable emphasis was placed on behalf of the petitioner on the fact that Ordinance 157 authorises the Syndicate to impose a penalty on a student and that in that sense it was a penal enactment and that, therefore, if two possible and reasonable constructions can be put upon such provision, the Court must lean towards that construction which exempts the student from penalty rather than one which imposes penalty. 27. It is true that Ordinance 157 occurs in a group of Ordinances relating to examinations and that it finds place under the group heading "Results, Condonation and Certificates". 27. It is true that Ordinance 157 occurs in a group of Ordinances relating to examinations and that it finds place under the group heading "Results, Condonation and Certificates". We are, however, not impressed by the argument that having regard to this setting of Ordinance 157 it must necessarily be read as limiting its operation to any malpractice, fraud, or any other improper conduct at an examination, that is to say, during the period of time when the examination is actually conducted. There is no such express limitation in the language of Ordinance 157 nor could such inference be raised by necessary implication. Ordinance 157 can, therefore, be invoked by the Syndicate even if there has been any malpractice, fraud, or any other improper conduct either at the time of the examination or preceding or succeeding such examination, provided the other conditions therein laid down are satisfied. If, therefore, it is found after the result of examination has been ascertained and published that such result has been affected by any malpractice, fraud, or any other improper conduct, either at the examination or preceding or succeeding it, whereby an examinee has been benefited and that such examinee was a party or privy to, or connived at such malpractice, fraud, or improper conduct, the Syndicate would be empowered under Ordinance 157 to take any one or more of the several courses open to it under the said Ordinance. We are also not impressed by the argument that by such malpractice, fraud or improper conduct, the result of an examination as a whole must have been affected. Even if the result has not been affected as a whole and it has been affected qua a student only, then also action could be taken under Ordinance 157 provided other conditions are satisfied. Considerable emphasis was placed on the meaning of the word 'affected' and it was urged that it should not be given a wider interpretation. We have been, frankly speaking, unable to appreciate this argument. The word 'affected' in the context in which it occurs in Ordinance 157 could only be given one meaning, namely, that the result must have been in some manner influenced, altered or shaped on account of the malpractice, fraud or improper conduct. We have been, frankly speaking, unable to appreciate this argument. The word 'affected' in the context in which it occurs in Ordinance 157 could only be given one meaning, namely, that the result must have been in some manner influenced, altered or shaped on account of the malpractice, fraud or improper conduct. That this is the narrower out of the several meanings of the word 'affected' is clear from the decision of the Court of Appeal in Re Bluston, (1966) 3 All ER 220 which was cited on behalf of the petitioner herself, Winn, L.J., in the course of his judgement in that case, pointed out that he understood the word 'affected' to mean 'influenced', 'altered', 'shaped'. The learned Judge referred to another meaning of the said word, which is a wider meaning, namely, 'touching' or 'relating to' or 'concerning'. It was the meaning assigned to the said word by the High Court of Australia in Shanks v. Shanks, (1942) 65 CLR 334 at p. 337. We too feel that in the context in which the word 'affected' is used in Ordinance 157, even grammatically, it could only mean 'influenced, altered or shaped'. In our opinion, therefore, there is only one reasonable construction possible of Ordinance 157 and it is that in order that the Syndicate could have power to act, thereunder, it must be shown that the result of an examination, which has been ascertained and published, is found to have been influenced, altered or shaped, either in its entirety or qua an examinee, by any malpractice, fraud or any other improper conduct, whether at the examination or at any time preceding or succeeding the same, whereby an examinee has been benefited and that such examinee has, in the opinion of the Syndicate, been party or privy to, or connived at such malpractice, fraud or improper conduct. 28. In this view of the matter, we do not propose to enter into the rather controversial field whether Ordinance 157 is a penal provision to which the rule of strict construction would apply and, if so, whether, having regard to the settled principle of construction, if there are two possible views as regards its interpretation, then that which exempts a student from penalty rather than one which imposes the same should be adopted. We cannot, however, help observing that even the rule of strict construction on which the petitioner relies so heavily is not absolute and that it does not necessarily mean that where a word, which has various known significations, is used in a statute, the Court must necessarily adopt one in preference to another, simply because it is more restrained, even if the objects of the statute equally apply to the largest and broadest sense of the word (see United States v. Winn (3 Sumn 209), referred to in Johnson v. Southern Pacific Co., (1904) 196 US 1 at pp. 18-19). As observed by the Supreme Court in Kanwar Singh v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1965 SC 871 , it is the duty of the Court in construing a statute to give effect to the intention of the legislature. If, therefore, giving a literal meaning to a word used by the draftsman, particularly in a penal statute, would defeat the object of the legislature, which is to suppress a mischief, the Court can depart from the dictionary meaning or even the popular meaning of the word and instead give it a meaning which will "advance the remedy and suppress the mischief". It would thus appear that if by any construction, whether narrower or wider, the object of the enactment of Ordinance 157, viz., to suppress the mischief of malpractice, fraud or any other improper conduct is defeated, then it would be open to this Court even to depart from the dictionary meaning or the popular meaning and to give it a meaning which will advance the remedy and suppress the mischief. This would be so even if Ordinance 157 is treated as a penal provision. The construction which we have placed upon Ordinance 157 accords with this well-settled rule of construction. 29. The question then is whether on the above construction, the impugned action could be justified in the present case. There is no manner of doubt that the first condition has been satisfied inasmuch as the result of the Pre-University Science examination has been ascertained and published long time back. Having regard to the provisions of Ordinance 144, the petitioner could not have appeared at such examination. She appeared thereat and benefited thereby only on account of the fraud committed by her with the University by making a false representation as also by suppressing the truth. Having regard to the provisions of Ordinance 144, the petitioner could not have appeared at such examination. She appeared thereat and benefited thereby only on account of the fraud committed by her with the University by making a false representation as also by suppressing the truth. It is true that the false representation and suppression of truth finds place in the application for eligibility certificate which was made by the petitioner at a point of time anterior to the examination. That, however, is a matter of no consequence on the view which we have taken on the interpretation of Ordinance 157. In the present case, however, even that question is somewhat academic because, in our opinion, the fraud continued even up to the stage of appearing at the examination. In fact, the appearance at the examination itself could be said to be an improper conduct on the part of the petitioner whereby she benefited. She was presumed to know the contents of Ordinance 144. It would not be unreasonable to assume that she must have known it because the application form for admission to P.T. Sarvajanik Science College made reference to the contents of the said Ordinance and so also did the prospectus of the said College for the relevant year. The very fact that there was suppressio veri and suggestio falsi in the several statements made in the application for eligibility certificate gives a clear indication in the direction that she was very much aware of Ordinance 144. Against this background, in our opinion, there is no escape from the conclusion that the fraud practised by the petitioner benefited her inasmuch as she could join the Pre-University Science Class and appear at the said examination in breach of Ordinance 144 and, having been declared successful thereat, she could secure admission to the Pre-medical course. Looked at from another angle, there was a clear improper conduct on her part to have appeared at the examination having fully known that she was not entitled to do so and there is no manner of doubt that as a result of such improper conduct the petitioner benefited inasmuch as upon being declared successful at the said examination she could secure admission to the Pre-medical course. Two of the conditions laid down in Ordinance 157 are thus clearly satisfied. Two of the conditions laid down in Ordinance 157 are thus clearly satisfied. The only condition which remains to be considered is whether it could be said that the result of the Pre-University Science Examination was affected on account of such fraud or improper conduct. Here, as we have earlier stated, it is not necessary that the result as a whole should have been affected. It is sufficient even if the said result qua the petitioner has been affected. The question, therefore, is whether the result of the petitioner in respect of the said examination has been in any manner influenced, altered or shaped by the fraud and improper conduct of the petitioner which enabled her to appear at the said examination and become successful thereat ? There is, in our opinion, no doubt that it is such fraud or improper conduct which influenced the result of the Pre-University Science Examination qua the petitioner, in the sense that it is only by practising such fraud or indulging in such improper conduct that she could appear and get herself declared successful at the said examination. In our opinion, therefore, all the conditions laid down in Ordinance 157 are satisfied. In the show cause notice as well as in the resolution of the Syndicate, it has been in terms stated that the petitioner had cheated the University and in that manner committed a breach of Ordinance 144 by appearing at the Pre-University Science Examination at which she was not otherwise entitled to appear. It is on the basis of this allegation and finding that the Syndicate of the University has taken the impugned action. In our opinion, in taking the impugned action the Syndicate was, therefore, well within its power and no objection could possibly be taken on the ground that the action is ultra vires. 30. Even assuming, however, that the view which we are taking with regard to Ordinance 157 is not well-founded, the question is whether the impugned action could still be justified on the basis of Section 20(xix) of the Act. The said provision authorises the Syndicate, inter alia, to control the conduct and discipline of the students of the University. The context and collocation of the words clearly indicate that thereby disciplinary jurisdiction over the students was intended to be conferred upon the Syndicate. The said provision authorises the Syndicate, inter alia, to control the conduct and discipline of the students of the University. The context and collocation of the words clearly indicate that thereby disciplinary jurisdiction over the students was intended to be conferred upon the Syndicate. The power of the Syndicate to punish a student as and by way of disciplinary measure by initiating a disciplinary proceeding for his improper conduct clearly flows out of this provision. When the parent legislation itself confers such power, there is no need to look for it elsewhere. If the argument of the petitioner were to be accepted and it were to be held that the only penal power is to be found in Ordinances 142, 156 and 157 many other acts or omissions of the students of the University amounting to improper conduct or misconduct might go unpunished for want of power. As we have seen earlier, Ordinances 142, 156 and 157 have some nexus with examination and they are attracted only when the misconduct, breach of rule, improper conduct, malpractice or fraud are concerning or in relation to or at an examination. There could, however, be hundreds of other varieties of misconduct or improper conduct on the part of University students which would require to be even more severely dealt with. Take, for example, the case of a University student committing an indecent assault on a female student within the campus of a University. Is it possible to take the view that such gross misconduct would go unpunished because of want of power in the University authorities ? To take such a view would not only be absurd but would also obliterate Section 20(xix) from the statute book. Even on behalf of the petitioner, it was conceded that under cl.(xxviii) of Section 20 the Syndicate was entitled to exercise all powers of the University not otherwise provided for in the Act or the Statutes and all other powers which are requisite to give effect to the provisions of the Act or the Statutes. It was conceded that under this power it may be possible for the University to take penal action against the student in order to give effect to the provisions of the Act or the Statute. It was, however, urged that since the breach in the instant case was of an Ordinance, the said power could not be invoked. It was conceded that under this power it may be possible for the University to take penal action against the student in order to give effect to the provisions of the Act or the Statute. It was, however, urged that since the breach in the instant case was of an Ordinance, the said power could not be invoked. We are afraid, in advancing this argument, the first part of cl.(xxviii) has been overlooked. The said part provides that the Syndicate shall exercise all powers of the University not otherwise provided for in the Act to the Statutes. Under Section 4, Sub-Section (23), subject to such conditions, as may be prescribed, the University has the power inter alia to supervise, regulate and control the conduct and discipline of the students of the University. The manner of exercise of such power and the authority by which it is to be exercised has, however, not been provided either in the Act or Statutes. This disciplinary power of the University can, therefore, be exercised by the Syndicate. Therefore, even on the petitioner's own argument based on cl.(xxviii) of Section 20, disciplinary power to take action against the students of the University for improper conduct or misconduct, must be found to have been vested in the Syndicate. 31. In our opinion, therefore, it is not possible to hold that the impugned action is not backed by any authority and that it is ultra vires. Even this argument must, therefore, be rejected. Re. Ground No. 4 : 32. Before proceeding to deal with the arguments advanced under this head, it might be stated that on behalf of the University authorities a statement was made before us that that part of the impugned resolution of the Syndicate and the consequential notification dated March 23, 1978 whereby the petitioner was debarred from appearing at any University Examination or joining any affiliated Colleges or recognised institution up to May 31, 1979 was cancelled and/or withdrawn with the right reserved to the competent authority to issue a fresh show cause notice to the petitioner giving her an opportunity to show cause why such penalty should not be imposed. On behalf of the University authorities it was made clear that this step was being taken notwithstanding their contention that in a proceeding of this nature it is not necessary as a part of the rule of natural justice to give an opportunity to a student against whom action is proposed to be taken to show cause against the proposed punishment. In view of this statement made on behalf of the University authorities, we are not required to express any opinion on ground No. 4© formulated above. 33. There is no force in any of the arguments advanced under this head. The tenor of the petitioner's reply dated March 2, 1978 to the show cause notice makes it clear that she did not dispute the fact that she had appeared and was declared successful at the F.Y. and Inter Science Examinations of the Bombay University. All that she stated is that she was not aware that it was an offence on her part not to have disclosed her having prosecuted studies in that course in the Bombay University and that it was not her intention to cheat the University. In terms she stated that she may be pardoned instead of being penalised for the default, if any, on her part. It is against this background that have to examine the effect of the failure on the part of the University authorities to furnish to the petitioner a copy of the complaint on the basis of which the show cause notice was issued. Be it noted that the Registrar of the University in his affidavit-in-reply dated April 20, 1978 has in terms stated that no fact-finding inquiry was instituted pursuant to the receipt of the complaint and that there was, therefore, no report made to the University authorities by the fact-finding authority. In view of this factual position, the grievance with regard to the non-supply of the report of the inquiry and the material collected at the fact-finding inquiry is unfounded and nothing more needs to be said about the same. 34. We do not think that under the circumstances aforementioned, the failure to supply a copy of the complaint has vitiated the proceedings. It is well-settled that the rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. 34. We do not think that under the circumstances aforementioned, the failure to supply a copy of the complaint has vitiated the proceedings. It is well-settled that the rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. The question whether the requirements of natural justice have been met by the procedure adopted in a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of the case in point, the constitution of the Tribunal and the rules under which it functions (see Suresh Koshy v. University of Kerala, AIR 1969 SC 198 ). In the context of the question of misconduct of a student in examination, which was the subject-matter of inquiry in that case, the dictum of Lord Harman, J. in Byrne v. Kinematograph Renters Society Ltd., (1958) 2 All ER 579) was cited with approval to bring out the true content of rules of natural justice applicable to such inquiry. According to the said dictum, the requirements of natural justice are that the person accused should know the nature of the accusation made, he should be given an opportunity to state his case and the Tribunal should act in good faith. After having cited this dictum, the Supreme Court referred to the grievance of the concerned student that the Vice Chancellor had not made available to him a copy of the report submitted by the Inquiry Officer. It was observed that the appellant had not asked for a copy of the report. There was no rule requiring the Vice-Chancellor to provide the appellant with a copy of the report of the Inquiry Officer before he was called upon to make his representation. If the appellant felt any difficulty in making his representation without looking into the report of the Inquiry Officer, he could have very well asked for a copy of that report. Under the circumstances, it was found that the grievance was clear afterthought and it had no substance. Apart from the fact that in the present case, the basic incriminating facts are not in dispute, if we look at the problem in the same manner in which the Supreme Court looked at the complaint with regard to non-supply of a copy of the report of the Inquiry Officer in Suresh Koshy's case, it would become clear that the grievance is more apparent than real. Herein also the appellant though she was informed in the show cause notice about a complaint having been received, did not ask for a copy of the complaint. There is no rule which requires the University authorities to supply her a copy of such complaint. If the petitioner felt that she could not make adequate representation (in fact, as earlier stated, she has really made no representation on facts), she could have asked for a copy of the complaint. She failed to do so. In our opinion, therefore, this grievance is clear afterthought. 35. The next grievance under this head is that no opportunity of personal hearing was afforded to the petitioner by the Syndicate. Much of what we have stated above in relation to the non-supply of a copy of the complaint applies to this ground of grievance also. The petitioner never asked for personal hearing. There is no rule requiring the University authorities to give her personal hearing. On the facts of the case also personal hearing does not appear to be necessary. There were no complicated questions of fact or law involved. The reply to the show cause notice raised no dispute either on the applicability of Ordinance 144 or about the jurisdiction of the University authorities to proceed against the petitioner or about any of the basic facts. All that the petitioner stated in the reply was that she should be treated leniently. The explanation offered by the petitioner was non-exculpatory. The only plea was for condonation. Under these circumstances, having regard to the applicability of the rules of natural justice to an inquiry of this nature, it could hardly be contended that there was an unfair deal by the University authorities in not giving personal hearing. As observed in Union of India v. Jyoti Prakash Mitter, 1971 (1) SCC 396 : ( AIR 1971 SC 1093 ), it is not necessarily an incident of the rules of natural justice that personal hearing must be given to a party likely to be affected. Except in proceedings in Courts, a mere denial of opportunity of making an oral representation will not, without more, vitiate the proceeding. A party likely to be affected by a decision is entitled to know the evidence against him, and to have an opportunity of making a representation. Except in proceedings in Courts, a mere denial of opportunity of making an oral representation will not, without more, vitiate the proceeding. A party likely to be affected by a decision is entitled to know the evidence against him, and to have an opportunity of making a representation. He, however, cannot claim that an order made without affording him an opportunity of a personal hearing is invalid. In the light of the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the claim that there was no breach of rules of natural justice in not affording to the petitioner a personal hearing. 36. It would thus appear that even this ground of challenge is without substance and it must be rejected. Re. Ground No. 5 : 37. This ground was very feebly presented for consideration and rightly so. As we have seen earlier, Section 30 read with Section 29 confers power upon the Senate to make Statutes, inter alia, with regard to all matters which by the Act are to be or may be prescribed by the Statutes. Section 43, the relevant portion of which has been set out above, provides that no student shall be enrolled as a student of the University unless he passed the Secondary School Certificate Examination conducted by the Secondary School Certificate Examination Board in such subjects and with such standards of attainment as may be prescribed by the Statutes, or any other examination prescribed as equivalent to the said examinations and possesses such further qualifications, if any, as may be prescribed by the Statutes. By virtue of this power, the Senate framed Statute 223 prescribing, for admission to the Pre-University Course in the faculties of Arts, Science, Commerce and Agriculture, the subjects which the students should have passed at the S.S.C. Examination of the Gujarat S.S.C. Examination Board or an equivalent examination. Ordinance 144, on the other hand, has been framed by the Syndicate in exercise of the power conferred by Section 32 read with Section 31. Section 31, cls. (i) and (iii) in terms give power to the Syndicate to make Ordinances prescribing the conditions under which students shall be admitted courses of studies for degrees, diplomas and other academic distinctions and conduct of examinations. It is in the exercise of this power that Ordinance 144 has been made and the said Ordinance clearly falls within the Ordinance-making power. (i) and (iii) in terms give power to the Syndicate to make Ordinances prescribing the conditions under which students shall be admitted courses of studies for degrees, diplomas and other academic distinctions and conduct of examinations. It is in the exercise of this power that Ordinance 144 has been made and the said Ordinance clearly falls within the Ordinance-making power. The field in which Statute 223 operates is different than the field in which Ordinance 144 operates. The Statute deals with the subjects with which a student should have passed the S.S.C. Examination or an equivalent examination in order to be eligible for admission to Pre -University Courses in different faculties. The Ordinance, on the other hand, lays down a condition which governs appearance of students at degree or diploma examinations. To say that a student who has passed any examination of a Statutory University will not be allowed to appear at the same examination of the University with the same subject is really to prescribe a condition for the conduct of that examination. In our opinion, therefore, there is no conflict, not even an apparent conflict, between Statute 223 and Ordinance 144. There is, therefore, no substance in the challenge under this ground. Re. Ground No. 6 : 38. This grievance is entirely baseless. This Court exercising writ jurisdiction cannot sit as a Court of appeal over the decision of a body like the Syndicate of the University. It cannot set aside the order of such a body on merits. It can only interfere if such body acts without jurisdiction or does not act in good faith or acts in violation of the principles of natural justice (see T.P. Daver v. Lodge Victoria, AIR 1963 SC 1144 ). This limitation will apply with still greater vigour in the case of a student who has been dealt with for misconduct by the academic authorities. We, therefore, cannot entertain the grievance that the conclusion of the University Authorities that the petitioner deliberately furnished false information for obtaining the certificate of eligibility and in that manner cheated them is not justified and warranted in the facts and circumstances of the case. We, therefore, cannot entertain the grievance that the conclusion of the University Authorities that the petitioner deliberately furnished false information for obtaining the certificate of eligibility and in that manner cheated them is not justified and warranted in the facts and circumstances of the case. Even assuming, however, that it was open to us to go into this question, we are satisfied that there was sufficient material before the University authorities to come to this conclusion and it would be impossible for this Court to reach a contrary conclusion. 39. These were the only points urged at the hearing of the Writ Petition and since there is no merit in any of them, the petition fails and is dismissed. Rule discharged with no order as to costs in the circumstances of the case. 40. At this stage, an oral request was made on behalf of the petitioner for a certificate under Article 133 of the Constitution. This case, in our opinion, does not involve a substantial question of law of general importance which requires to be decided by the Supreme Court. We, therefore, reject the oral application. 41. The interim relief granted by this Court at the stage of the admission of the petition would stand vacated with the dismissal of this petition. However, at the request of the petitioner, we direct, as and by way of ad interim relief until further orders, if any, by the Supreme Court, that the result of the Pre-medical course examination in which the petitioner has appeared by virtue of the interim order aforesaid shall withheld for a period of two months from today.